10/11/2011

botwinick, oct 11^th

new left falsely understood lack of labour organizing as failure of Marxism; in fact, it's consistent with a more clearly reconstructed version of Marxism, and an appreciation of the obstacles to organizing.

these are internal constraints on the organization of labour.

today we'll discuss external threats.

even when workers get organized, even once the overcome the constituent, internal obstacles, their ability to win concessions is constrained by the logic of accumulation—the context set by captialist competition.

the central conclusion is that its not only economic outcomes that are governed by the logic of accumulation, but also political outcomes.

this is why Marx spends thirty years on DK.

first limit: profitability—capitalism has in-built, system-wide mechanisms which repel improvement of working-class life. if wages rise, rate of investment declines, which means employment generation slows down, the reserve army of labour rises, and wages are brought down. this is the constraint of full employment. in contemporary capitalism, bringing the State in, there exist institutions that guarantee a baseline level of unemployment—the Fed's job is this, basically ('profit-squeeze' theory of crisis would fit here).

this is a limit on the system as a whole; wages as a whole, and profits as a whole.

but capital doesn't exist as homogenous units that are identical. the level of heterogeneity is important.

there are firms that are very capital-intensive, some with better techniques, etc.

workers, when they engage in bargaining, confront capitalists with different degrees of productivity and capital intensity—which will mean that they will incur different costs, when they concede to workers.

now, there are three limits

(1) 'costs of obstruction'--as soon as employees take up demands, employers have to decide whether it is worth it to heed the immediate impulse to repress their demands. where the costs of obstruction are sufficiently high, the capitalist will not say 'no,' but will relent.

workers have to impose costs sufficient to bring the employer to the table.

now, it will depend on two things

(2) do you work for the regulating capital?

reguating capitals are those plants operating with the most widely available, more-or-less widely available techniques. we're not talking about those plants with unique, and impossible to replicate techniques.

otherwise, workers are employed mainly in subdominant capitals.

the limits to wage demands are greater in subdominant capitals than in regulating capitals. an employer's ability to stay in business will depend on his ability to re-adjust to these costs. regulating capitals have a greater ability to recoup the losses that come from wage increases. either they'll raise prices, or, more likely, some will leave the sector, inducing higher prices through reduced supply.

after regulating capitals have raised wages, subdominant capitals can be organized—this is because they run the risk of going out of business, if they raise prices before regulating capitals. but if they do it after those have been successfully organized, workers have a better shot.

(3) the capital intensity of your sector

when wage costs are high as a portion of total costs, wage increases are very difficult for capital to accommodate.

in the history of the US, this theoretical framework has purchase. it's at least part of the reason that organizing in the South was less effective than organizing in the North—it's not just racism, nor is it mainly racism.

labour unions targeted the 'price-leaders' in auto, rubber, etc. there was an understanding that if we can organize these firms, the rest will follow. Weinberg, research director at UAW, said (1) success at better firms is important; (2) less efficient firms shouldn't be rewarded for being less efficient by being allowed to avoid unions—in essence, trying to replicate Sweden's efforts (though, w/o active labour market policy, you're fucked).

it's as the crisis sets in, and US industries cease to be regulating capitals on a global level, they become less accommodating to wage increases—this, at the same time that the labour movement calcifies into the bureaucratic monolith with which we're familiar. hence, concession after concession after concession is the story of the 1970s and 1980s.

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difficulty is that business unionism breeds in the context of declining industries

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(1) getting rid of labour-intensive jobs?