collected snippets of immediate importance...


Saturday, July 9, 2011

Imperialism and the rise and decline of the British Economy 1688-1989, O'Brien

(49): four stages
  1. 1688 to 1846, First Ind Rev, Mercantilism and Imperialism
  2. 1846 to 1914, W. Hegemon and Guardian of 'Liberal' Ec. Order
  3. 1913 to 1945, 'neo-mercantile' period of intensified competition
  4. 1945 to today, decline
(50): 1688 marks discontinuity, as Britain starts to get more involved in G. Power politics

(51): taxes to national income at 18%, in 1815; only 3% during reign of James II; enormous rise in national debt, to 60% of revenues after defeat of Napoleon

(51): 1688 to 1915, only 1/3rd of years were peaceful in Europe

(52): in 1688, ratio of exports to GDP was 8%

(53-54): in sum--trade was growing, but was it important in the mercantile period to England's growth? debate among historians. negative cas is that (1) proportions were too low; (2) commerce's growth was endogenously determined; (3) gains from trade were small, even if positive. [O'Brien begs to differ, re: this period--for him, imperialism was important, though the case is not uncontested--basically takes recourse in an evasion, see p. 56]

(57): consistently high levels of investment in Navy/State [proves what, exactly?]

(58): as 'safety valve' for migration [but in all of this, there is no real proof advanced for the significance of mercantilism.]

(59): again, summarizing his case against the 'endogenous' case, re: development between 1688 and 1815. counter-factual w/o imperialism seems implausible, to him. 


(61): citing Smith as suggesting that imperial commerce made possible a more extensive division of labour (40 to 50% of non-ag workforce produced for markets overseas!) [hmm]

(62): in short, taking a middling position--against liberal histoiography that imperialism has no place. not wanting to be the world-systems fools, either.

(63): in short, for 1846-1914 period, reproducing argument of nineteenth-century radicals that, once Britain was powerful, it had no need for empire--costs outweighed benefits. some groups, of course, did benefit--subgroups.

(64): proportion of trade on imperial markets declined, in this period. almost everything supplied by imperial markets could have been purchased elsewhere.

(64-65): finds c-factual, in this era, plausible. 1.1 percent hit to GDP in 1870; 2.6% in 1913.

(66): citing Hobsbawm, 'imperial status' was a cushion for decline. a cushion for which taxpayers were paying a high premium.

(67): export of capital? but most went to white dominions (65%). and something like 2/3 of all assets were purchase of governemtn bonds and stable securities.

(70-73): imp--England could have adjusted better to 2nd Ind Rev, w/o Empire (domestic investment, banking system, etc.)

(73-75): imp--Empire implied a high taxation burden on domestic population

(77): and, as Germany was emerging as rival, Britain was unable to adjust the various burdens to compete better

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