beatrice hibou, the force of obedience

(xiii): real transformation is disappearence of fear--too early to talk about anything else [hmm--a polite way of saying nothing has changed, yet]

(xiv): obedience was result of repression, yes, but also of inclusion -- the 'security pact,' is her term. and the movement, of course, made possible by decline of 'security pact'

(xv-xvi): decline partly consequence of objective grievances--job, bread [not enough--present in negative cases aplenty]

(xvi): elements of 'contingency' [come on...]

(xvii): business and m-class also alienated

(xviii): 'democratization' will depend on what happens with the RCD, since RCD is base of the 'security pact' -- it isn't simply a repressive institution, but also a network of clients/benefits

(xx, 278): corruption that concerned tunisian people was the 'daily' corruption; not the corruption of the ruling family

(xxi, 14-16): construction of 'economic fiction' was a mode of normalization [ah god]

(xxi-xxii): the 'economic is political,' and vice-versa

(xxii): the field is 'entirely open' , as regards the future[hmm]

(1-2): "analysis aims to restore ambiguity" [wtf? this way of writing is profoundly unhelpful]

(3): people are 'free' to manuever/negotiate, even when they seem thoroughly repressed.

(6-7): pervasive punishment of those who refuse to be 'politically normalized'

(9): these practices, though, happen to a small minority--the 'politically active'

(10): linz/stepan and 'economic society' [part of the critique here seems interesting; part seems absurd--b/c they use numbers, percentages!]

(12): distancing herself from the literature [but, in the process, plumping for something that seems pure verbiage]

(13): "domination is ambivalent' [sigh...]

(17): 'statistics is state knowledge" [astonishing]

(267): not simply authoritarian--people negotiate everyday life [of course, if you look at everyday life, people will do this in any authoritarian society]

(269-270): hyper-centralization

(272): 'legacies of colonialism'--the 'strong state', etc., citing Timothy Mitchell

(280): imp--policing state as an 'engineering' state, hostile to liberalism. liberalization didn't change this, insofar as it wasn't a 'real' withdrawal from the market [hmm--what exactly does this mean? it opens up space for the argument to be reactionary, though it probably isn't. it also isn't clear that the intervention of the state disproves liberalization, since that is common to all liberalizers. odd claim against Left--State hasn't ignored redistribution, look at all the other modes of regulation (consumption!?)]

(288): hey Hitchens--between 1989 to 1992, Ben Ali launched an attack on the headscarf

JPS October 1973, Vol 1 Number 1


Eric Hobsbawm, Peasants and Politics

(4): differentiating between the 'peasant' problem and the 'agrarian' problem (landless labourers or commercial farmers, he's arguing, belong to the latter)

(4): peasants on a continuum--the 'sack of potatoes' (i.e. 18th Brumaire) variety to more collective forms (i.e., 19th century Central Russia). most tending towards latter, though this doesn't imply egalitarianism, even if it does imply prohibition of unrestricted accumulation.

(5): peasant question is question of traditional group involved in 'modern' politics

(5): citing Shanin, 'peasantry' is characterized by 'low classness'--not much about its politics can be read off its relation to the MoP

(7): allowing for a vague consciousness of 'peasantness', as a distinct category of subalternity

(8): but stressing underdeveloped sense of the world beyond ('Cuba as another department of Peru,' etc.) [unique to the peasantry?]

(9, 11): imp, no such thing as a 'national peasant movement' -- only becomes wider by external force (and even then more likely to be regional) [hmm] (Mexico as his example--bulk of peasantry not involved, but key regions were: Pancho Villa's North (the equivalent of the Cossacks), and Zapata in Morelos, situated next to the capital)

(11): 1905-1907 in Russia, 80-100% of peasant population in action


(11): at the same time, such 'congolemerate' movements can be very important to the success/failure of revolutions, of course

(11-12): Peru 1962-1964 was impressive, but had limitations--took five years and a coup to win agrarian reform

(12): imp, major reason peasantry is weak is because of a pervasive sense of inferiority [hmm]. this has something (?) to do with the nature of the peasant economy, since unrest must stop for the harvest (hypothesis that the little labour required by the potato economy in Ireland made possible frequent unrest)

(13): peasant 'passivity' as a form of class struggle--since 'no change' suits them best [hmm]

(14-16) [becoming a bit too speculative, all this; Hobsbawm's writing doesn't really lend itself to journal articles]

(17): traditionally, peasants integrated into political apparatus by three ideological devices: King (precisely because he isn't their 'real' ruler, but wields power over their overlords), Church, proto-nationalism. all this lends them to right-wing politics, albeit of a revolutionary tenor

(17) int, so why do peasants come under the political Left? economic changes, urbanization, migration, etc. (Narodniks vs. early 20th C. revolutionaries in Russia). (but S. Italy and Garibaldi? no answers)

(18-20): three propositions about peasants in modern political situations

1. the 'peasantry' as a political concept disappears, because conflicts within rural sector eliminate what peasants have in common against outside (Bolsheviks were over-eager in anticipating this, of course--but this often redounds to the disadvantage of revolutionaries, since it antagonizes some groups [hmm])
2.  democratic electoral politics do not work for the peasantry as a class ('peasant party' is a freak phenomenon, no one-to-one attitude; peasantry as 'electoral fodder')
3. citing Marx, peasantry are incapable of representing their own interests; they need a master over them

(20): rise of Nazis 1928-1933 was last genuine 'mass movement' of peasants

This is simply a mathematical canard. According to the USAID Green Book, in 2009, total economic assistance to Pakistan came to $1.35 billion and military assistance totaled $0.429 (for a grand sum of $1.78 billion). In 2009, Pakistan's gross domestic product was $162 billion. Calling this is a dependency is an obvious stretch. (In fairness, I too have been guilty of lapsing into this idiom until I crunched the numbers.)


By way of contrast, the United States gave Israel $2.43 billion in total economic and military assistance in 2009. Israel's GDP was $204 billion. As a percentage of GDP, U.S. total assistance to both countries are nearly the same (around 1 percent). Between 1962 and 2009, total economic and military assistance to Israel totaled $178 billion in constant 2009 U.S. dollars. In the same period, U.S. military and economic aid to Pakistan comes to $37 billion in constant 2009 U.S. dollars. But would Mr. Hitchens describe Israel as being dependent upon Washington? By his own argumentation, he would have to answer in the affirmative.

origin of capitalism, EM Wood

(14): confusion of bourgeois with capitalist is a legacy of the historiography

(17): Weber as 'Smithian'

(19): for both old commercialization and w-systems models, the extent of trade is the index of capitalist development

(20-21): M. Mann, too

(21): Polanyi as (partial) exception--distinction between society w/ markets, and 'market society' (recognition that most early markets were not 'competitive', and that competitive markets were resisted by merchants,etc.)

(26): key--points is, of course, that advance of PF presupposed transformation of property relations. normal "order of causation suggests a failure to treat the capitalist market itself as a specific social form."

(27-32): nice critique of supposed anti-Eurocentrism--odd to challenge the argument by further naturalizing capitalism, saying it actually had advanced quite far in TW, etc. within this view, the absence of capitalism still constitutes a 'historic failure'

(35): two narratives in Marx: the old one, in GI and CM; suggestions of a different one, in Grundrisse and Capital [she's exaggerating the latter for effect, one thinks. but no mind]

(37-40): brief summary of Dobb-Sweezy--Dobb, drawing on Hilton, calling into question assumption that capitalism was a 'quantitative expansion of commerce', and that it was to be found in towns/trade. debate hinged on 'prime mover'--was it endogenous? or exogenous (trade)? Dobb/Hilton showed that latter was unsustainable. Hilton demolishing Pirenne. Dobb's argument was about differentiation in the petty mode of production, which was freed from feudal strictures after 'class struggle'.

(41-42): imp, Dobb/Hilton--despite the importance of their argument, the commercialization model is not dead, with them. once feudal fetters are removed, capitalist logic soon metastasizes (some of Sweezy's questions, in his c-argument, show this--why does petty commodity production generate capitalists and wage-labourers?)

(44-46): for Perry Anderson, 'Absolutist State' emerges in context of feudal bonds weakening (b/c of emergence of money rents), as lordly response to that challenge. Absolutist State as 're-charged' apparatus of feudal domination. BUT, though Anderson still understands it as feudal, he believes it liberates 'economy' because coercive powers are transferred upward, and de-coupled from point of economic extraction (this is why it's transitional); Wood making point that economic and political are still fused, but now through central State appropriating surplus through rents

(47): empirical problems with Anderson arg--English capitalism didn't need absolutism, and French absolutism didn't produce capitalism. and theoretically, still a 'fetters' model.

(48): PA review of Brenner--a 'value-added', commercialization account

(48): importance of capitalist agriculture in England is that it produces an 'internal market'--this sustains demand in the context of declining overseas markets

(49): English farmers can need Flemish market for wool--but opportunity for commerce does not produce capitalism; can simply entrench old relations of production. question is still begged, by Anderson and commercialization account.

(51): starting point of Brenner critique of both Malthusianism and commercialization--basic demographic patterns and insertion in network of trade produced different results in different places. this is a function, of course, of the character of SP relations

(54): why tenant farmers were, uniquely, capitalist--not b/c of wage labour (non-capitalist farmers in past had hired wage-labour), but because access to the means of reproducing themselves was mediated by the market and its imperatives

(57-58): one critique of Brenner--was 1600s or 1700s England distinct enough to be called agrarian capitalism (either b/c France was not that far behind, or b/c wage labour was not general)? but the first confuses land productivity with labour productivity; and the second leaves the origins of wage-labour mystified, unless it agrees to the Brenner thesis, which explains them (after all, proletarianization will not be the inevitable consequence of differentiation--in other words, differentiation was not the cause but the effect of the change in s-p relations)

(61-62): PA critique of Brenner--alleged contradiction between his transition argument, and his BR argument (i.e,. in Merchants and Revolution): said to have demonstrated the revolutionary role of merchants, in Eng Rev. actually, Brenner's position on BR is clear: he thinks it is a concept inherited from the commercialization model (mechanical materialism, etc.), in which PF increase (b/c of increasing division of labour--capitalist laws of motion are being generalized), merchant class grows, soon throws off feudal fetters.the key point, re: Merchants and Revolution, is that in France the revolutionary bourgeois need not be identified with capitalism; and in England, if they are to be identified, it is because the key transitions (in agriculture) have already taken place [EM Wood acknowledging that there is not enough, here, about links to international trade]

(66-67): EP Thompson offering a Brenner-like account, in Making of the English Working Class, b/c of his attentiveness to new forms of work discipline--new imperatives of productivity and profit mark capitalism as distinct, for him. this is why he focuses on 1700s, rather than later industrialization--b/c this is when specifically capitalist forms were taking shape

(74): identification of capitalism with towns is hegemonic (here discussing city-states). but incorrect.

(75): this becomes explanation of why West? b/c of unique autonomy of cities and the burghers.

(75): key--but, of course, historically this is absurd. lots of urban settlements that, while making use of market opportunities, never were systematically subject to market imperatives (and no tendency to develop from former to latter)

(77): early commercial rivalries had to do with competition over extra-economic privileges (shipping routes, etc.)

(78): dominant principle of trade was 'profit upon alienation'

(81): extensive commerce in food production is associated, of course, w/ rise of cities. but this does not mean that food production was subject to market imperatives (and its consequences--dev of PF, etc.)

(82): the trade in grain, also, was a function of the wealth of prosperous consumers (and, of course, their dependents).

(82): landed aristocracy was 'principal market for a range of products' at this time (Hilton)

(85-86): key-- urban wealth in medieval and early modern Europe was still 'politically constituted' -- it was a consequence of status, privileges ('collective lordships'). in short, this kind of 'economic development' was extra-economic in source, and thus self-limiting.

(88-89): int discussion of Dutch Republic, as paradigmatic failed transition--EM Wood arguing dominated by merchants whose chief vocation was circulation rather than production (even though direct producers start to depend on market for subsistence, etc.). in short, urban population was sustained by dominance in international trade, not by superior labour productivity in agriculture, as in Britain [hmm. more reading needed, here--how can you have such systematic market dependence, of direct producers?]

(91-93): in crisis of 17th century, Dutch came up against limits of pre-capitalist economic system. response to crisis was disinvestment from agriculture, unlike GB, and attempt to undergird commercial privilege (this was behind backing of William the Orange in England, against France)

(95-97): useful pithy description of SP relations, and difference between pre-capitalist rel. and capitalist rel.

(98): imp, England--none of the monarchical States were (1) as effectively unified as England (particularly true after 16th century). also, (2) no economy as characterized by as much land concentration--what landlords lacked in extra-economic autonomy, they made up for in economic power. this was to impel them towards a strategy of farming out to tenants, forcing productivity increases; they couldn't depend on extra-economic coercion, as in France [all this seems a rather roundabout way of explaining what happened in England]

(102): good point re: 'dissolving' effect of monetization of rents--whether or not this actually dissolves pre-capitalist relations of production depends on relations of production

(104): in France, crisis of 17th century was 'met' by a doubling-down of absolutism--vast new powers of extra-economic coercion over a peasantry with access to means of subsistence

(104): contrast between English and French surveyors--former searching for mkt values, latter for seigneurial rights

(105): a national market arose only as a corollary of capitalism/mkt society (Napoleonic State's efforts, in France); it was not a cause.

(107): early improvements were not revolutionary technological innovations--more application of accumulated knowledge, refinement in techniques (here, 16th and 17th century being discussed), and, crucially, elimination of old customs/practices (usufruct rights for non-owners, etc.)

(109): enclosures checked by monarchy, until 1688 rev. 18th C. as century of 'parliamentary enclosures'

(110-113): imp, Locke embodies this era--his theory of property is premised on 'improvement (i.e, this is how you prove your right to land). and, in case we need reminding, labour of servant is understood as counting towards 'productive use' by landlord. this, EM Wood adding, is a feature of capitalist ideology--would never have made sense under pre-capitalist MoP

(116-117): imp, the SRoP set the stage for class struggle--in France, over politically constituted property (aristocracy vs. monarchy, bourgeois vs. nobility and church, etc., peasants vs. all); in England, politically constituted property was not the issue, but more the economic powers of appropriation (right of enclosure, conflicts over use rights)

(118): class struggle set stage for capitalism, in England, by asserting landlords' rights over peasants' customary rights [not a very 'unintended' consequence, but this is weakness of summary]

(118-119): attack on concept of BR, even where it is rehabilitated to simply be 'outcome'-based--more 'effect than cause' where capitalism pre-exists it (can be a factor in its future development, but isn't key). BUT can't use the same concept to describe England AND France.

(120): imp, the popular elements in the English revolution were actually fighting against the forms of property most conducive to capitalism. theirs is an anti-capitalist legacy (this is further developed in 'Democracy Against Capitailsm,' one imagines)

(120): FR tensions were old-regime ones; conflict over State apparatus.

(121): and outcome-wise, difficult to argue that it facilitated rise of capitalism (even if it did unify State, etc.)

(122): again, ER did more to promote capitalism--but it didn't occur in context of feudalism.

(128): the 'idyllic' English countryside (image of) rests on disposession of peasantry, elimination of their villages and hegemony of territorial aristocrats

(130): imp, where does wage-labour fit in SRoP? new economic pressures produced wage-labour, but they don't presuppose wage-labour (even though wage-labour is part of the triad, it was a minority in seventeenth century England--restricted to parts of S and SE). you can be market-dependent w/o employing wage-labour, w/o being a wage-labourer. it requires only loss of non-market access to means of self-reproduction.

(131): by end of 1600s, English capitalism confirmed in productivity dominance

(132): urban population in 1850: 40% in England and Wales, 14% in France, 10% in Germany

(134): 'British capitalism depended on a highly developed domestic market'

(135): new banking system rooted in domestic transformations, in London

(136): similarly, naval and military power rooted in exceptional wealth, which was a property of domestic transformations

(137): competitive rents take off in 16th century

(137): EM Wood position on Dutch vs. English [interesting to compare w/ Brenner, of course]

(140): b/c of nature of mass mkt, extra pressure to produce cheaply [seems wrong]

(141-143): imp, the agrarian transition lay the groundwork for the industrial revolution--(1) created a proletariat; (2) with that, created a mass market. (Wood also adding that w/o agrarian transition, capitalism would not ever have developed! cf. demonstration effect, etc.). it was not technology (contra Polayni)--in fact, innovations in the first IR were quite minimal [hmm, worth interrogating, since this is what invites the ire of the PF school]

(144): nice sum--"industrialization was, then, the result not the cause of mkt society, and capitalist laws of motion were the cause not the result of mass proletarianization"

(148): the int market then transmitted the imperatives of efficient production, elsewhere (i.e., so it's not just via the 'demonstration effect,' and the State) [but hang on--why would other producers be forced to produce efficiently?]

(147): key--development of distinctive social property relations in England was well on its way by the time it became a major imperial power. the others that dominated were, of course, characterized by non-capitalist 'laws of motion'

(147-148): imp--lay 'Left' accounts of importance of imperialism, to capitalist take-off, are built on a 'commercialization model'. moreover, they fail to recognize that other powers were more important imperialists (Spain as best example)

(148-149): and slavery? other non-capitalist powers equally engaged in plantation slavery.

(149): in short, imperialism may have helped England on its way--but no amount of colonial wealth would have done anything to further capitalism in England, without prior transformation of social-property relations

(150): imperial expansion of pre-capitalist societies followed pre-capitalist logic: extra-economic coercion in extraction of surplus, extensive expansion, profits on alienation in trade

(153, see also 175): imp, English in Ireland, as emerging case of capitalist imperialism (late 1500s under Tudor colonization, to 1600s under Cromwell). imposition of a new economic system, via settlers--an 'English-style commercial order' was to be implanted [there is a danger, here, of identifying capitalist imperialism as an imperialism that brings capitalism--rather than as an imperialism impelled by distinctively capitalist imperatives. Wood isn't doing much to clarify this latter question. in fact, she's confounding the two questions].

(155): argument that capitalism has tendency to 'universalize its imperatives' [hmm], counter-balanced by attempt to manage effects [so this, in her argument, is why England retreats from capitalist development in Ireland; but it seems better to locate the tension in policy-makers, and question of what might be functional for English capital. maybe just a subtle distinction, though I think not]

(157): Locke on Indians and 'improvement'

(168): the question of the State, under feudalism--localized/territorialized parcels of sovereignty; modern nation-state was born with centralization

(169): again, contra Perry Anderson, for Wood 'absolutism' reproduces a pre-capitalist unity of political and economic power, but at a higher level (France as paradigmatic case). moreover, territorialized sovereignty never fully dissolved, under absolutism, of course.

(171): in England, story is a bit different. the social transformation that brought about capitalism is the same one that brought about the nation state

(172-173): imp, England's unification was far advanced, viz-a-viz France--this went hand in hand with 'economic unification, though it doesn't require it since the general process of centralization was rooted in tension between monarchies and parcellized sovereignties [she's being evasive re: exact nature of causation (b/c the same thing happens in France), but it clearly has its roots in underlying social transformations. the position seems to be that capitalism brings this to its fruition, but doesn't kickstart it.]

 (177): no evidence that capitalism today is less in need of 'nation states' than it was before, despite rhetoric to the contrary

(177): useful, disjuncture in capitalism between boundaries of economic appropriation and extra-economic coercion--the former can transcend the boundaries of the latter. this makes possible its unique expansiveness, also. BUT it also invites a contradiction, which is that capitalism does still need extra-economic coercion.

(182): nice, 'modernity' has been identified with 'capitalism,' as part of the 'commercialization' model that associates bourgeois and capitalist. rethinking this identity invites a re-thinking of the relationship between modernity and capitalism. and opens us up to an anti-capitalist modernity.

(183-184): much of the Enlightenment belongs to a 'non-capitalist' society--in France, for example, the absolutist State. an overwhelmingly rural society, limited internal market in the 1700s.

(185): imp, the 'revolutionary' program of the bourgeoisie consisted in demanding 'equal access' to the tax-office State. 'universalism,' in the language of the bourgeoisie, had a more limited meaning (anti- aristocratic privilege) than it has been given in theories of history. and their attitude to the absolutist State was equivocal.

(187): Berman/Harvey reading 'capitalism' into early accounts about 'confusion'/'flux' that are really being written about cities, not capitalism

(188): the de-coupling of Enlightenment from capitalism is clearer, still, when you look at England--'rationalism' is replaced by 'invisible hand,' etc [hmm]

(189-190): nice, much of what the Enlightenment is indicted for is actually the ideology of improvement we see in capitalist Britain (not a consequence of commitment to rational analysis, etc., but disconnected from it)

(191-192): pithy definition of postmodernism, and its idiotic rejection of 'totalizing narratives'

(193): in sum:

1. capitalism is not a natural/inevitable consequence of human nature
2. a deeply contradictory force--self-sustaining growth, but not incompatible with regular stagnation (important, re: thinking about development of PF)

 (197): Continental Europe has better public services b/c of 'legacy of absolutism'[!!?]

ahmed shawki and sebastien budgen, HM 2010 (european far Left)

SEBASTIEN BUDGENS

The Historical Context

(1) Crisis of ideological legitimacy (dating to 1995, and the French strikes, but onwards since then)

(2) Crisis of social democracy

• membership
• programmatic crisis
• moral crisis (corruption, political entropy)

(3) The stirrings of social resistance (students in Austria, Greece; strike activity in Germany).

New Elements

(4) Opening of political opportunities

(5) Crisis and austerity

(6) Crisis of confidence re: democratic centralism and vanguard parties

Three Different Models

(1) Coming-together of remnants of mass communist parties with other strands (including far-left, trade unionists, etc.). The obvious example is Die Linke, in Germany (East Communist party, splits from the SDP, sections of the trade union movement, Trotskyists, etc.) The party of Communist Re-Foudnation in Italy had similar origins. In Greece, the coalition aroud the former Eurocommunist Party resembles this.

(2) re-foundation of a Left party around many far-left group. The best example is the Left Bloc in Portugal; a more-or-less balanced coming-together of the far-left, to create a new force.

(3) the new anti-capitalist party, a re-making of the defunct Revolutionary Communist League.

We have to bear in mind, always, the disasters of England and Italy, as controls, so to speak.

Why are these worth considering?

(1) They have had electoral success, for one. In the last European elections, the New Anti-Capitalist Party got 5%; Die Linke 7.3%; Left Bloc 10%. In the federal elections, there was a substantial breakthrough for Die Linke (which won 11.9% of the vote; five million votes). In Portugal, the Left Bloc got 9.8%; doubled its parliamentary representation (becoming the fourth-largest in Portugal)

(2) They have a significant presence on the national scene, aside from this.

(3) A coming-together of different trends on the left (autonomists, trotskyists, etc.).

(4) Mixing of generations.

(5) Marks the end of period of bunkering down and ghettoization for the European left.

(6) Portends something on a European scale, perhaps.

General Obstacles

(1) The question of alliances, electorally or otherwise; the question of alliances to the right (and sometimes to the Left). In Germany the question is the possible alliance with the SPD (in Berlin has led to massive disagreements within the party); in France with the French Communist Party; In Portugal with the Portuguese Socialist Party. The question can't be dodged; there is significant pressure from below. Italy though gives us an example of how cooperation can destroy this kind of party (the party of Re-Foundation). It doesn't always have to be this stark—the question of the Left Front in France (for the first time, the Communist Party has decided not to stand with the Socialists in the first round of the elections). At the same time, the New Anti-Capitalist Party has certain conditions, which the Communist party is likely to refuse (no regional executives in alliance with the Socialist party).

(2) Their own programmatic weaknesses—how to articulate a defensist program, protecting the welfare state and whatnot, as part of a larger, more radical program?

(3) How do you translate electoral support into activist support? How do you turn millions of voters into thousands of activists?

(4) The question of internal organization—how do you balance plurality, with leadership? How do you relate to those within your organization who are more skeptical of party membership?

(5) A missing generation of cadre; many of these organizations involve a whole host of people in their 60s, or people in their 20s.

(6) The relationship to the media, and the question of the personalization of politics. You have effective, eloquent spokespeople; but how do you handle overexposure to the media? It makes parties very dependent on these personalities (if Olivier Betanscout was to give up his job tomorrow, the NPA would be in dire straits)

(7) Underdevelopment of theoretical consensus within the parties—often many strands coexisting, rather than constructive debate.

(8) The articulation of electoral movements, to movement-building; how do you relate to trade union leadership? Big problem in France where there's a tradition of resisting political influence over the decision of striking, etc. Or in Germany, may of the trade union bureaucrats are in Die Linke—makes a critique, complicated.

(9) Relate the national, to the international.

(10) How do relate to national minorities? NPA has very few roots amongst youth of color, etc.

(11) The biggest problem, which overdetermines all of this—the absence of mass struggle in these countries.

What are honest expectations?

It is clear that this will be determined by the outbreak of mass forms of struggle—and by the ability of these formations to relate to that struggle in a flexible, creative way.

But things to do in the interim, is quite clear—the creation of a liberated electoral zone, that Social Democracy has evacuated. The danger is the Americanization of European politics, where Left and Right are more-or-less meaningless.

The re-popularization of Socialist values and principles.

The engagement and unification of social movements; having a voice in the national media defending factory occupations, etc.

AHMED SHAWKI

These represent formations that we must learn more about in the US—their importance is obviously connected to our own ambitions and plans, here.

On a broader scale, the reference to the question of the return to the 19^th Century is worth taking up. We're in a new period. In the First International, you had many different currents coming together; then you had a dominant model, in the time of the Second International (which saw a split, then, at the time of the Second World War)--since that period, the main form of expression in the workers' movement was the Communist Parties, which entered a period of crisis, themselves. And they shared, at that time, an industrial organization. The other wing of the workers' movement, of course, was the parties of social democracy. The late 60's, then, saw an attempt to reclaim the revolutionary tradition.

That period, very schematically, has come to a close. It's in this context that the new parties have emerged.

Shared Characteristics

In the main, these parties have an electoral orientation—emerging from a period in the 1980s/1990s when struggles were not politicized in the same way.

The weakness of these parties and general discontent in society at-large, Shawki's arguing, is what explains the disconnect between their social base and their electoral success (so you see people's aspirations and desires reflected in electoral success, but no real social base and local cadre). Analagous to the Party of Socialist Liberation in Brazil, where the leader is well-known around the country, but the cadre is similarly absent.

In the US—the majority of activists want the creation of a revolutionary party, no doubt. The problem, of course, is what steps would this kind of political development take. At the very least:

1. A serious orientation toward elections and social struggles.
2. Decision by the constituent elements to accept other traditions. The problem here is that we don't have the background, the experience; we don't have a social democratic workers' movement that feels betrayal, etc.

Ways Forward

Need to come together in action and collaboration, much more so than the creation of a new party for the sake of having a party (Greece is a good model; painful years before the coalition was formed).

Comment and Questions

(1) The Communist Parties—niche parties; popularity perhaps partly explained by a history of struggle against dictatorship and fascism; element of familial reproduction; contradictory, tactical flexibility, which appeals to a traditional working-class elite which is tied to hard rhetoric but right-wing practice (Greek Communist Party published a favorable account from the perspective of a policeman!). Haven't managed to take it to a new generation. (Argument also that, with the defeat of these parties, Marxism has been liberated from being the property of these organizations; and thus, these new formations have complicated, interesting relationships to the re-formation/re-composition of Marxism. But this is where, obviously, the indeterminateness is interesting/problematic).

(2) Charlie arguing that much of what explains the formation of these parties and their absence in the US is, also, the differential levels of class struggle. (Paul LeBlanc making same point)

(3) How can we talk of the parties of social democracy as bourgeois workers' parties? Or are they capitalist capitalist parties, so to speak? (Paul Blackledge responding that it is the former, which is both a positive and a negative) (Sebastien saying that this is complicated, even metaphysical—how degenerate is the degenerate workers' party? And how degenerate does it get before...? But crux of response that this can only be debated in the context of different national realities. And we have to discuss what we mean by organic links to the workers' movement.) (Ahmed tracing it to its specific roots; a term deployed by the Third International to refer to movements that they had once belonged to; but crux of response seems to have to do with specifics of each situation. We require a willingness to understand the particularity of the situations that confront us).

(4) How to build a mass social movement? Point about Obama's electorate, hopes being aroused and then dashed—so we have 'new openings'. How to push this forward, as revolutionary Marxists? (Ahmed re-emphasizing that it's entirely false to think that there hasn't been a change in reality/consciousness, owing to crisis and Obama—and it may not all be positive, at all. But it's silly to deny that we're in a different context. Fair enough, but there is an enormous question about how this translates into organization ('infrastructures of resistance,' what have you.))

(5) “Cultural Politics”—not in the Eurocommunist aspiration for cultural hegemony; but rather the question of how to reach out to people who have no institutional links to the workers' movement. Film showings; work in mosques; etc. This is a useful term for something that could be critical to work in Pakistan, of course. (Ahmed mentioning that if you have a 'knee-jerk' stupid position on religion, you won't get anywhere in this country).

(6) Die Linke not as a revolutionary party with reformist tendencies; rather, a reformist party with revolutionary tendencies (has much to do with low-level of political consciousness, as much as it does has to do with bureaucratic structures; “I didn't leave the SPD, the SPD left me”). Similarly, on the question of entryism—you cannot simply be a critic from within, you have to be an organizer from within.

ahmed shawki, comintern

an ambiguity in the comintern's formulation of the national question, beginning with the second congress in 1920, which has led to the confounding of 'marxism' with a kind of 'radical nationalism'.
for marx, socialism meant international working-class revolution--not out of a moral duty, necessarily, but because of the nature of capitalism as a 'global' system. the possibility of victory in one country is premised on success in all countries.

marx also believed that capitalism would be reproduced in less developed countries in the way it appeared in advanced countries (his empirical material was limited). the spread of capitalist relations in these countries would be 'progressive' (this doesn't need to be the caricatured stagism that said and co. think it is--there were no sanguine descriptions of what it did, remember). the problem is, of course, is that he was wrong. he had concluded that national differences would tend to disappear as there is created a world-class; he was wrong about the pace, and the speed at which it would develop. revolutionary socialists face an entirely different problem, really--you had the development of imperialism, which is a fundamental obstacle to the disappearance of 'national antagonisms'.

the organizations of the socialist movement around WWI, of course, collapsed.

lenin's argument, at this time, was very different: in marx's time, capitalism was still contained within a few nation states. now, of course, we are talking about the uneven expansion of the world-system (you don't get many manchesters, but england and india). imperialism, furthermore, appears here; defined as the ferocious rivalry between advanced capitalist countries (not so much about the advanced countries and the less developed). this is why, of course, marxists reject variants of third-worldism; they are unable to accomodate the rivalries that ravage the 'advanced blocks'. this is the key to the collapse of the second international (here shawki is disagreeing--the question of the 'labor aristocracy,' etc.), in lenin's argument.

the most important thing about lenin, here, is that he is insisting that we begin not by ceding to the politics of nationalism, but by supporting the right to self-determination of those who are fighing colonial occupation (not necessarily secession, but if it comes to that, yes). this is the period of world war one.
this is really when Marxism starts to look beyond Europe, shawki is arguing.

comintern in 1919, in baku -- emancipation of workers in less advanced countries requires revolution in the advanced countries. if capitalist europe pillaged them, socialist europe will liberate them.

CRITICAL--what is important about this statement, shawki is noting, is that within a year, almost, or by the mid-1920s, this changes quite dramatically. their attitude changes. instead of seeing the emancipation of the third world as dependent on the workers of the advanced world, with the decline of revolutionary possibilities in europe, they began to see the struggles in the third world as the spark that would light the fire.
the comintern at this time is trying to clarify what their position should be, with respect to these countries, around this time (1920-1922, it seems). three central conclusions.

first and foremost, the precondition for socialism was the development of the economy and the development of a working-class. did that mean that socialism elsewhere was an impossibility? support for nationailst countries?
the comintern says no. capitalism is not inevitable--if the victorious proletariat in these countries conduct aggressive propaganda (and USSR come to their aid, note), capitalist development might be bypassed.

second, soviets are possible amongst the peasantry, etc.

thirdly, the nationalist movements in the third world would be the allies of the Soviet State, in that they fought against the domination of the imperialist countries.

this is where MN Roy steps in, of course. it was already raised, here, that class differentiation in the less developed countries had come to a degree that you already find movements that are 'bourgeois' in character--and more fearful of the proletariat than they will be brave in the face of imperialist oppression. he objected to blanket support to national liberation movements (he was saying, in effect, what Lenin had said in Tsarist Russia--the 'bourgeois-democratic' revolution, and then the 'national revolution')

this ambiguity in the formulation, then--how you assess national liberation movements?--was actually avoided at the congress of the comintern, and was left for the future. basically, Roy's amendments were spliced onto Lenin's original theses. an agreement, of course, to not obscure the nature of bourgeois movements--we will support the nationalist movements only when they are genuinely revolutionary, and when they will not block independent communist organizing.

KEY--of course, even this leaves many of the questions to be resolved, in practice. and leaves a contradiction in place. the stronger the communist party, the weaker and more conciliatory the natonialist movement. the weaker the communist party, the more revolutionary the nationalist movement. so confusion, he's arguing.
this said--there certainly is room, here, for tactical flexibility. moreover, practically, they never here compromised the politics of the international revolution, he's arguing. "a resolute struggle must be waged against coating the non-revolutionary movements in the colonies in the colors of revolution. comintern should collaborate with the revolutionary movement, yes, but it must unconditionally maintain the independence of the proletarian movement."

in practice, what did this mean? 

well, there was a tension--in part to do with the ambiguity of the formulation. but also--KEY--because you have two contradictory aims, of course: the defense of the Soviets, and the advance of the international working class.

one example--in 1921, the principal threat to the Soviet Union was Britain and France (third congress in 1921), acknowledging that revolution was no longer on the cards in the West. they looked, then, for allies who would assist them in their struggle against Britain and France, which leads, shawki's arguing, to a whole series of contradictions--signing of a treaty between Ataturk and the Russian State, for example. Ataturk took the support, of course, and this had disastrous consequences for the Turkish Communist Party, which was promptly slaughtered.

there is an objective difference, Shawki is arguing, between this and the comintern under Stalin. not a question of justifying anything, just understanding the context.
Bukharin, for example, to Turkish communists--"even now, with the persecutions, do not let yourself be blinded. you still have far to go." what is important here, he's arguing, is the beginnings of the development of a 'theory of stages'. in all of what has been given thus far, shawki's noting, there has been no hint of a 'theory of stages' in the backward countries.

KEY--theoretically, shawki is saying, this has to do with the arrival of socialism in one country. the european revolutions had failed; but the russian state survived, as a result of the smychka. bukharin, following some of his earlier analysis, adopted that as the theory of the world--in today's present circumstances, the struggle internationally was not about working-class revolution, but about 'the cities of the world' vs. the 'countryside' (modern-day third worldism). therefore we're not talking so much about international alliances, but instead a kind of 'nationalisms' (this has also to do with bukharin's belief that the working-classes in the advanced countries were vanishing).

it now becomes a question, then, of supporting nationalist movements against imperialism which is with us (where as we do not support those who aren't with us). a question of the defence of the russian state above all else. clearest illustration of this is the chinese revolution of 1925-1927. bukharin/stalin here are entirely different from what came previously; they were never unclear on the question of independent organization, and not dressing up the nationalists in communist colors (in china, the nationalist movement was literally constituted by the comintern (by Borodin)--it physically did not exist as an organization).

borodin is known for one famous quote in 1927--this is not our time, this is the time to do coolie service for the KMT. here's a quote from the central committee in 1926, in the midst of an enormous strike wave: "the greatest danger is that the mass movement is developing toward the left, while the KMT is seized with panic, and beginning to incline toward the right. should these tendencies continue, the cleavage will deepen... the red united front will be demolished..."

CONCLUSION--the practical consequence of this is that the comintern collapsed the struggle for socialism into the struggle for nationalism, and into the defence of the Soviet Union.  it began to blur the very important distinction between the class position in society--it's not a question of ignoring the peasantry, but a question of understanding divergent class interests.

lecture twelve, development

Nixon motivation to go off 'gold standard' driven by domestic policy. the 'discipline' put on it by the condition of convertibility was largely theoretical; others were willing to abide by it. there was a concern about holding dollars in the late 60s, but no one was willing to initiate the run.

SDRs was a counter-proposal, but US didn't let it happen, properly.

'Closing the Gold Window' is a good book about Nixon's decision to abandon the 'gold standard.'

the engineering of the 'Oil Shock' story is a bit problematic; it seems a bit of a stretch, given that (a) US never took opportunities to screw over Europe; (b) US capitalists/finance invested in Europe, they would be greatly damaged

when Europe goes into crisis, US does everything it can do to help (Aaron Major's research)

Atlantic alliance was not grounded on 'threat of USSR' – has to do with interpenetration of economies, and other factors. the thesis of intense interstate competition in the advanced world is not right—or, died with WWII

questions about whether the American ruling-class benefits from the dollar being the international currency. there's a hazard that goes along with Nixon wanting the dollar, which is that the dollar was seen as foundational to US hegemony.

the jacking up of oil prices as an expression of 'competition'--the least efficient producers need the price rise to benefit, because of the high costs of expansion.

major structural shift is the change in balance of forces in US, which seems important to explaining the high temporal concentration. one reason that the IMF of the 50s isn't the IMF of the 70s is b/c of influence of 'planning.'

theory of money: central banks control money supply (monetarists—a regulating institution) vs. central bank have to accommodate decisions of private banks (Marxists, post-Keynesians, etc.--an accomodating institution)

no Volcker shock, no debt crisis. ISI doesn't need to collapse, even if it isn't particularly strong—it's the shock of raising interest rates to 19%, of course.

financialization by '85

period between 1815 – 1870s is a period of 'global peace'; but it doesn't mean that military violence ceases, it's all turned inwards (and this is documented—state-building). and once they have built their States, imperialism commences.

lecture eleven, development

consequence of neoliberalism in LA has been the 'lost decades'. 1980-2000 are quite a dramatic contrast with what preceded them.

this poses a question, of course: why? and it also is an indictment of the promises neoliberalism made, of course

basic facts of LA growth: stagnating productivity growth (in both TFP and LP). stagnation in investment, both private and public. it's not surprising that these go together, of course—productivity presupposes investment, insofar as technical change requires buying/installation of new equipment.

public hasn't stood in for private investment. nor has there been, as a result, the expected 'crowding in' effect, that development economists have spoken about, due to income- or linkage-effects of public investment ('crowding out', remember, is meant to happen for (1) saturation of mkts; (2) raises interest rates, pushing out potential borrowers)

these economies, in sum, get trapped in a low-level equilibrium, feeding off the anemia off each other.

moreover, even where investment has been happening, productivity has been stagnant. this means that it's probably going toward low-productivity sectors: (1) services; (2) informal sector

in LA you've been getting more employment per unit of investment, versus other parts of the world. why? well, it seems that investment is going into labour-intensive industries precisely because labour mkts in LA are very loose, and there's great incentive to rely on low wages rather than invest in new machinery. in Palma's argument, this is because of the deregulation of the labour market. labour can be 'sweated'--absolute surplus value is the investment strategy, which ends up being deleterious for productivity growth.

liberalization has, in sum, had the effect that structuralists/keynesians would have anticipated. investment has flowed into low-productive sectors. the comparative advantages of LA as 'resources' and 'people'

according to Holzner/Kurtz, the consequences of neoliberalism for democratic participation has been poor (three mechanisms).

of the three factors, Vivek thinks that numbers one and three are less convincing. number two, though, the dismantling of organizations is important.

re: (1), resources → participation need not be

re: (3), it's not the case that the State was giving encouraging signals in the pre-reform era (they were all mildly to seriously hostile to political participation, from the poor). the poor participated even though they were getting negative signals. it could be the case, of course, that the intensity of negative signals has decreased. but Vivek doesn't thing this can do the work he wants it to.

other facts might be important, which show up in Kurtz. first, no mention of the degree of repression in explaining nonparticipation—if you looked, you would find evidence of more coercion, which is a direct deterrent. second, de-industrialization should lead to less mobilization, b/c of difficulties of collective action in informal sector.

- - -

TFP vs. LP? TFP does not decompose output in terms of source (capital vs. labour vs. technology). LP, on the other hand, is measured in terms of worker-hour or worker-year. the reason TFP is shady is b/c it relies on a particular understanding of how capital-labour come together to make products. at the heart of the controversy is the way capital is measured. it's easy to measure if there are 4 identical machines; but how do you measure qualitatively different forms? you can only do it in monetary terms. the problem here is that you include in your equation things that come on the other side of the equation (this is the 'Cambridge Capital Controversy'). [see Jesus Felipe, 'What does TFP mean?']

Joan Robinson argument that capital is not 'putty' (as it is for neoclassicals), but lumpy. this is where high wages might well lead to technical change (Capital can't just throw out workers, b/c they have fixed investments, etc.), even as they might also slow down the pace of investment.

discussion re: the degree of the impact of low wages on the pace of technical change. Vivek position that low wages are, more or less, 'fatal' for the pace of technical change—axis of competition is, increasingly, rationalization.

investment per worker vs. investment decline? has been investment in primary commodity production, maquila sector?

industrial policy in LA?

lecture nine, development

today we do Chile

the advent of neoliberalism comes through two roads: (1) revolution from above (happened in Chile, arguably Argentina, Colombia); (2) as a negotiated transitions

these are misnomers, insofar as they all involve negotiations and come 'from above'

no bourgeois State can unilaterally impose economic restructuring on capitalists, without negotiating with them.

however, this said, there was a difference in Chile—had to do with the level of violence used to impose it. the extent to which subaltern classes

Chile is also important in a second respect. one of the novelties of the experiment was that it was quite consciously made to restructure politically, as well as economically. the lower orders would not have the political capacity to push back the neoliberal agenda. it was set up, in short, to make neoliberalism 'safe' for democracy. the turn away from dictatorship to democracy was guided by Pinochet so that democracy would be unable to upset the neoliberal agenda, for elites.

all this said, let's pose the question of why the crisis of ISI leads to neoliberalism? in much of the literature, this is simply assumed.

but this begs the question. it turns 'a' crisis, into 'the' crisis – it didn't have to follow ISI. the solution to previous crisis of ISIs had been a re-vivification of ISI. why, now, neoliberailsm?

let's separate the two issues: (1) where the crisis comes from?; (2) why is neoliberalism the solution?

Chile stands out for being the (1) first country in LA to transition; also because (2) it is not caused by a direct economic crisis, but a political crisis.

Allende didn't 'de-mobilize' his base in the way that other SDs did. as soon as the mobilizations began, Chilean bourgeoisie torpedoed the economy. it was amplified by the US, of course.

Allende survives for two reasons: (1) mobilizations; (2) constitutional commitments of the Army

this broke down in 1973, with the coup

when the Army was in power, the Left was taken care of.

'free market fundamentalism' is the watchword of the new gov't, of course. but the actual pattern of reforms is interesting.

what 'business' wanted, according to Martinez and Diaz, was the continuation of protectionism and corporatism. this was their initial preference.

so the question, immediately, is why these preferences/policy change?

this is true of policy-makers, as well. the Navy is initially in charge, remember, and it's initially hesitant. the Chicago Boys find doors closed to them, initially. advisors only have as much power as capitalists give them. advisors don't sing seductive songs.

things change because of political conflicts in the first few years (in 1975)—they start worrying about the durability of the regime. elites argue to business that the specter of the previous era threatens to return. the right-wingers in the regime point to this.

in the Silva, the story is a bit distinct. there are internationally oriented capitalists, w/ liquid assests.

in any case, the Chicago Boys now find themselves with patrons.

there is, though, a question: why do the old capitalists relent so easily?

the answer is that this is because their power isn't what it used to be. the traditional elites were weakened by Allende's policy, reducing their clout. (worth thinking about here—resistance in first years is evidence of the opposite, remember. we have an underdetermination of theory by data).

but one thing is certain—business has invested an enormous amount of political confidence in Pinochet. somebody who wants to see Chile regain its economic growth. the business sector gave broad support to the government, according to Martinez and Diaz.

this is distinct from the idea of technocratic autonomy. they weren't insulated from political pressure, in the Martinez/Diaz, but the bourgeoisie ceded political power to the technocrats.

Vivek arguing that this is radical theory of State, not pluralist. the bourgeoisie 'cedes' autonomy. they were content to do so, largely because they had just seen it beat the shit out of labour. they have political confidence in Pinochet.

the neoliberal phase goes through two periods, according to Martinez and Diaz—1973-1983, 1983-1990

in the first phase, (1) liberalization, in terms of regulations; (2) privatization. lots of firms are going under in this period, the State had to re-regulate/nationalize failing sectors again and again, remember. neoliberalism is full of rent-producing behaviour. socialized costs, privatized gains. this is not economic dogma, but an intrinsically political project.

to understand neoliberalism, we cannot approach it as 'market fundamentalism'. free-market capitalism has actually required just as frequent interventions in the economy as ISI did. don't take this in the 'obscurantist way'--deregulation should not be confused with non-intervention

- - -

[1] class commitments vs. individual interests?

- - -

you have to establish the fact tht the internationally-oriented capitalists have clout. otherwise if it's a small sector, and you have a large component of the capitalist class not doing so well, the conditions for political stability just aren't in place.

Vivek saying that Silva' acct doesn't take into account how actually autonomous the State is, under capitalism

State actors are interested in growth? only for two reasons (1) warfare, which isn't much of an issue, today; (2) pressures from below, which aren't much of an issue under neoliberalism

we needn't be as concerned with passage of neoliberal policies, as their sustenance. that's why we won't talk about IMF as much. there are instances of attempted transitions that didn't work, in the 70s

States have to 'neutralize' dominant classes, under neoliberalism

lecture eight, development

today rounds out solid discussion. after today a lot is educated guesses (because that's where the literature is)

where there is not educated guesses is a descriptive account of what neoliberalism meant

but we don't have the same set of analytical insights

underlying causes of implosion of the State-led model.

we now need to revisit the issue of the debt crisis, to discuss this in the terms developed in Vivek's book

as Rodrik argues, ISI interregnum (1950-1980) was actually a 'world-historic success' (high relative to normal growth rates in capitalism in first half of 20^th century, and high relative to what followed)

at the same time, ISI was a 'ticking time bomb'. it had certain internal weaknesses (distinct from what neoliberals thought, but still exist). these are political and economic in nature.

economically, ISI could be of discipliary and non-disciplinary nature. in E. Asia, you had the former. in LA and Sasia you had the latter. this generated two problems, which were self-reinforcing: (1) in the absence of discipline, ISI became a gigantic subsidization scheme. meaning it was an ever-expanding drain on the public exchequer. for this to be sustainable, it had to be complemented by steady increases in productivity, expanding the tax base, etc. this didn't happen. the demands on the State outpaced the gains from subsidization. there was, therefore, an ever-tightening fiscal crisis on the State; (2) external debt problem, as well. because the developmental State was not able to transform the external basket that they sold to the world. they didn't quite move up the value-chain, in manufacturing. because these countries were locked into buying capital goods, costs outpaced gains. this was already evident by the 60s; this is why Prebisch is arguing that the only way the development model would survive is if it went whole hog on exports (and, unlike what's stressed in dev. literature, country after country attempted to export; only a few succeeded). firms uniformly opposed because it was not something they could rationally accept to succeed

as a result of this, developing countries are desperate for cheap loans. from 69-79, you get a longer lease on life for ISI because of the very easy conditions on the capital market. by '82, the chickens come home to roost.

in '79 you get the Volcker shock, which means that loan payments being made by LDCs tripled or quadrupled. every one of them comes into serious crisis, etc.

the underpinning of this is the inability of the State to adequately transform the economy, in order to get sufficient revenue from their economy. SK and Taiwan were fine, even though they had large amounts of debt. but their revenues were in good shape, fiscal and export.

the weakness of State-led development, then, was a weakness of one kind of State intervention.

politically, when capitalists changed their preferences away from ISI towards neoliberalism, labour was so enfeebled that it was unable to gather the power to do anything about it. in India, for example, labour was demobilized; elsewhere, it was hemmed in by a maze of corporatist arrangements that made its organizational power moot to what it could give its constituents. official labour movements could do very little to avert it. the only way they could resist was by cutting further deals with political elites, etc.

in Korea, the dismantling of the developmental State occurs prior to the crisis of 1997, in the early 90s. the chaebols start to see the discipline as an encumbrance that they can cast off without threat to their profits.

1. cheap capital roots in petro-dollars?
2. capitalists changing their preferences towards liberalization?

- - -

the smallness of size of mkt was not an inducement to SK firms to hazard export markets. Jamaica, Syria, etc. all stuck with ISI.

in Sweden, capitalists agree to keep labour in the coalition b/c there's not much planning, and no real public sector.

as early as late 19^th century, Sweden embarks on a high-technology export-based strategy. in the 1930s/40s it has a highly developed industrial sector already, despite having 30-40% agrarian strategy and being a 'developmental case.'

at the end of the day, you're dancing to capitalists' tune, and are always on a 'knife-edge'

late development vs. late-late development is important to understanding Sweden in the late nineteenth century. the latter face extraordinary pressures, remember, that the former simply don't face—they're oligarchies, etc.

capitalists never stop pushing for subsidies. in neoliberalism, they want regulations/impositions to be taken away, but not lose State assistance. behind the scenes capitalists are still lobbying States for assistance, etc. you have the luxury of a public posture of laissez faire, but the reality of getting significant structural assistance. they want done away, though, with obligations to labour, and obligations to invest according to plan requirements.

enabling condition for shift to neoliberalism will have to be stratified, but also global. you can't simply say that 'everywhere' you have a shift in the balance of forces. there's an underlying structural cause, which is the shift in the 1960s, through the 70s, early 80s, in the US. of course, independent of these changes, given the enfeeblement of the labour movement, it's likely to develop into something like neoliberalism. but the reason the US is important is because of the extraordinary simultaneity you see in the transitions to neoliberalism.

inflation in ISI—really only a problem in LA, wasn't as much of a problem in other parts of the world.

increased confidence for lenders owing to the fact that this is sovereign debt, not private debt. governments are good for it.

lecture seven, development

last week was about 'state capacity'

readings stressed two points

1. not the fact of State intervention that explains development, but the quality of State intervention.
2. well then what explains quality of State intervention? answer of that literature was State capacity?

that raises the question—well, why doesn't every State have State capacity? that literature has no answer.

Vivek's book tries to answer that question. in that sense it's adding 'causal depth'. in that sense carrying forward institutionalist literature

but the book is also making a theoretical point, that distinguishes it from their work. for the institutionalists, the 'consensual' relationship between States and capitalists is central to the picture of State capacity, remember. each member has its part.

if that's the case, though, then it should be rational for capitalists to support State capacity. the only explanation for failure is problems with State elites—they're too corrupt, too prone to infighting, etc. you end up, then, with State-centrism, in the institutionalist narrative.

to the extent that societal actors are brought into the narrative, it is the landlords—maybe the absence of land reforms, etc.

what isn't contemplated in this literature is the possibility that the industrial bourgeoisie—the treasured partner—might have had something to do with the failure to generate a powerful State.

Vivek's book suggests that there are reasons that capitalists would oppose the developmental State, which have to do with its dual character--(1) States give subsidies, largesse; (2) States discipline

Evans sees cooperation in the first, but assumes it in the second. Vivek's point is that it's not wrong to see cooperation, but of a limited sort—capitalists are willing to cooperate with regard to subsidies, but prone to conflict with respect to the disciplinary aspect.

in Korea that conflict does not emerge, of course, whereas in India it does.

the question asked by Vivek's book is why this is the case—under what conditions it is rational for capitalists to accept/resist?

the ruling assumption in much of the literature – the retort – is that this doesn't matter, because the State was always too powerful.

you can't retort this theoretically, you can only disprove this empirically. which Vivek did—the capitalist class was big enough, in India (and they were larger, as measured by conventional indices, in Korea).

as a consequence of all this, of course, India ends up with an enfeebled capitalist class, that's not properly embedded in the capitalist class.

the last third of the book takes up the question of why the State doesn't reform itself.

was Korea's authoritarianism doing the work, here? on theoretical and empirical grounds, no?

- - -

LR? we are not trying to explain the divergent develoment paths, per se. we're trying to explain the differences in the institutional capacity of the State.

1. LR re: State capacity? perplexing for Vivek, because there wasn't much evidence of landed class intervention in the formation of the PC, etc. it was only industrial associations, industrial elites. it was as if the landed elites had just been pushed out of the political scene. having said this, it is plausible that landlords have reason to oppose State capacity. so Vivek wants to say that it has little to do with installation of State capacity, but the fact of there not having been Land does have something to do with the actual working of the State apparatus. State w/ more equality would have an easier time disciplining capital—planning in capitalism is difficult, remember, because State plan has to map on to capitalist planning. the argument is that LRs leads to a situation where there is less divergence between State preferences and capitalist preferences. in high inequality places, capitalists want luxury goods; not capital goods, infrastructure, etc., which is what the State wants. in short, LR helps the 'principal agent' problem.
2. LR re: rates of growth? yes, important--the first part of the course.

for most developing countries, the size of the domestic market will help ISI be more successful—but it will only expand the constraints, but not eliminate them.

from 1870-1930, agrarian elites 'control' economic policy—export of commodities, etc; not inflationary policies, etc.

In LA, 1930 saw (1) agrarian elites as most powerful class; (2) beginnings of rapid industrialization. this is a puzzle?

for a landed elite, ISI is a kick in the gut—this is a rapid wiping out of the landed class policy. [still not clear why this is the case, necessarily—arithmetically yes, they disappear, but does this mean marginalization? inflationary policies associated with ISI do hurt them]

even if landed elites live on, they live on as junior partners. and they're going to have to increasingly find other ways to be accomodated. a 'passive revolution', war of attrition. gradually undermined.

authoritarianism vs. democracy – conventional argument is that Korea succeeded because it was an authoritarian State, and democracy makes it hard to have a good developmental State. the most plausible version of this argument is that democratic states are subject to competing pressures that make effective planning difficult; a subsidiary argument is that politicians pander, in a democracy, in order to placate constituencies—they therefore dispense rents, rather than act efficiently. in authoritarianism the idea is that you throw capitalists in jail.

this is appealing, at face-value. but let's look at the facts—both France and Japan are democracies, in post-war countries, and pursue successful discipline of capitalists.

what the authoritarian argument takes as implicit is the idea that what you need to discipline is labour (labour of course benefits from democracy). but we're interested in power. remember, capital doesn't rely on the channels associated with a democratic state—it's power over investment remains, whether or not the State is authoritarian. on balance, then, authoritarianism gives you an increase in the power of capital viz-a-viz labour. in this sense, State should have less leverage against capitalism, not more.

on the question of short-term interests, capitalists had to relinquish planning powers to bureaucrats, but never took a hit to profits

competition in ISI was not desired, because that is 'waste' – you don't want scarce resources being squandered, things being overproduced, etc.

nationalization of finance doesn't always have to piss off industrialists, because it helps concentrate investible resources. of course, financiers would have to be weak, and industrialists would have to be sure that this isn't the 'thin wedge' of a nationalization/socialization program.

lecture six, development

the developmental State

Gershenkron + Amsden/Evans/Wade are the bookends to an interesting period in the study of late development.

In the 50s and 60s, when Gershenkron was writing, it was understood that a developmental agenda will need a helping hand from the State. this was policy reality at the time. this was a mainstream assumption of social science.

up until the mid 70s, this consensus starts to come under attack. the economics profession, in particular, was starting to shift towards Keynesianism – that paradigm was coming into crisis not because of its intellectual infirmities (those were clear), but because of the failure of Keynesian policies.

Milton Friedman, domestically, and Anne Kruger in the WB/IMF (in '79, she publishes a three-volume study of trade regimes—systematically falsifying the history of trade regimes)

the turning point comes with the debt crisis. LA countries accumulated debt through the 60s and 70s which resulted, in the early 80s, in almost universal default. this was the opportunity for the whole State-led paradigm to be called into question. by the end of the decade, it became received wisdom that the whole post-war policy paradigm had been a failed argument.

the intellectual case that was made was partly empirical. the economic difficulties of LA were pointed to as a consequence of misconceived State-led policies. what this was contrasted to was the example of E. Asia.

the mainstream argument re: E. Asia was that it had escaped the crisis of the 80s because of an underlying difference—a model which more closely approximated free markets and free trade.

so the alleged contrast was clear: a tarriff regime in LA resulting in slow growth/economic collapse, and 'market fundamentalism' resulting in stellar growth in E. Asia.

it was in this context that Amsden/Wade/Evans emerged.

Amsden's Asia Next Giant (SK) and Wade's Governing the Economy (Taiwan) were very influential, 1989. In the background to these books was Chalmers Johnson's book MITI and Japan, which came out in 1982—but exploded in 1989. Johnson argued that the Japanese miracle (1954-1976) was the result of enlightened bureaucrats—this didn't make much of a splash in the literature, but it influenced Amsden and Wade, who both stressed that they copied Japan.

Amsden and Wade were both funded by the WB. SK and Taiwan actually eclipsed Japanese growth rates in the period of the Japanese miracle.

What they both found was that the free-market description of the development model adopted by Taiwan and SK was wrong. Taiwan and SK both were about as close to a planned economy as you could get—especially SK. They differed in every crucial respect (Taiwan is a bit enigmatic—sometimes met with a 'discreet silence' re: institutional configuration).

States not only refused to be nightwatchmen States, but they were thoroughly interventionist. Note that they don't turn the neoliberal narrative on its head—LA is still interventionist. LA was characterized by pervasive intervention by the State in trade policy and domestically.

This generated a claim: clearly, the difficulty of LA did not arise from the fact that they relied on State intervention. If that were the case, you should have had problems in E. Asia.

This premise grounded their investigations—why did State intervention lead to success in one case, or another?

Neither Amsden or Wade really answer this, except insofar as they provide certain truisms [?]

Evans comes closer. It's the 'quality' of State intervention that distinguishes LA from SK. And the quality of State intervention has to do with the 'institutional capacity' of the State—the degree of capacity that the State has distinguishes 'good' States from 'bad' States. Evans tries to specify the components that add to State capacity: (1) the relevant State agencies have to have strong ties to the relevant economic actors (embeddedness); (2) those links have to be such that they do not degenerate into cronyism/clientilism—in this sense, they have to have the right kind of autonomy from State actors.

His term for this is 'embedded autonomy'

Amsden does describe the kinds of intervention that this State has to make, despite not saying very much about the institutions that produce it—good intervention is distinguished by a certain kind of outcome (Evans is less clear about 'outcome'). The kinds of protection and subsidies that States give to capitalists have to be characterized by reciprocity—there has to be discipline. In both LA and E. Asia you had subsidies and tarriffs. But in LA those subsidies became gifts. In E. Asia the subsidies came with a condition attached to them—the firm had to abide by certain performance standards. Firms couldn't make easy, 'soft' profits.

Amsden and Evans together provide this interesting answer—in one case, intervention imposed discipline; In the other case, States did not (and could not) impose discipline.

This gave critical policy wonks something to hang their hat on. the Left in the 80s was in crisis, of course; the whole collapse of LA had called State-centric arguments into question.

Evans is a descendant of Gershenkron. Of course, Gershenkron said very little about institutional capacity. Evans improves on this—he talks about the nature of the institutions that would be necessary.

The influence of this work was unmistakable. In '93 the WB comes out with a report, The East Asian Miracle. for the first time since the 1970s, the Bank agrees that 'industrial policy' played a very important role. it still makes fictitious distinctions (they call it 'market-conforming' rather than 'market-distorting'), but it was still an extremely important intellectual concession.

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WB responded to 'industrial policy' in Japan argument by agreeing that it was a success—the proviso was that had they not intervened growth would have been better.

SK in two spurts: 1961-1973 (textiles, etc.) to 1973- (heavy and chemical industry: automobiles, steel, synthetics, etc.). The latter are given protection from outside imports, but not made to export right from the start (which was untrue of textiles). Automobiles were given ten years to export—in those ten years, there are administrative ways in which they impose discipline [How is Korea able to discipline capital in these years?]

Vernon's theory of the product cycle – selling commodity with innovative technology in the home market for a while; over time technology diffuses, and initial disadvantages start to disappear; the initial producer takes his technology and starts to sell in another country; that technology, while uncompetitive in the home market is still competitive in an export market. now, diffusion starts to occur in the secondary market.

what the 'flying geese' theory doesn't explain well is 'diffusion'; it's more complicated. consider a natural experiment—Japan invested in N. E. Asia and in S. E. Asia, but N. E. Asia succeeded (b/c they were able to compel the diffusion of the technology). this developmental disjuncture is rich for possibilities for research.

were L-reforms important for State capacity? or important for growth? or both? certainly important for the size of the domestic market, but not for State capacity.

Evans is right to say that we have middle-ground between the State overrunning the private sector and the private sector overrunning the State. we're concerned in a 'joint-project'

for Weiss, cooperation matters. OK – but this only matters when antecedent discipline is in place, it seems. in which case the institutions that Weiss specifies might be insufficient, or misguided.