(42): active governments pursuing strategic intervention have been essential to E. Asian growth
(43): three questions
- what about the State has made it effective?
- how has this changed over time
- is this capacity obsolete in current global context?
(45): main argument--it's not weak capital that explains State capacity, but almost opposite: strong, well-established capital complemented by a strong State (Government-industry linkages are critical). State capacity is best understood as effective co-operation
(46-47): summarizing Wade, E. Asian success was result of a strong State, which could:
- heavy investment in high-growth competitive industry, which is different from what the mkt would have encouraged
- deliberate outcome of strategic industrial policies
- consistency in policy
(48): key--for Weiss, GI's key benefit is that it socializes risk, improving coordination: firms don't need to (1) raise capital; (2) develpo new products (3) find new markets; (4) train skilled engineers. this is better understood as 'coordination', rather than as an imposition.
(49): power through, not power over
(50-52): you need [to what extent to each of these have a post-hoc character? the first, especially?]
- high-quality bureaucracy
- intelligence gathering infrastructure
- insulated pilot agencies which can sit back and coordinate policy
(57): consultation, not imposition
(58, 68): it almost becomes entirely a problem of 'information-sharing'/coordination. Weiss' point is that this also becomes increasingly the case, as you develop -- coordination becomes more importnat as technology becomes more complex [this threatens to underestimate the 'disciplining' aspect of what was stressed earlier--that investors actually want to invest elsewhere]
(58): chaebol is critical to facilitating cooperation
(62): imp--success is seen as a function of the form in which business and the State are organized [this, again, threatens to underestimate the importance of actually elucidating their interests in a specific context]
(64): GI requires a State that is both distant and close
(64-65): opposed to a 'negative sum' view of State strength
(67): States can't just be strong, they have to be 'catalytic'
(69): not submission, not domination
(73-79): four aspects of cooperation in E. Asian case
- disciplined support--subsidies in exchange for performance
- public risk absorption--require private sector, but they won't invest unless guarded against catastrophe
- private sector governance -- getting them to self-govern (not a sign of State weakness, but of sagacity)
- public-private innovation alliances -- coordinated approach to technological development
(79): this is a relationship that leads to win-win solutions [no clarity as to what the enabling conditions are, for this]
(82): as chaebols/business gets more powerful, this might become more difficult
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