collected snippets of immediate importance...


Monday, March 7, 2011

weiss, transformative capacity in evolution: east asian developmental states

(42): active governments pursuing strategic intervention have been essential to E. Asian growth

(43): three questions
  1. what about the State has made it effective?
  2. how has this changed over time
  3. is this capacity obsolete in current global context?
(45): main argument--it's not weak capital that explains State capacity, but almost opposite: strong, well-established capital complemented by a strong State (Government-industry linkages are critical). State capacity is best understood as effective co-operation

(46-47): summarizing Wade, E. Asian success was result of a strong State, which could:
  1. heavy investment in high-growth competitive industry, which is different from what the mkt would have encouraged
  2. deliberate outcome of strategic industrial policies
  3. consistency in policy
(48): key--for Weiss, GI's key benefit is that it socializes risk, improving coordination: firms don't need to (1) raise capital; (2) develpo new products (3) find new markets; (4) train skilled engineers. this is better understood as 'coordination', rather than as an imposition.

(49): power through, not power over

(50-52): you need [to what extent to each of these have a post-hoc character? the first, especially?]
  1. high-quality bureaucracy
  2. intelligence gathering infrastructure
  3. insulated pilot agencies which can sit back and coordinate policy

(57): consultation, not imposition

(58, 68): it almost becomes entirely a problem of 'information-sharing'/coordination. Weiss' point is that this also becomes increasingly the case, as you develop -- coordination becomes more importnat as technology becomes more complex [this threatens to underestimate the 'disciplining' aspect of what was stressed earlier--that investors actually want to invest elsewhere]

(58): chaebol is critical to facilitating cooperation

(62): imp--success is seen as a function of the form in which business and the State are organized [this, again, threatens to underestimate the importance of actually elucidating their interests in a specific context]

(64): GI requires a State that is both distant and close

(64-65): opposed to a 'negative sum' view of State strength

(67): States can't just be strong, they have to be 'catalytic'

(69): not submission, not domination

(73-79): four aspects of cooperation in E. Asian case
  1. disciplined support--subsidies in exchange for performance
  2. public risk absorption--require private sector, but they won't invest unless guarded against catastrophe
  3. private sector governance -- getting them to self-govern (not a sign of State weakness, but of sagacity)
  4. public-private innovation alliances -- coordinated approach to technological development
(79): this is a relationship that leads to win-win solutions [no clarity as to what the enabling conditions are, for this]

(82): as chaebols/business gets more powerful, this might become more difficult


No comments: