(7): definition--social revolution = political change + structural transformation + mass participation [q. of the kind of cases we've excluded w/ the last factor]
(8): but Grenada 1979-1983 is included, even though it was a coup, b/c of "enthusiasm" [this is problematic]
(9): the 'J-curve', James Davies--growing prosperity followed by sharp downturn
(11): critique of Skocpol [largely uncompelling, about 'structure,' ideology]
(14): definition--'political cultures of opposition' -- 'value systems'/ideologies through which people make sense of world around them
(15): the who of revolution is coalitions/multi-class alliances [a la Parsa et. al.]
(15): Third World needs its own theory
(18): the model: (1) dependent development ('growth within limits') --> (2) exclusionary personalist/colonial state/or open polity (vs. Goodwin, here -- it's the middling regimes, the polyarchies, that are most stable) --> (3) political cultures of opposition (ways of seeing the world) all meet the triggers that are (a) economic downturn + (b) world-systemic opening ---> revolutionary outbreak
(23): again, the problem of the multi-class claim, like Parsa [he agrees that they are likely to fracture, but this doesn't preclude 'social revolution'; we must ask, though, what it means that they fail in their aspirations]
(35): Mexcio largely agricultural, in 1910
(36): 'growth within limits,' Mexcio
(37): Porfirian state slogan: 'Pan y palo'
(37): political cultures of opposition, Mexico [clear problem, here, of how to evaluate this claim. it is far too hand-wavy; but can it be made more definite?]
(40-41): multi-class alliance, Mexico [question of the nature of elite participation--is it that they stand aside? not much by way of active participation, it seems, though Foran concludes the opposite]
(43): failure of Villa and Zapata [there's a clear failure, here, so it's unclear why it's helpful to consider this as 'social revolution'. and auxiliary question of why they failed is interesting, but unaddressed b/c of the nature of his argument]
(44-45): more than a reform? [how can your evidence for this be PRI nationalization under Cardenas?]
(45): Gilly--a bourgeois revolution that was pushed, by radial peasants, to being more than simply bourgeois outcome [hmm]
(47): China as 'not feudal, not yet capitalist' (b/c share-cropping and wage labour were common, he argues)
(50): debate on peasant conditions in the 1930s, with some suggesting that they didn't worsen, but most agreeing that they did, including Foran.
(50): GMD regime alienated elites, depending almost wholly on the army. no social base.
(52): vs. Skocpol, emphasizes the organizational role of the CCP (Skocpol thinks that peasants had no alternative but to respond favourably to CCP; Foran's argument is that, had they not been effectively organized/political cultures of opposition present, the peasantry would not have flocked. a 'battle for ideological hegemony')
(53): Communist movement as a 'nationalist' movement
(54): a diverse social base to the side of the revolution, China [OK, to a point. but this is directly consonant with the limited goals, as they themselves stressed. it is quite another to make this into the general condition of social revolution, since they abandoned the NDR soon after taking power]
(57): Cuba as a 'willed' revolution? no.
(58): more Cadillacs sold in 1954 Havana than in any other city in the world
(58): dependent development, Cuba ('a textbook case')
(59): US control of Cuban economy very pronounced
(60): 20,000 Cubans died at hands of police/army/intelligence, between 1952 and 1959 [!]
(61): oppositional culture, Cuba [here it becomes quite clear that this is too 'post hoc'; it seems easy to make similar summaries in clear negative cases]
(62-63): w-systemic opening, Cuba (US backing-off from Batista in late 50s)
(65): middle-class populist coalition, Cuba [first, seems extremely strange to talk about a 'mass' movement but then use composition of 600 guerrilla members as main piece of evidence for its being middle-class; second, the actual evidence of cooperation across classes gives absolutely no sense of its significance--it's just a quote. third, and perhaps most importantly, again it's shown that elite dissension is important to regime downfall; but a 'social revolution'? you can't show this by saying that, prior to post-revolutionary social upheavals, elites were partial toward the revolutionaries]
(67): American interest in Nicaragua; though lowest rates of investment, large American multinationals were present
(67): dependent development, Nicaragua (q. of whether it was developed enough to be considered)
(68): incredible land concentration figures--1.5% had 40% of land, 78% had 17% of land
(70): oppositional cultures, Nicaragua [again, not convincing--no way of assessing the significance, easy to make similar point in negative cases. and this is meant to be his clearest case--but if you had evaluated this in the mid-70s, or before the earthquake, would you have made a similar case?]
(73): 50,000 people died, ion total
(72-73): w-systemic opening, Nicaragua [OK, but Carter's posture is quite uncertain -- proposing a peace-keeping force, looking for internal changes. Sandinistas very clearly say no to this. how much this helps is entirely uncertain? maybe 'opening' is better understood as the absence of a 'w-systemic closing'?]
(73): FSLN was tiny! 200 members in 1977, 5,000 in July 1979 (though many fought who weren't expressly members of the FSLN)
(74): m-class populist coalition, Nicaragua [problem here is simple, and familiar -- you can't use the evidence of m-class involvement to make the claim that all classes contributed equally. this seems singularly unhelpful. in all of these it seems the case that the m-class have to withdraw support from the regime; but whether this is best understood as their being active members of the coalition, as a class, is extremely suspect]
(74-75): vs. Skocpol--Iran not exceptional, but prototypical
(75): dependent development, Iran [again, the narrative is not unhelpful, but the more I read the more I think that a better 'test' would be to see what isn't dependent development in the Third World. b/c everything short of that, which is most, seems eligible for a description like the one offered here: 'there was growth, but there was also poverty+inequality'. I don't know if unbelievers would be convinced by the analysis here, in other words]
(77): Shah's Army budget at $10 billion in late 70s!
(78): w-systemic opening, Iran (from Nixon doctrine to Carter's inaction) [but again, he is showing that Carter had 'strong personal rapport and called him an 'island of stability'; support Shah after massacre of protestors. we risk elevating rhetoric to reality, unless this is framed as 'absence of w-systemic closing'; inaction is read as paralysis, but better read as unwillingness to 'interevene' b/c of w-historic moment, I think]
(78): May '78 cable suggesting Shah was stable
(81): v. different from Parsa--where Parsa stressed the marginality of the religious forces to the making of revolution, Khumaini and the clergy dominate Foran's portrayal of the revolutionary movement
(83): political cultures of opposition, Iran [another example of how difficult this is to evaluate]
(84): largest crowd in w. history, three to four million people in February 1979
(87): m-class alliance, Iran [again, difficult to celebrate this as source of regime's radical nature when the consolidation of the regime demands the denial of so many of the participants' aspirations]
(89): in colonial cases, a 'distinct variant' of dependent development
(90): because foreign, collective dictatorship by outsiders is personalistic (in emotional terms) [emotional terms???]
(90): imp--conjunctural factors end up being very important, to the spate of revolutions that occur in the 1970s (both w-systemic opening, in US after Vietnam, and Portugese revolution; and economic downturn + the two oil shocks)
(91): though downturn can be 'partly' a subjective factor (in Cuba, guerrilla struggles helped create it, for example)
(92): literacy in Algeria comparable to Fr. at time of revolution
(93): exceptional violence of French conquest, extraordinary massacres
(94): Tocqueville--'we have been more barbaric than the Arabs'
(94-5): dependent development, Algeria (a 'split society'--key to which was 'agricultural exp. on mass scale'; urbanization w/o industrialization, as people pushed from coutnryside)
(95): in 1954, 85% of population illiterate
(95): Napoleon 1865-- to become French, one had to give up Islam; 98 of 106 mosques in Algiers made into churches
(98): in 1937, PCF was counseling that Algerians had to wait for the revolution in France [!]
(102): 1956, FLN strength was at 8,500, w/ 21,000 auxiliaries [quite small, in relation to French forces--450,000!]
(103-104): class basis, Algeria: led by urban middle-class, but fought by youth from rural proletariat; involved most of Muslim population in urban areas [a bit snide to call this a coalition, and Foran's comments are very hurried]
(104): imp--Angolan revolution (1960-1975) is excellent example of Third World Rev touching off First World Rev
(108): brutal Angolan State, no health or education budget 1953-1958, forced labour
(108-109): three anti-colonial movements
(110): political culture, Angola: length of struggle into 1970s radicalized the MPA [interesting--if it is an underlying condition, how can it be explained as a result of the mobilization?](47): China as 'not feudal, not yet capitalist' (b/c share-cropping and wage labour were common, he argues)
(50): debate on peasant conditions in the 1930s, with some suggesting that they didn't worsen, but most agreeing that they did, including Foran.
(50): GMD regime alienated elites, depending almost wholly on the army. no social base.
(52): vs. Skocpol, emphasizes the organizational role of the CCP (Skocpol thinks that peasants had no alternative but to respond favourably to CCP; Foran's argument is that, had they not been effectively organized/political cultures of opposition present, the peasantry would not have flocked. a 'battle for ideological hegemony')
(53): Communist movement as a 'nationalist' movement
(54): a diverse social base to the side of the revolution, China [OK, to a point. but this is directly consonant with the limited goals, as they themselves stressed. it is quite another to make this into the general condition of social revolution, since they abandoned the NDR soon after taking power]
(57): Cuba as a 'willed' revolution? no.
(58): more Cadillacs sold in 1954 Havana than in any other city in the world
(58): dependent development, Cuba ('a textbook case')
(59): US control of Cuban economy very pronounced
(60): 20,000 Cubans died at hands of police/army/intelligence, between 1952 and 1959 [!]
(61): oppositional culture, Cuba [here it becomes quite clear that this is too 'post hoc'; it seems easy to make similar summaries in clear negative cases]
(62-63): w-systemic opening, Cuba (US backing-off from Batista in late 50s)
(65): middle-class populist coalition, Cuba [first, seems extremely strange to talk about a 'mass' movement but then use composition of 600 guerrilla members as main piece of evidence for its being middle-class; second, the actual evidence of cooperation across classes gives absolutely no sense of its significance--it's just a quote. third, and perhaps most importantly, again it's shown that elite dissension is important to regime downfall; but a 'social revolution'? you can't show this by saying that, prior to post-revolutionary social upheavals, elites were partial toward the revolutionaries]
(67): American interest in Nicaragua; though lowest rates of investment, large American multinationals were present
(67): dependent development, Nicaragua (q. of whether it was developed enough to be considered)
(68): incredible land concentration figures--1.5% had 40% of land, 78% had 17% of land
(70): oppositional cultures, Nicaragua [again, not convincing--no way of assessing the significance, easy to make similar point in negative cases. and this is meant to be his clearest case--but if you had evaluated this in the mid-70s, or before the earthquake, would you have made a similar case?]
(73): 50,000 people died, ion total
(72-73): w-systemic opening, Nicaragua [OK, but Carter's posture is quite uncertain -- proposing a peace-keeping force, looking for internal changes. Sandinistas very clearly say no to this. how much this helps is entirely uncertain? maybe 'opening' is better understood as the absence of a 'w-systemic closing'?]
(73): FSLN was tiny! 200 members in 1977, 5,000 in July 1979 (though many fought who weren't expressly members of the FSLN)
(74): m-class populist coalition, Nicaragua [problem here is simple, and familiar -- you can't use the evidence of m-class involvement to make the claim that all classes contributed equally. this seems singularly unhelpful. in all of these it seems the case that the m-class have to withdraw support from the regime; but whether this is best understood as their being active members of the coalition, as a class, is extremely suspect]
(74-75): vs. Skocpol--Iran not exceptional, but prototypical
(75): dependent development, Iran [again, the narrative is not unhelpful, but the more I read the more I think that a better 'test' would be to see what isn't dependent development in the Third World. b/c everything short of that, which is most, seems eligible for a description like the one offered here: 'there was growth, but there was also poverty+inequality'. I don't know if unbelievers would be convinced by the analysis here, in other words]
(77): Shah's Army budget at $10 billion in late 70s!
(78): w-systemic opening, Iran (from Nixon doctrine to Carter's inaction) [but again, he is showing that Carter had 'strong personal rapport and called him an 'island of stability'; support Shah after massacre of protestors. we risk elevating rhetoric to reality, unless this is framed as 'absence of w-systemic closing'; inaction is read as paralysis, but better read as unwillingness to 'interevene' b/c of w-historic moment, I think]
(78): May '78 cable suggesting Shah was stable
(81): v. different from Parsa--where Parsa stressed the marginality of the religious forces to the making of revolution, Khumaini and the clergy dominate Foran's portrayal of the revolutionary movement
(83): political cultures of opposition, Iran [another example of how difficult this is to evaluate]
(84): largest crowd in w. history, three to four million people in February 1979
(87): m-class alliance, Iran [again, difficult to celebrate this as source of regime's radical nature when the consolidation of the regime demands the denial of so many of the participants' aspirations]
(89): in colonial cases, a 'distinct variant' of dependent development
(90): because foreign, collective dictatorship by outsiders is personalistic (in emotional terms) [emotional terms???]
(90): imp--conjunctural factors end up being very important, to the spate of revolutions that occur in the 1970s (both w-systemic opening, in US after Vietnam, and Portugese revolution; and economic downturn + the two oil shocks)
(91): though downturn can be 'partly' a subjective factor (in Cuba, guerrilla struggles helped create it, for example)
(92): literacy in Algeria comparable to Fr. at time of revolution
(93): exceptional violence of French conquest, extraordinary massacres
(94): Tocqueville--'we have been more barbaric than the Arabs'
(94-5): dependent development, Algeria (a 'split society'--key to which was 'agricultural exp. on mass scale'; urbanization w/o industrialization, as people pushed from coutnryside)
(95): in 1954, 85% of population illiterate
(95): Napoleon 1865-- to become French, one had to give up Islam; 98 of 106 mosques in Algiers made into churches
(98): in 1937, PCF was counseling that Algerians had to wait for the revolution in France [!]
(102): 1956, FLN strength was at 8,500, w/ 21,000 auxiliaries [quite small, in relation to French forces--450,000!]
(103-104): class basis, Algeria: led by urban middle-class, but fought by youth from rural proletariat; involved most of Muslim population in urban areas [a bit snide to call this a coalition, and Foran's comments are very hurried]
(104): imp--Angolan revolution (1960-1975) is excellent example of Third World Rev touching off First World Rev
(108): brutal Angolan State, no health or education budget 1953-1958, forced labour
(108-109): three anti-colonial movements
- MPLA, Pan-African and socialist
- FNLA, non-communist nationalist--evolved in pro-Western direction by 1960s
- UNITA, counter-revolutionary, especially after 1975-1976 civil war
(111): mid-1970s US pushing for UNITA-led independence
(112): guerrillas didn't win on battlefield, v. few Portuguese troops died
(114): broad coalition, Angola: if the three movements [!] are included, cross-class [this is utterly absurd--three movements that were hardly allies in the liberation struggle, and then fell upon one another are the source of this claim!]
(115): not clear that condition of 'significant social claim' is met--instead, what qualifies this as a social revolution seems to be the 'ideas' of the revolutionaries. but of course that's not what we're trying to explain.
(116): dependent development vs. underdevelopment, in case of Mozambique
(120): multi-class, Mozambique [again, this just seems absurd. a fringe of elite leaders is not enough to make a peasant movement multi-class. the claim is simply confusing]
(121): the West supported Portugal consistently; South Africa and Rhodesia even more so, of course
(121): economic downturn, Mozambique: both in Portugal and in Mozambique (created by guerrillas?)
(123): creating an opening through disruption? (a la Cuba and Angola(
(125-126): dependent development, Rhodesia
(126): US circumventing sanctions it formally supported, to import minerals
(128): in 1971, Britain promising 'majority rule' in 100 years. Smith agreed.
(128): ZANU emerged successful over ZIPA and ZAPU b/c of appeal of its vision, more effective recruitment (winning support from the people) [this is less an 'ideology' issue, than an 'organizing' issue]
(129): radicals had been sidelined; this was the National Democratic Revolution
(130): conjunctural factors, Zimbabwe: impact of late 1970s--world-systemic opening (though ambiguous), and the independence of Mozambique and Angola
(131): 30k Africans died in Zimbabwe struggle
(132): Vietnam as best case--all factors come together, in 1945
(132, 139-141): imp, question re: Foran's use of political cultures, here [here it means something different than a 'historical endowment'; means something contingent, subject to organizing success. see also his explanation of later movement, which is a 'historical endowment' argument--'fusion' of indigenous and Marxism. entirely q-begging]
(135): dependent development, Vietnam: exporting raw materials, limited industrializatoin
(135): imp, some recognition, here, of importance of wider class base --> less radicalism (a non-communist alternative, had there been a middle-class][possible tension in larger argument]
(138): 1965-1973, USA dropped triple the bomb tonnage dropped on Europe, Asia, AFrica on an area the size of Texas
(139): at least 1.5 million dead Vietnamese; along with Mexico, biggest toll in all of the revolutions
(142): m-class, Vietnam: won the middle-class by not being too radical (a la Race) [but didn't this, simultaneously, have something to do with its failures post-revolution? and the vast majority of the rank and file were peasants; we need some way of deciding when the fact of overall, average composition ceases to be significant, if that's ever the case]
(144): Nixon's rearguard strategy for 'peace' w/ honor, a la Obama in Afghanistan today (Nixon Christmas bombing in 1972, for example, after breakdown in negotiations)
(151): imp, here looking at 'reversed revolutions' that weren't able to live up to their promise--but a central issue is that the claim of 'radical social transformation' in the 'successful' cases hasn't really been substantiated
(152): vs. Goodwin, the examples of Chile, Jamaica, and Iran as situations where revolutionary challenge launched through political process
(153): Bolivia in 1952--a revolution that was rolled back ever so slowly, after 18 months of radical reforms, thanks to US pressures (here discussion of 'coming to power'
(158): Army stands aside in 1952
(159): Chile is Foran's key argument against Goodwin -- a truly democratic polity undergoing dep. development is vulnerable to revolution (it's the in-betweens that aren't amenable to rev. challenge)
(159): strong existence of working-class parties explains the comparative strength of democratic institutions (four decades of democratic rule); though the electorate was considerably narrow, even in 1971[!] (only 28.3%???)
(161): strong labour movement --> strong political consciousness [again, q-begging]
(162): gradualists (CP, Allende's wing of SP) vs. radicals (MIR, etc.) -- UP as fragile center-point between these views
(163): key--more generally, ec. downturn matters only in context of ongoing dependent development
(167): 46 men in Granada! [again, raises question about the 'movement'--here, it's popular sympathy that's enough to make this into a case of revolution. but that's a bit of a stretch]
(170): in sum, revolutionary failure--the same factors that brought these movements to power worked to unseat them: dependency was restraint, democracy opened up space for the right, economic difficulties, intervention of empire
(170): in Bolivia, MNR leads social revolution
(171): LR, though, touched only 8 of 36 million hectares [for Foran this is enough, b/c it's 'popular']
(171-172): but, w-systemic closure brought MNR rev to knees [example, possibly, of the State being brought to heel by Capital]. 1956 as turning point.
(173): JFK's Alliance for Progress in Bolivia was culmination of US efforts to bring Bolivia back in line
(175): Chile LR touched 1/2 of all land
(175): Korry quote--'we will do all in our power to condemn Chileans to utmost poverty'
(176): CIA study: US has no vital interests in region--but Chile would represent a 'psychological set-back' to US, and 'psychological advantage' for Marxism
(177); State structure was never in Allende's hands: no majority in Congress, no support from judiciary, no loyalty of civil service or Army. no control of mass media.
(178): Allende in Aug 1972, amidst heightening class conflict, split w/ MIR: 'the fact that you have to get up at dawn to get to work, whlie I ride in a car...' [brilliantly tragic]
(180): imp--the middle-classes and the CD were the social base for the coup, hit hard by inflation/shortages. of course the landowners/industrialists/army were the prime movers. but their support was critical.
(181, 186): imp--failure of New Jewel Movement in Grenada shows causal importance of political culture. this was the explanation of breakdown. Coard vs. Bishop [seems question-begging, at some level--fragmented despite everything else being in place]
(182): FDI went up during NJM tenure
(185): Carter's FP was hardening, after 1979 revolutions--Grenada, Nicaragua, Jamaica were defined as threats
(185): Bishop on Reagan--'he's readying himself to drop into what he thinks is his bathtub!'
(189): US invasion of Grenada was not principal cause--it followed the break-up of the revolutionary coalition
(190): imp--after taking power, Sandinistas did their best to pursue a 'mixed economy', trying to keep national bourgeoisie and even foreign capital happy--big public sector, investing in basic needs, took over about 1/5 of arable land. as Foran puts it, basically took over Somoza's place in the economy. btw 1979 and 1983, this worked 'quite well'
(191): 1984 elections, they won 2/3
(191): coalition starting to fragment in mid-1980s [not well-explained--partly defection of industrial and agricultural elites]
(191): closure of w-systemic opening, with Reagan. US 'created' Contras out of Somoza's NG
(192): 30,000 Nicaraguans killed as result of Contra war
(192-193): in response to Reagan, Nicaragua kept civil liberties open--tried to push date of elections forward
(193): by 1987, were spending 60% of budget on military--US aid cut off, as was IMF/World Bank, active intervention in the banks
(194): Sandinista economic policy played a part? agrarian reform jeopardized agrarian exports, which put pressure on foreign exchange. this, plus falling commodity prices in the 80s, was big issue
(195): Sandinistas forced to implement austerity in 1988-1989, after economy brought to its knees in '85 to '87 period
(196): voting them out of office in 1990 was rational, given US posture
(197): ag. reform 'failed' in Guatemala, for reasons of complexity of existing tenure
(197): Manley government undermined, after nationalizing bauxite--again, US involved, according to Foran, in sanctioning gov't, which then turned to IMF/WB
(200): imp point against Goodwin--'open democratic polities' can be challenged [Iran, Chile, Jamaica, and Guatemala after Arevalo]
(202): post-Rev, becoming more democratic actually made these States more vulnerable
(200, 202-203): summary of argument re: reversals: dep development, open democracies, attenuation of political cultures, closing of w-systemic window. these four factors are found in all seven cases.
(205-206): studying the negative cases--attempted revolutions, political revolutions, non-revolutions, revolutions from above
(207): Salvadoran dictatorship favored by JFK, as bulwark against Communism
(208): El Salvador: it lacked the breadth of the movement in Nicaragua (also, stable nature of 'crisis'--things always very bad. regime well supported. w-systemic closure.
(208-216): other cases here [many of these are very underdeveloped
(218): final table
(222): here, in China 1911, w-systemic opening becoming a bit like 'political opportunity' [very underdeveloped and imprecise]
(222): imp--logic of book is that dependent development is expected to produce a cross-class coalition [hmm]
(223): Aristide is simply a political revolution. but surely as radical as some of the examples that have been considered social revolutions. [and, in any case, how do we measure whether dep development has gone 'far enough'?]
(223): odd--in Philippines, NPA is too narrow to produce a 'social revolution' [this encapsulates some of the problems with 'broad-based'. if it were to have reached out to m-class elements, it would have retained its social revolutionary commitments? come on]
(225): pol rev in SA--very forced, doesn't really make sense, to me
(231, see 257 for sum of PC): Iraq was non-attempt b/c no political culture [great place to show that this basically begs more questions than it answers. tautological]
(232): imp, w-systemic opening, Egypt [what, in general, are the mechanisms by which the w-systemic opening/closure makes itself felt?]
(234): Cuba and culture [pop consensus? but come on...]
(235): key--in SK, no revolution b/c they didn't enlist the middle-class [great place to expose this problem]
(235): advantages of real development
(242): m-class becomes part of the prescription for how to make revolution [ugh!]
(244): w-systemic opening and 'political culture' his two most important, for explaining failure [happily, they're also the two most poorly defined]
(253): key--what a good political culture should do, in short, is facilitate a broad-based cross-class coalition [ouch!]
(259): w/ Selbin, against Goodwin -- inequalities rising, and also possibility of democratic route to power
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