doug mcadam, political process and black insurgency

(1-3): four objectives

1. evaluate social movement theory--develop political process model
2. explore power in america--rebellion as politics by other means
3. analyze balck protest movement
4. show that 1930-1954 was critical to the civil rights movement--it didn't just erupt with Montgomery in 55-56, or 1954 Supreme Court decision

(6-9): classical model operates with pluralist premise. three versions

1. mass society--people who aren't integrated show extreme behavior
2. status inconsistency
3. collective behavior--disruption of normative order produces social movements (Smelser)

(10): s. movement as 'therapy'

(11-19): three weaknesses of classical model

1. no one-to-one correspondance between strain and social movement. protests are rare, strain is common. no political context.
2. individual discontent as driver--but often actors are better integrated. moreover, the theorists never empirically demonstrate this. also individualist, while movements are collective.
3. social movements as psychological problem. but movements are rational, not irratioanl--we need to take substantive demands seriously

(21): two key tenets of resource mobilization

1. strain is insufficient to produce s. movement
2. amount of social resources is what produces movement (resources always come from without, though)

(22-23): good things about r. mobilization (rationality, take movements seriously, imp. of resources)

(24, 29): central weaknesses are that, while this might explain well some movements (elite-led), but there are others (mass-based) that it can't explain, because it has no sense of 'structural power' ('negative inducements' -- pg. 30, indigenous organizational networks -- pg. 31)

(32): definition of resources is also weak

(33): no distinction between objective grievances, and their subjective recognition

(37): nice--political process depends on Marxist, rather than 'elite' view of power--where disparities are recognized, but it's also recognized that the disempowered have their own sources of power

(40): three factors to political process model

1. structure of political opportunities--as existing power relations change (gradually, rather than abruptly) [question, here, of whether this can be precise enough to have predictive powers--'finite list impossible to compile!']
2. indigenous organizational strength--resources of minority comunity allow exploitation of opportunity (members, leaders, communication networks, etc.)
3. cognitive liberation--people have to recognize themselves as capable of acting, empowered [this is the most hand-wavy--because even while it definitely gets at something, there's no way to (a) predict, for sure; (b) explain, even, because of the difficulty of operationalizing it. is the best we can say that this is facilitated by 'organization', as he admits (pg. 51)? but even then we only explain a little (e.g., Egypt)]

(46): int--solidarity incentives, vs. Olson [quite unsatisfying, though--very brief, hand-wavy]

(50): hmm--cognitive liberation doesn't depend on observation/empirical evidence [too strong? this implies something other than rationality, when i'm not sure we need to]

(53): study of movement development calls in a fourth variable--the response of other groups to insurgent challenge

(54): vs. Piven and Cloward, argue that sustaining an organizational structure can, absolutely, sustain a movement--the decline is not inevitable. there are these threats, of course, which they are right to note, wrong to finger as inevitable

1. oligarchization
2. co-optation
3. dissolution of indigenous support

(56): two factors shape response of others to insurgency

1. the strength of insurgent forces (heightens cost of repression)
2. the goals and tactics of the insurgent forces (more radical, more likely to trigger repressive response)

(65): political process suggests long historical time frame; other frameworks see social movements as a stimulus-response problem

(67): n. industrialists willing to abandon South because of threats to their profits; this explains end of Reconstruction

(69): disenfranchisement

(69): 90% of blacks in Sotuh in 1900

(69-70): Republican rapproachment w/ establishment--black political influence at very low ebb, 1896-1928

(71): correspondingly, Federal action against blacks

(73): in short--federal government transformed into force buttressing southern racial status quo, post-Reconstruction

(72): nadir after 1891

(72): Woodrow Wilson, anti-black legislation--the 'great progressive'!!

(73): the collapse of cotton, then, becomes the underlying structural factor

(74): labour shortage in North, after WWI, breaking the compact

(75): Depression, impact

(75): mechanization, impact

(77): four reasons black political prospects improved

1. n. demand for black labour, collapse of cotton, undermined economic basis of S-N alliance
2. oppressive social controls declined as cotton economy dissolved
3. massive rural-to urban migration, within South, gave blacks organizational context
4. massive migration, to North, gave blacks serious political leverage (deciding presidential elections, etc.)

(81): especially 1940-1960

(81): turn to Dems in early 30s

(82): creating shift in attitude of N. Elite, as a result

(83): the international context was a factor, as well

(84): by early 1930s, S. Court decisions turning

(84): executive, by 1941

(86): in short--1931-1954 period is very important, laying the foundation

(88): in rural South social control, via debt bondage, violence and physical force.

(90-91): S. Black Church was conservative, at this time

(92): B. Colleges basically non-existent

(93): NAACP ineffectual, in South

(98): in sum, the transitions were laying foundations for transformations of these institutions, as well

1. Church (98)
2. Black Colleges (100)
3. NAACP (103)

(106-112): collective perception, 1876-1930 vs. 1931-1954 [here problems surface, of course--alludes to the idea that modern survey techniques would help. but how? uncertain results. and then, moreover, don't we also want some idea of what explains the change in collective attribution--is it just a function of the first two, or something more?]

(118): three classical models, for black insurgency--none have empirical support (or, all do, which is precisely the problem!)

1. absolute gains
2. relative deprivation
3. J curve, rise and drop

(120-125): resource mobilization doesn't help, either--can't make sense of the centrality of indigenous resources to the movement

(134): 1956, D-Action Dampaigns

(134): 1960, Sit-ins

(135): activists of independent means were important

(138): SCLC founded 1957

(142): two responses

1. s. white supremacists
2. federal government (movement used them astutely, against the first, to further the insurgency in the early 60s) [anything to be said at a higher level of abstraction? b/c this is certainly made possible by the nature of the things being demanded--the State is not always going to "take pity" on you, even in the limited ways being detailed here--see p. 174]

(147): imp--need to 'develop' resources, for continued success-(1) formal organizations became more central to actions, 1960-1965

(148): but, vs. r. mobilization perspective, this external involvement was reactive

(154): competition amongst f. organizations aided movement

(158): b. vote even more precious, 1960 election

(159): gaining support in the white population

(160): in sum--(2) external political pressures were favorable, 1960-1965

(161-163): in sum--(3) pronounced sense of optimism, in this period [again, same issues here]

(164-166): 'genuis' of the movement was tactical. its tactics were more of a threat than its goals

(174): imp--triangulation of f. government and w. supremacists ('conscious provocation')

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[1] question of typology of s. movements

[2] objective/subjective problem -- how to explain, much less predict, what moves people to recognize their grievances?

[3] imp. of this being the civil rights movement--the 'easy consensus' around r. integration. does it matter that other groups would look different?