(vii): power works to develop and maintain powerlessness.
(4): quiescence appears as a function of the power relationship itself (rebellion, then, presupposes some change in this power relationship--some 'crack') [can we falsify this? how do you assess power, independent of the fact of quiescence? it is certainly possible, but we need to be clear]
(5-8): within first dimension -- quiescence is a sign of consent; power irrelevant to explaining consent
(8- 11): within second dimension -- power affects grievances by narrowing/limiting the field of options (it doesn't shape grievances, like the third dimension, but organizes them out)
(11-13, 17): within third dimension -- power actually shapes grievances [as will be clarified later, this is still understood as a rational reaction to the field of power that shapes the terrain on which people formulate grievances/ideology ('history of defeat'--pp. 16-17). people do not hold these beliefs irrationally, in other words--though it might be true that they are not being 'superrational' (e.g. power may be weakening, but they don't know it)]
(19): 'split consciousness'
(22): different forms of power build on each other (accumulate)
(23): power maintained by inaction -- rebellion made possible by shifts in power [here he proposes either a loss in power of A or gain in power of B -- but surely this is a zero-sum game, they must mean the same thing]
(25): the power of a single victory
(29): against 'false consciousness', b/c it's analytically confusing [a bit unnecessary, I think]
(37-39): imp--noting high levels of labour militancy, relatively high levels of unionization. somewhat less in C. Appalachia, where we're concentrating, b/c of company unions. 'conflict consciousness,' not class consciousness. [this does raise the question of the explanandum--later chapter shows that what he wants to explain is real, but the whole idea of quiescence might still be a bit stylized. it's less of a puzzle than it needs to be--people are not always revolutionary/class-conscious because they've suffered defeat after defeat at the hands of the much more powerful]
(40): dominant explanation is a cultural one
(80-83): rough sum-- early encounters with absentee monopoly power shaped the field of power, producing powerlessness/legitimation, etc.
(86-87, 89, 94): v. imp--not the nature of work that explains quiescence--has to do more with company control of these communities (over homes, shops, workplace, etc.). no possibility of exit from the labour market, even if they wanted to escape. much more company control in Appalachia than in Illinois/Indiana [most lived in company housing vs. 1/10th, etc.]
(90-91): explaining that miners favoured short-term interests over long-term ones [but this is not at all irrational, let's be clear! we're not talking about delusion, at all]
(92): imp--q. of the appeal of fundamentalist religion--an 'adaptive response' to the exploitative situation [fair enough. using it to make sense of their misery. but the implication of his presentation, which he has to stick to, is that it's not a change in 'conceptions' that would matter, but a change in the field of power]
(99, 108, 120, 140, 141, 145, 164): again, v. important, rationality--quiescence/lack of enthusiasm for the union seems a perfectly sensible response to betrayal by the union. UMWA backed down in 1931; Lewis backed Turnblazer in 1933. other pages speak to quiescence as a rational reaction to a situation in which the costs of challenging the powerful are ominous [and then D-III is nothing more than a rationalization of this predicament]. politics take place in the field of power controlled by local elites.
(105): repression is critical, but not enough [perhaps, but the repression you've documented is quite awesome in scope]
(105): also the gate-keeping of information [yes--but D-II or D-III, this?]
(112, 223): here question of the evidence he uses to prove his claims re: quiescence/militancy
(115): re: Communists and ideology, arguing that their was an 'underlying ideological' effect of the differences over God, which was still a consequence of the 'prior role of power' in shaping consciousness [seems plausible; difficult to refine without better knowledge of the case]
(119): 1933, John Lewis and Turnblazer's local fiefdom -- Lewis sides with Turnblazer (whose son, his successor, was convicted for conspiracy to murder Yablonski)
(126, 128): structural context of mechanization and 60s trough -- by 70s more coal, less workers
(129-131 ): a mix of values--individualism of mountaineer, collective life of worker [if culture is 'mixed', it's quite clear that it can't really explain anything. all possibilities are open]
(139): statistics re: taxation
(141): exactly right--apathy as a result of the power processes of local politics.
(143): the Family
(145): costs of challenge are high for the powerless
(149-151, 154, 156-157, 159, 160-161): key--individuals' vulnerability to the company/powerful explains voting behaviour
(162, 252): also, emergence of challengers provokes counter-attack [this raises the Schwartz discussion--how do you deal with the challenges of escalation? can the powerless defeat the powerful? how and under what conditions?]
(165-166): Yablonski, and the puzzle of District 19 -- even in the 'open' election, only 19% voted for him (implication, he's suggesting, that D-II isn't enough) [but here the q. is how 'deep' does D-III go? as deep as influencing people to act in a certain way--but down to their deep convictions? who knows? how can we say? important?]
(168): v. good -- vs. Michels and the argument that oligarchy is a function of 'mass psychology'. Gaventa very correctly suggesting that 'mass psychology' is not timeless, but best understood as a function of 'powerlessness' and power
(170): pluralists are wrong -- by any measure, the union leadership had failed them. why quiescent?
(177): UMWA as business union in the 50s and 60s
(179-190): dimension II is the extraordinary apparatus of oligarchy -- mobilized its resources to defeat Yablonski. barriers put before insurgents.
(183): important--pensioners felt they had to cooperate [is this D-II or D-III? perfect place to raise the confusion.
(191-192): important--he wants to say that all 'barriers' were lifted by Dept of Labor intervention [really?], so we need D-III -- the participants and voters internalized their powerlessness, and collaborated. powerholders didn't need to actively 'exercise' power [is this rational on the part of the powerless, or not? seems definitely the case, see below]
(194-195): key--in short, internalized expectations seem to be the result of a rational weighing of accumulated evidence--so people were coming to this way of understanding the conflict on the basis of past experiences, and not just the present period of 'openness' [in this sense they're not superrational, because they're wrong--but they're still rational. this interpretation suggests that 'ideology' is an informational problem? like health care in 2009]
(200-201): important--he doesn't properly answer the principal question (why the MFD won in other places, but lost in District 19). his suggestion is that C. Appalachian environment is particularly responsible for this, developed in the last paragraph of the chapter [OK, but could have been made more central to the account]
(206): underlying fatalism is fear [a rational response to a terrifying situation]
(209): initial participation --> greater participation (builds confidence)
(217): in sum, study of CDC doesn't yield much. contradictory effects [he's reaching, here]
(218): dominant media misinforms
(223): one or two quotes don't prove that a people's attitude is changing!!!
(226): 'culture of silence' is broken [hmm. bad evidence, and b/c thin evidence, possibility of many other cases. doesn't speak well to the larger argument. he just hasn't found a positive case]
(235): the number of people mobilized to fight the AA ends up being quite small, actually
(246): imp--under conditions of weakness, the MNC becomes vulnerable [but again, the weakness of this speaks to his failure to find a positive case. when you've discussed the field of power in such depth, you can't say a hit to the MNC's reputation is sufficient to change the field of power. and that's, ultimately, what his conclusions demonstrate]
(252-254): main point--silence is never consensus, but a rational response to power.
(256): power and powerlessness are self-reinforcing [problem of radical structuralism. not a problem with the theory, but a problem of the world, in the main--but there is something more that needs accounting for. people do mobilize]
(257): alterations of power field need to be developed much more thoroughly
(258): no successful case in C. Appalachia, he admits [well then]
(261): odd implication--people can't challenge power, they need theorists and practitioners [hmm?]
----
[1] odd way of setting up power/powerless. the initial set-up makes them more powerful and powerless, respectively--well why not just start at time t1, instead of time t0?
[2] if their 'conceptions' are just an echo of the larger situtation, how much do they explain?
[3] evidence offered is better in the later chapters (voting patterns), but even there there's a tendency to use a quote or description to 'prove' (a) total quiescence, or (b) changes in attitude that are presumed to be widespread. very difficult to accept.
[4] for this to be social scientific, you should be able to anticipate a reaction, based on changes in field of power. but if your evidence for changes in field of power is thin (or worse, if it's circular--i.e., you observe changes in field of power when people start to mobilize), then you're in bad shape.
[5] how 'deep' does D-III go? voting behaviour not so deep. participation in a murder, maybe is evidence that something is up (but this is rare...)
[6] low standards for what constitutes change in the field of power
[7] the Schwartz problem. of course the powerless won't rise up and defeat the powerful. if you don't believe that, then you need to show how and under what conditions they might succeed. for that, you should probably have better successful cases than a BBC documentary!
[8] radical structuralism?
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