(xxix): record of the judiciary in validating military rule
(xxx): military w/ 'hand on the tiller' since 1988
(xxxi): "Army, America, and Allah"
(xxxi): Ayub on the Mullah
(xxxvi-xxxvii): Pak as Turkey (army for the people!) or Pak as Indonesia?
(xxxviv-xxxvii): useful--development and defence spending [limited]
(xxxix): Warrant of Procedure
(xli-xliii): SUMMARY of the major themes
- army reflects pakistani society more than at any time in history
- internally weak political parties have handed army power
- army has acquired a corporate structure and acts on its own institutional interests
- role of the army has been given a boost by the US' strategic interests
- army has performed well in its primary task of defending the country (!)
- protection of its corporate image against its own leadership
- highly partial selection of successors to army chief
- pakistan remains very strategic in global geo-politics
(12): Rejecting anyone whose hands were soft!
(15, 17): L. Curzon, and numbers of gov't vs. population
(16): 1917, Sandhurst is open to native officers
(30): the birth of a 'moth-eaten' military
(32): dependent on India for transfers, while fighting India in Kashmir! [this aside--there is good material here for a Skocpol-like narrative of literal State-construction. though not sure how far it would get me in the context of my paper]
(33): Waziristan as one of the six 'static area' commands in 1947; though Pakistan withdraws in hilariously-named Operation Curzon
(71-73): relevant--The Kashmir War as marking the beginnings of Bonapartism in Pakistan (i.e., a gap seen between Army and politicians) [but there's not much in the way of mechanisms, here--just narrative. if it marked military disaffection at the politicians, fine. but we need to ask, still, what allows the military to run roughshod over the interests of the economy at-large. need to make sure, though, not to confound the two questions: (1) relative autonomy of the State; (2) role of the military in the State (viz-a-viz politicians, of course)]
(78): Muhammad Ali on Muslim League as drawn from 'pillars of society', starting to unravel post-independence
(81-82): Ayub Khan promotion discussion (made C in C on 17th January, 1951)
(83-84): discussion of Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case (linked, here, to Kashmir conflict via Akbar Khan)
(86): Martial Law in Punjab, 8 March 1953 -- establishing Army as political force
(89): precious--Ayub on becoming army chief, says: "...keep out of politics..."
(89): important--again, here there is a narrative of political chaos, which, he is arguing, had the effect of laying the groundwork of inviting the army in. this is fine as far as history goes (not very far); a structural account of this incapacity is demanded, of course.
(94): Liaquat playing games re: his visit to Moscow/DC (helped by fact that Nehru's 1949 visit did not go too well)
(96): Korean War as 'political glue' for the new relationship
(98): important--David Bruce 1952 report to NSC warns of mullahs lying in wait. Must support these Western-oriented friendly leaders. Telling quotes re: imperialism and geo-strategic interests in the region (proximity to C. Asia/USSR)
(100-101): Ayub and Mirza courting the Dulles brothers to support Pakistan as bulwark of ME anti-communist strategy
(102): Dulles very impressed on tour to Pakistan ("best guard of honor"!)
(102-104): Ayub learning from Turkey military model
(107): US calculus in lead-up to decision to give Pakistan aid in 1954 (re: India)
(111): Nixon (as Eisenhower's VP) committed to relationship with Pakistan, lest he lose everyone to the Asian-Arab bloc of neutrals
(112): important?--Ayub citing fact that 75% of Pakistan gov't budget was going to defence, as part of his plea for American aid
(114-116): a relatively 'unsuccessful' first meeting, in 1954, thanks to one Meyers--though firm Pakistan view forced US, Nawaz is arguing, to be decisive in this regard (people in US were on both sides of fence)
(118): important--May 1954, America and Pakistan sign Mutual Defense Agreement. "Uncle Sam was now officially on Pakistan's side..."
(122): social origins of CSP--British in outlook
(125-126): US expressing that Pakistan military is most reliable institution amidst political infighting (around Ghulam Muhammad's dismissal of the Const. Assembly in 1954)
(126): memo from US ambassador confirms that the US has interest in democratic procedure/'appearance of legitimacy'
(127): Fed Court rules in favor of Ghulam Muhammad's dismissal --making a case against oligarchic power [!]
(127): One Unit proposals, towards "controlled democracy" and administrative centralization
[have to be understood in the context of political illegitimac(y--these ministers were finding it impossible to even win seats in the assemblies!]
(128): elections to Const. Assembly in1955--ML win 20 of 32 seats; US happy
(128): Islamic Republic born on 23 March 1956 [worth remembering that this was the work of the pro-West].Gives Pres. inordinate power.
(130): Suhrawardy comes to power as PM [has to work with US, of course--think about what it means, again, that the US was another 'power center,' in effect]
(131): Admiral Radford on Army as an ally 'which no other friendly power can match'
(135-136): Aid not being delivered at rate promised, infuriating Ayub. Nixon, friend of Pakistan, understands.
(136): military taking up 65% of government revenues at this point [highlights the urgent need for aid from US, for state-builders' perspective]
(138): here, wants to complement Huntington's argument about failure of political institutions, by talking about the personal characteristics of Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan (that this is important for understanding the Coup, in other words)
(140): political 'shenanigans' in build-up to coup
(140-141): key--serious fiscal crisis in 1958, drain of foreign exchange reserves
(141): important--socialists might get elected at the polls, worries Ayub! [this connects the coup issue to issues of the autonomy of the State--you are pre-emptively worried, in effect, that the State apparatus will be put to some other use]
(141): amidst all this, Baluchistan lowers the Pakistani flag and announces its intention to secede (Mirza has hand in this, it is being alleged?)
(142): Mirza worry that "men of character" won't be returned at the polls
(143): Ayub confident about Army ability to step in at any time, if things were to "get out of hand"
(151): US wants its cake, eating and having both--wants democratic government, but the election of people favorable to its interests.
(151): general elections originally scheduled for November 1958, it seems
(153): Dulles saying that US supports democracy in principle. Exceptions can be made under limited circumstances, however.
(154): Shah proposes to Ayub that the countries merge--July 1958!
(157): important--intelligence analysts attribute coup to Mirza/Ayub's worry that general elections would see Noon-Suhrawardy come to power, E. Bengal would make serious inroads
(160): Palace intrigues culminating in Ayub expelling Mirza
(160): ZA Bhutto is commerce minister in the martial law cabinet, appointed by Mirza before Ayub's takeover
(161): the ministers re-take their oaths, after Mirza's resignation
(164): Coup sanctioned by Supreme Court (as a revolution, no less!)
(170-171): Justice Munir says constitution can be approved by public acclaim, a la the Greeks!
(171-172): Martial Law existed to carry out basic reforms that Pakistan had been unable to implement, thus far
(172-173): reform proposals--including idea of mixing Urdu and Bengali in a language; roman script, etc.
(175-176): Ayub pandering to Americans in the writing of the new constitution [again, we see them as a power center quite clearly--need to include this fact, obviously, in the theory]
(176): the farce of Ayub's thinking on BD
(178): Bhutto is on the constitution commission that helps to think through Ayub's constitution [Ayub doesn't accept their recommendations in toto]
(178): announced in March 1962 as the 'blending of democracy with discipline'[!]
(180-181): US wanted to avoid an arms race between India and Pakistan
(181): Pakistan dependent on US to finance its military [need to quantify this, really--make sense of the 'autonomy' in this way would be very helpful]
(182): January 1958--Ayub fighting with Truman over India and Communism -- when Ayub gets tanks anyway, he makes up by sending him three ducks that he had shot the previous day [!!!]
(185-186): the Badaber Base (sending U-2 spy planes, what have you), 1958-1968
(186-187): important--numbers on GDP and military budget and US aid (limited to early 60s, though)
(188): US reconsidering its goals--but realizes centrality of military and Pakistan, and the danger of the democratic process [good quote, here, about the danger of political parties emerging]
(192): Ayub tied his political fortunes to the Muslim League, which had degenerated terribly by this point (even his brother doesn't join his party!)
(193, 200): 60s as marking a shift away from the US, to an extent--as the US begins to eye India following Sino-Indian conflict in '62
(196): Ayub cables Kennedy in 1961, concerned that military aid might be going towards India
(200): Army had, by now, doubled since partition--it was threatening to become not Pakistan having army but Army having Pakistan
(201): ZA Bhutto beginning to assert himself--though this will lead to agitation around Kashmir and 1965 war
(207): no coordination with leaders of Kashmiri resistance in '65, prior to the 'uprising' that was to launch the war--the assumption was that they would rise spontaneously!
(236): Figures on gov't spending, in the context of this war -- 1.6 billion dollars on military expenditure between 1958-1965, about 50% of total gov't expenditure!
(236-237): the War heightened tensions with the US considerably (Shoaib vs. Bhutto)
(237-238): Lyndon Johnson warns Ayub, around this time, that Bhutto is "damn dangerous"
(239): Tashkent Accord, Jan 1966--Shastri dies that day; at home there are protests; the Ayub-Bhutto split takes final shape (Bhutto had been posturing as a dissenter--by that summer he had left the cabinet)
(244): Yahya takes charge, abrogating the constitution
(250): Yahya staffing his 'cabinet' with his favored officers -- including Major General Sher Ali Khan, who as minister of information will sponsor Islamists
(251): Yahya moves to control growing power of labor unions (no details given, but new labor policy was promulgated)
(252): 1962 constitution had stipulated that for the next 20 years minister of defence would be a military person
(253): policy of land allotments, begun under Ayub, as well as Fauji Foundation and Army Welfare Trust [remember that in the Siddiqa (via Zaidi), this is a policy that takes shape under Zia]
(254, 258): Nov 1969 announces elections for Oct 1970. Abolishes "One Unit", restores one-man vote (which gives E. Pakistan 169 seats in NA, vs. 144 for West)
(256): Pak economy suffering in aftermath of 1965 war (#'s)
(258-259, 260): The ISI makes its appearance in the build-up to the 1970 elections, but establishment was underestimating the strength of the PPP and Awami League
(259): Tribal chief in NWFP lamenting universal suffrage--"If they're all able to vote, it will be difficult to pay them all!"
(260): Mujib had good relations with Adamjee and the House of Haroon
(261): Flooding and cyclone coupled with Yahya's druken speech
(262): "The regime was astounded by the results..." Gul Hassan says, "Let's back Bhutto"
(263-267): important--Military was already planning an alternative to Mujib ("Operation Blitz", planned by Yaqub, who later resigns however b/c he only sees a political solution to post-election tension. Tikka Khan takes over, already known as the "Butcher of Baluchistan". Some kind of 'concealed' regime/support for Bhutto is on the cards (NA has to be postponed, because Bhutto refuses to show in early March--round table conferences are further postponed). Talks fail, aleady worry is that Mujib might use power to reduce army's influence.
(268, 270): mutiny in the ranks -- 8 East Bengal REgiment kills its West Pakistani CO
(268): Roedad Khan as hawk!
(269): Niazi and Tikka Khan, re: "scorched earth" policy in E. Bengal
(271-272): Aug 1969 is when talk begins, w/ Nixon, of using Pakistan as intermediary for US and China talks. Kissinger's visit, of course, is in 1971 (argument here is that this is distracting Yahya from issues at home).
(272-273, 287): Yahya becoming close to Nixon (Nixon also didn't like Indira Gandhi), which would pay off around '71 war, though not to the extent Yahya would have liked (a false sense of security, which made him less conciliatory)
(274): Chou En-Lai has 17 hours of talks with Kissinger--mentioning Indian 'expansionism' and support for Pakistan, over Bangladesh
(277): [shameful treatment of E. Bengal atrocities by Shuja Nawaz.]
(284-285): CIA sees writing on the wall, despite apparent military success
(285): important--India not only interested in hurting Pakistan, but also forestalling the emergence of radicals and Leftists in E. Bengal
(298): Yahya speaks of 120 million mujahids ready to defend E. Bengal from full Indian invasion [hah!]
(307): a new constitutional package, in journalists' hand, but never actually read out -- "nine months too late"
(320-321): 1971 transfer of power as a 'putsch' by junior officers, after Yahya had actually announced his intention to preside over a new constitution
(320): "the army that facilitated his direct rise to the presidency dropped him in the end."
(323): Bhutto sacks 1,300 civil servants
(323): Bhutto moves against the army (but retires the more intelligent generals, keeping many of those that supported the war)
(324, 338-339, 343): important--Bhutto's decision to constitute FSF comes in context of Army (Gul Hassan Khan) not cooperating fully with his injunctions; creation, in effect, of a parallel authority to Pakistani Army (at 18,000 people in 1976!)
(325): Bhutto removes Gul Hassan Khan and Rahim Khan, March 1972--for 'bonapartist' tendencies
(326): 21 April 1972 Bhutto takes oath as President/CMLA (under provisional constitution approved by NA)
(328-330): Army brief to Bhutto, before Simla negotiations -- not as if it were a defeated army, for one
(330-331): Triumph for Bhutto at Simla
(331-333): Bhutto politicking--deals with JUI and NAP re: coalition gov'ts in 1972 -- by 1975, though, he had smashed this accord and dismissed the gov'ts (sent the Army into Baluchistan--"inviting the Army back into the political process," says Nawaz)
(333-334): Ahmed Rashid, Najam Sethi, etc. gone to 'fight' in Baluchistan--Sethi kept in solitary confinement for seven months!
(335): important--"key role being played by the army in propping up civilian rule."
(335-337): key--planners of a military coup were arrested -- Bhutto chooses a 'fawning' an 'obsequious' General Zia to be head of the Attock tribunal (this is despite the fact that Brigadier Nawazish had recommended he be courtmartialed for participating in Black September operations against orders)
(337-338): Zia's promotion, over six generals (simultaneously Bhutto had lost a lot of support in the Army because of his treatment of the accused in the trial)
(339-340): Dr. IH Usmani and nuclear weapons -- balks at idea of a weapons program at a secret meeting in Multan in 1972
(342-343): The 1973 Constitution (April 1973) -- a parliamentary system, albeit with a strong centre (apparently in exchange for Islamist provisions)
(343-344): astonishing eulogy to Bhutto, from Zia, re: attention showered on Pak. Army
(344): Bhutto calling on the 'ancien regime' to shore up his rule
(345-347): Bhutto fixes 1977 elections -- himself embarassed by how lop-sided his victory was, apparently
(348): PNA begins campaign of mass agitation -- petit-bourgeois elements
(349): this is when Bhutto, in vain, bans alcohol and promises an Islamic system in order to appease them--April 22, he declares martial law
(349-350): there is rumbling discontent in the Army, especially amongst junior officers
(350-351): US-Bhutto relationship, blowing hot and cold after Nixon/Kissinger leave the White House
(352-353): July 4, 1977--Zia's coup (Bhutto had distanced himself from his core, surrounded himself with sycophants, and alienated the business/banking community) [obviously Aijaz Ahmed is superior on this score]
(359-360): here, also, Nawaz is attributing a new "Culture of Entitlement" to the Zia era--a "new crop of millionaire generals."
(359, 363): Zia promised elections within 90 days! (couldn't hold elections, obviously, as PPP would win--canceled both the proposed 1977 ones and the 1979 elections, as the writing is on the cards: re: local body elections; Bhutto is also getting huge support at rallies, don't forget)
(360): important--narrative, here, is that far from fading from political life, the Army ended the Zia decade very much on top. an empowered ISI, ethnic conflict ravaging civil society.
(362): Zia became president on 16 December 1978, deposing Faiz Ilahi Chaudry (who had been Bhutto's president)
(363): Supreme Court, of course, gave Zia legal cover, invoking the Doctrine of Necessity (making martial law superior to the Constitution, in the process); March 1981 some took oath under a PCO
(365): Bhutto hung
(366-367): Pakistan outsourced its writ to tribal leaders, in FATA
(367-378): Pakistan sheltering the radicals against whom Daud was cracking down (Hekmatyar, of course)
(370): beginning, of course, of the strategic relationship with the USA after USSR invades Afghanistan on December 24, 1979
(371): Pakistan became world's largest heroin supplier
(372): Defence spending 'jump' after invasion--up to $1.86 billion in 1981
(373): The ISI was coming into prominence, initially to the chagrin of Zia, apparently (though he took full advantage, of course)
(374): 67% of the aid was going to the fundamentalists by 1987; most to Hekmatyar
(374): another estimate is one-third to Hekmatyar, one-third to Rabbani (Massoud), and the rest to the others (these figures discount Soviet aid, don't forget)
(376): Reagan comes with a 3.2 billion dollar aid plan (return to democracy is Pakistan's "internal situation")
(380): classic -- the 1984 referendum text
(381): Junejo-Zia confrontation over cabinet posts
(382): Martial law lifted 30 December 1985
(382): B. Bhutto returns to Lahore on 10 April 1986, and one million people turn out to greet her
(384): the tensions between Zia and Junejo eventually culminate in the latter's dismissal (military is not informed of this)
(385): changes in the demographics of the Army (urbanization meant that more were lower middle-class, a la Zia)
(386): Pakistan base in Saudi (some 20,000 troops, in 1983)
(387): important--Zia's time also saw the army's deepest penetration of the civil service--about a quarter of the forty senior bureaucratic posts. Ambassadorial posts and lower level positions, as well. And martial law meant that military was in charge in the provinces, too. "He realized that his only constiutency was the Army."
(389): BCCI corruption--helping gov't get foreign exchange, and boosting reserves
(390): decline in US-Pakistan relationship under Zia, b/c of the 'nuclear programme'
(390-391): Pressler and Solarz amendments, where it has to be verified that Pakistan wasn't pursuing nuclear weapons
(396): After the Zia crash on 17 Aug 1988, army high command took the decision to pursue the constitutional path (no details here--but done in a way that confirmed rank of Army over Civil, argues Nawaz) [certainly an empty transition, if ever there was one--even still, Zia had promised elections in Nov 1988, and those would still take place]
(411, 422): important--the 'troika' (President, PM, Army Chief) would contest power for the next decade
(411-412): Hamid Gul cobbles together the IJI (Nawaz Sharif who had been finance and chief minister of Punjab after being picked by Lt. Gen., Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi who was ex-PPP)
(412-413): Beg and Ishaq Khan, separately, were both willing to have elections (even as Gul said they needed more time to build up IJI)
(413): 1988 elections: first-past-the-post helped PPP win more seats than it had popular vote; Nawaz, though, became Chief Minister of the Punjab. "Bhutto had a victory but not a real mandate."
(414-415): a 'gentleman's argeement' that there were certain things that Bhutto couldn't touch (five points)
(415): PPP makes mistake of agreeing to support Ghulam Ishaq Khan in the presidential elections
(416): Bhutto's tense relations with Beg and Khan
(423-425): differences with Hamid Gul and Beg over Afghanistan--resulting in former's dismissal
(425): Bhutto also tried to bring the ISI under control, appointing Kallue to the chagrin of Beg and the military; she was depending on advice of Imtiaz Ahmed and Naseerullah Babar, both people whom were not trusted by the army establishment
(426-427): tensions come to a head over Sirohey--though Bhutto noting that Beg didn't expect Sharif to win the ensuing elections, thought instead that he would be the matchmaker of a hung parliament, or something
(428): Altaf Hussain was rejected from the Army, for being a 'refugee'
(429): Aitzaz Ahsan as Interior Minister, at this time
(430): key--Bhutto dismissed by Beg and Khan in Aug 1990, as issues accumulate (she was grooming her own COAS), on grounds of inefficiency/corruption
(432): US and IMF, even, were warm to the Bhutto gov't, here -- it is primarily the military and civil establishment that is responsible for her fall
(433): Roedad Khan was involved in this dismissal, allegedly
(433): Beg 'takes back' the ISI after dismissing Bhutto (Kallue removed)
(434): wow--Rs. 140m were distributed to help opponents of the PPP in the 1990 elections; see the breakdown, here
(435): IJI wins Nov 1990 elections--Bhutto elected leader of the opposition
(436): apparent harmony between political leaders and Army, at this early stage of the Sharif gov't
(436): a 'pro-business' gov't--seeing to it that earlier nationalizations were undone, etc.; "has the support of the business community"
(437): US sanctions, b/c of the continued nuclear program
(438): Tensions emerging between Sharif and Beg, re: Gulf War
(439): Beg becoming increasingly loony as he becomes a 'lame duck' (western-zionist conspiracies, etc.)
(443): Asif Nawaz appointed COAS
(444): Sharif and Ijazul Haq allied on the third anniversary of Zia's death--but soon to part ways, as Ijazul Haq aligned himself with Musharraf in 1999
(445): important--Army's annual turnover was 12-14 billion rupees in 1991 -- a "huge industrial conglomerate" (twice as big as the biggest private conglomerate at the time, the Crescent Group, which had an annual turnover of six billion rupees)
(446): again, a balancing act would be necessary--the Army had hardly vanished from the political scene
(447-448): "strong" relationship between the US and Asif Nawaz' army, at this time, though nuclear issue and terrorism remained problems
(449): tensions between Sharif and Ghulam Ishaq Khan--former making moves to remove the 8th amendment, but didn't have the leverage
(450): Asif Nawaz given a BMW by Shahbaz Sharif! (they had been distributing them to other generals)
(449-452): and tensions between Sharif and Asif Nawaz
(452): Sharif made Javed Nasir, a fundoo, DG ISI (Nasir wouldn't even look at women when they entered the room)
(452): CIA giving Nawaz signals that the army ought to intervene (the abiding concern being the nuclear programme, it seems?)
(453): Hamid Gul is retired, after refusing the transfer ordered by Nawaz
(454-455): Nawaz and Sharif coming to loggerheads over policy in Sindh, as PML was backing MQM at the time. Nawaz was 'overstepping' his duty and threatening the coalition with MQM, in Sharif's eyes.
(456-457): Gen. Nawaz allegedly being asked to take power in coup, by numerous figures
(459): tension between Sharif and Khan over who was to succeed Asif Nawaz
(466-467): relations with the US are deteriorating, under Bill Clinton's time in office (again, Kashmir and nuclear program are the issues). not helped by Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir as DG ISI (replaced eventually by Qazi, on orders of Waheed)
(469): attempted repeal of 8th Amendment, by Sharif
(469): succession battle within PML, after Junejo dies in March 1993
(470): President Ishaq sacks the gov't after an inflammatory speech by Nawaz (backed by Waheed) -- but Supreme Court does not side with him
(471-472): Army as kingmaker in agreement that sees both Sharif and Ishaq resign--replaed by Qureshi, an IMF and banker's man
(473): Qureshi introduced the independence of the State Bank from the Ministry of Finance and exposed some defaulters on gov't loans from Sharif's party, with the support of the Army [here described as freeing it from the 'thicket' of politics; but obviously a profoundly anti-democratic measure, at its heart]
(473): Bhutto wins October 1993 elections--again a victory, but not a mandate
(474): Bhutto knew she had to be more careful re: the Army and Intelligence Services, the second time around
(474): Pakistan contributed 'peacekeeping' troops to Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti
(477): abortive Islamist coup--found out and snuffed out
(477-478): mistrust in the early Clinton years, again, though Bhutto did her best (very successful visit to Washington in early 1995)
(478): Mullah Omar acquired support after dealing with the rape and murder of Herati villagers by renegade Mujahideen (who had been running a tax-collection checkpoint)
(479): Taliban, in this narrative, not created by Pakistan but collaborated with very readily, of course (then, as now, needed to dislodge pro-India Tajik force)
(481-482): Karamat made COAS, after Waheed's term is up
(483-486): the issues leading up to Leghari's sacking of Bhutto in November 1996 -- have to do with corruption and the economy [but the economic issues are not at all dealt with, here--mentioned as depleting foreign exchange reserves, etc.]
(487): Sharif trounces all opposition in February 1997 elections -- PPP reduced to 18 seats!
(487): Removes 8th Amendment by passing the 13th Amendment -- Leghari and the COAS did not have objections, though
(487-489): Crisis re: Chief Justice Ali Shah--events are very hectic, Leghari ends up resigning, Chief Justice ends up sacked, and Sharif wins.
(492): India, under BJP, weighed up cost-benefit on its economy of the nuclear test--confident that it could withstand the expected shocks
(493-495): Sharif decides on retaliatory test in response, against Karamat's advice [no taking the high ground, here]. the economic consequences stood to be grave [how do you make sense of this? clearly in violation of any rational person's interests re: stability of Pakistani capitalism]
(497): Senate blocks 15th Amendment -- Sharif's "caliphate" amendment
(498-499): Sharif and Karamat fall out, allegedly over Karamat's speech re: founding of an NSC
(500): October 1998, after Karamat leaves post two months early, Sharif chooses Musharraf (picked over more senior, more suitable candidates--ostensibly b/c of lack of base in the Army)
(517-518): Sharif allegedly on board re: Kargil invasion
(520-522): re: pulling out, it was a problem of saving national face (Musharraf here is reported saying that he left this up to Sharif, who made the decision; Sharif says that Musharraf asked him to pull out)
(524): in September, Shahbaz Sharif has the US release a statement regarding opposition to an unconstitutional takeover.
(525): Touching moment with Sharif senior, where Musharraf and Sharifs are deemed brothers, apparently (one month before coup)
(526): Sharif wants to replace Musharraf with Lt. Gen. Ziauddin (who had been made DG ISI)
(527): Sharif, quite simply, didn't have the backing of the Army to remove Musharraf--instead, it sided with the ousted General.
(528): the third of Musharraf's seven goals, in coming to power, was to "revive the economy and restore investor confidence." (Nawaz noting that he made progress on this score)
(529): Supreme Court judgement of May 2000, LFO of 2002, 17th amendment all gave extraordinary legal cover to Musharraf.
(530): Supreme Court acquiescence
(531): 'successful' April 2002 referendum
(532): MMA wins 18 seats
(532): Musharraf brought some 1,000 military officers into senior positions in the civil administration, academia, etc." -- this ensured continued loyalty of the military, of course
(533): his King's party prevented the passage of a Women's Rights Bill in 2006
(533): troika had been replaced by a one-legged stool (Shaukat Aziz became PM in August 2004)
(533): Musharraf's regime continued the 'pro-business trend'--attracting investment flows from Pakistanis and the Middle East
(535): Ambassador Ayub trying to convince Omar not to blow up the statues at Bamiyan
(536): Taliban de-weaponized Kandahar
(538): Musharraf had been shunned by Clinton; but 9/11 changed everything, of course (an 'anchor of stability' -- what Nixon had called the Shah and Marcos both)
(541): the seven demands made after 9/11 attacks, to which Musharraf partly agreed (objected to some, apparently)--nonetheless, this is relayed back to US and then becomes fact as total agreement [unclear why, how, in this narrative]
(542): Pakistan had recognized Taliban after capture of Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997 -- against the advice of Karamat
(542-543): Mahmud Ahmed, Musharraf's DG ISI, was an Islamist, and removed by Musharraf soon after the US attack on Afghanistan
(546): Musharraf had given space to the Islamists in order to combat Nawaz and Bhutto--this gave the MMA a respectability it never ought to have had
(547-548): important--economic 'progress' during the Musharraf period. Saw to it that the investors were kept happy [again, here it's not a case of a coordinated project--rather it's a question of what capitalists are happy with, and when they feel compelled to organize themselves (ought to look at the disorganization of labor, too)]
(551): AQ Khan corruption and dealings with Iran, Libya, NK
(557): PEMRA and censorship
(559): Musharraf talking of a French-style presidential system
(560): sacking of Chaudry, overturned by Supreme Court
(560-561): Declaration of Emergency, Nov 2007--coup within a coup (stating elections would be held January 2008). Musharraf left position of COAS on 28 November, though, bowing to internal and external pressure.
(570-571): changing composition of Army, by ethnicity
(572): the 'Zia Bharti'
(575): miltiary's share of the budget, viz-a-viz health and education
(576): perks go only to those who make it at the higher echelons -- a steep privilege curve
(582): too much power goes to the Army Chief--need a division of power amongst regional commanders
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(1) key point is to make sense of institutional interests/personal interests within a context that is set by the contours of class politics. this is what i hope to add to this literature. in other words, its possible to see that some of the balancing act between military and civil plays out without interference, on the basis of competing interests--it is when structural interests are threatened, though, that it needs to be adjudicated directly. [in other words, it is a mistake to think that everything that happens within the institutions is mandated by the underlying class structure--but it is the case that larger questions cannot be resolved without consulting that class structure]
(2) must make use of the constructs of 'structural autonomy' and 'political autonomy' (and somewhere in between these two has to fit the notion of the hand of Empire)
(3): should emphasize the continuity of the 'form of state' (Bhutto as martial ruler, Zia w/ Junejo, Bhutto w/ Beg/Khan, etc.)
(4): when speaking about US role, important to note that they figure directly only really in the periods where their interest is most intense (so in the 50's and80's and 2000's, but not so much in the 90's). will have to make this more airtight, but this seems defensible at first glance.
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