akbar zaidi, "state, military and social transition" (2005)

(5173): the core claim--Pakistan's middle classes already have access to political power, and thus prefer to be partners of military gov't (see 5174--they have "no need to struggle" for democracy)

(5173): summarizing other accounts:

1. Jinnah would have led us to democracy, but he died
2. Pakistani elite had no roots in what would come to be Pakistan
3. democracy would have meant the emancipation of E. Pakistan, which could not be allowed
4. low level of capitalist development meant that there were not many social groups who could have pushed democracy (large landowners were averse)
5. most well-organized institutions in Pakistan were army and bureaucracy

(5174): Pakistan has not had a 'democratization' process--at best, it will continue to have "praetorian democracy" [dubiously constructed thesis--useful term, though]

(5174-5175): in brief class formation narrative, landlords are quickly sidelined (even in the early period, the bureaucracy is looking to give industrialists a 'leg up'; and then you have the Green Revolution)

(5175): here you get infuriating deployment of the 'm-class'

(5175): contradictory character of Bhutto (though never welcomed the industrialists back, he's aruging) -- contrast this w/ Aijaz Ahmad

(5175): SUMMARY picture of the period 1947-1977: emergent m-class; great progress of industrialists but stymied by Bhutto; 'feudals' in decline, but some capitalist landlords in the ascendancy

(5175): with Zia, the military bureaucracy emerges [re-emerges?] as a key, entrenched entity (this is where you get the beginnings of Millibus, he's arguing)

(5176): three of four elections after 1988 were rigged, he's arguing

(5176): again, the middle-classes! [goodness--they have economic power?! wtf are they?]

(5177): once more!

(5177): important--the question, here, of the military's increasing role in the economy [the question here, really, is whether it increases the autonomy of the State? it's unclear, though, that we're operating in anything but a capitalist environment. control over some re-investment does not mean control over money markets. this aside, why would it be that economic investments would require political control? they only require pliable politicians. though this is an insight, in and of itself]

(5178): civil society as a passive actor

(5179): dynamic account, trying to describe the rise of the 'intermediate classes' -- politicized classes, incorporating Cheema's account of local-level gov't. "the nature and form of the state changing markedly..." [this is important, within limits. my account will have to be able to resist charges of being static, so will have to think through the evidence presented here]

(5180): localization of politics leading to "politics of patronage"

(5180): key--the thesis here becomes very difficult to sustain once you try and substantiate (a) middle-classes; (b) the political power they allegedly possess