leon trotsky, history of the russian revolution (1930)

(xv): revolutions as marked by the direct interference of the masses in historical events

(xvi): organization as 'piston box'

(4-7): key--combined and uneven development--"privilege of historic backwardness", etc.

(9): important--a hesitant bourgeoisie, entangled with the landed class

(14): contradictions in the army, which are critical, introduced by universal military service

(17): the army disintegrates--"peace at any cost"

(21): dissolution of the Duma in September 1915 a challenge to the bourgeoisie, but burden taken up by workers

(24): key, of course, will be the incapacity of the State to effect repression

(27): 1908-1911 as the ebb--period of counterrevolution/reaction

(28): Menshevism vs. Bolshevism (former taking shape in period of reaction; latter rising on the crest of revolutionary agitation after)

(34-35): importance of the peasantry--the Stolypin reforms, need for an ally

(36): the class question within the peasantry [we are entitled to ask if this is overoptimistic, re: the poorer peasants, etc.]

(38): peasant had to be led by the worker [we can make of this what we will]

(39): summary statement of the claims--agrarian problem couldn't be solved by the bourgeoisie, so you confronted two problems in 1917: (1) a peasant war, otherwise characteristic of bourgeois development [again, think through this--he is taking this as emblematic of 'combined and uneven development']; (2) a proletarian insurrection.

(77, 80): reactionary nature of police vs. progressive role of the soldiers

(87): late Feb - "the masses make their own history"

(88-89): key to every revolution is a break in the disposition of the army; soldiers have to be convinced that the rebels are really rebelling

(102): important--"Petrograd achieved the Revolution. the rest of the country merely adhered to it." [but this has grave implications, for later, we can acknowledge--re: the peasantry]

(103): reflections on revolution and democracy [the problem is not the immediate problem of insurrection; but rather the problem of the social base]

(107, 110-111): important--against "spontaneous" theory of the revolution--it was a "well-founded commitment", made by a history of struggle

(351-352): critical--elaborating the "materialist method" -- proceeding from the objective to the subjective; the fundamental forces of the historical process are classes; political parties rest upon them. [such that the method reveals the 'inevitability' of the revolution--simultaneously, then, room for contingency and not? need to think through this]

(740): "the art of insurrection"--demands leadership, of course

(742): a rejoinder to the notion that attention to 'insurrectionary tactics' is "Blanquist" -- Blanquism obviously assumes that tactics are sufficient without mass backing. thus any failed revolution fails because of tactics. this is obviously untrue. but it doesn't obviate the need to think about tactics

(745-746): four political premises of a revolution

1. a crisis in the ruling classes
2. the new political consciousness of the revolutionary classes
3. the radicalization of the intermediate layers
4. the revolutionary party and an organized vanguard

(748): from revolutionary tactics to a majority, not vice-versa [reminds one of Luxemburg]

(749): quoting Lenin on the question of focusing on the capital [here, again, is contained the problem--not that I have an alternative, just a lament]

(751): key--the garrison of the capital had been won over before the insurrection itself

(757): the Red Guard and "Dual Power"

(758): the ruling classes--"accustomed to hearing about action on the telegraph"

(765): memorable--the fate of 'respectable families'

(769) ;the countermanding of official orders

(776): Mensheviks and the pre-parliament--captains of moderation

(777): 'weakness of the government exceeded all expectations"

(784): the CEC as a 'corpse'

(785): "having read about the Paris Commune, they made sure to seize the Bank"

(787): "most popular mass insurrection at history", though things need not all happen at once

(794): Kerensky trapped between Left and Right--though ceding, always, to the Right (reveals the bankruptcy of the captains of moderation)

(820): masses to the Left of the Party, though this was tested by the July days

(823): Bolsheviks as a "lever" for the Soviets [raises questions, of course, about the nature of leadership--that can't all be obviated by the success of this revolution

(825): September to December as the period in which revolution could have been made

(826, 828): question of insurrection via the Party, or Via the Soviets ["resolved," of course, via the MRC--an elected organ of the Soviet]

(827): Stalin misrepresenting Lenin to tar Trotsky

(829): "the coming over of the garrison decided the matter."

(832): key--the reason that the struggle could become 'conspiratorial' was precisely because the Bolsheviks were backed in such numbers