In 2008, the most recent year for which figures are available, the U.S. expenditure was 696.3 billion dollars, followed by Russia’s 86 billion and China’s 83.5 billion. The U.S. defense budget is 15 times that of Japan, 47 times that of Israel, and nearly 73 times that of Iran.
Saturday, May 29, 2010
Thursday, May 20, 2010
karl marx, capital (volume II)
chapter one: the circuit of money capital (109-144)
three main points:
chapter two: the circuit of productive capital (144-167)
(148-149): the vulgar economists, in the capitalist production process, see only the "simple production of commodities" -- 'use-values' destined for consumption.
(149): commodity vs. commodity capital (it is the latter as a moment of the circulation of capital)
(152): the insanity of the worker's position -- in the money with which his wage is paid, "the worker receives the transformed form of his own future labour or that of other workers. With one part of his past labour the capitalist gives him a draft on his own future labour."
(153): in the circuit of productive capital, money is 'evanescent' -- before, remember, it appeared as the purpose of the entire undertaking.
(154): addition to the class relation of M-C-M -- 'money' can simply outlast 'commodities' (capitalist can hoard it, put it in the bank, etc.)
(154): M-L is unlike all other exchanges, which is something unknowable to our vulgar friends
(156): capitalist does not care if his things are consumed--he cares only if they are bought (be it by wholesalers, merchants, what have you). this becomes important in considering crises.
(161): again, money vs. money capital, commodity vs. commodity capital, productive capital vs. mode of existence of mop as capital
(165): the reserve fund
chapter three: the circuit of commodity capital (167-180)
(172): again, our vulgar economists, focusing on P...P', could ignore the fact that all this was devoted to 'valorization'
(173): productive consumption and individual consumption (which it encompasses)
(175, 177, 178): key argument--this third form (the circuit of commodity capital) takes us immediately toward the social circuit, he's arguing. it twice presupposes 'c', from without. in other words, in the case of commodity capital, you require others outside the circuit who also have 'commodity capital'. however, this is not the case in 'money capital' circuit or 'productive capital' circuit.
chapter four, the three figures of the circuit (180-199)
(182): "each of these stages not only conditions the other, but at the same time excludes it..."
(183): "each delay... brings the coexistence into disarray"
(184): in sum--the particular circuits constitute simultaneous and successive moments of the overall process.
(185): the point emphasized throughout volume 1 -- looking at is this way, we see that capital is certainly not just money, but also not just a social relation. Capital is a movement, and not at all static.
(185-186): passages here to unpack about the 'independence' of value, as revealed by the circuit and experience of the individual capital.
(187): speaking of a tendency to monopoly?
(189): important--here writing about how capitalism can use means of production/labor, commodity capital, or money capital that have been acquired from other modes of production (i.e., that haven't themselves been commodified yet). the groundwork for notions of articulation is here. (see 190)
(190): but he goes one further, writing also about capital's definite tendency to transform pre-capitalist modes of production into capitalist, by drawing this production into its circulation process (how do we want to deal with this? kautsky/lenin)
(191): 'fractions of capital' -- since we're looking at the process from production to final consumption
(192): money--means of pruchase vs. means of payment (discussing 'velocity' of circulation, by means of this distinction)
(194): again, this is the earlier point -- the circuits need not be entwining circuits of capital, precisely because you don't need everything to be produced by capitalist social relations.
(196): a very Brenner-ish exposition of the social relation at capitalism's heart--"rests fundamentally on the social character of procution." denouncing the other view (the Smithian view) as "typical of the bourgeois horizon". mode of commerce is subordinate to the mode of production, in other words, whereas they see the mode of production wherever they see its mode of commerce.
(197): speaking, here, of the rising organic composition of cpaital.
(198): the demand for means of production must always be smaller in value that the commodity product of the capital. in other words, he produces more value than he took out of circulation. so is the question one of missing demand? (discuss this)
chapter 5: circulation time
(200): production time--duration of stay in the production sphere
(202-203): capitalist production exhibits a tendency to shorten as much as possible the excess of production time over working time (there will always be this excess, but the idea is to limit as much as possible)
(203): circulation time--wherein capital exists as commodity and money capital; "circulation time acts as a negative limit... on production time..."
(204): classical political economy stuck in the illusion that circulation time is productive--that it valorizes capital
(204): C-M is much more difficult than M-C, remember
(206): perishability of the commodity is a barrier to its becoming the purview of capitalist production (until you have a 'populous place' and concentration')--example of breweries and dairies
chapter 6: the costs of circulation
(208-210): those capitalists who only mediate a change in the form of value, do not produce surplus-value. they take a cut, and they help free up production time. thus wage-laborers engaged in these industries perform surplus labor for their capitalists, but this is not surplus time from the perspective of society--the capitalist will, of course, lose those two hours. [all of this needs to be discussed]
(212): important--the division of labor does not make things into surplus-value producing functions, unless the entire function being divided is already a product- or value- forming function to begin with [so the university? how do we talk about 'commodification', if this is the case?]
(214): the individual capitalist can make 'extra' profits if he keeps his 'costs of storage' down, but this is not the same thing as generating extra surplus-value from a social perspective [again, needs discussion]
(216): capital and labor-power is needed to maintain and store the commodity stock--these are expenses. (1) insofar as they arise from "time" demands, they can be thought of as circulation costs; (2) insofar as their purpose is to 'conserve' value (i.e. storage?), they do not add value but are critical all the same.
(217): stock exists in three forms:
(221): important--as capitalist production develops, scale of production is determined less by immediate demand for the product, and more by the scale of the capital at captialist' disposal and its drive for valorization... mass of capital tied up as commodity capital grows, and commodity stock grows [da da dum... foreshadowing of crisis]
(222): the commodity stock phase is scary for the capitalist--he is going to be throughly disciplined, in this stage and in general, by the pressures of competition (innovation by other capitalists is ongoing, remember)
(224-225): expense required to maintain commodity stock are merely 'deductions from social wealth'
(225): "commodity stock is not a condition of uninterrupted sale, but a consequence of the saleability of the commodities"
(225-226): crux, introducing 'transportation costs', but first a comment--"all circulation costs that arise from a change in form of the commodity cannot add any value to it." these costs will be paid for out of the surplus product.
(226-227): there can be 'productive transport', insofar as consumption requires a change of location--and, obviously, the transport that's involved within the production process [discuss--what counts, what doesn't]
chapter 7: turnover time and number of turnovers
(234): can't really see turnover from the perspective of the third circuit (C'...C'), but rather, from the perspective of the first two (M...M'), and (P...P)
(235): turnover is the name given to the circuit of capital, when it is understood not as an isolated act but as a "periodic process". it includes, of course, both the production time and circulation time of a given capital.
chapter 8: fixed capital and circulating capital
(237): the pecularity of 'fixed capital' (which is a part, but not all, of the constant capital) is that it maintains an independent use-shape in the production process (i.e., for a given period of time that is longer than one iteration of the process, itself)
(238): "as long as it continues to function," a part of its value will remain fixed in it. this is contrasted, of course, to 'fluid capital.'
(241): reminding us that 'capital' only exists with reference to social relations of production--so, too, then, the distinction between 'fixed capital' and 'circulating/fluid capital'. (presumably because the notion of 'fixity' presumes capitalist turnover)
(243): the value of 'fixed capital' has a dual existence--part of it remains attached to the original form, part of it ventures off into the commodity, eventually becoming money
(244): here the implication is about 'obstacles' to turnover/profitability, which is quite important--this is what's at stake, in other words, in this distinction: fluid capital transfers its entire value to the product, but the 'turnover' of fixed capital is interrupted (which has all sorts of consequences for the capitalist, of course).
(244-245): labor-power, with respect to this distinction, functions as 'fluid capital' (more precisely, he goes on to say, it is "the portion of the value of the productive capital that is spent" on the laborer's labor-power that is part of the fluid capital)
(246-248): here summarizing four conclusions
(251): extensive and intensive reproduction: the former, if the field of production is extended; the latter, if the means of production are made more effective.
(252): in defence of socialist planning--there is a lot of needless horizontal expansion owing to the lack of a "social plan"
(255): the average expenditure for the maintenance of a machine, etc., will go into the price of the product (not, obviously, the price of repairing for individual or freak accidents, etc.)
(257): the replacement of the 'fixed capital', of course, demands expansion/accumulation (earlier, he spoke about this coming from a reserve fund, but here he's acknowledging that you can't have the latter without the former, in a sense)
(261): the big capitalist accumulates a hoard that can be thrown into the purchase of fixed capital. this is what will become, in a sense, the credit system--when this hoard begins to function as 'capital', in the hands of other capitalist at whose disposal it is put.
chapter 9: the overall turnover of the capital advanced. turnover cycles.
(263): value turnover -- amount that comes back, each cycle
(264): speaking about the cycle of related turnovers as one of the 'material foundation' for business cycles. also noting, here, that crises precipitate large volumes of new investment [fruitful place to unpack things]
(267): credit system has the effect of speeding up consumption and production
chapter 10: theories of fixed and circulating capital, adam smith and the physiocrats [skipped]
chapter 11: theories of fixed and circulating capital, ricardo [skipped]
(304): summarizing, here, the confusion created by Adam Smith
(307): comparing the production of locomotives to the production of yarn, where in the latter capital circulates quickly and comes back, therefore, to assist the capitalist in the renewed purchase of labor-power, raw materials. in the former, not like this, so a much larger outlay of capital is required ("twelve times as much") (see also 310)
(308): definition of the working period, as contrasted to the working day
(311): at less developed stages of capitalism, production lines that require larger outlays of capital are often not pursued--they are done, instead, by the State. it is only with the credit system and the concentration of capital that this enables that these products are opened to capitalist production.
(312-313): here the example being given is the production of houses, where it is only in relatively developed capitalism that builders produce in large quantities for a market)
(314): example of the starving farmer and fat ox in India. hmm.
chapter 13: production time
(316): writing, here, about instances where all of the production time is not taken up by working time, but rather there is some time in which the product is left to be worked on by other forces (grapes in wine, agriculture, etc.)
(319): interesting reflection on the consequences of this for the worker -- where the production time does not require him, he has to find alternative sources of work (seasonal migration, etc.)
(320); this also has consequences for 'fixed capital', insofar as the disjuncture demands that it sid idle, at times.
(322): looking at forests, in particular -- the enormously small part of time taken up by working time, in this case, makes this more-or-less off-limits for capitalism (and has had, he's saying, the result of making forests completely irrational from the perspective of capitalism. can we expand this, perhaps, to say more about the environment? though it is a bit odd, because this presupposes their commodification? unpack)
(324): summary passage of the different permutations, and their consequences. worth reading through.
chapter 14: circulation time
(326): circulation time = selling time + purchasing time (see 329)
(327-328): selling time, of course, is affected by the geographical proximity of production to the market, which can be affected by technological revolutions in communication and transport
(329): introducing the 'world market' to hammer this point home--at a stretch, we could use this passage to speak about the impossibility of defining space/time outside of social relations
(330): the longer the circulation time, of course, the more the risk incurred by the capitalist that prices will fluctuate. this has the result, it's being noted, of predisposing different kinds of products to different levels of stock formation--owing to speculative considerations (see 331-332)
(333): the capitalist has some incentive to, every turnover cycle, retain some money and gradually add to his reserve fund. this has the effect of inuring him in the event of crisis.
chapter 15: effect of circulation time on the magnitude of the capital advanced [skipped]
chapter 16: the turnover of variable capital
(369): fixed capital/circulating capital distinction, once more
(371): definition of the annual rate of surplus value
(373): "it is only the capital actually operating in the labour process which creates surplus-value and to which all the laws given for surplus-value apply..."
(374, 378): the difference here, between capital A and B, is essentially one that hinges on a distinction between capital advanced vs. capital applied.
(379): summarizing, again, the problem being treated here (the value is presumably because this is something that the Ricardians had trouble with--see 373).
(381): important--here he is making the claim that the annual rate of surplus value is 'a comparison produced by the actual movement of capital itself' [need to cash this out through the examples of capital A, capital B, capital C. is he arguing that this is how it looks to the capitalists? an illusion, of sorts?]
(382): the mass of surplus value produced in ten turnover periods in the course of one year will be ten times that corresponding to one turnover period [the amount of capital being equal, it seems--cash out]
(386): important--distinction between capitalists A and capitalists B in terms of the source of the wages they pay--for the first (with turnover time of five weeks), every five weeks the source of wages paid for labor-power is produced by the working hours of the previous five weeks; this is not the case for capitalist B, who has to advance the wages without having it been renewed (here, the distinction is that the first capitalist sees the renewal of the 'form' of its value, whereas the second doesn't see this--both, of course, do see the replacement of its value in the object under production).
(388): important--considering the turnover of variable capital from the perspective of society, sees three things.
chapter 17: the circulation of surplus-value
(394): again, summarizing Capitalist A vs. Capitalist B
(396): the pooling of accumulated money capital through the credit system--extra money capital as no more than legal titles to future production, in this sense [a concrete way to make sense of the claim about this form of wealth's 'fictitious' nature]
(398-399): Thompson's claim, cited approvingly [I think?], regarding the fact that all the wealth constantly re-produced is much more than the accumulated money capital. [this is true, I think--but how do we make sense of wealth held in derivatives (600 trillion, at one point), or total financial assets (167 trillion), etc., which both exceed total GDP? is Marx outdated, here? or am I misunderstanding the argument about 'assets', and he's only talking about hoarded 'money capital'? the message is important all the same--capitalists cannot rest on their laurels]
(400): money supply must be enough to cope with fluctuations, and enough must be produced to cope with wear and tear
(404-407): question of where the money that pays for 'surplus-value' comes from? the final answer is that this is not a legitimate problem, in the first place. it makes no different whether the mass contains surplus-value, or not [remember, we are dealing with simple reproduction here, so the nature of the question is different from what we might think--see also 410, below]
(408): there are only two starting-points (workers and capitalists)--all other must receive money from these two, or have co-proprietary rights in this relationship (rent, interest, etc.)
(410): important--the answer to the question, still, is that, assuming simple reproduction, the capitalist class as a whole puts in the money required for circulation of the surplus-value, for the purposes of its individual consumption. in other words, workers purchase everything short of surplus-value; and other capitalists purchase that sliver [this is where Rosa Luxemburg floundered, famously]
(414): rising wages, oscillating prices--none of this makes anything but temporary differences
(415): a Botwinick like opening--abnormally high profits allow producers to pass on increased wage costs
(416): important--circuit of money is very different from circulation of money (former refers to things coming back to origins; the second just means moving from one entity to another)
(418): question of the historical precondition being a sufficient supply of precious metals [a Brenner/w-system question, maybe? not really, though--the former can accommodate this, i would think]
(419): additional money, in the case of expanded reproduction, has to be created by an increase in money
(422): Rosa Luxemburg problem--worker buying power
Chapter 18: Introduction (Part III)
(427-430): useful summary of what has been argued thus far
(434): again, re: differential turnovers, the problem is one of withdrawing commodities from the market (i.e., labor-power, means of production) without giving anything back, for a time.
(434): explicit note about the society to come (paper tokens instead of money, which would cease to exist in the sense of something that circulates)
(438): Smith misses the reproduction of 'constant' capital -- instead, he borrows from the Physiocrats the notion that 'fixed' vs. 'circulating' capital is the fundamental distinction.
(441): very important distinction between means of production, and means of consumption (something which Smith 'stumbles onto')
(444-446): two observations, re: the two departments
(449): what Smith does is not problematic insofar as it is true that rent/profit/wages are portions of the total value of any commodity. the mistake he makes is to, having shown this, 'reverse' the framing of the issue and make rent/profit/wages the source of value. [i don't understand exactly what this means, but the charge is here]
(451): again, against Smith's understanding of the issue [and here, at the bottom, it does seem as if the 'reverse' understanding, however counterintuitive, is indeed Smith's--'worker adds a value equivalent to his wages]
(452): Smith misses the problem of constant capital, once you zoom out and look at the reproduction of social capital [and partly, it seems, this is because of the preceding problem]
(453): Smith's two errors, then:
(458): again, Smith's reversal--for him, different forms of revenue form the 'component parts' of the commodity value annually produced, where in actual fact, it is the value annually produced (split into two, for the capitalist--variable capital and surplus value [and constant capital?]) that is split into revenue. [cash this out, why no constant capital, here? and what are the stakes of this confusion?]
(461-462): for those who care, a 'socio-property relations' definition of capitalism
(465): summary of Marx's critique of Smith's reversal
chapter 20: simple reproduction
(469): C' ... C' reveals the preconditions for social reproduction (i.e., when seen from the perspective of total social capital--need to produce both means of production and means of consumption)
(470): thus, when we are analyzing this process, we will need to look seriously at 'use-values' -- it is insufficient to consider the process in the abstract
(471-472): useful summary of the terms being employed
(476): first discussion of the phenomenon of 'flowing back' -- department I recovering the variable capital through department II (once deparatment II's capitalists have received payment for consumption goods from the workers of department I)
(477): relevant to remember, of course, that no one is getting 'richer' -- these are all exchanges of equivalents
(477): in short--it matters not whether this is advanced on account of the constant value portion of what they've produced or the surplus value. the money will flow back in this way.
(478, 483-4): we have gotten the result that, in the case of simple reproduction, I (variable + surplus) = II (constant) (because we have said, already, that II (surplus) can't be used to buy means of production).
(479-481): introducing the distinction between necessary means of subsistence (IIa) and luxury means of consumption (IIb)--and what follows is the attempt to show how they can balance, if capitalists buy in the correct proportions.
(484): the relationship between workers in luxury consumption and capitalists producing necessary means of subsistence parallels the relationship between workers in department I and capitalists in department II.
(486-487): key--the famous anti-underconsumptionist passage, where the theory is decried as pure tautology. worth thinking through how this fits in the prior analysis of the effects of crisis/inflation on luxury workers.
(487-488): good summary of the preceding
(490): important--we have seen from this that variable capital actually plays an important role in monetary circulation. and because workers live hand-to-mouth, it is required that it be advanced at "definite and short" intervals, irregardless of the turnover time.
(491-492): summary of the individual transactions involved in the 'balancing act'
(492): all this reproduces the relationship between wage-laborers and capitalists as well, don't forget
(495, 496, 497): key--we see that because of the phenomenon of 'flowing back', it is the money that department I itself cast into circulation that realizes its own surplus value (i.e., if we follow the chain of transactions) [question of whether this is under particular conditions--Dept I going first--or a general rule? a general rule, it would seem. the later passages would seem to confirm that this is true for all capitalists--particularly because of the point on p. 497 that the working-class could scarcely advance the money to realize the surplus-value.]
(497): all of this will be obscured by two circumstances: the appearance of money capital, and the sub-division of surplus-value
(504, 506, 508-509): the "riddle" being resolved--how can the value product be resolved into v+s, yet two thirds of the working day be spent on producing stuff that is going to function as constant capital? well, because from the perspective of value-creation, only v+s worth of 'new' value is created--whereas from the perspective of use-values, everything is new.
(512): response to Smith--the entire value of the annual product will not be consumed only by consumers (if it's meant by this, individual consumers), but by consumers (individual capitalists as consumers, and workers) and capitalists (as capitalists--or as 'productive' consumers) seeking new means of production.
(513): definition--value product (value newly created) vs. value of the product (total value of the mass of commodities)
(516): against Smith--labor power is not capital for the worker. it is a capacity (or a simple commodity that he sells). it only becomes capital in the hand of the capitalist.
(519): one big company store, of sorts
(523): variable capital always remains in the hands of the capitalist (in one form or another), so it can't be said to be 'revenue' for anyone. the money that workers get in wages are not conversions of variable capital, but just the value of their labor-power transformed into money.
(526): hoard formation has to be a part of the capitalist reproduction process, because capitalists will need to take money out of the production process to defray the costs of fixed capital
(535): key--introducing the two sections [here it becomes confusing]--section 1 pays for fixed capital with an extra 200 pounds, while section 2 gets the reflux from Department I, from section 1's purchase (which it then makes into a hoard--saving up for the day that it is capable of paying for its fixed capital costs)
(536): three different ways in which this can work (which are then developed over the next several pages)
(540): in sum--re: fixed capital and the two sections
(542): a law--if a greater portion of fixed capital is slated to be renewed, then the portion that is en route to its demise will be proportionately less
(543): important--this all will display a tendency towards disequilibrium/crisis (in other words, if you don't assume a constant proportion is not assumed between defunct fixed capital and fixed capital--remember this is all assuming simple reproduction)
(544-545): important--once you realize that the amount of fixed capital that needs to be replaced varies from year to year (and the production of other things remaining constant) you realize, also, that the problem can only be remedied by "perpetual relative over-production."
(546-548): for those who produce gold, department I does not appear as a seller, but only as a buyer [unpack, if necessary]
(552-553): repeating the example of production branches with long turnover times--withdrawing commodities without putting commodities back (thus a 'lag' created thanks to the money market)
(554): interesting discussion of slavery and the natural economy--a short history of all time, in a sense
(559): discussing the silliness of Destutt's theory of profit
(561): reference to the division of profit between capitalists (Destutt somehow thinks this is a source of profit)
(562): we see that this form of profit is parasitic, in one obvious sense, while also being a necessary "condition of production"
(564): self-laudatory Destutt as height of "bourgeois cretinism."
chapter one: the circuit of money capital (109-144)
three main points:
- (113) class relation is implicit in opposition of M-C-M', to C-M-C
- (112) distinction between 'money' and 'money capital', defined with respect to the process of accumulation. so money capital can have the function of money--what makes it capital, though, is its presence in a circuit of accumulation. this implies something interesting, perhaps, about what it presupposes (115--can't have it until you have the relevant class relations)
- (133) presentation of the phases alerts us to the problem of discontinuity
chapter two: the circuit of productive capital (144-167)
(148-149): the vulgar economists, in the capitalist production process, see only the "simple production of commodities" -- 'use-values' destined for consumption.
(149): commodity vs. commodity capital (it is the latter as a moment of the circulation of capital)
(152): the insanity of the worker's position -- in the money with which his wage is paid, "the worker receives the transformed form of his own future labour or that of other workers. With one part of his past labour the capitalist gives him a draft on his own future labour."
(153): in the circuit of productive capital, money is 'evanescent' -- before, remember, it appeared as the purpose of the entire undertaking.
(154): addition to the class relation of M-C-M -- 'money' can simply outlast 'commodities' (capitalist can hoard it, put it in the bank, etc.)
(154): M-L is unlike all other exchanges, which is something unknowable to our vulgar friends
(156): capitalist does not care if his things are consumed--he cares only if they are bought (be it by wholesalers, merchants, what have you). this becomes important in considering crises.
(161): again, money vs. money capital, commodity vs. commodity capital, productive capital vs. mode of existence of mop as capital
(165): the reserve fund
chapter three: the circuit of commodity capital (167-180)
(172): again, our vulgar economists, focusing on P...P', could ignore the fact that all this was devoted to 'valorization'
(173): productive consumption and individual consumption (which it encompasses)
(175, 177, 178): key argument--this third form (the circuit of commodity capital) takes us immediately toward the social circuit, he's arguing. it twice presupposes 'c', from without. in other words, in the case of commodity capital, you require others outside the circuit who also have 'commodity capital'. however, this is not the case in 'money capital' circuit or 'productive capital' circuit.
chapter four, the three figures of the circuit (180-199)
(182): "each of these stages not only conditions the other, but at the same time excludes it..."
(183): "each delay... brings the coexistence into disarray"
(184): in sum--the particular circuits constitute simultaneous and successive moments of the overall process.
(185): the point emphasized throughout volume 1 -- looking at is this way, we see that capital is certainly not just money, but also not just a social relation. Capital is a movement, and not at all static.
(185-186): passages here to unpack about the 'independence' of value, as revealed by the circuit and experience of the individual capital.
(187): speaking of a tendency to monopoly?
(189): important--here writing about how capitalism can use means of production/labor, commodity capital, or money capital that have been acquired from other modes of production (i.e., that haven't themselves been commodified yet). the groundwork for notions of articulation is here. (see 190)
(190): but he goes one further, writing also about capital's definite tendency to transform pre-capitalist modes of production into capitalist, by drawing this production into its circulation process (how do we want to deal with this? kautsky/lenin)
(191): 'fractions of capital' -- since we're looking at the process from production to final consumption
(192): money--means of pruchase vs. means of payment (discussing 'velocity' of circulation, by means of this distinction)
(194): again, this is the earlier point -- the circuits need not be entwining circuits of capital, precisely because you don't need everything to be produced by capitalist social relations.
(196): a very Brenner-ish exposition of the social relation at capitalism's heart--"rests fundamentally on the social character of procution." denouncing the other view (the Smithian view) as "typical of the bourgeois horizon". mode of commerce is subordinate to the mode of production, in other words, whereas they see the mode of production wherever they see its mode of commerce.
(197): speaking, here, of the rising organic composition of cpaital.
(198): the demand for means of production must always be smaller in value that the commodity product of the capital. in other words, he produces more value than he took out of circulation. so is the question one of missing demand? (discuss this)
chapter 5: circulation time
(200): production time--duration of stay in the production sphere
(202-203): capitalist production exhibits a tendency to shorten as much as possible the excess of production time over working time (there will always be this excess, but the idea is to limit as much as possible)
(203): circulation time--wherein capital exists as commodity and money capital; "circulation time acts as a negative limit... on production time..."
(204): classical political economy stuck in the illusion that circulation time is productive--that it valorizes capital
(204): C-M is much more difficult than M-C, remember
(206): perishability of the commodity is a barrier to its becoming the purview of capitalist production (until you have a 'populous place' and concentration')--example of breweries and dairies
chapter 6: the costs of circulation
(208-210): those capitalists who only mediate a change in the form of value, do not produce surplus-value. they take a cut, and they help free up production time. thus wage-laborers engaged in these industries perform surplus labor for their capitalists, but this is not surplus time from the perspective of society--the capitalist will, of course, lose those two hours. [all of this needs to be discussed]
(212): important--the division of labor does not make things into surplus-value producing functions, unless the entire function being divided is already a product- or value- forming function to begin with [so the university? how do we talk about 'commodification', if this is the case?]
(214): the individual capitalist can make 'extra' profits if he keeps his 'costs of storage' down, but this is not the same thing as generating extra surplus-value from a social perspective [again, needs discussion]
(216): capital and labor-power is needed to maintain and store the commodity stock--these are expenses. (1) insofar as they arise from "time" demands, they can be thought of as circulation costs; (2) insofar as their purpose is to 'conserve' value (i.e. storage?), they do not add value but are critical all the same.
(217): stock exists in three forms:
- productive capital
- individual consumption fund
- commodity stock/commodity capital
(221): important--as capitalist production develops, scale of production is determined less by immediate demand for the product, and more by the scale of the capital at captialist' disposal and its drive for valorization... mass of capital tied up as commodity capital grows, and commodity stock grows [da da dum... foreshadowing of crisis]
(222): the commodity stock phase is scary for the capitalist--he is going to be throughly disciplined, in this stage and in general, by the pressures of competition (innovation by other capitalists is ongoing, remember)
(224-225): expense required to maintain commodity stock are merely 'deductions from social wealth'
(225): "commodity stock is not a condition of uninterrupted sale, but a consequence of the saleability of the commodities"
(225-226): crux, introducing 'transportation costs', but first a comment--"all circulation costs that arise from a change in form of the commodity cannot add any value to it." these costs will be paid for out of the surplus product.
(226-227): there can be 'productive transport', insofar as consumption requires a change of location--and, obviously, the transport that's involved within the production process [discuss--what counts, what doesn't]
chapter 7: turnover time and number of turnovers
(234): can't really see turnover from the perspective of the third circuit (C'...C'), but rather, from the perspective of the first two (M...M'), and (P...P)
(235): turnover is the name given to the circuit of capital, when it is understood not as an isolated act but as a "periodic process". it includes, of course, both the production time and circulation time of a given capital.
chapter 8: fixed capital and circulating capital
(237): the pecularity of 'fixed capital' (which is a part, but not all, of the constant capital) is that it maintains an independent use-shape in the production process (i.e., for a given period of time that is longer than one iteration of the process, itself)
(238): "as long as it continues to function," a part of its value will remain fixed in it. this is contrasted, of course, to 'fluid capital.'
(241): reminding us that 'capital' only exists with reference to social relations of production--so, too, then, the distinction between 'fixed capital' and 'circulating/fluid capital'. (presumably because the notion of 'fixity' presumes capitalist turnover)
(243): the value of 'fixed capital' has a dual existence--part of it remains attached to the original form, part of it ventures off into the commodity, eventually becoming money
(244): here the implication is about 'obstacles' to turnover/profitability, which is quite important--this is what's at stake, in other words, in this distinction: fluid capital transfers its entire value to the product, but the 'turnover' of fixed capital is interrupted (which has all sorts of consequences for the capitalist, of course).
(244-245): labor-power, with respect to this distinction, functions as 'fluid capital' (more precisely, he goes on to say, it is "the portion of the value of the productive capital that is spent" on the laborer's labor-power that is part of the fluid capital)
(246-248): here summarizing four conclusions
- characteristics of fixed and fluid capital arise from the different turnovers of the productive capital that function in production (which is another way of seeing that they transfer their value to the product, in different ways)
- turnover of the fixed components spans several turnovers of the fluid components
- the capitalist has to advance capital for the fixed capital all at once, but the value is only realized bit by bit
- elements of fluid capital are steadily renewed in kind, with every turnover; the fluid capital is not renewed until it has to be re-purchased
(251): extensive and intensive reproduction: the former, if the field of production is extended; the latter, if the means of production are made more effective.
(252): in defence of socialist planning--there is a lot of needless horizontal expansion owing to the lack of a "social plan"
(255): the average expenditure for the maintenance of a machine, etc., will go into the price of the product (not, obviously, the price of repairing for individual or freak accidents, etc.)
(257): the replacement of the 'fixed capital', of course, demands expansion/accumulation (earlier, he spoke about this coming from a reserve fund, but here he's acknowledging that you can't have the latter without the former, in a sense)
(261): the big capitalist accumulates a hoard that can be thrown into the purchase of fixed capital. this is what will become, in a sense, the credit system--when this hoard begins to function as 'capital', in the hands of other capitalist at whose disposal it is put.
chapter 9: the overall turnover of the capital advanced. turnover cycles.
(263): value turnover -- amount that comes back, each cycle
(264): speaking about the cycle of related turnovers as one of the 'material foundation' for business cycles. also noting, here, that crises precipitate large volumes of new investment [fruitful place to unpack things]
(267): credit system has the effect of speeding up consumption and production
chapter 10: theories of fixed and circulating capital, adam smith and the physiocrats [skipped]
chapter 11: theories of fixed and circulating capital, ricardo [skipped]
(304): summarizing, here, the confusion created by Adam Smith
- fixed capital and fluid capital distinction is confused with the distinction between productive and commodity capital
- circulating capital is identified with capital laid out on wages
- because of this confusion, they are unable to understand the distinction between constant and variable capital properly
- understood, incorrectly, as 'money at call' and 'money not at call', by those who look at this as bank clerks
(307): comparing the production of locomotives to the production of yarn, where in the latter capital circulates quickly and comes back, therefore, to assist the capitalist in the renewed purchase of labor-power, raw materials. in the former, not like this, so a much larger outlay of capital is required ("twelve times as much") (see also 310)
(308): definition of the working period, as contrasted to the working day
(311): at less developed stages of capitalism, production lines that require larger outlays of capital are often not pursued--they are done, instead, by the State. it is only with the credit system and the concentration of capital that this enables that these products are opened to capitalist production.
(312-313): here the example being given is the production of houses, where it is only in relatively developed capitalism that builders produce in large quantities for a market)
(314): example of the starving farmer and fat ox in India. hmm.
chapter 13: production time
(316): writing, here, about instances where all of the production time is not taken up by working time, but rather there is some time in which the product is left to be worked on by other forces (grapes in wine, agriculture, etc.)
(319): interesting reflection on the consequences of this for the worker -- where the production time does not require him, he has to find alternative sources of work (seasonal migration, etc.)
(320); this also has consequences for 'fixed capital', insofar as the disjuncture demands that it sid idle, at times.
(322): looking at forests, in particular -- the enormously small part of time taken up by working time, in this case, makes this more-or-less off-limits for capitalism (and has had, he's saying, the result of making forests completely irrational from the perspective of capitalism. can we expand this, perhaps, to say more about the environment? though it is a bit odd, because this presupposes their commodification? unpack)
(324): summary passage of the different permutations, and their consequences. worth reading through.
chapter 14: circulation time
(326): circulation time = selling time + purchasing time (see 329)
(327-328): selling time, of course, is affected by the geographical proximity of production to the market, which can be affected by technological revolutions in communication and transport
(329): introducing the 'world market' to hammer this point home--at a stretch, we could use this passage to speak about the impossibility of defining space/time outside of social relations
(330): the longer the circulation time, of course, the more the risk incurred by the capitalist that prices will fluctuate. this has the result, it's being noted, of predisposing different kinds of products to different levels of stock formation--owing to speculative considerations (see 331-332)
(333): the capitalist has some incentive to, every turnover cycle, retain some money and gradually add to his reserve fund. this has the effect of inuring him in the event of crisis.
chapter 15: effect of circulation time on the magnitude of the capital advanced [skipped]
chapter 16: the turnover of variable capital
(369): fixed capital/circulating capital distinction, once more
(371): definition of the annual rate of surplus value
(373): "it is only the capital actually operating in the labour process which creates surplus-value and to which all the laws given for surplus-value apply..."
(374, 378): the difference here, between capital A and B, is essentially one that hinges on a distinction between capital advanced vs. capital applied.
(379): summarizing, again, the problem being treated here (the value is presumably because this is something that the Ricardians had trouble with--see 373).
(381): important--here he is making the claim that the annual rate of surplus value is 'a comparison produced by the actual movement of capital itself' [need to cash this out through the examples of capital A, capital B, capital C. is he arguing that this is how it looks to the capitalists? an illusion, of sorts?]
(382): the mass of surplus value produced in ten turnover periods in the course of one year will be ten times that corresponding to one turnover period [the amount of capital being equal, it seems--cash out]
(386): important--distinction between capitalists A and capitalists B in terms of the source of the wages they pay--for the first (with turnover time of five weeks), every five weeks the source of wages paid for labor-power is produced by the working hours of the previous five weeks; this is not the case for capitalist B, who has to advance the wages without having it been renewed (here, the distinction is that the first capitalist sees the renewal of the 'form' of its value, whereas the second doesn't see this--both, of course, do see the replacement of its value in the object under production).
(388): important--considering the turnover of variable capital from the perspective of society, sees three things.
- like this point on page 386, he is stressing that the money that workers under capital A put into circulation (in purchasing wage-goods) is not only the money form of the value of their own labor-power, but it is also the money form of their own value product (i.e., things that they have produced). this is not true for capital B--here the labor is not paid for with the value they themselves have produced, until the second year onwards [a question to ask, of course, is what makes this very important, if we acknowledge that there is no 'first' turnover period when we are looking at the world as it exists--or is there?]. at a given size of production, the annual rate of surplus-value will increase as the brevity of the turnover time increases (because the absolute size of capital advanced will be reduced]
- workers in capital B, in this first year, do not supply any commodity to the market, though they take from it commodities. for communism, Marx is saying, this would not be a problem--society would simply have to decide how much of a 'wait' it can bear. for capitalism, however, where social rationality only asserts itself post festum, this is the source of major disturbances: "the money market is under pressure because large-scale advances of money capital are always needed..." [here, the question is relevant, especially once you introduce credit, of course]. he is noting also that this process puts pressure on society's productive capital, insofar as its being withdrawn without anything being put back--this causes a rise in 'effective demand:' demand rises without any increase in supply, causing an increase in price, people flock to sectors, bringing imports and whatnot where they can't increase production, expanding production where they can--this, ultimately, can cause over-suply and speculation. this has its effect on the labor market, too, bringing workers into new lines of business. "this lasts until the inevitable crash". (he is noting that turnover time can be socialyl determined, but also naturally determined, as in agriculture). an account, here, of british trade with india to cash out these points about money market credit and crisis, the key point being that, again: "what appears as a crisis on the money market in actual fact expresses anomalies in the production and reproduction process itself." [worth going through this example, to clarify everything]
- a seemingly banal point about how workers, in industries with quick turnover time, can provide an element of the variable and constant capital with the very product that they're producing (coal or clothes, are the examples here).
chapter 17: the circulation of surplus-value
(394): again, summarizing Capitalist A vs. Capitalist B
(396): the pooling of accumulated money capital through the credit system--extra money capital as no more than legal titles to future production, in this sense [a concrete way to make sense of the claim about this form of wealth's 'fictitious' nature]
(398-399): Thompson's claim, cited approvingly [I think?], regarding the fact that all the wealth constantly re-produced is much more than the accumulated money capital. [this is true, I think--but how do we make sense of wealth held in derivatives (600 trillion, at one point), or total financial assets (167 trillion), etc., which both exceed total GDP? is Marx outdated, here? or am I misunderstanding the argument about 'assets', and he's only talking about hoarded 'money capital'? the message is important all the same--capitalists cannot rest on their laurels]
(400): money supply must be enough to cope with fluctuations, and enough must be produced to cope with wear and tear
(404-407): question of where the money that pays for 'surplus-value' comes from? the final answer is that this is not a legitimate problem, in the first place. it makes no different whether the mass contains surplus-value, or not [remember, we are dealing with simple reproduction here, so the nature of the question is different from what we might think--see also 410, below]
(408): there are only two starting-points (workers and capitalists)--all other must receive money from these two, or have co-proprietary rights in this relationship (rent, interest, etc.)
(410): important--the answer to the question, still, is that, assuming simple reproduction, the capitalist class as a whole puts in the money required for circulation of the surplus-value, for the purposes of its individual consumption. in other words, workers purchase everything short of surplus-value; and other capitalists purchase that sliver [this is where Rosa Luxemburg floundered, famously]
(414): rising wages, oscillating prices--none of this makes anything but temporary differences
(415): a Botwinick like opening--abnormally high profits allow producers to pass on increased wage costs
(416): important--circuit of money is very different from circulation of money (former refers to things coming back to origins; the second just means moving from one entity to another)
(418): question of the historical precondition being a sufficient supply of precious metals [a Brenner/w-system question, maybe? not really, though--the former can accommodate this, i would think]
(419): additional money, in the case of expanded reproduction, has to be created by an increase in money
(422): Rosa Luxemburg problem--worker buying power
Chapter 18: Introduction (Part III)
(427-430): useful summary of what has been argued thus far
(434): again, re: differential turnovers, the problem is one of withdrawing commodities from the market (i.e., labor-power, means of production) without giving anything back, for a time.
(434): explicit note about the society to come (paper tokens instead of money, which would cease to exist in the sense of something that circulates)
(438): Smith misses the reproduction of 'constant' capital -- instead, he borrows from the Physiocrats the notion that 'fixed' vs. 'circulating' capital is the fundamental distinction.
(441): very important distinction between means of production, and means of consumption (something which Smith 'stumbles onto')
(444-446): two observations, re: the two departments
- even though social capital is the sum of individual capitals, the form of appearance that these components assume in the overall process of social reproduction is different (even though, just like individual capital, social capital breaks down into surplus value and 'reproduced' value)
- at the social level, we see the reproduction of not just wages and surplus value, but also the reproduction of 'constant capital', which has to provide the means of production for re-starting the production process (this is something that can be ignored in the case of the individual capital, of course)
(449): what Smith does is not problematic insofar as it is true that rent/profit/wages are portions of the total value of any commodity. the mistake he makes is to, having shown this, 'reverse' the framing of the issue and make rent/profit/wages the source of value. [i don't understand exactly what this means, but the charge is here]
(451): again, against Smith's understanding of the issue [and here, at the bottom, it does seem as if the 'reverse' understanding, however counterintuitive, is indeed Smith's--'worker adds a value equivalent to his wages]
(452): Smith misses the problem of constant capital, once you zoom out and look at the reproduction of social capital [and partly, it seems, this is because of the preceding problem]
(453): Smith's two errors, then:
- to equate the value of the annual product (total value of current year's labor plus the value of everything used to produce it) with the annual value product (total product of current year's labor) -- missing, in effect, the reproduction of constant capital (i.e., the value that simply re-appears)
- this is because he has not distinguished the two-fold character of labor -- labor that creates value, and concrete useful labor [cash out this connection]
(458): again, Smith's reversal--for him, different forms of revenue form the 'component parts' of the commodity value annually produced, where in actual fact, it is the value annually produced (split into two, for the capitalist--variable capital and surplus value [and constant capital?]) that is split into revenue. [cash this out, why no constant capital, here? and what are the stakes of this confusion?]
(461-462): for those who care, a 'socio-property relations' definition of capitalism
(465): summary of Marx's critique of Smith's reversal
chapter 20: simple reproduction
(469): C' ... C' reveals the preconditions for social reproduction (i.e., when seen from the perspective of total social capital--need to produce both means of production and means of consumption)
(470): thus, when we are analyzing this process, we will need to look seriously at 'use-values' -- it is insufficient to consider the process in the abstract
(471-472): useful summary of the terms being employed
(476): first discussion of the phenomenon of 'flowing back' -- department I recovering the variable capital through department II (once deparatment II's capitalists have received payment for consumption goods from the workers of department I)
(477): relevant to remember, of course, that no one is getting 'richer' -- these are all exchanges of equivalents
(477): in short--it matters not whether this is advanced on account of the constant value portion of what they've produced or the surplus value. the money will flow back in this way.
(478, 483-4): we have gotten the result that, in the case of simple reproduction, I (variable + surplus) = II (constant) (because we have said, already, that II (surplus) can't be used to buy means of production).
(479-481): introducing the distinction between necessary means of subsistence (IIa) and luxury means of consumption (IIb)--and what follows is the attempt to show how they can balance, if capitalists buy in the correct proportions.
(484): the relationship between workers in luxury consumption and capitalists producing necessary means of subsistence parallels the relationship between workers in department I and capitalists in department II.
(486-487): key--the famous anti-underconsumptionist passage, where the theory is decried as pure tautology. worth thinking through how this fits in the prior analysis of the effects of crisis/inflation on luxury workers.
(487-488): good summary of the preceding
(490): important--we have seen from this that variable capital actually plays an important role in monetary circulation. and because workers live hand-to-mouth, it is required that it be advanced at "definite and short" intervals, irregardless of the turnover time.
(491-492): summary of the individual transactions involved in the 'balancing act'
(492): all this reproduces the relationship between wage-laborers and capitalists as well, don't forget
(495, 496, 497): key--we see that because of the phenomenon of 'flowing back', it is the money that department I itself cast into circulation that realizes its own surplus value (i.e., if we follow the chain of transactions) [question of whether this is under particular conditions--Dept I going first--or a general rule? a general rule, it would seem. the later passages would seem to confirm that this is true for all capitalists--particularly because of the point on p. 497 that the working-class could scarcely advance the money to realize the surplus-value.]
(497): all of this will be obscured by two circumstances: the appearance of money capital, and the sub-division of surplus-value
(504, 506, 508-509): the "riddle" being resolved--how can the value product be resolved into v+s, yet two thirds of the working day be spent on producing stuff that is going to function as constant capital? well, because from the perspective of value-creation, only v+s worth of 'new' value is created--whereas from the perspective of use-values, everything is new.
(512): response to Smith--the entire value of the annual product will not be consumed only by consumers (if it's meant by this, individual consumers), but by consumers (individual capitalists as consumers, and workers) and capitalists (as capitalists--or as 'productive' consumers) seeking new means of production.
(513): definition--value product (value newly created) vs. value of the product (total value of the mass of commodities)
(516): against Smith--labor power is not capital for the worker. it is a capacity (or a simple commodity that he sells). it only becomes capital in the hand of the capitalist.
(519): one big company store, of sorts
(523): variable capital always remains in the hands of the capitalist (in one form or another), so it can't be said to be 'revenue' for anyone. the money that workers get in wages are not conversions of variable capital, but just the value of their labor-power transformed into money.
(526): hoard formation has to be a part of the capitalist reproduction process, because capitalists will need to take money out of the production process to defray the costs of fixed capital
(535): key--introducing the two sections [here it becomes confusing]--section 1 pays for fixed capital with an extra 200 pounds, while section 2 gets the reflux from Department I, from section 1's purchase (which it then makes into a hoard--saving up for the day that it is capable of paying for its fixed capital costs)
(536): three different ways in which this can work (which are then developed over the next several pages)
(540): in sum--re: fixed capital and the two sections
(542): a law--if a greater portion of fixed capital is slated to be renewed, then the portion that is en route to its demise will be proportionately less
(543): important--this all will display a tendency towards disequilibrium/crisis (in other words, if you don't assume a constant proportion is not assumed between defunct fixed capital and fixed capital--remember this is all assuming simple reproduction)
(544-545): important--once you realize that the amount of fixed capital that needs to be replaced varies from year to year (and the production of other things remaining constant) you realize, also, that the problem can only be remedied by "perpetual relative over-production."
(546-548): for those who produce gold, department I does not appear as a seller, but only as a buyer [unpack, if necessary]
(552-553): repeating the example of production branches with long turnover times--withdrawing commodities without putting commodities back (thus a 'lag' created thanks to the money market)
(554): interesting discussion of slavery and the natural economy--a short history of all time, in a sense
(559): discussing the silliness of Destutt's theory of profit
(561): reference to the division of profit between capitalists (Destutt somehow thinks this is a source of profit)
(562): we see that this form of profit is parasitic, in one obvious sense, while also being a necessary "condition of production"
(564): self-laudatory Destutt as height of "bourgeois cretinism."
Wednesday, May 19, 2010
harman, the lost revolution
(12): explanation for Stalinism and Nazism lies in the lost German revolution
(14): State machine still run by the Junkers
(15): liberals after 1848 backed the monarchy (only bourgeois opposition was the Catholic party)--the regime became more illiberal as time passed. this didn't prevent it making economic concessions to the lower classes, though.
(16): SDP had its origins in two different movements
(17): however, the minimum demands of Erfurt became the real concern of party activists--revolution had shifted to indefinite future
(18): the Erfurt synthesis--working-class in pariah status, but also extracting concessions from vigorously expanding capitalism.
(19-21): key--Rosa Luxemburg saw the problems with the SDP, but refused to break for fear of isolating herself. this failure to be independently organized is at the heart of Harman's argument re: early failures of the revolution.
(24): Liebknecht didn't break party discipline over war vote until November
(25): effect of the war on popular mood was to wear off very quickly, as Luxemburg noted in early 1915.
(26): gov't had calculated for a 9-month war. so economic crisis soon began: "forty years of slow improvement gave way to a nightmare deterioration" [this bears on the nature of crisis that makes people revolutionary]
(27): women enter workforce
(27): backbone of SDP had been skilled workers--now they were under threat from new forms of industrial discipline, etc.
(28): in sum--short-term effect of war was to destabilize the organizations of the working class, the long-term effect was to create a uniformity of conditions that was propitious for revolutionary organizing.
(30): the class question was opening up in the Army, too, as officers enjoyed better conditions, and whatnot
(32): strike against the war in Jan 1918
(33): treachery of the SDP--Ebert joins the strike committee to help bring it to an end
(35-36): the founding of the USP in early 1917--the centrist current within the SDP (Kautsky, Bernstein)
(37-38): a weak Left, split into three groupings (Spartakus leaders, 'left radicals', working-classmilitants within the Berlin MWU)
(38-39): a failed offensive in the summer of 1918 leads to the collspe of the gov't--a new liberal coalition gov't formed under Prince Baden in September 1918 (aim was to preserve the monarchy)
(41): German Revolution starts in Kiel
(44): treachery of the SDP--Ebert says to the Kaiser that he hates revolution like sin. Therefore he must abdicate.
(46): twin declarations of the republic--Schiedemann and Liebknecht (former just in time, in other words, despite advice of Ebert)
(48-51, 56-57): key--you see a situation of "dual power" being handed away, in effect, precisely because of the weakness of the Left. the SDP can compel the delegates to the Congress of workers' and soldiers' to vote away their power to the Reichstag. ("the masses do not overnight abandon their prejudices"). Ebert retains General Groener, the Imperial High Command, who phones him to express his support--maintains the old Army apparatus intact (USP goes along with this)
(55): in the aftermath of the Revolution, the Councils still ruled Germany, with varying degrees of alleigance to the Ebert gov't ("dual power")
(62): treachery of the SDP--Ebert agrees to led Maercher organize the Frei Korps in order to maintain order
(63, 65, 95): key--there is radicalization and ferment in these months without there being an organized Left hold on the German proletariat. this will prove fatal in January. (attempt to organize themselves as the KPD in December 1918, but they are very weak)
(68-72): key--Luxemburg understood their weakness and the need for long-term work amongst the working-class, but others were leaning too Left and were too immature--this was seen as regards the question of participation in elections for the National Assembly, as regards union work ("out of the unions," said Frolich)
(75-79, 84, 88): key--"Spartakist Days"--in Berlin, January 1919. They were much weaker than they knew. A call for uprising which Liebknecht follows, against wishes of the leadership of the KDP. Nonetheless, they have to go through, with tragic consequences. Failed, in sum, b/c poorly organized.
(80, 82): Revolutionary Committee fails miserably (USP participation)--masses come, wait in fog for the whole day, and go home (hadn't made any preparations, didn't know how to lead--masses were prepared to strike, but not prepared to fight, Harman's arguing) [were they not just waiting for the word?]
(82, 182): the unique difficulties of the "masses" as an army -- will only fight if they're sure of victory.
(84-86): treachery of the SDP--Vorwarts celebrates murder of Liebknecht and Luxemburg
(93-94): important--comparison of July 1917 and January 1919 -- the main difference was that the Sparatkists were much, much weaker than the Bolsheviks had been.
(97): even after the January days, a weak sort of "dual power" still prevailed (SDP still had to talk a radical talk)
(99, 118): in short--Frei Korps would be sent on a march around Germany to clean up a still radical, though uncoordinated Left
(99-103): "Red Bremen"--invaded by Frei Korps in late January
(103-107): The Ruhr--strikes in Februrary
(107-110): Central Germany--strikes in February
(110-116): Berlin again--strikes in late February/March (some 1,500 killed!)
(116-118): The Ruhr again--strikes in late March/April
(118-119): treachery of the SDP, in sum--alas, the Old Order was returned, no small thanks to the SDP. power of the councils was replaced by the old state structure (bureaucrats, judges, police, officers). SDP was necessary to put a lid on the massive upheavals.
(123): in Hamburg, too (factory owner tossed into river!)--but here, too, the Frei Korps arrive by June and run a military occupation until December.
(123): contrast between Hamburg and Chemnitz, where in the latter the revolutionary Left was able to organize independently (and this stood it in good stead for the Spring of 1920)
(126): the war 'shook' the whole social structure in Bavaria, which had always been conservative/reactionary (though separatist)
(128): Max Weber makes an appearance
(131, 138, 141): key--things erupt in Bavaria in April 1919--first Soviet republic, and then a second Soviet republic. didn't understand, Harman's arguing, the limitations placed by (1) objective material conditions (that Bavaria was rural hinterland, in effect) and by (2)the rollback of revolution in the rest of the country (on decline by mid-April). Frei Korps destroy the republic in short time.
(146): stability by the summer of 1919--SDP support shoots up (though here we see the beginnings of the middle-class-ization of its backing). certainly by June 1920, the USP is the majority party.
(147-150): central and key--excellent critique of Barrington Moore, that 'revolutionary consciousness' cannot be adduced on the basis of fixed expectation. it's contradictory ('ideological turmoil'), and therefore in flux. Germany in 1918-1919 is testimony to this fact.
(154): Versailles not French obstinacy, but expected outcome of capitalist competition (the war by other means)
(159-160, 170, 171): important--Kapp Putsch triggers general strikes (analogy made to Franco's military uprising in 1936)--"in three parts of Germany--Ruhr, Central Germany, and the northern region--the armed working class effectively took power into its own hands." Kapp is forced to back out.
(165): lack, though, of centralized coordination
(172): key--treachery of the SDP (Ebert and Noske), once more. they had an opportunity to smash the apparatus of the Right, which had been wholly discredited. Instead they proceeded to bail out most of the figures involved. (here Harman gives the figure of 20,000 as the number of those that the Frei Korps had killed in the past 14 months).
(175-179): the leadership of the Left, though, dithers in the aftermath, Harman is arguing. didn't agree to 'compromise' until it was too late (it seems like a 'united front' argument is being advanced, here)
(184-185): key--why did the Kapp putsch not have the same effect that the Kornilov coup had in Russia? for Harman, the critical difference is the level of organizatoin and leadership that could have measured up to the consciousness engendered by the putsch. (p. 187--in Berlin it had actually intially opposed a general strike called by the SDP, explaining that the w-class was too weak)
(189): the failure, then, was in overcompensating for past errors. it lies in the 'ultra-leftism' and immaturity of the leadership, which allowed them to abstain from the struggle.
(191): thus, a 'might have been'/'missed opportunity'
(192): important--now the history of the German Revolution becomes a history of the KPD, rather than a history of spontaneous struggles that the Left was too weak to intervene in.
(197): Zinoviev's big moment--wins over the left of the USP to form the new VKPD in Dec 1920
(201-210): key--Party completely misjudged what was happening in March 1921. Lost about 200,000 members. Why? Party being urged, by Kun, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Radek, to take action to prevent a drift to the Right (under Levi's 'conservative' influence). the "Theory of the Offensive." forgot that it wasn't revolutionaries who make the revolution, but the masses.
(214-216): Lenin sides with Levi and Zetkin against Thalheimer and Bela Kun (despite this, Levi remains expelled). Trotsky also. They take this to the Third Congress in June 1921 (this is where the 'United Front' is hammered out)
(220, 258): key--here, again, we have an explanation that focuses on the lack of a shared history of struggle within the Party (a 'weakness of organization' explanation, once more). had there been a party with months of common struggle, the German leaders wouldn't have caved as they did to Bela's advice. and they wouldn't, he's saying, have then felt the need to overcompensate (which led to the grave errors of 1923).
(223-224): grave inflation, pushed by industrialists [where is finance? why doesn't it care?]
(231-234): rise of the Far Right (Bavaria in particular--with an extremely right-wing gov't)
(234): 1922 had seen the working-class grow, once more. its traditional representatives were satisifed (merger of right USP with SDP in the autumn)
(235-237, 239, 254-256): success of the United Front in these months
(247, 248-249): by early summer 1923, with hyperinflation, the SPD was collapsing; a "massive movement of alleigance"
(256-257, 258): key--by April and May of 1923, a revolutionary will was appearing (and the party, trapped in the UF, was slow to recognize this fact). Party was taken by surprise by the strike wave in May and June. Why? The experience of the March Action still haunted them.
(260-263): key--the events of the Anti-Fasicst Day (late July 1923)--Brandler opposed by his right and his Left, no coherent advice forthcoming from Russia (Radek said no, Stalin said no, Trotsky didn't know, Zinoviev/Bukharin said yes).
(266): Communist leaders belatedly start to understand the scale of what's unfolding. Begin to agitate for the overthrow of the gov't.
(270): new gov't formed in August 1923.
(272): key--the counterfactual, re: 1923--should have moved to the offensive before the strike broke, should not have retreated, should have raised a clearer slogan. if it had done all this--maybe? [but this feels a tad weak?]
(289-290): Brandler, finding himself in gov't, expecting the Left SD's to rise with him. completely mistaken. decision, then, to abandon rather than push through [and so we're saying, had he pushed through, history might have been different]
(291): rising succeeded, for 24 hours, in Hamburg
(294-300): four possible explanations for the failures of 1923--Harman sides with Trotksy, who attributes it to a failure of the KPD to test the waters (can't address this in hindsight--can't look at this after the event and say the workers wouldn't have risen) [but this might be a bit weak, too?]
(302): in sum--a lack of organization in November 1918 (a kind of tragic path-dependency)
-----
(1): all else aside, what is the nature of a crisis that is propitious for revolution? it is precisely what you see here -- the vigorous expansion of capitalism, which allows the construction of large working-class organization, culminating in a sharp crisis. added to this are the the points about de-skilling and uniformity of conditions. (p. 26; p. 28)
(2): the serious failures of the early years had to do with the lack of a independently-organized Left--contrast Luxemburg with Lenin (the Spartakus Rising--p.88, p. 95; p. 302 for summary argument). There is a larger question here, though, about whether we're willing to admit any objective antecedents to 'organization'--i.e., is there anything in the nature of German captialim that we would allow to 'explain' the weakness of the independent Left (or, what is the same thing, the strength of the SDP--something about relationship between vigorous captialism, the concessions it can given, and the corresponding strength of reformist politics). Because the reason that Luxemburg didn't feel compelled to have an independent organization was precisely this--she didn't want to abandon the workers' movement.
in other words, we might not have any problem with Harman's argument as a set of political claims. but we're entitled to ask some analytical questions.
(3): the 'shaking' of the social structure--how to make sense of this, sociologically? (so you have Bavaria oscillating wildly (p. 126--but also p. 138), it seems; and students also, maybe, in flux (p. 155--maybe he wouldn't want to make too much of this point, but important nonetheless--p. 180)
(4): similar to the point above, Harman makes an excellent point about the nature of revolutionary consciounsess in the critique of Barrington Moore (pp. 147-149)
(12): explanation for Stalinism and Nazism lies in the lost German revolution
(14): State machine still run by the Junkers
(15): liberals after 1848 backed the monarchy (only bourgeois opposition was the Catholic party)--the regime became more illiberal as time passed. this didn't prevent it making economic concessions to the lower classes, though.
(16): SDP had its origins in two different movements
- Marx and revolutionary current
- Lasalle and reformist current
(17): however, the minimum demands of Erfurt became the real concern of party activists--revolution had shifted to indefinite future
(18): the Erfurt synthesis--working-class in pariah status, but also extracting concessions from vigorously expanding capitalism.
(19-21): key--Rosa Luxemburg saw the problems with the SDP, but refused to break for fear of isolating herself. this failure to be independently organized is at the heart of Harman's argument re: early failures of the revolution.
(24): Liebknecht didn't break party discipline over war vote until November
(25): effect of the war on popular mood was to wear off very quickly, as Luxemburg noted in early 1915.
(26): gov't had calculated for a 9-month war. so economic crisis soon began: "forty years of slow improvement gave way to a nightmare deterioration" [this bears on the nature of crisis that makes people revolutionary]
(27): women enter workforce
(27): backbone of SDP had been skilled workers--now they were under threat from new forms of industrial discipline, etc.
(28): in sum--short-term effect of war was to destabilize the organizations of the working class, the long-term effect was to create a uniformity of conditions that was propitious for revolutionary organizing.
(30): the class question was opening up in the Army, too, as officers enjoyed better conditions, and whatnot
(32): strike against the war in Jan 1918
(33): treachery of the SDP--Ebert joins the strike committee to help bring it to an end
(35-36): the founding of the USP in early 1917--the centrist current within the SDP (Kautsky, Bernstein)
(37-38): a weak Left, split into three groupings (Spartakus leaders, 'left radicals', working-classmilitants within the Berlin MWU)
(38-39): a failed offensive in the summer of 1918 leads to the collspe of the gov't--a new liberal coalition gov't formed under Prince Baden in September 1918 (aim was to preserve the monarchy)
(41): German Revolution starts in Kiel
(44): treachery of the SDP--Ebert says to the Kaiser that he hates revolution like sin. Therefore he must abdicate.
(46): twin declarations of the republic--Schiedemann and Liebknecht (former just in time, in other words, despite advice of Ebert)
(48-51, 56-57): key--you see a situation of "dual power" being handed away, in effect, precisely because of the weakness of the Left. the SDP can compel the delegates to the Congress of workers' and soldiers' to vote away their power to the Reichstag. ("the masses do not overnight abandon their prejudices"). Ebert retains General Groener, the Imperial High Command, who phones him to express his support--maintains the old Army apparatus intact (USP goes along with this)
(55): in the aftermath of the Revolution, the Councils still ruled Germany, with varying degrees of alleigance to the Ebert gov't ("dual power")
(62): treachery of the SDP--Ebert agrees to led Maercher organize the Frei Korps in order to maintain order
(63, 65, 95): key--there is radicalization and ferment in these months without there being an organized Left hold on the German proletariat. this will prove fatal in January. (attempt to organize themselves as the KPD in December 1918, but they are very weak)
(68-72): key--Luxemburg understood their weakness and the need for long-term work amongst the working-class, but others were leaning too Left and were too immature--this was seen as regards the question of participation in elections for the National Assembly, as regards union work ("out of the unions," said Frolich)
(75-79, 84, 88): key--"Spartakist Days"--in Berlin, January 1919. They were much weaker than they knew. A call for uprising which Liebknecht follows, against wishes of the leadership of the KDP. Nonetheless, they have to go through, with tragic consequences. Failed, in sum, b/c poorly organized.
(80, 82): Revolutionary Committee fails miserably (USP participation)--masses come, wait in fog for the whole day, and go home (hadn't made any preparations, didn't know how to lead--masses were prepared to strike, but not prepared to fight, Harman's arguing) [were they not just waiting for the word?]
(82, 182): the unique difficulties of the "masses" as an army -- will only fight if they're sure of victory.
(84-86): treachery of the SDP--Vorwarts celebrates murder of Liebknecht and Luxemburg
(93-94): important--comparison of July 1917 and January 1919 -- the main difference was that the Sparatkists were much, much weaker than the Bolsheviks had been.
(97): even after the January days, a weak sort of "dual power" still prevailed (SDP still had to talk a radical talk)
(99, 118): in short--Frei Korps would be sent on a march around Germany to clean up a still radical, though uncoordinated Left
(99-103): "Red Bremen"--invaded by Frei Korps in late January
(103-107): The Ruhr--strikes in Februrary
(107-110): Central Germany--strikes in February
(110-116): Berlin again--strikes in late February/March (some 1,500 killed!)
(116-118): The Ruhr again--strikes in late March/April
(118-119): treachery of the SDP, in sum--alas, the Old Order was returned, no small thanks to the SDP. power of the councils was replaced by the old state structure (bureaucrats, judges, police, officers). SDP was necessary to put a lid on the massive upheavals.
(123): in Hamburg, too (factory owner tossed into river!)--but here, too, the Frei Korps arrive by June and run a military occupation until December.
(123): contrast between Hamburg and Chemnitz, where in the latter the revolutionary Left was able to organize independently (and this stood it in good stead for the Spring of 1920)
(126): the war 'shook' the whole social structure in Bavaria, which had always been conservative/reactionary (though separatist)
(128): Max Weber makes an appearance
(131, 138, 141): key--things erupt in Bavaria in April 1919--first Soviet republic, and then a second Soviet republic. didn't understand, Harman's arguing, the limitations placed by (1) objective material conditions (that Bavaria was rural hinterland, in effect) and by (2)the rollback of revolution in the rest of the country (on decline by mid-April). Frei Korps destroy the republic in short time.
(146): stability by the summer of 1919--SDP support shoots up (though here we see the beginnings of the middle-class-ization of its backing). certainly by June 1920, the USP is the majority party.
(147-150): central and key--excellent critique of Barrington Moore, that 'revolutionary consciousness' cannot be adduced on the basis of fixed expectation. it's contradictory ('ideological turmoil'), and therefore in flux. Germany in 1918-1919 is testimony to this fact.
(154): Versailles not French obstinacy, but expected outcome of capitalist competition (the war by other means)
(159-160, 170, 171): important--Kapp Putsch triggers general strikes (analogy made to Franco's military uprising in 1936)--"in three parts of Germany--Ruhr, Central Germany, and the northern region--the armed working class effectively took power into its own hands." Kapp is forced to back out.
(165): lack, though, of centralized coordination
(172): key--treachery of the SDP (Ebert and Noske), once more. they had an opportunity to smash the apparatus of the Right, which had been wholly discredited. Instead they proceeded to bail out most of the figures involved. (here Harman gives the figure of 20,000 as the number of those that the Frei Korps had killed in the past 14 months).
(175-179): the leadership of the Left, though, dithers in the aftermath, Harman is arguing. didn't agree to 'compromise' until it was too late (it seems like a 'united front' argument is being advanced, here)
(184-185): key--why did the Kapp putsch not have the same effect that the Kornilov coup had in Russia? for Harman, the critical difference is the level of organizatoin and leadership that could have measured up to the consciousness engendered by the putsch. (p. 187--in Berlin it had actually intially opposed a general strike called by the SDP, explaining that the w-class was too weak)
(189): the failure, then, was in overcompensating for past errors. it lies in the 'ultra-leftism' and immaturity of the leadership, which allowed them to abstain from the struggle.
(191): thus, a 'might have been'/'missed opportunity'
(192): important--now the history of the German Revolution becomes a history of the KPD, rather than a history of spontaneous struggles that the Left was too weak to intervene in.
(197): Zinoviev's big moment--wins over the left of the USP to form the new VKPD in Dec 1920
(201-210): key--Party completely misjudged what was happening in March 1921. Lost about 200,000 members. Why? Party being urged, by Kun, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Radek, to take action to prevent a drift to the Right (under Levi's 'conservative' influence). the "Theory of the Offensive." forgot that it wasn't revolutionaries who make the revolution, but the masses.
(214-216): Lenin sides with Levi and Zetkin against Thalheimer and Bela Kun (despite this, Levi remains expelled). Trotsky also. They take this to the Third Congress in June 1921 (this is where the 'United Front' is hammered out)
(220, 258): key--here, again, we have an explanation that focuses on the lack of a shared history of struggle within the Party (a 'weakness of organization' explanation, once more). had there been a party with months of common struggle, the German leaders wouldn't have caved as they did to Bela's advice. and they wouldn't, he's saying, have then felt the need to overcompensate (which led to the grave errors of 1923).
(223-224): grave inflation, pushed by industrialists [where is finance? why doesn't it care?]
(231-234): rise of the Far Right (Bavaria in particular--with an extremely right-wing gov't)
(234): 1922 had seen the working-class grow, once more. its traditional representatives were satisifed (merger of right USP with SDP in the autumn)
(235-237, 239, 254-256): success of the United Front in these months
(247, 248-249): by early summer 1923, with hyperinflation, the SPD was collapsing; a "massive movement of alleigance"
(256-257, 258): key--by April and May of 1923, a revolutionary will was appearing (and the party, trapped in the UF, was slow to recognize this fact). Party was taken by surprise by the strike wave in May and June. Why? The experience of the March Action still haunted them.
(260-263): key--the events of the Anti-Fasicst Day (late July 1923)--Brandler opposed by his right and his Left, no coherent advice forthcoming from Russia (Radek said no, Stalin said no, Trotsky didn't know, Zinoviev/Bukharin said yes).
(266): Communist leaders belatedly start to understand the scale of what's unfolding. Begin to agitate for the overthrow of the gov't.
(270): new gov't formed in August 1923.
(272): key--the counterfactual, re: 1923--should have moved to the offensive before the strike broke, should not have retreated, should have raised a clearer slogan. if it had done all this--maybe? [but this feels a tad weak?]
(289-290): Brandler, finding himself in gov't, expecting the Left SD's to rise with him. completely mistaken. decision, then, to abandon rather than push through [and so we're saying, had he pushed through, history might have been different]
(291): rising succeeded, for 24 hours, in Hamburg
(294-300): four possible explanations for the failures of 1923--Harman sides with Trotksy, who attributes it to a failure of the KPD to test the waters (can't address this in hindsight--can't look at this after the event and say the workers wouldn't have risen) [but this might be a bit weak, too?]
(302): in sum--a lack of organization in November 1918 (a kind of tragic path-dependency)
-----
(1): all else aside, what is the nature of a crisis that is propitious for revolution? it is precisely what you see here -- the vigorous expansion of capitalism, which allows the construction of large working-class organization, culminating in a sharp crisis. added to this are the the points about de-skilling and uniformity of conditions. (p. 26; p. 28)
(2): the serious failures of the early years had to do with the lack of a independently-organized Left--contrast Luxemburg with Lenin (the Spartakus Rising--p.88, p. 95; p. 302 for summary argument). There is a larger question here, though, about whether we're willing to admit any objective antecedents to 'organization'--i.e., is there anything in the nature of German captialim that we would allow to 'explain' the weakness of the independent Left (or, what is the same thing, the strength of the SDP--something about relationship between vigorous captialism, the concessions it can given, and the corresponding strength of reformist politics). Because the reason that Luxemburg didn't feel compelled to have an independent organization was precisely this--she didn't want to abandon the workers' movement.
in other words, we might not have any problem with Harman's argument as a set of political claims. but we're entitled to ask some analytical questions.
(3): the 'shaking' of the social structure--how to make sense of this, sociologically? (so you have Bavaria oscillating wildly (p. 126--but also p. 138), it seems; and students also, maybe, in flux (p. 155--maybe he wouldn't want to make too much of this point, but important nonetheless--p. 180)
(4): similar to the point above, Harman makes an excellent point about the nature of revolutionary consciounsess in the critique of Barrington Moore (pp. 147-149)
zaidi, issues in pakistan's economy (2005)
(x): both the Ayub and Zia eras, high-growth though they were, confronted their internal contradictions in the popular movements that brought them down
(x): 'middle-class consolidation' [again, though, this is so nebulous as to be unhelpful]
(xi): important--two comprehensive IMF programs of 1988 and 1993-4 were agreed by caretaker gov'ts -- and had to be ratified by Bhutto's incoming gov't [Pakistan didn't need the first, he's noting]. Pakistan goes to the IMF because it is incapable of pushing through those structural reforms that the economy needs (due, explicitly, to its lack of autonomy from its own elites)
(2-3): Pakistan no longer an agricultural country
(4): Pakistan stopped being a feudal country after the Green Revolution of the 1960s, he's arguing--power has shifted from a so-called feudal class towards the urban and rural middle-classes [here, presumably, he means capitalists--"middle-classes" is just a catch-all]
(5): the windfall gains made by the mercantile class in the aftermath of the Korean war laid the groundwork for industrialization--but here, anyway, the State sector was very prominent
(5):important--Ayub's decade of development brought impressive growth in manufacturing, etc.; but no growth in real wages (this, he's saying, was entirely expected--"inherent, inbuilt, inevitable."). Reminding us, also, that this was not, at all, a 'liberal' period. Bureaucracy gave birth to the capitalist [this is not an example of autonomy, but the opposite, in effect]
(6): important--calling for re-evaluation of the Bhutto years--"the bad luck years" (economic loss of E. Pakistan, OPEC price increases and deterioration of balance of payments, worldwide recession, domestic cotton crop failures, nationalized sector did better than most believe)
(6): Zia's period was most liberal yet, brought on by remittances and aid in particular. private sector emerged in the stable post-Bhutto era.
(7): important--post-1988 period was an "era of structural adjustment" more than it was the rebirth of democracy. a blind adherence to Washington; "almost every decision of any consequence was predetermined by Washington" (main focus of fiscal deficit--expansion of indirect taxes, cuts to development expenditure, reduction in tariff rates, increasing in price of utilities, privatization, devaluation of the currency). All has resulted in a serious economic crisis.
(7): increased prices, devalued currency and higher taxes resulted in higher inflation [why would the IMF have wanted higher inflation?]
(8): Musharraf gov't on board with IMF agreements, as well (2001 agreement, for example)--but 9/11 gave him more fiscal space
(31): green revolution as elite-farmer strategy (for Burki, this is the middle-classes, who benefit; for Alavi, it was the large landowners). for both, GR does mean the entrenchment of capitalism in rural areas. [we can infer from this what we will]
(32): important--the 'structure of technology' and 'distribution of credit' reflected the influence of large landowners over public policy [i.e., State hardly autonomous in this regard]
(32): PPP prayed on the contradictions that the GR wrought in rural areas [analagous case to be made for the rural areas]
(33-34): important--Central Council of the Muslim League in 1947 consisted, in the main, of very large landowners (50% of those from Punjab; 60% of those from Sindh). Or, in 1953, won 90% of the seats in the provincial election in Sindh [important to think through this, for the nature of the State--this is a Milibandian style problem, where feudals staff the State apparatus of an aspiring capitalist State. Speaks also to the weakness of the elite's political roots, that they had to depend on landlords].
(34): All this ensured that land reforms were off the agenda during the early part of Pakistani history.
(34-35): question of the nature of Ayub's land reforms -- only Burki seems to think that it made inroads on power of the landed elite [remember Ayub had to lean on the ML for political support]. Damning verdict by Khan.
(36): and Bhutto's reforms weren't very different, of course, though the rhetoric was more radical (no compensation, for example)
(36): Zaidi ends by arguing that the daily work of capitalism may do some of the work of land reforms (small landholdings are emerging, etc.)
(51): tenancy and sharecropping have fallen drastically, both in the number of farms and in the area farmed.
(75): indirect taxes constitute 85% of the total revenues of the federal gov't
(73-75): the issue of the agricultural tax is clearly a testing ground for questions of fractions of capital, etc.
(76): rural elite has a disproportionate political influence, it is being argued [they are not feudal, but constitute an important fraction of the ruling class in Pakistan]
(77): Musharraf's gov't has said repeatedly that it was unwilling to embark on land reforms
(98): important--Ayub's regime pushed through limited 'liberalization' in 1959, which acted as a spurt to further growth, it is argued. this was made possible only because of an increase in the availability of foreign aid. this was set back in 1965, once foreign aid was curtailed and foreign exchange difficulties were encountered, as a result [question, here, of the importance of foreign aid in explaining gov't policy, then]
(99): b/c of the changed trade policies, none of the growth during the second five-year plan, it is being said here, was ISI.
(105): important--radical PPP manifesto, demanding nationalization of banking, insurance and of basic industries. the gov't pushed through labor and land reforms, devalued the rupee (which wiped away the subsidy to industrialists), increased procurement prices, abandoned EBS [evidence of significant autonomy, though limited]
(107): important--at the height of Bhutto's nationalizations, private sector investment had dropped to 15 per cent of its late 60's level [can be thought of as investment strike, or as simple crowding out?], public sector investment had become 75% of the total. "there is no doubt that the anti-industrialist policies..." were responsible. [partly, at least, an investment strike--revealing the limits to State autonomy, in short--"Bhutto had broken his promises"]
(111): since 1988, total capitulation to the IMF
(111-112): phenomenal growth rate of 6.5% (including real wages growing at 6.2%) from 1980-1988 (but productivity doesn't increase significantly, nor do employment opportunities)
(113-114): key--policy periods under Zia--first concern was to restore business confidence--denationalization of some agro-based industriees, and others, as well as further incentives given to the private sector, ease regulations, etc.
(114): story of the five-year plans
(116): important to note, though, that Zia couldn't demolish the public sector in toto (it employed 50,000 people, many firms were in the red)--handing this back to the private sector would have meant chaos. Zaidi making the additional point that it didn't want to alienate the middle-classes that had benefited from nationalization.
(116): nonetheless, public sector share of investment fell--from 72% in 1978-79 to 18 percent in 1988
(117): 1983-1988 was marked by further deregulation and liberalization--including the removal of the peg to the dollar in 1982
(118): the World Bank was particularly happy--the 'private sector's' share in total fixed investment increased to 42%, and to 83% in the manufacturing sector
(118-119): evaluation of the reasons for the high level of growth--for our purposes, it is important to note that all are agreed on renewed private sector confidence (we can say, quite clearly, that this was functional for capitalists).
(122-123): private investment as a percentage of GDP dropped through the 90s, so one wants to be careful in using this as an index of 'business confidence.' [this has to do, though, with the hiking of the interest rate--so maybe there is something to be said about financial capital? regardless--it would be foolish to read too much into this]
(146): Privatization really began under Nawaz Sharif, in November 1990, on the principle that the gov't should not be involved in the production of industrial goods--Bhutto had made noises, but not much progress was made.
(147): why privatization? partly to raise revenue. partly also to stimulate private investment in the economy [here, then, is a clear example of the limits to the autonomy of a State operating in capitalism--nationalizations induce wariness in the private sector]
(148): corruption in the selling process
(242): IMF/World Bank fuzziness on Pakistan's fiscal deficit
(244, 247): while Ayub was in power, development spending exceeded defence expenditure; with the democratic interregnum, this was decisively reversed! [at the very least, this offers little evidence for 'institutional' arguments--or that institutional argument that suggests the military intervenes in order to give itself a bigger piece of the pie]
(245): debt crisis was particularly acute when Musharraf first took over--this has eased, since, giving the State some fiscal space
(247): the interest rate was allowed to soar in the late 90s (up to 20% under Moeen Qureshi!), which obviously had the effect of exacerbating the debt problem (promoted low growth, etc.)
(247): damning facts about development and defence spending--almost all the increase in interest payments came at the expense of development spending.
(293): inflation is low in the 80s, high in the 90s (this is where IMF/WB see a problem to be solved)
(297-298): inflation has not been connected, empirically, to the money supply in Pakistan's history
(344): again, decline in private gross fixed capital formation in the 90's -- capitalists investing less, despite SAP.
(345): Bhutto tried to discontinue a standby loan, but was forced to go back to the IMF for a loan a few months later. Sharif came in and willingly pursued reforms they would like--and then in October 1997 became the first elected gov't to make a new agreement with them. Gen Musharraf has continued the proud tradition.
(365-367): the debt crisis that plagued Pakistan through the 90s was resolved by 2002ish. how? Thanks largely to phenomenal rescheduling of debt in December 2001, as payback to Musharraf for backing the WoT.
(368-369): what is the implication for Th. of the State, that relation with the US has been a key determinant of the ease with which the State gets credit?
(369): remittances rose in the 80s, fell in the 90s, rose dramatically after 9/11 (enormous explosion from the US, in particular)
(491): democratic regimes more likely to receive aid from abroad
(491): arguing that the 'threat' of India is critical for the military's continued survival--this is the reason the peace process doesn't move forward (example, here, of independent interest, qua institution)
(500): policy in the first decade geared toward industrialists--not toward landlords
(502): Bhutto antagonized capital
(502): [again, ludicrous arguments here about the middle-classes backing and then turning on Bhutto]
(503): main reason that Zia had a trouble-free decade was massive remittances from abroad ($20 billion over the decade)
(503): three local body elections, under Zia: 1979, 1983, and 1987
(504): Bhutto, even when she first came to gov't in 1988, had to agree to an IMF package that was signed hours before her accession.
(506): a 'middle-class revolution' [but this is all fly-by observation--not rigorous, at all]
(506): a decline in the importance of the 'national question'?
(x): both the Ayub and Zia eras, high-growth though they were, confronted their internal contradictions in the popular movements that brought them down
(x): 'middle-class consolidation' [again, though, this is so nebulous as to be unhelpful]
(xi): important--two comprehensive IMF programs of 1988 and 1993-4 were agreed by caretaker gov'ts -- and had to be ratified by Bhutto's incoming gov't [Pakistan didn't need the first, he's noting]. Pakistan goes to the IMF because it is incapable of pushing through those structural reforms that the economy needs (due, explicitly, to its lack of autonomy from its own elites)
(2-3): Pakistan no longer an agricultural country
(4): Pakistan stopped being a feudal country after the Green Revolution of the 1960s, he's arguing--power has shifted from a so-called feudal class towards the urban and rural middle-classes [here, presumably, he means capitalists--"middle-classes" is just a catch-all]
(5): the windfall gains made by the mercantile class in the aftermath of the Korean war laid the groundwork for industrialization--but here, anyway, the State sector was very prominent
(5):important--Ayub's decade of development brought impressive growth in manufacturing, etc.; but no growth in real wages (this, he's saying, was entirely expected--"inherent, inbuilt, inevitable."). Reminding us, also, that this was not, at all, a 'liberal' period. Bureaucracy gave birth to the capitalist [this is not an example of autonomy, but the opposite, in effect]
(6): important--calling for re-evaluation of the Bhutto years--"the bad luck years" (economic loss of E. Pakistan, OPEC price increases and deterioration of balance of payments, worldwide recession, domestic cotton crop failures, nationalized sector did better than most believe)
(6): Zia's period was most liberal yet, brought on by remittances and aid in particular. private sector emerged in the stable post-Bhutto era.
(7): important--post-1988 period was an "era of structural adjustment" more than it was the rebirth of democracy. a blind adherence to Washington; "almost every decision of any consequence was predetermined by Washington" (main focus of fiscal deficit--expansion of indirect taxes, cuts to development expenditure, reduction in tariff rates, increasing in price of utilities, privatization, devaluation of the currency). All has resulted in a serious economic crisis.
(7): increased prices, devalued currency and higher taxes resulted in higher inflation [why would the IMF have wanted higher inflation?]
(8): Musharraf gov't on board with IMF agreements, as well (2001 agreement, for example)--but 9/11 gave him more fiscal space
(31): green revolution as elite-farmer strategy (for Burki, this is the middle-classes, who benefit; for Alavi, it was the large landowners). for both, GR does mean the entrenchment of capitalism in rural areas. [we can infer from this what we will]
(32): important--the 'structure of technology' and 'distribution of credit' reflected the influence of large landowners over public policy [i.e., State hardly autonomous in this regard]
(32): PPP prayed on the contradictions that the GR wrought in rural areas [analagous case to be made for the rural areas]
(33-34): important--Central Council of the Muslim League in 1947 consisted, in the main, of very large landowners (50% of those from Punjab; 60% of those from Sindh). Or, in 1953, won 90% of the seats in the provincial election in Sindh [important to think through this, for the nature of the State--this is a Milibandian style problem, where feudals staff the State apparatus of an aspiring capitalist State. Speaks also to the weakness of the elite's political roots, that they had to depend on landlords].
(34): All this ensured that land reforms were off the agenda during the early part of Pakistani history.
(34-35): question of the nature of Ayub's land reforms -- only Burki seems to think that it made inroads on power of the landed elite [remember Ayub had to lean on the ML for political support]. Damning verdict by Khan.
(36): and Bhutto's reforms weren't very different, of course, though the rhetoric was more radical (no compensation, for example)
(36): Zaidi ends by arguing that the daily work of capitalism may do some of the work of land reforms (small landholdings are emerging, etc.)
(51): tenancy and sharecropping have fallen drastically, both in the number of farms and in the area farmed.
(75): indirect taxes constitute 85% of the total revenues of the federal gov't
(73-75): the issue of the agricultural tax is clearly a testing ground for questions of fractions of capital, etc.
(76): rural elite has a disproportionate political influence, it is being argued [they are not feudal, but constitute an important fraction of the ruling class in Pakistan]
(77): Musharraf's gov't has said repeatedly that it was unwilling to embark on land reforms
(98): important--Ayub's regime pushed through limited 'liberalization' in 1959, which acted as a spurt to further growth, it is argued. this was made possible only because of an increase in the availability of foreign aid. this was set back in 1965, once foreign aid was curtailed and foreign exchange difficulties were encountered, as a result [question, here, of the importance of foreign aid in explaining gov't policy, then]
(99): b/c of the changed trade policies, none of the growth during the second five-year plan, it is being said here, was ISI.
(105): important--radical PPP manifesto, demanding nationalization of banking, insurance and of basic industries. the gov't pushed through labor and land reforms, devalued the rupee (which wiped away the subsidy to industrialists), increased procurement prices, abandoned EBS [evidence of significant autonomy, though limited]
(107): important--at the height of Bhutto's nationalizations, private sector investment had dropped to 15 per cent of its late 60's level [can be thought of as investment strike, or as simple crowding out?], public sector investment had become 75% of the total. "there is no doubt that the anti-industrialist policies..." were responsible. [partly, at least, an investment strike--revealing the limits to State autonomy, in short--"Bhutto had broken his promises"]
(111): since 1988, total capitulation to the IMF
(111-112): phenomenal growth rate of 6.5% (including real wages growing at 6.2%) from 1980-1988 (but productivity doesn't increase significantly, nor do employment opportunities)
(113-114): key--policy periods under Zia--first concern was to restore business confidence--denationalization of some agro-based industriees, and others, as well as further incentives given to the private sector, ease regulations, etc.
(114): story of the five-year plans
(116): important to note, though, that Zia couldn't demolish the public sector in toto (it employed 50,000 people, many firms were in the red)--handing this back to the private sector would have meant chaos. Zaidi making the additional point that it didn't want to alienate the middle-classes that had benefited from nationalization.
(116): nonetheless, public sector share of investment fell--from 72% in 1978-79 to 18 percent in 1988
(117): 1983-1988 was marked by further deregulation and liberalization--including the removal of the peg to the dollar in 1982
(118): the World Bank was particularly happy--the 'private sector's' share in total fixed investment increased to 42%, and to 83% in the manufacturing sector
(118-119): evaluation of the reasons for the high level of growth--for our purposes, it is important to note that all are agreed on renewed private sector confidence (we can say, quite clearly, that this was functional for capitalists).
(122-123): private investment as a percentage of GDP dropped through the 90s, so one wants to be careful in using this as an index of 'business confidence.' [this has to do, though, with the hiking of the interest rate--so maybe there is something to be said about financial capital? regardless--it would be foolish to read too much into this]
(146): Privatization really began under Nawaz Sharif, in November 1990, on the principle that the gov't should not be involved in the production of industrial goods--Bhutto had made noises, but not much progress was made.
(147): why privatization? partly to raise revenue. partly also to stimulate private investment in the economy [here, then, is a clear example of the limits to the autonomy of a State operating in capitalism--nationalizations induce wariness in the private sector]
(148): corruption in the selling process
(242): IMF/World Bank fuzziness on Pakistan's fiscal deficit
(244, 247): while Ayub was in power, development spending exceeded defence expenditure; with the democratic interregnum, this was decisively reversed! [at the very least, this offers little evidence for 'institutional' arguments--or that institutional argument that suggests the military intervenes in order to give itself a bigger piece of the pie]
(245): debt crisis was particularly acute when Musharraf first took over--this has eased, since, giving the State some fiscal space
(247): the interest rate was allowed to soar in the late 90s (up to 20% under Moeen Qureshi!), which obviously had the effect of exacerbating the debt problem (promoted low growth, etc.)
(247): damning facts about development and defence spending--almost all the increase in interest payments came at the expense of development spending.
(293): inflation is low in the 80s, high in the 90s (this is where IMF/WB see a problem to be solved)
(297-298): inflation has not been connected, empirically, to the money supply in Pakistan's history
(344): again, decline in private gross fixed capital formation in the 90's -- capitalists investing less, despite SAP.
(345): Bhutto tried to discontinue a standby loan, but was forced to go back to the IMF for a loan a few months later. Sharif came in and willingly pursued reforms they would like--and then in October 1997 became the first elected gov't to make a new agreement with them. Gen Musharraf has continued the proud tradition.
(365-367): the debt crisis that plagued Pakistan through the 90s was resolved by 2002ish. how? Thanks largely to phenomenal rescheduling of debt in December 2001, as payback to Musharraf for backing the WoT.
(368-369): what is the implication for Th. of the State, that relation with the US has been a key determinant of the ease with which the State gets credit?
(369): remittances rose in the 80s, fell in the 90s, rose dramatically after 9/11 (enormous explosion from the US, in particular)
(491): democratic regimes more likely to receive aid from abroad
(491): arguing that the 'threat' of India is critical for the military's continued survival--this is the reason the peace process doesn't move forward (example, here, of independent interest, qua institution)
(500): policy in the first decade geared toward industrialists--not toward landlords
(502): Bhutto antagonized capital
(502): [again, ludicrous arguments here about the middle-classes backing and then turning on Bhutto]
(503): main reason that Zia had a trouble-free decade was massive remittances from abroad ($20 billion over the decade)
(503): three local body elections, under Zia: 1979, 1983, and 1987
(504): Bhutto, even when she first came to gov't in 1988, had to agree to an IMF package that was signed hours before her accession.
(506): a 'middle-class revolution' [but this is all fly-by observation--not rigorous, at all]
(506): a decline in the importance of the 'national question'?
Wednesday, May 5, 2010
leon trotsky, history of the russian revolution (1930)
(xv): revolutions as marked by the direct interference of the masses in historical events
(xvi): organization as 'piston box'
(4-7): key--combined and uneven development--"privilege of historic backwardness", etc.
(9): important--a hesitant bourgeoisie, entangled with the landed class
(14): contradictions in the army, which are critical, introduced by universal military service
(17): the army disintegrates--"peace at any cost"
(21): dissolution of the Duma in September 1915 a challenge to the bourgeoisie, but burden taken up by workers
(24): key, of course, will be the incapacity of the State to effect repression
(27): 1908-1911 as the ebb--period of counterrevolution/reaction
(28): Menshevism vs. Bolshevism (former taking shape in period of reaction; latter rising on the crest of revolutionary agitation after)
(34-35): importance of the peasantry--the Stolypin reforms, need for an ally
(36): the class question within the peasantry [we are entitled to ask if this is overoptimistic, re: the poorer peasants, etc.]
(38): peasant had to be led by the worker [we can make of this what we will]
(39): summary statement of the claims--agrarian problem couldn't be solved by the bourgeoisie, so you confronted two problems in 1917: (1) a peasant war, otherwise characteristic of bourgeois development [again, think through this--he is taking this as emblematic of 'combined and uneven development']; (2) a proletarian insurrection.
(77, 80): reactionary nature of police vs. progressive role of the soldiers
(87): late Feb - "the masses make their own history"
(88-89): key to every revolution is a break in the disposition of the army; soldiers have to be convinced that the rebels are really rebelling
(102): important--"Petrograd achieved the Revolution. the rest of the country merely adhered to it." [but this has grave implications, for later, we can acknowledge--re: the peasantry]
(103): reflections on revolution and democracy [the problem is not the immediate problem of insurrection; but rather the problem of the social base]
(107, 110-111): important--against "spontaneous" theory of the revolution--it was a "well-founded commitment", made by a history of struggle
(351-352): critical--elaborating the "materialist method" -- proceeding from the objective to the subjective; the fundamental forces of the historical process are classes; political parties rest upon them. [such that the method reveals the 'inevitability' of the revolution--simultaneously, then, room for contingency and not? need to think through this]
(740): "the art of insurrection"--demands leadership, of course
(742): a rejoinder to the notion that attention to 'insurrectionary tactics' is "Blanquist" -- Blanquism obviously assumes that tactics are sufficient without mass backing. thus any failed revolution fails because of tactics. this is obviously untrue. but it doesn't obviate the need to think about tactics
(745-746): four political premises of a revolution
(749): quoting Lenin on the question of focusing on the capital [here, again, is contained the problem--not that I have an alternative, just a lament]
(751): key--the garrison of the capital had been won over before the insurrection itself
(757): the Red Guard and "Dual Power"
(758): the ruling classes--"accustomed to hearing about action on the telegraph"
(765): memorable--the fate of 'respectable families'
(769) ;the countermanding of official orders
(776): Mensheviks and the pre-parliament--captains of moderation
(777): 'weakness of the government exceeded all expectations"
(784): the CEC as a 'corpse'
(785): "having read about the Paris Commune, they made sure to seize the Bank"
(787): "most popular mass insurrection at history", though things need not all happen at once
(794): Kerensky trapped between Left and Right--though ceding, always, to the Right (reveals the bankruptcy of the captains of moderation)
(820): masses to the Left of the Party, though this was tested by the July days
(823): Bolsheviks as a "lever" for the Soviets [raises questions, of course, about the nature of leadership--that can't all be obviated by the success of this revolution
(825): September to December as the period in which revolution could have been made
(826, 828): question of insurrection via the Party, or Via the Soviets ["resolved," of course, via the MRC--an elected organ of the Soviet]
(827): Stalin misrepresenting Lenin to tar Trotsky
(829): "the coming over of the garrison decided the matter."
(832): key--the reason that the struggle could become 'conspiratorial' was precisely because the Bolsheviks were backed in such numbers
(xv): revolutions as marked by the direct interference of the masses in historical events
(xvi): organization as 'piston box'
(4-7): key--combined and uneven development--"privilege of historic backwardness", etc.
(9): important--a hesitant bourgeoisie, entangled with the landed class
(14): contradictions in the army, which are critical, introduced by universal military service
(17): the army disintegrates--"peace at any cost"
(21): dissolution of the Duma in September 1915 a challenge to the bourgeoisie, but burden taken up by workers
(24): key, of course, will be the incapacity of the State to effect repression
(27): 1908-1911 as the ebb--period of counterrevolution/reaction
(28): Menshevism vs. Bolshevism (former taking shape in period of reaction; latter rising on the crest of revolutionary agitation after)
(34-35): importance of the peasantry--the Stolypin reforms, need for an ally
(36): the class question within the peasantry [we are entitled to ask if this is overoptimistic, re: the poorer peasants, etc.]
(38): peasant had to be led by the worker [we can make of this what we will]
(39): summary statement of the claims--agrarian problem couldn't be solved by the bourgeoisie, so you confronted two problems in 1917: (1) a peasant war, otherwise characteristic of bourgeois development [again, think through this--he is taking this as emblematic of 'combined and uneven development']; (2) a proletarian insurrection.
(77, 80): reactionary nature of police vs. progressive role of the soldiers
(87): late Feb - "the masses make their own history"
(88-89): key to every revolution is a break in the disposition of the army; soldiers have to be convinced that the rebels are really rebelling
(102): important--"Petrograd achieved the Revolution. the rest of the country merely adhered to it." [but this has grave implications, for later, we can acknowledge--re: the peasantry]
(103): reflections on revolution and democracy [the problem is not the immediate problem of insurrection; but rather the problem of the social base]
(107, 110-111): important--against "spontaneous" theory of the revolution--it was a "well-founded commitment", made by a history of struggle
(351-352): critical--elaborating the "materialist method" -- proceeding from the objective to the subjective; the fundamental forces of the historical process are classes; political parties rest upon them. [such that the method reveals the 'inevitability' of the revolution--simultaneously, then, room for contingency and not? need to think through this]
(740): "the art of insurrection"--demands leadership, of course
(742): a rejoinder to the notion that attention to 'insurrectionary tactics' is "Blanquist" -- Blanquism obviously assumes that tactics are sufficient without mass backing. thus any failed revolution fails because of tactics. this is obviously untrue. but it doesn't obviate the need to think about tactics
(745-746): four political premises of a revolution
- a crisis in the ruling classes
- the new political consciousness of the revolutionary classes
- the radicalization of the intermediate layers
- the revolutionary party and an organized vanguard
(749): quoting Lenin on the question of focusing on the capital [here, again, is contained the problem--not that I have an alternative, just a lament]
(751): key--the garrison of the capital had been won over before the insurrection itself
(757): the Red Guard and "Dual Power"
(758): the ruling classes--"accustomed to hearing about action on the telegraph"
(765): memorable--the fate of 'respectable families'
(769) ;the countermanding of official orders
(776): Mensheviks and the pre-parliament--captains of moderation
(777): 'weakness of the government exceeded all expectations"
(784): the CEC as a 'corpse'
(785): "having read about the Paris Commune, they made sure to seize the Bank"
(787): "most popular mass insurrection at history", though things need not all happen at once
(794): Kerensky trapped between Left and Right--though ceding, always, to the Right (reveals the bankruptcy of the captains of moderation)
(820): masses to the Left of the Party, though this was tested by the July days
(823): Bolsheviks as a "lever" for the Soviets [raises questions, of course, about the nature of leadership--that can't all be obviated by the success of this revolution
(825): September to December as the period in which revolution could have been made
(826, 828): question of insurrection via the Party, or Via the Soviets ["resolved," of course, via the MRC--an elected organ of the Soviet]
(827): Stalin misrepresenting Lenin to tar Trotsky
(829): "the coming over of the garrison decided the matter."
(832): key--the reason that the struggle could become 'conspiratorial' was precisely because the Bolsheviks were backed in such numbers
Sunday, May 2, 2010
hamza alavi, the state in post-colonial societies: pakistan and bangladesh (1974)
(59): historical specificity of the postcolonial experience
(61): state as 'over-developed' in relation to the structure
(61): key--argument is that the inherited state apparatus weighs heavy on the domestic bourgeoisie, at the moment of independence. [but no mechanisms are elucidated--so this is a profoundly institutionalist argument. how the hell does this institutional complex reproduce itself?]
(62): relatively autonomous in order to mediate between three classes [is the sneaking implication here, though, that it would not be 'relatively autonomous' were it simply the instrument of one class? seems like it.]
(62): also must track his use of relative autonomy of the oligarchy vs. relative autonomy of the state (they are used interchangeably in this piece--they might mean the same thing, but they aren't the same thing)
(62): key--he notes that the State's acquiring an economic role matters. [but the mechanisms are not clear, nor are the facts. is it true that the State appropriates much of the economic surplus, as he is saying here? will have to look more closely at the Ayub period to substantiate this--but my hunch was that it was not the case. State pandered to its capitalists.]
(62-63): key--here he's mentioning the relationship between politicians and the oligarchy (ambivalent--acceptable insofar as they accede to the oligarchy's interests). next page he is clarifying that his argument is meant to apply to the State apparatus as a whole. [this is fine, I have no qualms with the claim--but he's not consistently explicit enough about defining the oligarchy as a part of the State]
(65-66): two facts about Pakistan, which stand out
(69): key--claim that the bureaucracy and the military are "highly developed" viz-a-viz the capitalist class [that they have a corrupt relationship to the few corrupt families that command the economy -- thus giving them a different kind of autonomy, the implication would be. nonetheless, we can focus on the fact that this is only ever an implication. the mechanism is not made clear enough.]
(69): landowners dominate party politics; their interests, though, are being served unevenly
(70): mentioning the role of the US
(70): relative autonomy of the oligarchy
(71): SUMMARY of the argument, once more -- none of the three propertied classes can command the State. hence it's relatively autonomous.
(72): key--again, making clear that the 'material basis' for the relative autonomy is the proportion of the economic surplus that the State commands
(72): key--there is now, also, a very different kind of rivalry between these three competing classes, than there existed previously ("mutually competing but reconcilable") [what follows, of course, is an account of the failure of the postcolonial bourgeoisie. an antiquated understanding of the bourgeois revolutions].
(73-74): the relationships:
(76): ideology of the oligarchy [not v. insightful]
(77): elitist and populist wings of the Bengali leadership (Suhrawardy/Mujib vs. Bhashani, break in 1957)
(79): in E. Pakistan, State giving handouts to capitalists (two-thirds of all investment)
(80-81): implication that had the Indians not intervened, maybe the reformists wouldn't have won (and that this is precisely why they intervened)
(59): historical specificity of the postcolonial experience
(61): state as 'over-developed' in relation to the structure
(61): key--argument is that the inherited state apparatus weighs heavy on the domestic bourgeoisie, at the moment of independence. [but no mechanisms are elucidated--so this is a profoundly institutionalist argument. how the hell does this institutional complex reproduce itself?]
(62): relatively autonomous in order to mediate between three classes [is the sneaking implication here, though, that it would not be 'relatively autonomous' were it simply the instrument of one class? seems like it.]
(62): also must track his use of relative autonomy of the oligarchy vs. relative autonomy of the state (they are used interchangeably in this piece--they might mean the same thing, but they aren't the same thing)
(62): key--he notes that the State's acquiring an economic role matters. [but the mechanisms are not clear, nor are the facts. is it true that the State appropriates much of the economic surplus, as he is saying here? will have to look more closely at the Ayub period to substantiate this--but my hunch was that it was not the case. State pandered to its capitalists.]
(62-63): key--here he's mentioning the relationship between politicians and the oligarchy (ambivalent--acceptable insofar as they accede to the oligarchy's interests). next page he is clarifying that his argument is meant to apply to the State apparatus as a whole. [this is fine, I have no qualms with the claim--but he's not consistently explicit enough about defining the oligarchy as a part of the State]
(65-66): two facts about Pakistan, which stand out
- dominant position of the oligarchy
- challenges to the oligarchy have been led by national minorities
(69): key--claim that the bureaucracy and the military are "highly developed" viz-a-viz the capitalist class [that they have a corrupt relationship to the few corrupt families that command the economy -- thus giving them a different kind of autonomy, the implication would be. nonetheless, we can focus on the fact that this is only ever an implication. the mechanism is not made clear enough.]
(69): landowners dominate party politics; their interests, though, are being served unevenly
(70): mentioning the role of the US
(70): relative autonomy of the oligarchy
(71): SUMMARY of the argument, once more -- none of the three propertied classes can command the State. hence it's relatively autonomous.
(72): key--again, making clear that the 'material basis' for the relative autonomy is the proportion of the economic surplus that the State commands
(72): key--there is now, also, a very different kind of rivalry between these three competing classes, than there existed previously ("mutually competing but reconcilable") [what follows, of course, is an account of the failure of the postcolonial bourgeoisie. an antiquated understanding of the bourgeois revolutions].
(73-74): the relationships:
- there is accord b/c the national bourgeoisie no longer needs to 'win a national-bourgeois legal framework'. this was already established by metropolitan bourgeoisie.
- green revolutions eliminated need for 'land reform' for national bourgeoisie (thus landlords can rest easy).
- national bourgeoisie does like restrictions on foreign investment, but it also needs foreign technology. it becomes "increasingly dependent on the metropolitan bourgeoisie"
(76): ideology of the oligarchy [not v. insightful]
(77): elitist and populist wings of the Bengali leadership (Suhrawardy/Mujib vs. Bhashani, break in 1957)
(79): in E. Pakistan, State giving handouts to capitalists (two-thirds of all investment)
(80-81): implication that had the Indians not intervened, maybe the reformists wouldn't have won (and that this is precisely why they intervened)
akbar zaidi, "state, military and social transition" (2005)
(5173): the core claim--Pakistan's middle classes already have access to political power, and thus prefer to be partners of military gov't (see 5174--they have "no need to struggle" for democracy)
(5173): summarizing other accounts:
(5174-5175): in brief class formation narrative, landlords are quickly sidelined (even in the early period, the bureaucracy is looking to give industrialists a 'leg up'; and then you have the Green Revolution)
(5175): here you get infuriating deployment of the 'm-class'
(5175): contradictory character of Bhutto (though never welcomed the industrialists back, he's aruging) -- contrast this w/ Aijaz Ahmad
(5175): SUMMARY picture of the period 1947-1977: emergent m-class; great progress of industrialists but stymied by Bhutto; 'feudals' in decline, but some capitalist landlords in the ascendancy
(5175): with Zia, the military bureaucracy emerges [re-emerges?] as a key, entrenched entity (this is where you get the beginnings of Millibus, he's arguing)
(5176): three of four elections after 1988 were rigged, he's arguing
(5176): again, the middle-classes! [goodness--they have economic power?! wtf are they?]
(5177): once more!
(5177): important--the question, here, of the military's increasing role in the economy [the question here, really, is whether it increases the autonomy of the State? it's unclear, though, that we're operating in anything but a capitalist environment. control over some re-investment does not mean control over money markets. this aside, why would it be that economic investments would require political control? they only require pliable politicians. though this is an insight, in and of itself]
(5178): civil society as a passive actor
(5179): dynamic account, trying to describe the rise of the 'intermediate classes' -- politicized classes, incorporating Cheema's account of local-level gov't. "the nature and form of the state changing markedly..." [this is important, within limits. my account will have to be able to resist charges of being static, so will have to think through the evidence presented here]
(5180): localization of politics leading to "politics of patronage"
(5180): key--the thesis here becomes very difficult to sustain once you try and substantiate (a) middle-classes; (b) the political power they allegedly possess
(5173): the core claim--Pakistan's middle classes already have access to political power, and thus prefer to be partners of military gov't (see 5174--they have "no need to struggle" for democracy)
(5173): summarizing other accounts:
- Jinnah would have led us to democracy, but he died
- Pakistani elite had no roots in what would come to be Pakistan
- democracy would have meant the emancipation of E. Pakistan, which could not be allowed
- low level of capitalist development meant that there were not many social groups who could have pushed democracy (large landowners were averse)
- most well-organized institutions in Pakistan were army and bureaucracy
(5174-5175): in brief class formation narrative, landlords are quickly sidelined (even in the early period, the bureaucracy is looking to give industrialists a 'leg up'; and then you have the Green Revolution)
(5175): here you get infuriating deployment of the 'm-class'
(5175): contradictory character of Bhutto (though never welcomed the industrialists back, he's aruging) -- contrast this w/ Aijaz Ahmad
(5175): SUMMARY picture of the period 1947-1977: emergent m-class; great progress of industrialists but stymied by Bhutto; 'feudals' in decline, but some capitalist landlords in the ascendancy
(5175): with Zia, the military bureaucracy emerges [re-emerges?] as a key, entrenched entity (this is where you get the beginnings of Millibus, he's arguing)
(5176): three of four elections after 1988 were rigged, he's arguing
(5176): again, the middle-classes! [goodness--they have economic power?! wtf are they?]
(5177): once more!
(5177): important--the question, here, of the military's increasing role in the economy [the question here, really, is whether it increases the autonomy of the State? it's unclear, though, that we're operating in anything but a capitalist environment. control over some re-investment does not mean control over money markets. this aside, why would it be that economic investments would require political control? they only require pliable politicians. though this is an insight, in and of itself]
(5178): civil society as a passive actor
(5179): dynamic account, trying to describe the rise of the 'intermediate classes' -- politicized classes, incorporating Cheema's account of local-level gov't. "the nature and form of the state changing markedly..." [this is important, within limits. my account will have to be able to resist charges of being static, so will have to think through the evidence presented here]
(5180): localization of politics leading to "politics of patronage"
(5180): key--the thesis here becomes very difficult to sustain once you try and substantiate (a) middle-classes; (b) the political power they allegedly possess
shuja nawaz, crossed swords (2008)
(xxix): record of the judiciary in validating military rule
(xxx): military w/ 'hand on the tiller' since 1988
(xxxi): "Army, America, and Allah"
(xxxi): Ayub on the Mullah
(xxxvi-xxxvii): Pak as Turkey (army for the people!) or Pak as Indonesia?
(xxxviv-xxxvii): useful--development and defence spending [limited]
(xxxix): Warrant of Procedure
(xli-xliii): SUMMARY of the major themes
(12): Rejecting anyone whose hands were soft!
(15, 17): L. Curzon, and numbers of gov't vs. population
(16): 1917, Sandhurst is open to native officers
(30): the birth of a 'moth-eaten' military
(32): dependent on India for transfers, while fighting India in Kashmir! [this aside--there is good material here for a Skocpol-like narrative of literal State-construction. though not sure how far it would get me in the context of my paper]
(33): Waziristan as one of the six 'static area' commands in 1947; though Pakistan withdraws in hilariously-named Operation Curzon
(71-73): relevant--The Kashmir War as marking the beginnings of Bonapartism in Pakistan (i.e., a gap seen between Army and politicians) [but there's not much in the way of mechanisms, here--just narrative. if it marked military disaffection at the politicians, fine. but we need to ask, still, what allows the military to run roughshod over the interests of the economy at-large. need to make sure, though, not to confound the two questions: (1) relative autonomy of the State; (2) role of the military in the State (viz-a-viz politicians, of course)]
(78): Muhammad Ali on Muslim League as drawn from 'pillars of society', starting to unravel post-independence
(81-82): Ayub Khan promotion discussion (made C in C on 17th January, 1951)
(83-84): discussion of Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case (linked, here, to Kashmir conflict via Akbar Khan)
(86): Martial Law in Punjab, 8 March 1953 -- establishing Army as political force
(89): precious--Ayub on becoming army chief, says: "...keep out of politics..."
(89): important--again, here there is a narrative of political chaos, which, he is arguing, had the effect of laying the groundwork of inviting the army in. this is fine as far as history goes (not very far); a structural account of this incapacity is demanded, of course.
(94): Liaquat playing games re: his visit to Moscow/DC (helped by fact that Nehru's 1949 visit did not go too well)
(96): Korean War as 'political glue' for the new relationship
(98): important--David Bruce 1952 report to NSC warns of mullahs lying in wait. Must support these Western-oriented friendly leaders. Telling quotes re: imperialism and geo-strategic interests in the region (proximity to C. Asia/USSR)
(100-101): Ayub and Mirza courting the Dulles brothers to support Pakistan as bulwark of ME anti-communist strategy
(102): Dulles very impressed on tour to Pakistan ("best guard of honor"!)
(102-104): Ayub learning from Turkey military model
(107): US calculus in lead-up to decision to give Pakistan aid in 1954 (re: India)
(111): Nixon (as Eisenhower's VP) committed to relationship with Pakistan, lest he lose everyone to the Asian-Arab bloc of neutrals
(112): important?--Ayub citing fact that 75% of Pakistan gov't budget was going to defence, as part of his plea for American aid
(114-116): a relatively 'unsuccessful' first meeting, in 1954, thanks to one Meyers--though firm Pakistan view forced US, Nawaz is arguing, to be decisive in this regard (people in US were on both sides of fence)
(118): important--May 1954, America and Pakistan sign Mutual Defense Agreement. "Uncle Sam was now officially on Pakistan's side..."
(122): social origins of CSP--British in outlook
(125-126): US expressing that Pakistan military is most reliable institution amidst political infighting (around Ghulam Muhammad's dismissal of the Const. Assembly in 1954)
(126): memo from US ambassador confirms that the US has interest in democratic procedure/'appearance of legitimacy'
(127): Fed Court rules in favor of Ghulam Muhammad's dismissal --making a case against oligarchic power [!]
(127): One Unit proposals, towards "controlled democracy" and administrative centralization
[have to be understood in the context of political illegitimac(y--these ministers were finding it impossible to even win seats in the assemblies!]
(128): elections to Const. Assembly in1955--ML win 20 of 32 seats; US happy
(128): Islamic Republic born on 23 March 1956 [worth remembering that this was the work of the pro-West].Gives Pres. inordinate power.
(130): Suhrawardy comes to power as PM [has to work with US, of course--think about what it means, again, that the US was another 'power center,' in effect]
(131): Admiral Radford on Army as an ally 'which no other friendly power can match'
(135-136): Aid not being delivered at rate promised, infuriating Ayub. Nixon, friend of Pakistan, understands.
(136): military taking up 65% of government revenues at this point [highlights the urgent need for aid from US, for state-builders' perspective]
(138): here, wants to complement Huntington's argument about failure of political institutions, by talking about the personal characteristics of Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan (that this is important for understanding the Coup, in other words)
(140): political 'shenanigans' in build-up to coup
(140-141): key--serious fiscal crisis in 1958, drain of foreign exchange reserves
(141): important--socialists might get elected at the polls, worries Ayub! [this connects the coup issue to issues of the autonomy of the State--you are pre-emptively worried, in effect, that the State apparatus will be put to some other use]
(141): amidst all this, Baluchistan lowers the Pakistani flag and announces its intention to secede (Mirza has hand in this, it is being alleged?)
(142): Mirza worry that "men of character" won't be returned at the polls
(143): Ayub confident about Army ability to step in at any time, if things were to "get out of hand"
(151): US wants its cake, eating and having both--wants democratic government, but the election of people favorable to its interests.
(151): general elections originally scheduled for November 1958, it seems
(153): Dulles saying that US supports democracy in principle. Exceptions can be made under limited circumstances, however.
(154): Shah proposes to Ayub that the countries merge--July 1958!
(157): important--intelligence analysts attribute coup to Mirza/Ayub's worry that general elections would see Noon-Suhrawardy come to power, E. Bengal would make serious inroads
(160): Palace intrigues culminating in Ayub expelling Mirza
(160): ZA Bhutto is commerce minister in the martial law cabinet, appointed by Mirza before Ayub's takeover
(161): the ministers re-take their oaths, after Mirza's resignation
(164): Coup sanctioned by Supreme Court (as a revolution, no less!)
(170-171): Justice Munir says constitution can be approved by public acclaim, a la the Greeks!
(171-172): Martial Law existed to carry out basic reforms that Pakistan had been unable to implement, thus far
(172-173): reform proposals--including idea of mixing Urdu and Bengali in a language; roman script, etc.
(175-176): Ayub pandering to Americans in the writing of the new constitution [again, we see them as a power center quite clearly--need to include this fact, obviously, in the theory]
(176): the farce of Ayub's thinking on BD
(178): Bhutto is on the constitution commission that helps to think through Ayub's constitution [Ayub doesn't accept their recommendations in toto]
(178): announced in March 1962 as the 'blending of democracy with discipline'[!]
(180-181): US wanted to avoid an arms race between India and Pakistan
(181): Pakistan dependent on US to finance its military [need to quantify this, really--make sense of the 'autonomy' in this way would be very helpful]
(182): January 1958--Ayub fighting with Truman over India and Communism -- when Ayub gets tanks anyway, he makes up by sending him three ducks that he had shot the previous day [!!!]
(185-186): the Badaber Base (sending U-2 spy planes, what have you), 1958-1968
(186-187): important--numbers on GDP and military budget and US aid (limited to early 60s, though)
(188): US reconsidering its goals--but realizes centrality of military and Pakistan, and the danger of the democratic process [good quote, here, about the danger of political parties emerging]
(192): Ayub tied his political fortunes to the Muslim League, which had degenerated terribly by this point (even his brother doesn't join his party!)
(193, 200): 60s as marking a shift away from the US, to an extent--as the US begins to eye India following Sino-Indian conflict in '62
(196): Ayub cables Kennedy in 1961, concerned that military aid might be going towards India
(200): Army had, by now, doubled since partition--it was threatening to become not Pakistan having army but Army having Pakistan
(201): ZA Bhutto beginning to assert himself--though this will lead to agitation around Kashmir and 1965 war
(207): no coordination with leaders of Kashmiri resistance in '65, prior to the 'uprising' that was to launch the war--the assumption was that they would rise spontaneously!
(236): Figures on gov't spending, in the context of this war -- 1.6 billion dollars on military expenditure between 1958-1965, about 50% of total gov't expenditure!
(236-237): the War heightened tensions with the US considerably (Shoaib vs. Bhutto)
(237-238): Lyndon Johnson warns Ayub, around this time, that Bhutto is "damn dangerous"
(239): Tashkent Accord, Jan 1966--Shastri dies that day; at home there are protests; the Ayub-Bhutto split takes final shape (Bhutto had been posturing as a dissenter--by that summer he had left the cabinet)
(244): Yahya takes charge, abrogating the constitution
(250): Yahya staffing his 'cabinet' with his favored officers -- including Major General Sher Ali Khan, who as minister of information will sponsor Islamists
(251): Yahya moves to control growing power of labor unions (no details given, but new labor policy was promulgated)
(252): 1962 constitution had stipulated that for the next 20 years minister of defence would be a military person
(253): policy of land allotments, begun under Ayub, as well as Fauji Foundation and Army Welfare Trust [remember that in the Siddiqa (via Zaidi), this is a policy that takes shape under Zia]
(254, 258): Nov 1969 announces elections for Oct 1970. Abolishes "One Unit", restores one-man vote (which gives E. Pakistan 169 seats in NA, vs. 144 for West)
(256): Pak economy suffering in aftermath of 1965 war (#'s)
(258-259, 260): The ISI makes its appearance in the build-up to the 1970 elections, but establishment was underestimating the strength of the PPP and Awami League
(259): Tribal chief in NWFP lamenting universal suffrage--"If they're all able to vote, it will be difficult to pay them all!"
(260): Mujib had good relations with Adamjee and the House of Haroon
(261): Flooding and cyclone coupled with Yahya's druken speech
(262): "The regime was astounded by the results..." Gul Hassan says, "Let's back Bhutto"
(263-267): important--Military was already planning an alternative to Mujib ("Operation Blitz", planned by Yaqub, who later resigns however b/c he only sees a political solution to post-election tension. Tikka Khan takes over, already known as the "Butcher of Baluchistan". Some kind of 'concealed' regime/support for Bhutto is on the cards (NA has to be postponed, because Bhutto refuses to show in early March--round table conferences are further postponed). Talks fail, aleady worry is that Mujib might use power to reduce army's influence.
(268, 270): mutiny in the ranks -- 8 East Bengal REgiment kills its West Pakistani CO
(268): Roedad Khan as hawk!
(269): Niazi and Tikka Khan, re: "scorched earth" policy in E. Bengal
(271-272): Aug 1969 is when talk begins, w/ Nixon, of using Pakistan as intermediary for US and China talks. Kissinger's visit, of course, is in 1971 (argument here is that this is distracting Yahya from issues at home).
(272-273, 287): Yahya becoming close to Nixon (Nixon also didn't like Indira Gandhi), which would pay off around '71 war, though not to the extent Yahya would have liked (a false sense of security, which made him less conciliatory)
(274): Chou En-Lai has 17 hours of talks with Kissinger--mentioning Indian 'expansionism' and support for Pakistan, over Bangladesh
(277): [shameful treatment of E. Bengal atrocities by Shuja Nawaz.]
(284-285): CIA sees writing on the wall, despite apparent military success
(285): important--India not only interested in hurting Pakistan, but also forestalling the emergence of radicals and Leftists in E. Bengal
(298): Yahya speaks of 120 million mujahids ready to defend E. Bengal from full Indian invasion [hah!]
(307): a new constitutional package, in journalists' hand, but never actually read out -- "nine months too late"
(320-321): 1971 transfer of power as a 'putsch' by junior officers, after Yahya had actually announced his intention to preside over a new constitution
(320): "the army that facilitated his direct rise to the presidency dropped him in the end."
(323): Bhutto sacks 1,300 civil servants
(323): Bhutto moves against the army (but retires the more intelligent generals, keeping many of those that supported the war)
(324, 338-339, 343): important--Bhutto's decision to constitute FSF comes in context of Army (Gul Hassan Khan) not cooperating fully with his injunctions; creation, in effect, of a parallel authority to Pakistani Army (at 18,000 people in 1976!)
(325): Bhutto removes Gul Hassan Khan and Rahim Khan, March 1972--for 'bonapartist' tendencies
(326): 21 April 1972 Bhutto takes oath as President/CMLA (under provisional constitution approved by NA)
(328-330): Army brief to Bhutto, before Simla negotiations -- not as if it were a defeated army, for one
(330-331): Triumph for Bhutto at Simla
(331-333): Bhutto politicking--deals with JUI and NAP re: coalition gov'ts in 1972 -- by 1975, though, he had smashed this accord and dismissed the gov'ts (sent the Army into Baluchistan--"inviting the Army back into the political process," says Nawaz)
(333-334): Ahmed Rashid, Najam Sethi, etc. gone to 'fight' in Baluchistan--Sethi kept in solitary confinement for seven months!
(335): important--"key role being played by the army in propping up civilian rule."
(335-337): key--planners of a military coup were arrested -- Bhutto chooses a 'fawning' an 'obsequious' General Zia to be head of the Attock tribunal (this is despite the fact that Brigadier Nawazish had recommended he be courtmartialed for participating in Black September operations against orders)
(337-338): Zia's promotion, over six generals (simultaneously Bhutto had lost a lot of support in the Army because of his treatment of the accused in the trial)
(339-340): Dr. IH Usmani and nuclear weapons -- balks at idea of a weapons program at a secret meeting in Multan in 1972
(342-343): The 1973 Constitution (April 1973) -- a parliamentary system, albeit with a strong centre (apparently in exchange for Islamist provisions)
(343-344): astonishing eulogy to Bhutto, from Zia, re: attention showered on Pak. Army
(344): Bhutto calling on the 'ancien regime' to shore up his rule
(345-347): Bhutto fixes 1977 elections -- himself embarassed by how lop-sided his victory was, apparently
(348): PNA begins campaign of mass agitation -- petit-bourgeois elements
(349): this is when Bhutto, in vain, bans alcohol and promises an Islamic system in order to appease them--April 22, he declares martial law
(349-350): there is rumbling discontent in the Army, especially amongst junior officers
(350-351): US-Bhutto relationship, blowing hot and cold after Nixon/Kissinger leave the White House
(352-353): July 4, 1977--Zia's coup (Bhutto had distanced himself from his core, surrounded himself with sycophants, and alienated the business/banking community) [obviously Aijaz Ahmed is superior on this score]
(359-360): here, also, Nawaz is attributing a new "Culture of Entitlement" to the Zia era--a "new crop of millionaire generals."
(359, 363): Zia promised elections within 90 days! (couldn't hold elections, obviously, as PPP would win--canceled both the proposed 1977 ones and the 1979 elections, as the writing is on the cards: re: local body elections; Bhutto is also getting huge support at rallies, don't forget)
(360): important--narrative, here, is that far from fading from political life, the Army ended the Zia decade very much on top. an empowered ISI, ethnic conflict ravaging civil society.
(362): Zia became president on 16 December 1978, deposing Faiz Ilahi Chaudry (who had been Bhutto's president)
(363): Supreme Court, of course, gave Zia legal cover, invoking the Doctrine of Necessity (making martial law superior to the Constitution, in the process); March 1981 some took oath under a PCO
(365): Bhutto hung
(366-367): Pakistan outsourced its writ to tribal leaders, in FATA
(367-378): Pakistan sheltering the radicals against whom Daud was cracking down (Hekmatyar, of course)
(370): beginning, of course, of the strategic relationship with the USA after USSR invades Afghanistan on December 24, 1979
(371): Pakistan became world's largest heroin supplier
(372): Defence spending 'jump' after invasion--up to $1.86 billion in 1981
(373): The ISI was coming into prominence, initially to the chagrin of Zia, apparently (though he took full advantage, of course)
(374): 67% of the aid was going to the fundamentalists by 1987; most to Hekmatyar
(374): another estimate is one-third to Hekmatyar, one-third to Rabbani (Massoud), and the rest to the others (these figures discount Soviet aid, don't forget)
(376): Reagan comes with a 3.2 billion dollar aid plan (return to democracy is Pakistan's "internal situation")
(380): classic -- the 1984 referendum text
(381): Junejo-Zia confrontation over cabinet posts
(382): Martial law lifted 30 December 1985
(382): B. Bhutto returns to Lahore on 10 April 1986, and one million people turn out to greet her
(384): the tensions between Zia and Junejo eventually culminate in the latter's dismissal (military is not informed of this)
(385): changes in the demographics of the Army (urbanization meant that more were lower middle-class, a la Zia)
(386): Pakistan base in Saudi (some 20,000 troops, in 1983)
(387): important--Zia's time also saw the army's deepest penetration of the civil service--about a quarter of the forty senior bureaucratic posts. Ambassadorial posts and lower level positions, as well. And martial law meant that military was in charge in the provinces, too. "He realized that his only constiutency was the Army."
(389): BCCI corruption--helping gov't get foreign exchange, and boosting reserves
(390): decline in US-Pakistan relationship under Zia, b/c of the 'nuclear programme'
(390-391): Pressler and Solarz amendments, where it has to be verified that Pakistan wasn't pursuing nuclear weapons
(396): After the Zia crash on 17 Aug 1988, army high command took the decision to pursue the constitutional path (no details here--but done in a way that confirmed rank of Army over Civil, argues Nawaz) [certainly an empty transition, if ever there was one--even still, Zia had promised elections in Nov 1988, and those would still take place]
(411, 422): important--the 'troika' (President, PM, Army Chief) would contest power for the next decade
(411-412): Hamid Gul cobbles together the IJI (Nawaz Sharif who had been finance and chief minister of Punjab after being picked by Lt. Gen., Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi who was ex-PPP)
(412-413): Beg and Ishaq Khan, separately, were both willing to have elections (even as Gul said they needed more time to build up IJI)
(413): 1988 elections: first-past-the-post helped PPP win more seats than it had popular vote; Nawaz, though, became Chief Minister of the Punjab. "Bhutto had a victory but not a real mandate."
(414-415): a 'gentleman's argeement' that there were certain things that Bhutto couldn't touch (five points)
(415): PPP makes mistake of agreeing to support Ghulam Ishaq Khan in the presidential elections
(416): Bhutto's tense relations with Beg and Khan
(423-425): differences with Hamid Gul and Beg over Afghanistan--resulting in former's dismissal
(425): Bhutto also tried to bring the ISI under control, appointing Kallue to the chagrin of Beg and the military; she was depending on advice of Imtiaz Ahmed and Naseerullah Babar, both people whom were not trusted by the army establishment
(426-427): tensions come to a head over Sirohey--though Bhutto noting that Beg didn't expect Sharif to win the ensuing elections, thought instead that he would be the matchmaker of a hung parliament, or something
(428): Altaf Hussain was rejected from the Army, for being a 'refugee'
(429): Aitzaz Ahsan as Interior Minister, at this time
(430): key--Bhutto dismissed by Beg and Khan in Aug 1990, as issues accumulate (she was grooming her own COAS), on grounds of inefficiency/corruption
(432): US and IMF, even, were warm to the Bhutto gov't, here -- it is primarily the military and civil establishment that is responsible for her fall
(433): Roedad Khan was involved in this dismissal, allegedly
(433): Beg 'takes back' the ISI after dismissing Bhutto (Kallue removed)
(434): wow--Rs. 140m were distributed to help opponents of the PPP in the 1990 elections; see the breakdown, here
(435): IJI wins Nov 1990 elections--Bhutto elected leader of the opposition
(436): apparent harmony between political leaders and Army, at this early stage of the Sharif gov't
(436): a 'pro-business' gov't--seeing to it that earlier nationalizations were undone, etc.; "has the support of the business community"
(437): US sanctions, b/c of the continued nuclear program
(438): Tensions emerging between Sharif and Beg, re: Gulf War
(439): Beg becoming increasingly loony as he becomes a 'lame duck' (western-zionist conspiracies, etc.)
(443): Asif Nawaz appointed COAS
(444): Sharif and Ijazul Haq allied on the third anniversary of Zia's death--but soon to part ways, as Ijazul Haq aligned himself with Musharraf in 1999
(445): important--Army's annual turnover was 12-14 billion rupees in 1991 -- a "huge industrial conglomerate" (twice as big as the biggest private conglomerate at the time, the Crescent Group, which had an annual turnover of six billion rupees)
(446): again, a balancing act would be necessary--the Army had hardly vanished from the political scene
(447-448): "strong" relationship between the US and Asif Nawaz' army, at this time, though nuclear issue and terrorism remained problems
(449): tensions between Sharif and Ghulam Ishaq Khan--former making moves to remove the 8th amendment, but didn't have the leverage
(450): Asif Nawaz given a BMW by Shahbaz Sharif! (they had been distributing them to other generals)
(449-452): and tensions between Sharif and Asif Nawaz
(452): Sharif made Javed Nasir, a fundoo, DG ISI (Nasir wouldn't even look at women when they entered the room)
(452): CIA giving Nawaz signals that the army ought to intervene (the abiding concern being the nuclear programme, it seems?)
(453): Hamid Gul is retired, after refusing the transfer ordered by Nawaz
(454-455): Nawaz and Sharif coming to loggerheads over policy in Sindh, as PML was backing MQM at the time. Nawaz was 'overstepping' his duty and threatening the coalition with MQM, in Sharif's eyes.
(456-457): Gen. Nawaz allegedly being asked to take power in coup, by numerous figures
(459): tension between Sharif and Khan over who was to succeed Asif Nawaz
(466-467): relations with the US are deteriorating, under Bill Clinton's time in office (again, Kashmir and nuclear program are the issues). not helped by Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir as DG ISI (replaced eventually by Qazi, on orders of Waheed)
(469): attempted repeal of 8th Amendment, by Sharif
(469): succession battle within PML, after Junejo dies in March 1993
(470): President Ishaq sacks the gov't after an inflammatory speech by Nawaz (backed by Waheed) -- but Supreme Court does not side with him
(471-472): Army as kingmaker in agreement that sees both Sharif and Ishaq resign--replaed by Qureshi, an IMF and banker's man
(473): Qureshi introduced the independence of the State Bank from the Ministry of Finance and exposed some defaulters on gov't loans from Sharif's party, with the support of the Army [here described as freeing it from the 'thicket' of politics; but obviously a profoundly anti-democratic measure, at its heart]
(473): Bhutto wins October 1993 elections--again a victory, but not a mandate
(474): Bhutto knew she had to be more careful re: the Army and Intelligence Services, the second time around
(474): Pakistan contributed 'peacekeeping' troops to Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti
(477): abortive Islamist coup--found out and snuffed out
(477-478): mistrust in the early Clinton years, again, though Bhutto did her best (very successful visit to Washington in early 1995)
(478): Mullah Omar acquired support after dealing with the rape and murder of Herati villagers by renegade Mujahideen (who had been running a tax-collection checkpoint)
(479): Taliban, in this narrative, not created by Pakistan but collaborated with very readily, of course (then, as now, needed to dislodge pro-India Tajik force)
(481-482): Karamat made COAS, after Waheed's term is up
(483-486): the issues leading up to Leghari's sacking of Bhutto in November 1996 -- have to do with corruption and the economy [but the economic issues are not at all dealt with, here--mentioned as depleting foreign exchange reserves, etc.]
(487): Sharif trounces all opposition in February 1997 elections -- PPP reduced to 18 seats!
(487): Removes 8th Amendment by passing the 13th Amendment -- Leghari and the COAS did not have objections, though
(487-489): Crisis re: Chief Justice Ali Shah--events are very hectic, Leghari ends up resigning, Chief Justice ends up sacked, and Sharif wins.
(492): India, under BJP, weighed up cost-benefit on its economy of the nuclear test--confident that it could withstand the expected shocks
(493-495): Sharif decides on retaliatory test in response, against Karamat's advice [no taking the high ground, here]. the economic consequences stood to be grave [how do you make sense of this? clearly in violation of any rational person's interests re: stability of Pakistani capitalism]
(497): Senate blocks 15th Amendment -- Sharif's "caliphate" amendment
(498-499): Sharif and Karamat fall out, allegedly over Karamat's speech re: founding of an NSC
(500): October 1998, after Karamat leaves post two months early, Sharif chooses Musharraf (picked over more senior, more suitable candidates--ostensibly b/c of lack of base in the Army)
(517-518): Sharif allegedly on board re: Kargil invasion
(520-522): re: pulling out, it was a problem of saving national face (Musharraf here is reported saying that he left this up to Sharif, who made the decision; Sharif says that Musharraf asked him to pull out)
(524): in September, Shahbaz Sharif has the US release a statement regarding opposition to an unconstitutional takeover.
(525): Touching moment with Sharif senior, where Musharraf and Sharifs are deemed brothers, apparently (one month before coup)
(526): Sharif wants to replace Musharraf with Lt. Gen. Ziauddin (who had been made DG ISI)
(527): Sharif, quite simply, didn't have the backing of the Army to remove Musharraf--instead, it sided with the ousted General.
(528): the third of Musharraf's seven goals, in coming to power, was to "revive the economy and restore investor confidence." (Nawaz noting that he made progress on this score)
(529): Supreme Court judgement of May 2000, LFO of 2002, 17th amendment all gave extraordinary legal cover to Musharraf.
(530): Supreme Court acquiescence
(531): 'successful' April 2002 referendum
(532): MMA wins 18 seats
(532): Musharraf brought some 1,000 military officers into senior positions in the civil administration, academia, etc." -- this ensured continued loyalty of the military, of course
(533): his King's party prevented the passage of a Women's Rights Bill in 2006
(533): troika had been replaced by a one-legged stool (Shaukat Aziz became PM in August 2004)
(533): Musharraf's regime continued the 'pro-business trend'--attracting investment flows from Pakistanis and the Middle East
(535): Ambassador Ayub trying to convince Omar not to blow up the statues at Bamiyan
(536): Taliban de-weaponized Kandahar
(538): Musharraf had been shunned by Clinton; but 9/11 changed everything, of course (an 'anchor of stability' -- what Nixon had called the Shah and Marcos both)
(541): the seven demands made after 9/11 attacks, to which Musharraf partly agreed (objected to some, apparently)--nonetheless, this is relayed back to US and then becomes fact as total agreement [unclear why, how, in this narrative]
(542): Pakistan had recognized Taliban after capture of Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997 -- against the advice of Karamat
(542-543): Mahmud Ahmed, Musharraf's DG ISI, was an Islamist, and removed by Musharraf soon after the US attack on Afghanistan
(546): Musharraf had given space to the Islamists in order to combat Nawaz and Bhutto--this gave the MMA a respectability it never ought to have had
(547-548): important--economic 'progress' during the Musharraf period. Saw to it that the investors were kept happy [again, here it's not a case of a coordinated project--rather it's a question of what capitalists are happy with, and when they feel compelled to organize themselves (ought to look at the disorganization of labor, too)]
(551): AQ Khan corruption and dealings with Iran, Libya, NK
(557): PEMRA and censorship
(559): Musharraf talking of a French-style presidential system
(560): sacking of Chaudry, overturned by Supreme Court
(560-561): Declaration of Emergency, Nov 2007--coup within a coup (stating elections would be held January 2008). Musharraf left position of COAS on 28 November, though, bowing to internal and external pressure.
(570-571): changing composition of Army, by ethnicity
(572): the 'Zia Bharti'
(575): miltiary's share of the budget, viz-a-viz health and education
(576): perks go only to those who make it at the higher echelons -- a steep privilege curve
(582): too much power goes to the Army Chief--need a division of power amongst regional commanders
- - - - - -
(1) key point is to make sense of institutional interests/personal interests within a context that is set by the contours of class politics. this is what i hope to add to this literature. in other words, its possible to see that some of the balancing act between military and civil plays out without interference, on the basis of competing interests--it is when structural interests are threatened, though, that it needs to be adjudicated directly. [in other words, it is a mistake to think that everything that happens within the institutions is mandated by the underlying class structure--but it is the case that larger questions cannot be resolved without consulting that class structure]
(2) must make use of the constructs of 'structural autonomy' and 'political autonomy' (and somewhere in between these two has to fit the notion of the hand of Empire)
(3): should emphasize the continuity of the 'form of state' (Bhutto as martial ruler, Zia w/ Junejo, Bhutto w/ Beg/Khan, etc.)
(4): when speaking about US role, important to note that they figure directly only really in the periods where their interest is most intense (so in the 50's and80's and 2000's, but not so much in the 90's). will have to make this more airtight, but this seems defensible at first glance.
(xxix): record of the judiciary in validating military rule
(xxx): military w/ 'hand on the tiller' since 1988
(xxxi): "Army, America, and Allah"
(xxxi): Ayub on the Mullah
(xxxvi-xxxvii): Pak as Turkey (army for the people!) or Pak as Indonesia?
(xxxviv-xxxvii): useful--development and defence spending [limited]
(xxxix): Warrant of Procedure
(xli-xliii): SUMMARY of the major themes
- army reflects pakistani society more than at any time in history
- internally weak political parties have handed army power
- army has acquired a corporate structure and acts on its own institutional interests
- role of the army has been given a boost by the US' strategic interests
- army has performed well in its primary task of defending the country (!)
- protection of its corporate image against its own leadership
- highly partial selection of successors to army chief
- pakistan remains very strategic in global geo-politics
(12): Rejecting anyone whose hands were soft!
(15, 17): L. Curzon, and numbers of gov't vs. population
(16): 1917, Sandhurst is open to native officers
(30): the birth of a 'moth-eaten' military
(32): dependent on India for transfers, while fighting India in Kashmir! [this aside--there is good material here for a Skocpol-like narrative of literal State-construction. though not sure how far it would get me in the context of my paper]
(33): Waziristan as one of the six 'static area' commands in 1947; though Pakistan withdraws in hilariously-named Operation Curzon
(71-73): relevant--The Kashmir War as marking the beginnings of Bonapartism in Pakistan (i.e., a gap seen between Army and politicians) [but there's not much in the way of mechanisms, here--just narrative. if it marked military disaffection at the politicians, fine. but we need to ask, still, what allows the military to run roughshod over the interests of the economy at-large. need to make sure, though, not to confound the two questions: (1) relative autonomy of the State; (2) role of the military in the State (viz-a-viz politicians, of course)]
(78): Muhammad Ali on Muslim League as drawn from 'pillars of society', starting to unravel post-independence
(81-82): Ayub Khan promotion discussion (made C in C on 17th January, 1951)
(83-84): discussion of Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case (linked, here, to Kashmir conflict via Akbar Khan)
(86): Martial Law in Punjab, 8 March 1953 -- establishing Army as political force
(89): precious--Ayub on becoming army chief, says: "...keep out of politics..."
(89): important--again, here there is a narrative of political chaos, which, he is arguing, had the effect of laying the groundwork of inviting the army in. this is fine as far as history goes (not very far); a structural account of this incapacity is demanded, of course.
(94): Liaquat playing games re: his visit to Moscow/DC (helped by fact that Nehru's 1949 visit did not go too well)
(96): Korean War as 'political glue' for the new relationship
(98): important--David Bruce 1952 report to NSC warns of mullahs lying in wait. Must support these Western-oriented friendly leaders. Telling quotes re: imperialism and geo-strategic interests in the region (proximity to C. Asia/USSR)
(100-101): Ayub and Mirza courting the Dulles brothers to support Pakistan as bulwark of ME anti-communist strategy
(102): Dulles very impressed on tour to Pakistan ("best guard of honor"!)
(102-104): Ayub learning from Turkey military model
(107): US calculus in lead-up to decision to give Pakistan aid in 1954 (re: India)
(111): Nixon (as Eisenhower's VP) committed to relationship with Pakistan, lest he lose everyone to the Asian-Arab bloc of neutrals
(112): important?--Ayub citing fact that 75% of Pakistan gov't budget was going to defence, as part of his plea for American aid
(114-116): a relatively 'unsuccessful' first meeting, in 1954, thanks to one Meyers--though firm Pakistan view forced US, Nawaz is arguing, to be decisive in this regard (people in US were on both sides of fence)
(118): important--May 1954, America and Pakistan sign Mutual Defense Agreement. "Uncle Sam was now officially on Pakistan's side..."
(122): social origins of CSP--British in outlook
(125-126): US expressing that Pakistan military is most reliable institution amidst political infighting (around Ghulam Muhammad's dismissal of the Const. Assembly in 1954)
(126): memo from US ambassador confirms that the US has interest in democratic procedure/'appearance of legitimacy'
(127): Fed Court rules in favor of Ghulam Muhammad's dismissal --making a case against oligarchic power [!]
(127): One Unit proposals, towards "controlled democracy" and administrative centralization
[have to be understood in the context of political illegitimac(y--these ministers were finding it impossible to even win seats in the assemblies!]
(128): elections to Const. Assembly in1955--ML win 20 of 32 seats; US happy
(128): Islamic Republic born on 23 March 1956 [worth remembering that this was the work of the pro-West].Gives Pres. inordinate power.
(130): Suhrawardy comes to power as PM [has to work with US, of course--think about what it means, again, that the US was another 'power center,' in effect]
(131): Admiral Radford on Army as an ally 'which no other friendly power can match'
(135-136): Aid not being delivered at rate promised, infuriating Ayub. Nixon, friend of Pakistan, understands.
(136): military taking up 65% of government revenues at this point [highlights the urgent need for aid from US, for state-builders' perspective]
(138): here, wants to complement Huntington's argument about failure of political institutions, by talking about the personal characteristics of Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan (that this is important for understanding the Coup, in other words)
(140): political 'shenanigans' in build-up to coup
(140-141): key--serious fiscal crisis in 1958, drain of foreign exchange reserves
(141): important--socialists might get elected at the polls, worries Ayub! [this connects the coup issue to issues of the autonomy of the State--you are pre-emptively worried, in effect, that the State apparatus will be put to some other use]
(141): amidst all this, Baluchistan lowers the Pakistani flag and announces its intention to secede (Mirza has hand in this, it is being alleged?)
(142): Mirza worry that "men of character" won't be returned at the polls
(143): Ayub confident about Army ability to step in at any time, if things were to "get out of hand"
(151): US wants its cake, eating and having both--wants democratic government, but the election of people favorable to its interests.
(151): general elections originally scheduled for November 1958, it seems
(153): Dulles saying that US supports democracy in principle. Exceptions can be made under limited circumstances, however.
(154): Shah proposes to Ayub that the countries merge--July 1958!
(157): important--intelligence analysts attribute coup to Mirza/Ayub's worry that general elections would see Noon-Suhrawardy come to power, E. Bengal would make serious inroads
(160): Palace intrigues culminating in Ayub expelling Mirza
(160): ZA Bhutto is commerce minister in the martial law cabinet, appointed by Mirza before Ayub's takeover
(161): the ministers re-take their oaths, after Mirza's resignation
(164): Coup sanctioned by Supreme Court (as a revolution, no less!)
(170-171): Justice Munir says constitution can be approved by public acclaim, a la the Greeks!
(171-172): Martial Law existed to carry out basic reforms that Pakistan had been unable to implement, thus far
(172-173): reform proposals--including idea of mixing Urdu and Bengali in a language; roman script, etc.
(175-176): Ayub pandering to Americans in the writing of the new constitution [again, we see them as a power center quite clearly--need to include this fact, obviously, in the theory]
(176): the farce of Ayub's thinking on BD
(178): Bhutto is on the constitution commission that helps to think through Ayub's constitution [Ayub doesn't accept their recommendations in toto]
(178): announced in March 1962 as the 'blending of democracy with discipline'[!]
(180-181): US wanted to avoid an arms race between India and Pakistan
(181): Pakistan dependent on US to finance its military [need to quantify this, really--make sense of the 'autonomy' in this way would be very helpful]
(182): January 1958--Ayub fighting with Truman over India and Communism -- when Ayub gets tanks anyway, he makes up by sending him three ducks that he had shot the previous day [!!!]
(185-186): the Badaber Base (sending U-2 spy planes, what have you), 1958-1968
(186-187): important--numbers on GDP and military budget and US aid (limited to early 60s, though)
(188): US reconsidering its goals--but realizes centrality of military and Pakistan, and the danger of the democratic process [good quote, here, about the danger of political parties emerging]
(192): Ayub tied his political fortunes to the Muslim League, which had degenerated terribly by this point (even his brother doesn't join his party!)
(193, 200): 60s as marking a shift away from the US, to an extent--as the US begins to eye India following Sino-Indian conflict in '62
(196): Ayub cables Kennedy in 1961, concerned that military aid might be going towards India
(200): Army had, by now, doubled since partition--it was threatening to become not Pakistan having army but Army having Pakistan
(201): ZA Bhutto beginning to assert himself--though this will lead to agitation around Kashmir and 1965 war
(207): no coordination with leaders of Kashmiri resistance in '65, prior to the 'uprising' that was to launch the war--the assumption was that they would rise spontaneously!
(236): Figures on gov't spending, in the context of this war -- 1.6 billion dollars on military expenditure between 1958-1965, about 50% of total gov't expenditure!
(236-237): the War heightened tensions with the US considerably (Shoaib vs. Bhutto)
(237-238): Lyndon Johnson warns Ayub, around this time, that Bhutto is "damn dangerous"
(239): Tashkent Accord, Jan 1966--Shastri dies that day; at home there are protests; the Ayub-Bhutto split takes final shape (Bhutto had been posturing as a dissenter--by that summer he had left the cabinet)
(244): Yahya takes charge, abrogating the constitution
(250): Yahya staffing his 'cabinet' with his favored officers -- including Major General Sher Ali Khan, who as minister of information will sponsor Islamists
(251): Yahya moves to control growing power of labor unions (no details given, but new labor policy was promulgated)
(252): 1962 constitution had stipulated that for the next 20 years minister of defence would be a military person
(253): policy of land allotments, begun under Ayub, as well as Fauji Foundation and Army Welfare Trust [remember that in the Siddiqa (via Zaidi), this is a policy that takes shape under Zia]
(254, 258): Nov 1969 announces elections for Oct 1970. Abolishes "One Unit", restores one-man vote (which gives E. Pakistan 169 seats in NA, vs. 144 for West)
(256): Pak economy suffering in aftermath of 1965 war (#'s)
(258-259, 260): The ISI makes its appearance in the build-up to the 1970 elections, but establishment was underestimating the strength of the PPP and Awami League
(259): Tribal chief in NWFP lamenting universal suffrage--"If they're all able to vote, it will be difficult to pay them all!"
(260): Mujib had good relations with Adamjee and the House of Haroon
(261): Flooding and cyclone coupled with Yahya's druken speech
(262): "The regime was astounded by the results..." Gul Hassan says, "Let's back Bhutto"
(263-267): important--Military was already planning an alternative to Mujib ("Operation Blitz", planned by Yaqub, who later resigns however b/c he only sees a political solution to post-election tension. Tikka Khan takes over, already known as the "Butcher of Baluchistan". Some kind of 'concealed' regime/support for Bhutto is on the cards (NA has to be postponed, because Bhutto refuses to show in early March--round table conferences are further postponed). Talks fail, aleady worry is that Mujib might use power to reduce army's influence.
(268, 270): mutiny in the ranks -- 8 East Bengal REgiment kills its West Pakistani CO
(268): Roedad Khan as hawk!
(269): Niazi and Tikka Khan, re: "scorched earth" policy in E. Bengal
(271-272): Aug 1969 is when talk begins, w/ Nixon, of using Pakistan as intermediary for US and China talks. Kissinger's visit, of course, is in 1971 (argument here is that this is distracting Yahya from issues at home).
(272-273, 287): Yahya becoming close to Nixon (Nixon also didn't like Indira Gandhi), which would pay off around '71 war, though not to the extent Yahya would have liked (a false sense of security, which made him less conciliatory)
(274): Chou En-Lai has 17 hours of talks with Kissinger--mentioning Indian 'expansionism' and support for Pakistan, over Bangladesh
(277): [shameful treatment of E. Bengal atrocities by Shuja Nawaz.]
(284-285): CIA sees writing on the wall, despite apparent military success
(285): important--India not only interested in hurting Pakistan, but also forestalling the emergence of radicals and Leftists in E. Bengal
(298): Yahya speaks of 120 million mujahids ready to defend E. Bengal from full Indian invasion [hah!]
(307): a new constitutional package, in journalists' hand, but never actually read out -- "nine months too late"
(320-321): 1971 transfer of power as a 'putsch' by junior officers, after Yahya had actually announced his intention to preside over a new constitution
(320): "the army that facilitated his direct rise to the presidency dropped him in the end."
(323): Bhutto sacks 1,300 civil servants
(323): Bhutto moves against the army (but retires the more intelligent generals, keeping many of those that supported the war)
(324, 338-339, 343): important--Bhutto's decision to constitute FSF comes in context of Army (Gul Hassan Khan) not cooperating fully with his injunctions; creation, in effect, of a parallel authority to Pakistani Army (at 18,000 people in 1976!)
(325): Bhutto removes Gul Hassan Khan and Rahim Khan, March 1972--for 'bonapartist' tendencies
(326): 21 April 1972 Bhutto takes oath as President/CMLA (under provisional constitution approved by NA)
(328-330): Army brief to Bhutto, before Simla negotiations -- not as if it were a defeated army, for one
(330-331): Triumph for Bhutto at Simla
(331-333): Bhutto politicking--deals with JUI and NAP re: coalition gov'ts in 1972 -- by 1975, though, he had smashed this accord and dismissed the gov'ts (sent the Army into Baluchistan--"inviting the Army back into the political process," says Nawaz)
(333-334): Ahmed Rashid, Najam Sethi, etc. gone to 'fight' in Baluchistan--Sethi kept in solitary confinement for seven months!
(335): important--"key role being played by the army in propping up civilian rule."
(335-337): key--planners of a military coup were arrested -- Bhutto chooses a 'fawning' an 'obsequious' General Zia to be head of the Attock tribunal (this is despite the fact that Brigadier Nawazish had recommended he be courtmartialed for participating in Black September operations against orders)
(337-338): Zia's promotion, over six generals (simultaneously Bhutto had lost a lot of support in the Army because of his treatment of the accused in the trial)
(339-340): Dr. IH Usmani and nuclear weapons -- balks at idea of a weapons program at a secret meeting in Multan in 1972
(342-343): The 1973 Constitution (April 1973) -- a parliamentary system, albeit with a strong centre (apparently in exchange for Islamist provisions)
(343-344): astonishing eulogy to Bhutto, from Zia, re: attention showered on Pak. Army
(344): Bhutto calling on the 'ancien regime' to shore up his rule
(345-347): Bhutto fixes 1977 elections -- himself embarassed by how lop-sided his victory was, apparently
(348): PNA begins campaign of mass agitation -- petit-bourgeois elements
(349): this is when Bhutto, in vain, bans alcohol and promises an Islamic system in order to appease them--April 22, he declares martial law
(349-350): there is rumbling discontent in the Army, especially amongst junior officers
(350-351): US-Bhutto relationship, blowing hot and cold after Nixon/Kissinger leave the White House
(352-353): July 4, 1977--Zia's coup (Bhutto had distanced himself from his core, surrounded himself with sycophants, and alienated the business/banking community) [obviously Aijaz Ahmed is superior on this score]
(359-360): here, also, Nawaz is attributing a new "Culture of Entitlement" to the Zia era--a "new crop of millionaire generals."
(359, 363): Zia promised elections within 90 days! (couldn't hold elections, obviously, as PPP would win--canceled both the proposed 1977 ones and the 1979 elections, as the writing is on the cards: re: local body elections; Bhutto is also getting huge support at rallies, don't forget)
(360): important--narrative, here, is that far from fading from political life, the Army ended the Zia decade very much on top. an empowered ISI, ethnic conflict ravaging civil society.
(362): Zia became president on 16 December 1978, deposing Faiz Ilahi Chaudry (who had been Bhutto's president)
(363): Supreme Court, of course, gave Zia legal cover, invoking the Doctrine of Necessity (making martial law superior to the Constitution, in the process); March 1981 some took oath under a PCO
(365): Bhutto hung
(366-367): Pakistan outsourced its writ to tribal leaders, in FATA
(367-378): Pakistan sheltering the radicals against whom Daud was cracking down (Hekmatyar, of course)
(370): beginning, of course, of the strategic relationship with the USA after USSR invades Afghanistan on December 24, 1979
(371): Pakistan became world's largest heroin supplier
(372): Defence spending 'jump' after invasion--up to $1.86 billion in 1981
(373): The ISI was coming into prominence, initially to the chagrin of Zia, apparently (though he took full advantage, of course)
(374): 67% of the aid was going to the fundamentalists by 1987; most to Hekmatyar
(374): another estimate is one-third to Hekmatyar, one-third to Rabbani (Massoud), and the rest to the others (these figures discount Soviet aid, don't forget)
(376): Reagan comes with a 3.2 billion dollar aid plan (return to democracy is Pakistan's "internal situation")
(380): classic -- the 1984 referendum text
(381): Junejo-Zia confrontation over cabinet posts
(382): Martial law lifted 30 December 1985
(382): B. Bhutto returns to Lahore on 10 April 1986, and one million people turn out to greet her
(384): the tensions between Zia and Junejo eventually culminate in the latter's dismissal (military is not informed of this)
(385): changes in the demographics of the Army (urbanization meant that more were lower middle-class, a la Zia)
(386): Pakistan base in Saudi (some 20,000 troops, in 1983)
(387): important--Zia's time also saw the army's deepest penetration of the civil service--about a quarter of the forty senior bureaucratic posts. Ambassadorial posts and lower level positions, as well. And martial law meant that military was in charge in the provinces, too. "He realized that his only constiutency was the Army."
(389): BCCI corruption--helping gov't get foreign exchange, and boosting reserves
(390): decline in US-Pakistan relationship under Zia, b/c of the 'nuclear programme'
(390-391): Pressler and Solarz amendments, where it has to be verified that Pakistan wasn't pursuing nuclear weapons
(396): After the Zia crash on 17 Aug 1988, army high command took the decision to pursue the constitutional path (no details here--but done in a way that confirmed rank of Army over Civil, argues Nawaz) [certainly an empty transition, if ever there was one--even still, Zia had promised elections in Nov 1988, and those would still take place]
(411, 422): important--the 'troika' (President, PM, Army Chief) would contest power for the next decade
(411-412): Hamid Gul cobbles together the IJI (Nawaz Sharif who had been finance and chief minister of Punjab after being picked by Lt. Gen., Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi who was ex-PPP)
(412-413): Beg and Ishaq Khan, separately, were both willing to have elections (even as Gul said they needed more time to build up IJI)
(413): 1988 elections: first-past-the-post helped PPP win more seats than it had popular vote; Nawaz, though, became Chief Minister of the Punjab. "Bhutto had a victory but not a real mandate."
(414-415): a 'gentleman's argeement' that there were certain things that Bhutto couldn't touch (five points)
(415): PPP makes mistake of agreeing to support Ghulam Ishaq Khan in the presidential elections
(416): Bhutto's tense relations with Beg and Khan
(423-425): differences with Hamid Gul and Beg over Afghanistan--resulting in former's dismissal
(425): Bhutto also tried to bring the ISI under control, appointing Kallue to the chagrin of Beg and the military; she was depending on advice of Imtiaz Ahmed and Naseerullah Babar, both people whom were not trusted by the army establishment
(426-427): tensions come to a head over Sirohey--though Bhutto noting that Beg didn't expect Sharif to win the ensuing elections, thought instead that he would be the matchmaker of a hung parliament, or something
(428): Altaf Hussain was rejected from the Army, for being a 'refugee'
(429): Aitzaz Ahsan as Interior Minister, at this time
(430): key--Bhutto dismissed by Beg and Khan in Aug 1990, as issues accumulate (she was grooming her own COAS), on grounds of inefficiency/corruption
(432): US and IMF, even, were warm to the Bhutto gov't, here -- it is primarily the military and civil establishment that is responsible for her fall
(433): Roedad Khan was involved in this dismissal, allegedly
(433): Beg 'takes back' the ISI after dismissing Bhutto (Kallue removed)
(434): wow--Rs. 140m were distributed to help opponents of the PPP in the 1990 elections; see the breakdown, here
(435): IJI wins Nov 1990 elections--Bhutto elected leader of the opposition
(436): apparent harmony between political leaders and Army, at this early stage of the Sharif gov't
(436): a 'pro-business' gov't--seeing to it that earlier nationalizations were undone, etc.; "has the support of the business community"
(437): US sanctions, b/c of the continued nuclear program
(438): Tensions emerging between Sharif and Beg, re: Gulf War
(439): Beg becoming increasingly loony as he becomes a 'lame duck' (western-zionist conspiracies, etc.)
(443): Asif Nawaz appointed COAS
(444): Sharif and Ijazul Haq allied on the third anniversary of Zia's death--but soon to part ways, as Ijazul Haq aligned himself with Musharraf in 1999
(445): important--Army's annual turnover was 12-14 billion rupees in 1991 -- a "huge industrial conglomerate" (twice as big as the biggest private conglomerate at the time, the Crescent Group, which had an annual turnover of six billion rupees)
(446): again, a balancing act would be necessary--the Army had hardly vanished from the political scene
(447-448): "strong" relationship between the US and Asif Nawaz' army, at this time, though nuclear issue and terrorism remained problems
(449): tensions between Sharif and Ghulam Ishaq Khan--former making moves to remove the 8th amendment, but didn't have the leverage
(450): Asif Nawaz given a BMW by Shahbaz Sharif! (they had been distributing them to other generals)
(449-452): and tensions between Sharif and Asif Nawaz
(452): Sharif made Javed Nasir, a fundoo, DG ISI (Nasir wouldn't even look at women when they entered the room)
(452): CIA giving Nawaz signals that the army ought to intervene (the abiding concern being the nuclear programme, it seems?)
(453): Hamid Gul is retired, after refusing the transfer ordered by Nawaz
(454-455): Nawaz and Sharif coming to loggerheads over policy in Sindh, as PML was backing MQM at the time. Nawaz was 'overstepping' his duty and threatening the coalition with MQM, in Sharif's eyes.
(456-457): Gen. Nawaz allegedly being asked to take power in coup, by numerous figures
(459): tension between Sharif and Khan over who was to succeed Asif Nawaz
(466-467): relations with the US are deteriorating, under Bill Clinton's time in office (again, Kashmir and nuclear program are the issues). not helped by Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir as DG ISI (replaced eventually by Qazi, on orders of Waheed)
(469): attempted repeal of 8th Amendment, by Sharif
(469): succession battle within PML, after Junejo dies in March 1993
(470): President Ishaq sacks the gov't after an inflammatory speech by Nawaz (backed by Waheed) -- but Supreme Court does not side with him
(471-472): Army as kingmaker in agreement that sees both Sharif and Ishaq resign--replaed by Qureshi, an IMF and banker's man
(473): Qureshi introduced the independence of the State Bank from the Ministry of Finance and exposed some defaulters on gov't loans from Sharif's party, with the support of the Army [here described as freeing it from the 'thicket' of politics; but obviously a profoundly anti-democratic measure, at its heart]
(473): Bhutto wins October 1993 elections--again a victory, but not a mandate
(474): Bhutto knew she had to be more careful re: the Army and Intelligence Services, the second time around
(474): Pakistan contributed 'peacekeeping' troops to Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti
(477): abortive Islamist coup--found out and snuffed out
(477-478): mistrust in the early Clinton years, again, though Bhutto did her best (very successful visit to Washington in early 1995)
(478): Mullah Omar acquired support after dealing with the rape and murder of Herati villagers by renegade Mujahideen (who had been running a tax-collection checkpoint)
(479): Taliban, in this narrative, not created by Pakistan but collaborated with very readily, of course (then, as now, needed to dislodge pro-India Tajik force)
(481-482): Karamat made COAS, after Waheed's term is up
(483-486): the issues leading up to Leghari's sacking of Bhutto in November 1996 -- have to do with corruption and the economy [but the economic issues are not at all dealt with, here--mentioned as depleting foreign exchange reserves, etc.]
(487): Sharif trounces all opposition in February 1997 elections -- PPP reduced to 18 seats!
(487): Removes 8th Amendment by passing the 13th Amendment -- Leghari and the COAS did not have objections, though
(487-489): Crisis re: Chief Justice Ali Shah--events are very hectic, Leghari ends up resigning, Chief Justice ends up sacked, and Sharif wins.
(492): India, under BJP, weighed up cost-benefit on its economy of the nuclear test--confident that it could withstand the expected shocks
(493-495): Sharif decides on retaliatory test in response, against Karamat's advice [no taking the high ground, here]. the economic consequences stood to be grave [how do you make sense of this? clearly in violation of any rational person's interests re: stability of Pakistani capitalism]
(497): Senate blocks 15th Amendment -- Sharif's "caliphate" amendment
(498-499): Sharif and Karamat fall out, allegedly over Karamat's speech re: founding of an NSC
(500): October 1998, after Karamat leaves post two months early, Sharif chooses Musharraf (picked over more senior, more suitable candidates--ostensibly b/c of lack of base in the Army)
(517-518): Sharif allegedly on board re: Kargil invasion
(520-522): re: pulling out, it was a problem of saving national face (Musharraf here is reported saying that he left this up to Sharif, who made the decision; Sharif says that Musharraf asked him to pull out)
(524): in September, Shahbaz Sharif has the US release a statement regarding opposition to an unconstitutional takeover.
(525): Touching moment with Sharif senior, where Musharraf and Sharifs are deemed brothers, apparently (one month before coup)
(526): Sharif wants to replace Musharraf with Lt. Gen. Ziauddin (who had been made DG ISI)
(527): Sharif, quite simply, didn't have the backing of the Army to remove Musharraf--instead, it sided with the ousted General.
(528): the third of Musharraf's seven goals, in coming to power, was to "revive the economy and restore investor confidence." (Nawaz noting that he made progress on this score)
(529): Supreme Court judgement of May 2000, LFO of 2002, 17th amendment all gave extraordinary legal cover to Musharraf.
(530): Supreme Court acquiescence
(531): 'successful' April 2002 referendum
(532): MMA wins 18 seats
(532): Musharraf brought some 1,000 military officers into senior positions in the civil administration, academia, etc." -- this ensured continued loyalty of the military, of course
(533): his King's party prevented the passage of a Women's Rights Bill in 2006
(533): troika had been replaced by a one-legged stool (Shaukat Aziz became PM in August 2004)
(533): Musharraf's regime continued the 'pro-business trend'--attracting investment flows from Pakistanis and the Middle East
(535): Ambassador Ayub trying to convince Omar not to blow up the statues at Bamiyan
(536): Taliban de-weaponized Kandahar
(538): Musharraf had been shunned by Clinton; but 9/11 changed everything, of course (an 'anchor of stability' -- what Nixon had called the Shah and Marcos both)
(541): the seven demands made after 9/11 attacks, to which Musharraf partly agreed (objected to some, apparently)--nonetheless, this is relayed back to US and then becomes fact as total agreement [unclear why, how, in this narrative]
(542): Pakistan had recognized Taliban after capture of Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997 -- against the advice of Karamat
(542-543): Mahmud Ahmed, Musharraf's DG ISI, was an Islamist, and removed by Musharraf soon after the US attack on Afghanistan
(546): Musharraf had given space to the Islamists in order to combat Nawaz and Bhutto--this gave the MMA a respectability it never ought to have had
(547-548): important--economic 'progress' during the Musharraf period. Saw to it that the investors were kept happy [again, here it's not a case of a coordinated project--rather it's a question of what capitalists are happy with, and when they feel compelled to organize themselves (ought to look at the disorganization of labor, too)]
(551): AQ Khan corruption and dealings with Iran, Libya, NK
(557): PEMRA and censorship
(559): Musharraf talking of a French-style presidential system
(560): sacking of Chaudry, overturned by Supreme Court
(560-561): Declaration of Emergency, Nov 2007--coup within a coup (stating elections would be held January 2008). Musharraf left position of COAS on 28 November, though, bowing to internal and external pressure.
(570-571): changing composition of Army, by ethnicity
(572): the 'Zia Bharti'
(575): miltiary's share of the budget, viz-a-viz health and education
(576): perks go only to those who make it at the higher echelons -- a steep privilege curve
(582): too much power goes to the Army Chief--need a division of power amongst regional commanders
- - - - - -
(1) key point is to make sense of institutional interests/personal interests within a context that is set by the contours of class politics. this is what i hope to add to this literature. in other words, its possible to see that some of the balancing act between military and civil plays out without interference, on the basis of competing interests--it is when structural interests are threatened, though, that it needs to be adjudicated directly. [in other words, it is a mistake to think that everything that happens within the institutions is mandated by the underlying class structure--but it is the case that larger questions cannot be resolved without consulting that class structure]
(2) must make use of the constructs of 'structural autonomy' and 'political autonomy' (and somewhere in between these two has to fit the notion of the hand of Empire)
(3): should emphasize the continuity of the 'form of state' (Bhutto as martial ruler, Zia w/ Junejo, Bhutto w/ Beg/Khan, etc.)
(4): when speaking about US role, important to note that they figure directly only really in the periods where their interest is most intense (so in the 50's and80's and 2000's, but not so much in the 90's). will have to make this more airtight, but this seems defensible at first glance.
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