up until the 1960s, in political science and sociology the reigning approach to the State was 'pluralism' (and it's still the dominant approach in the mainstream). this takes the State as a neutral actor; simply a site that takes in pressures and demands from outside groups, and acts accordingly (not necessarily a passive actor—but its direction comes from 'pressure groups', fundamentally)
it does not assign, to any particular pressure group, any advantage in access or influence. the list of potential pressure groups is quite large (students, employers, religious organizations, etc. – any 'civic' organization, which is pursuing its interests in an organized way).
politics, therefore, doesn't have any ex ante direction—all groups have potentially the same influence over state policy as any other group
around the 1960s, criticisms of this approach started to circulate.
in the US, you get C. Wright Mills ('a strange character').
it's Ralph Miliband's book, on the British state, which heralds this literature
primarily, this 'radical' approach attacks the illusion that no one pressure group has an ex ante advantage. simply put, because lobbying and pressure takes resources, groups that have greater resources will have a structural advantage in the political process.
in fact, there are four nested arguments, here:
social origins, recruitment from elite circles-- the highest echelons of State mangers, in the US, are recruited out of the corporate sector; in Britain, the civil service plays this role.
social networks—even if the social origins aren't aligned, the social networks into which these folks are cast define their buddies, allies, etc. (kids in private schools, etc.)
lobbying—in the form of think-tanks/advice, as well as the more obvious forms (in the US, any crucial legislation that's drawn up on business is drawn up by thinktanks—the simple reason for this, of course, is because lawmakers are idiots). expertise belongs to the people that run the economy.
finance—in the US, there are two elections, every four years: the less important one is the one we know—before you get the votes, there's an initial competition over funders. before politicans compete over votes, they compete over funders. cannot say anything that gives the impression they will act against the interests of their funders.
these four, taken together, have come to be known as the 'instrumentalist' theory of the State. the State is being wielded by the State, as an instrument (the capitalist class control the State apparatus—their physical proximity to the State, 'claims' over the State constitute their authority). this is to be contrasted to the 'structuralist' theory of the State, which we will come to.
vivek, however, is noting that the four 'instrumentalist' claims are better understood as a 'structuralist' theory (because the notion of unequal resources demands a 'structural' understanding, most obviously).
important--at the same time, it does share an important commonality with 'pluralism', which is that the State is more-or-less neutral (that all of these influences/pressures come from without, in a sense). it is, in some sense, a 'thing' to be wielded, even still. where they differ from pluralists is that they believe that certain pressure groups have structural advantages.
this is what Poulantzas is objecting to, principally (and others, too).
important--the political implications of the 'instrumentalist' view obviously problematic. the notion is that the institutions of the State can be changed, if the nature of the navigator and the maps change. the State is simply a machine, in a sense. it is a distinction understood, for example, as “the State in Capitalism” vs. “the Capitalist State” [the notion, of course, is that the State has to be smashed—that it
is intrinsically biased towards the interests of elites]
so what's the argument?
the challenge for structuralist state theory has been to adduce mechanisms which incline it toward dominant class interests. something about the State's very institutional structure that biases it toward capitalists' intrests.
what is Poulantzas' argument?
he begins by noting that the Capitalist State is characterized by a structural fact about the capitalist economy—which is that the extraction of the surplus does not require the use of political power to extract the surplus. feudalism, of course, works differently. in capitalism, force is not required—the 'dull compulsion' of economic relations is sufficient.
what, then, is the function of the State, under Capitalism? it switches from being an actor in extraction—instead, it manages the 'effects' of surplus extraction. it strives to be the factor of cohesion; it is what keeps the whole thing together. (this is compatible with the pluralist notion, vivek is arguing—it 'manages' difference. in other words, we can't stop here)
the question of its complicity in elites' interests, of course, relies on Poulantzas' argument that the 'way' in which it keeps things together is crucial.
in managing and organizing for the coherence of society, the State becomes a bourgeois state by virtue of the fact that it reproduces capitalist relations of production. this is a political function, two-fold:
disorganizes the dominated classes.
organizes the dominant classes.
how does it do this?
for the dominated classes, two things:
constitutes them as 'formally equal' to their exploiters—it reinforces economic atomization with political atomization (this is very different from the Feudal State, which enshrines status distinctions). abstracts away from class to found the nation (we can think of this as a separate function).
disorganizes the dominated classes by allowing for economic concessions, to them. the root of what Lenin called 'economism'
notice, though, that this 'atomization' of subjects applies to everybody. left to itself, then, this is a mechanism that should equally effect both classes. so this disorganization has to be complemented by the selective organization of elites. this is where the theory gets murky, vivek's arguing.
Poulantzas argues that the State organizes the dominant classes by “the play of its institutions”. the first claim: the action of the State institutions have to have the effect of increasing the organization of the dominant classes. the second claim: capitalist classes exist as a bloc of classes, which means that it has to organize a differentiated mass—how is it, then, that the State organizes the dominant classes into a power bloc?
in almost every instance, though, in Poulantzas' book he is exceedingly vague on how the State institutions organize the dominant classes. rather, it seems more that the dominant classes act on the State, in his narrative (in effect, here you have to introduce the 'instrumentalist' claims to make this sensible, in a way—but this is precisely what he is writing against).
it is not clear that it is the State which is making them cohere as a dominant power bloc. there is no sense that it is the State which is doing the work.
this is a weakness of the theory—but it doesn't necessarily make this theory useless.
it does show that the State disorganizes the dominated classes, as an effect of its own reproduction. but the second dynamic is not justified, in his account.
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types of States (class character) vs. forms of State (within these class categories) – if the effect of disorganizing dominated classes is the task of the bourgeois state itself, it is hard to see how this could be true. this is an artifact of the 20th century state—the bourgeois State has been around for four hundred years, and it was not the case that workers were formally equal to capitalists throughout this period. what Poulantzas is really describing, here, is the 'bourgeois-democratic' state. before this, it was the 'bourgeois-oligarchic' state.
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structured totality (Althusserian conception—each part has its own integral logic) vs. expressive totality (everything is a jumble, expressing the overwhelming influence of the 'essence')
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functional vs. intrinsic definition of a concept
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'contradictoriness' of State intervention? certainly, every effect of the State is not an 'intended' effect; how do you account for this? 'functional' vs. 'accidental'?
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Althusser was the first Western Marxist who argued that Marxism must be a 'science' (unlike the Frankfurt School and Lukacs). Yet his actual epistemology was fundamentally 'idealist' – 'generality 1, generality 2, generality 3'. Concepts working on concepts generating theories—so you have claims of science, rhetorical, that don't prove to be worth anything, philosophically. People who take the rhetoric seriously and abandon the philosophy became good Marxists. People who take the philosophy seriously become poststructuralists (Laclau/Mouffe).
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Summary remarks: we're trying to understand whether the State, by its very institutional structure, is implicated in class power. Poulantzas is one attempt. Next week we will look at three reasons that this might be the case: Offa, Miliband, Bloch.
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