persistent inequalities, howard botwinick (1993)

chapter one

(7-8): positioning himself against neoclassicals, but also against radicals who see differential wages as produced by 'monopoly' or 'dual markets' [because, as he says, they accept the traditional theory of 'competitive wage determination'--"that wage differentials persist only when competition is restricted"]

(9): concerned with three dynamics that explain wage differentials [:

1. capitalist competition and technical change;
   
2. regeneration of a reserve army
3. uneven efforts of organized workers to raise their wage rates within lmits

(10): a theory of discrimination (race, gender) would need to begin with what is outlined here, and explain discriminatory assignment to low-wage jobs (the latter is what is explained here, in other words)

(11): wage differentials perfectly consistent with capitalist competition

(13): and certainly, wage differentials are not the result of individual differences in skill/quality (he is not saying this is unimportant--but these are decisively secondary, and do not explain what we are interested in)

(15): importance of 'class struggle'--both negative and positive, of course, depending on how it's waged

(16): arguing that class struggle, though, cannot lead to capitalist crisis (there are in-built mechanisms that 'check' this)

(17-18): two anomalies that radicals have been unable to solve, that we will now

1. successful unionization and wage increases in the 'periphery'
2. absence of segmentation in Europe

chapter three--wage level

(63): neoclassical assumptions, nature of their static abstraction

1. give endowment of capital and labor
2. technology exogenously determined
3. supply and demand of labor are autonomous and stationary entities
4. perfect competition
5. profit-maximizing behavior based on dininishing returns

(66): summary of the neoclassical picture

(69-70): 'historical' and 'moral' element to wages in Marx's theory; not an 'iron law of wages'

(73): excellent explosion of neoclassical position on labor supply -- because of uniqueness of labor power as a commodity, even when wages drop, laborers cannot exit the market.

(74): three dynamics go into law of accumulation:

1. changes in rate of accumulation--this is the critical, 'independent' variable, setting the limits
   
2. changes in organic composition
   
3. changes in labor force participation

(79): key passage--two contradictory effects: increased rate of accumulation enhanced demand for labor; increased organic comp, contracts it. the latter effect, though, limits the former in three ways:

1. accumulation accelerates increased organic comp
2. original capital also changes when additional capital changes, meaning extra workers are thrown out
3. lowering rate of profit, dampening accumulation

(80): all this means that seriously high demand for those in the reserve army will be attenuated by these dynamics. in other words, it is more or less impossible.

(84): critique of Keynesian position on chronic unemployment [a functionalist retort?]

1. reserve army provides capital with a critical mechanism
2. provides capital with necessary flexibility

(88): importatn, depressing effects of the reserve army

(89): again, iron law of wages in Marx? No, says Botwinick.

(92): post-crisis, an anticapitalist consciousness?

(93): Shaikh on crisis and rising organic composition of capital, post-WWII

chapter four--wage differentials

(94): again, wrt to wage differentials, we're looking to explain "systematic variation within limits."

(96-97): four basic forms of the reserve army

1. floating--attached to centers of modern industry
2. latent--on the verge of becoming proletariat
3. stagnant--decaying branches of industry, etc.
4. pauperism

(97): critical, of course, that these positions are not temporary

(100-101): important--a discussion of de-skilling does not obviate the continuous redifferentiation of workers, even if between increasingly narrow limits.

(102): craft unions, and industrial unions

(106-107): important discussion, citing Moody and Davis, of labor's co-option in the late 40s, early 50s (prohibition of solidarity strikes, etc., with taft-hartley)

(110): summary of observations on the 'wage level' -- that it cannot outstrip productivity growth, because of the effect that has on the rate of profit.

(111): labor mobility is not any longer an assumption, of course, because we have a reserve army. so there is no automatic 'upward pressure' on wage rates at the low end. there is, of course, downward pressure--the way in which this is effected will depend on three things:

1. level of militancy
2. differential costs of training a new work force
3. differential technical conditions of production

(114): the important regulating principle, stated in the abstract: "overall range of wge differentiation" will depend on a particular firm/industry's access to labor reserves [which can depend on many different factors and dynamically vary, of course]

(116): in sum--he is stating his argument, briefly and without complications:

1. between industry wage differentials--stagnant industries will be flooded with those that are adopting more capital-intensive techniques; in low-wage sectors, you see a race ot the bottom; the uneven development of technical change is exacerbated even further, because low-wage sectors have little incentive to pursue technical improvements
2. within industry wage differentials--workers in more backward firms will find that they are being super-exploited to compete with more advanced firms. this is not just a featyure of the transition to handicraft/manufacture-industry.