waziristan: the faqir of ipi and the indian army, alan warren

(xxxii): "Pathans, living as agriculturists on the Indus plains, were relieved to escape despotic Sikh rule, and the introduction of British government in the late 1840s was relatively smooth..." Not until 1870s that the government takes much interest in internal affairs; the British at this stage are content to continue the Mughal and Sikh "practice of grudgingly respecting the autonomy of the hill tribes..." Soon, though, the Great Game, for which the Hindu Kush were critical.

(xxiii): 2nd Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1881) precedes the formal annexation of the frontier territories in 1893 (for 'strategic reasons', thus content with a 'superficial' presence/loyalty)--"the government wished to control only a handful of vital passes"

(xxiv): this is the context that gave rise to the "political agent", who would maintain contact with the tribes--"the political agents paid the tribes regular allowances in return for their recognition of the principle that they lived under imperial government." of course, this was not always smooth--often required use of the State's 'stick'

(xxiv-xxv): 1850s-1900, "bulk of campaigns took place in northern and central sections" ; during last decades of british india, locus of fighting shifted southward, towards Kurram and Waziristan (and even Balochistan)

(xxv): Gov of India's 'long struggle' to pacify Waziristan was the climactic episode in the history of these tribal wars. one major revolt after WWI was followed by a period of calm, which was in turn followed by the famous revolt of 1936, led by the Faqir of Ipi (raised a force of "thousands")

(xxv): "If casualties are compared to the size of the indigenous population, the attempt to pacify Waziristan was one of the bitterest large-scale struggles of its kind."

(xxvi): what's more, the Great Game was over in 1907 and the British were in decline, anyway. nonetheless, "the British Indian government set out to crush resistance in Waziristan as if they were going to be running the Frontier for many years to come."

(xxvii): the author is here grouping this counter-insurgency campaign in Waziristan with the famous campaigns in Iraq (1920-1921), Ireland (1916-1922), Palestine, etc.

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(1): despite the fact that the 19th century was, for the most part, characterized by a 'closed door' policy on the Frontier, "the Indian army were no strangers to Waziristan... no less than six expeditions were sent into the Wazir hills between the 1840s and 1880s."

(2): the British were re-committing to the possibility of confrontation with Russia in the late 1880s, as a conservative gov't came to power--for that, control of key positions in NWFP was key (they had already made their advances in Baluchistan--Quetta was soon to become one of the largest military cantonments in all of India)

(4): the Durand Line was born in this context, as Amir Abdur Rahman in Afghanistan was made insecure by British advances into tribal territory (this is, again, 1893)--as a reward, they raised the Amir's subsidy from annual 80,000 to 120,000 pounds.

(7-9): British make their first post-Durand incursion in 1894; though limited in its objectives, the invading force is met with resistance, but wins out (winning lenient terms of peace for the state). nonetheless, gov't refuses to occupy waziristan in campaign's aftermath, despite the wishes of one Richard Bruce, who wanted a cantonment built there. they are still, invited by some Toch valley Wazirs to build some military posts. "In 1895-1896 the North and South Waziristan political agencies were established."

(13-14): writing about Waziristan--into the 20th century, mainly a village-based subsistence economy (biggest village was about 400 households large), with the added depredation of being constantly at war (as a result, resources constantly diverted into armaments).

(16): KEY: "In the richer areas north of Peshawar, and in the trans-Indus border districts, the rough equivalent of feudal barons or khans existed (even small states in very favorable situations) but the tribal economy in Waziristan lacked the resources to develop a centralized political structure... If Waziristan lacked strong tribal chieftans it could boast a great number of petty chieftans.. The political life... revolved around the institution of the jirga... [where] any jirga member could speak his mind, but the maliks were likely to dominate proceedings... Significantly, the mullahs were not permitted a place in the jirga..."

(17): pukhtunwali--revenge (badal), asylum (nanwatee), and hospitality (malmastia) [needs theoretical an historical treatment, OF COURSE]

(17): women as objects--"women had no inheritance rights"

(19): "...in Pathan districts of the Indus valley under direct British rule, and subject to arms regulation and the Indian penal code, the observed murder rate was the better part of a hundred times that prevailing in the UK."

(21-22): unlike Baluchistan, early attempts at indirect rule in Waziristan were not very successful. the key difference was the lack of identifiable leaders with whom the State could enter in compact (it tried to fashion these by distributing allowances)--"Over time, the granting of monetary benefits to maliks would formalize and ossify the maliks into a government funded elite."

(23-24): Waziristan was not subject to land tax, nor to a penal code--rather, the Frontier Crimes Regulation (1872) was applied, like in Baluchistan and other border areas.

(27): in general, the political agent "tried to remain aloof from inter-tribal disputes. Tribes in conflict with each oteh was preferable to their uniting against the government..."

(27-28): the period of gradual extension of British administration over the Frontier came to an abrupt halt in 1897, when there began a general, though uncoordinated revolt in many different areas (began in N. Waziristan, in Tochi, though S. Waziristan would lay dormant throughout); this is when Winston Churchill fought in Malakand and Mohmand, restoring 'peace' to the hills north of Peshawar. The Army settled the areas by April 1898.

(29): KEY: in steps Curzon, who forms NWFP (taking it out of the Punjab gov't's hands). "The NWFP was conceived as a security arrangement. IT was a bureaucratic initiative, and did not arise out of a local demand for a Pathan province."

(30-31): rapid development of British military technology (Lee-Enfield introduced in 1908), which--it is thought--will help leave the tribes behind. but Kohat was already a major center of arms production, and replica rifles were doing the trick--they were able to inflict signficant damage on troops.

(32): it was 1900-1902 campaign against Mahsuds that prompted Curzon's remark about military steamroller. this was followed by an attempt to co-opt them into the British structure (along with Afridis, they were most favored tribe). but not always successful (in 1904, Political Agent murdered by a Mahsud sepoy)

(33): in 1907/1908, accusations/facts circling that Afghanistan was funding Mullah Powindah's attempts on the lives of political agents (ha!)

(34): Powindah's death paved way for his son, Fazal Din, who was to become famous. Organized assasination of Political Agent in 1914, but no action taken against tribe (seen as crime of the individual assistant)

(35): again, British confronted general rebellion in 1915-1917 (including a warring party from Afghanistan, which took issue with Britain's being at war with the Ottoman Empire), in much of the area. the Mahsuds, under loose leadership of Fazal Din, in particular, continue to be the most troublesome.

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(44): in 1919, as Third Anglo-Afghan war begins (and ends), continuous trouble in Waziristan sees the agency moved to direct administration by military command in Delhi. Wazirs had a total fighting force of about 23,000, all told.

(51): final tally of 1919-1920 campaigns were heavy: "both the suddenness with which British authority had been expelled, and the human costs of the 1919-1920 campaign of reconquest, constituted powerful arguments for putting the administration of Waziristan on a new footing."

(52): KEY: here discussion in post-campaign environment of whether to puruse the military pacification to its fullest conclusion (but risk falling into greater deficits), or withdraw (but be seen as weak, and risk the possibilty of greater expenditure in the future). sounds familiar? it was decided, in a sense, to escalate--to build roads, and whatnot

(55): scouts being stationed in Waziristans were, in the main, Pathans from other tribes

(58): nonetheless--"fighting in Waziristan quietened down as 1923 wore on... A little prematurely Waziristan was declared a 'peace district' from 1 April 1924, and the Chief Commissioner resumed politcial control on 25 July. Gang warfare continued for the rest of the year, and early in 1925 an intensive aerial campaign was successfully waged against the last remaining pocket of tribal resistance." (!)

(59): Sir Denys Bray, India's Foreign Secretary (1923): "Come what may, civilization must be made to penetrate these inaccessible mountains, or we must admit that there is no solution to the Waziristan problem... I may be thought a visionary to talk of the civilization of the Mahsud. But you must take long views on the Frontier."

(60): "...the opening of the first Mahsud school by Malik Mir Badshah Khan, a former regular soldier, in 1922, caused a mullah-led riot."

(60): gov't not sure whether to educate tribesmen, as there wasn't much room to absorb them--"unemployed tribesmen with academic qualifications were 'bound to be a source of potential trouble.'

(61): regardless, never enough revenue to invest properly in non-tax paying areas, extenisvely (not that they invested anywhere else, extensively)

(63-64): in the late 1920s, NWFP joined the nationalist movement--a Congress flag seen in Waziristan! (though the revolt that racked the areas in 1930 was put down, quickly, allegedly thanks to the "forward policy in Waziristan")

(64): KEY, air power: "The RAF was quick to claim a share of the credit for the restoration of order in 1930. Several tribal sections had submitted in the face of air action alone. According to one senior RAF commander, 'without air power I believe that there would have been a general blaze up all along the Frontier.'"

(64): important analytic point: "With the benefit of hindisght, it is clear that the origins of the 1930 risings lay in the settled districts, where economic changes had altered the status quo. These changes were not mirrored in the tribal agencies, where only a handful of Red Shirt agents were detected."

(68-69): 1929 incursions from Waziristan into Afghanistan to support Nadir Shah; 1933 incursions of Wazir militia to do opposite, but this threatened interests of British, who threatened to bomb wazir militia unless they stopped fighting in Khost.

(68): KEY: "Despite persistent minor troubles, life in Waziristan between 1925 and 1935 was usually settled. As the government's medical, teaching, and political presence was so slender, the personnel in the military cantonments and scouts' posts were central to the imperial experience in Waziristan."

(70): "The 1945 Government of India Act, and plans for a new federal India, did not impact upon the NWFP tribal agencies, whereas in the settled areas..." [a very discontinuous experience, in other words--no "common sense of the national" through struggle, the q. of however illusory that might have been in other cases notwithstanding]

(72): SETTING SCENE FOR 1936 INSURGENCY: "Despite the growing arms trade, by 1935...the tribal lashkars had been dispersed and a long-running insurgency had been crushed. A large garrison had been installed in a brand new cantonment in the heart of tribal territory... The Wazirs and Mahsuds had been extensively involved in the new regimne... But had there been in any substantial change...?"

(81-82): the Islam Bibi case as the match that lit the fire (but there are questions to be asked here; which we cannot ask, I suppose...)

(82-83): tradition of muslim holy men resisting foreign occupation, especially the British (Mullah Powindah, Fazal Din, in particular)--in this tradition enters Faqir of Ipi.

(84-85): Faqir of Ipi born in 1901, settles in Tochi valley in mid-1920s. acquires reputation for demanding minimal donations from his followers. an important member of the N. Waziristan Lashkar that went to Khost to fight in 1933.