hobbes, "leviathan"

chp 13

...the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he... [rejection of natural, hereditary difference--at the very least, we are no longer royalists/feudals here...]

...From this equality of ability ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; [only insofar as you presume the scarcity of what they're fighting for, of course]

...So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name. [is it worth discussing the extent to which this engages a theory of human nature? or are we content with historicizing this observation?]

...It may peradventure be thought there was never such a time nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America, except the government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no government at all, and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common power to fear, by the manner of life which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government use to degenerate into a civil war. [along the same lines, here he seems to commit to both (or, alternatively, neither): on the one hand he is refusing to universalize his current observations, on the other he's extrapolating from the present anarchy in britain to make a universal point...)

...The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice. [ha--this is to sap 'justice' of all its meaning; in this sense Hobbes pre-exists, uneasily, more developed understandings of the social contract--is that fair?]

chp 14

...THE right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything which, in his own judgement and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. (natural man as 17th century man? please... society must be made to re-assert itself here, at all points)

Whensoever a man transferreth his right, or renounceth it, it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself, or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself. And therefore there be some rights which no man can be understood by any words, or other signs, to have abandoned or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force to take away his life, because he cannot be understood to aim thereby at any good to himself... [drumroll...] The mutual transferring of right is that which men call contract. [i am deeply uneasy, of course, with the petty-bourgeois persona being constructed here, insofar as the social 'contract' is going to be understood as profoundly 'limiting' as a consequence. obliterated, in other words, is talk of social classes; we are speaking of humankind in the abstract]

chp 17

...of men (who naturally love liberty, and dominion over others)[gross...]

...And as small families did then; so now do cities and kingdoms, which are but greater families (for their own security), enlarge their dominions upon all pretences of danger, and fear of invasion, or assistance that may be given to invaders; endeavour as much as they can to subdue or weaken their neighbours by open force, and secret arts, for want of other caution, justly; and are remembered for it in after ages with honour. [what nonsense--"um, the state behaves more-or-less like a big baby..."]

...whereas amongst men there are very many that think themselves wiser and abler to govern the public better than the rest, and these strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into distraction and civil war. [ah, pesky troublemakers--but now, honestly, here hobbes seems to be operating on jefferson's dialectic (good government/rebellion), but with a decidedly more fatigued valorization. in other words, he sounds terrified of the haters.]

...Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice in making known to one another their desires and other affections, yet they want that art of words by which some men can represent to others that which is good in the likeness of evil; and evil, in the likeness of good; and augment or diminish the apparent greatness of good and evil, discontenting men and troubling their peace at their pleasure. [all bee and ant propagandists would be quite offended. there is perhaps something here, the seeds of an understanding of 'hegemony,' except that here the propagandists are exclusively anti-establishment. it doesn't seem possible for the gov't to deceive its citizens into thinking all is great in the best of all possible worlds.]

...Fifthly, irrational creatures cannot distinguish between injury and damage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their fellows: whereas man is then most troublesome when he is most at ease; for then it is that he loves to show his wisdom, and control the actions of them that govern the Commonwealth. [again, this is a thoroughly offensive understanding of human suffering--the idea that all were 'at ease' in 17th century england is outlandish;' perhaps if he is limiting himself to the protagonists of the revolution, but that itself is a misunderstanding of the social grievances that were its foundation.]

...to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and every one to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgements to his judgement. This is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man: I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition; that thou give up, thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH; in Latin, CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN [again, the notion that this is possible runs roughshod over class realities. but that's too easy, of course. instead, note here that the 'real unity' is perhaps defensible, and insofar as he makes place for a 'democratic assembly', consent starts to mean something substantive. i suppose this is what earned him his exile. the seeds of rousseau's general will, of course]

One, by natural force: as when a man maketh his children to submit themselves, and their children, to his government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse; or by war subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition. The other, is when men agree amongst themselves to submit to some man, or assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others. This latter may be called a political Commonwealth, or Commonwealth by Institution; and the former, a Commonwealth by acquisition. [the falsest of false distinctions]

chp 18

...And therefore, they that are subjects to a monarch cannot without his leave cast off monarchy and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude; nor transfer their person from him that beareth it to another man, other assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to every man, to own and be reputed author of all that already is their sovereign shall do and judge fit to be done; so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break their covenant made to that man, which is injustice: and they have also every man given the sovereignty to him that beareth their person; and therefore if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice. Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his sovereign be killed or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as being, by the institution, author of all his sovereign shall do; and because it is injustice for a man to do anything for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title unjust. And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their sovereign a new covenant, made, not with men but with God, this also is unjust: for there is no covenant with God but by mediation of somebody that representeth God's person, which none doth but God's lieutenant who hath the sovereignty under God. But this pretence of covenant with God is so evident a lie, even in the pretenders' own consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile and unmanly disposition. [this, to my mind, represents the denial of the social contract--"you made a promise so don't break it"!? thomas jefferson re: rebellion would be refreshing here. hobbes, in sum, has been offering a very underdeveloped, uneasy vision of the contract.]

The opinion that any monarch receiveth his power by covenant, that is to say, on condition, proceedeth from want of understanding this easy truth: that covenants being but words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the public sword; that is, from the untied hands of that man, or assembly of men, that hath the sovereignty, and whose actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united. But when an assembly of men is made sovereign, then no man imagineth any such covenant to have passed in the institution: for no man is so dull as to say, for example, the people of Rome made a covenant with the Romans to hold the sovereignty on such or such conditions; which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman people. [in other words, his refusal to endorse the right of rebellion rests on (a) a cynical understanding that gov't is monopoly over legitimate violence in the last instance (there is, again, no injustice/justice here); (b) the necessary identity of ruler and ruled, so much so that rebellion (and injustice) appears as tautology.]

Ninthly, is annexed to the sovereignty the right of... [i mean, presumably, if this is Commenwealth by Association, the people doing the associating ought to have some say in this process?]