goodin and mitchell, foundations of the welfare state
(x): geographical mobility undermined earlier forms of poor relief, which were localized/parish-based
(xii): breadwinner's welfare state vs. univeralized benefits
(xiii): regime types--'liberal', 'social democratic,' 'corporatist'
(xiv): nowadays, a return to 1601 and localism -- importantly, 'in an era of declining public budgets'
(xv): imp--here, the shift to neoliberalism/decline is seen as a response to changing economic circumstances. [is this not mediated by politics!? come on]
(xvi): other reasons for its decline [but, again, all these sidestep the question of shifts in the balance of forces. it's not an objective fact that SS is unpayable, for example, etc.]
(149): three sorts of rights--civil (property rights, negative rights), political, and social (welfarish)
(150): civil rights, of course, were entirely functional for a market economy (from Status to Contract)
(151, 154): good--civil rights run up against social rights. the welfare state has to fight the effects of free operation of mkts [acknowledged in the others, but clearest here]
[1] In the sense of the last argument, the Welfare State is one thing and NOT many. Reforms that attenuate the ravages of the market. It may be true that this takes different forms at different times and in different places, but the fact that, at heart, its a question of redistributing resources ought to alert us to the importance of a structural theory of its implementation. The wealthy don't just give up resources because (1) changing philosophical fashions; (2) moral concerns.
pierson and leimgruber, intellectual roots
(32): though it's been identified with the historical project of SD, its origins "more usually" lie in liberal/conservative thought [!]
(34): [BUT] acknowledging that motivated by an attempt to answer the 'social question'. [well, who was posing the social question, for god's sake? is the idea that it was posed purely passively, because there was increasing misery, etc.? of course not!]
(37-38): idealism--the forward role of the ideas of the 'new' or 'social' liberalism. [let us clarify the claim--at its strongest, its explanatory! nutty]
(39): the New Deal bringing through earlier ideas and concepts [but come on, this makes it difficult to (a) explain the ND; (b) understand how transformative of a break it was w/ past policy, no?]
[1] There's a real need to clarify exactly what we're doing, here. A genealogy of the welfare state, ok. But none of this can suffice as an explanation of its origins, which is what Pierson and Co. lapse into, routinely.
asa briggs, on the welfare state
(222): what once seemed fixed (the fact of welfare), obviously is not
(223): not one 'movement', but remedies for specific problems [I'm sure this is true--but let's not obscure the important point, which is that these are all part of a single effort to attenuate the effects of the free operation of mkts]
(225): 'it was increasingly regarded as an obligation of government to ward of distress...' [OK, but why? Need to think systematically about this. State actors can change their minds--though surely in response to things happening around them, not arbitrariliy--but they also have certain imperatives to which they have to hew. So what determines policy? At the very least, not their preferences alone...]
(227): 'consensus' years of 1945 to 1950, in the UK [why?!?]
(228): definition of Welfare State: (1) minimum income; (2) meeting social contingencies; (3) range of services to all citizens
(232): Fabians kept the 'masses' in the background, only later discovered the trade unions.
(241): Oastler and the 'feudal Welfare State'
(249): Bismarck worried about SDem
(251): complexity of lineage of 19th century welfare state [but at least part of the reason that this is less relevant is because these were not nearly as significant, in terms of impact/scope, as 20th century welfare States]
(253): implicitly, the explanation is a moral one--State actors couldn't avoid the moral pressure of reformers [this just can't explain very much]
(256-257): US is different. [but no attempt to explain this!?]
(x): geographical mobility undermined earlier forms of poor relief, which were localized/parish-based
(xii): breadwinner's welfare state vs. univeralized benefits
(xiii): regime types--'liberal', 'social democratic,' 'corporatist'
(xiv): nowadays, a return to 1601 and localism -- importantly, 'in an era of declining public budgets'
(xv): imp--here, the shift to neoliberalism/decline is seen as a response to changing economic circumstances. [is this not mediated by politics!? come on]
(xvi): other reasons for its decline [but, again, all these sidestep the question of shifts in the balance of forces. it's not an objective fact that SS is unpayable, for example, etc.]
- changing nature of work
- women's increasing participation in the labour force
marshall, citizenship and social class
(149): three sorts of rights--civil (property rights, negative rights), political, and social (welfarish)
(150): civil rights, of course, were entirely functional for a market economy (from Status to Contract)
(151, 154): good--civil rights run up against social rights. the welfare state has to fight the effects of free operation of mkts [acknowledged in the others, but clearest here]
[1] In the sense of the last argument, the Welfare State is one thing and NOT many. Reforms that attenuate the ravages of the market. It may be true that this takes different forms at different times and in different places, but the fact that, at heart, its a question of redistributing resources ought to alert us to the importance of a structural theory of its implementation. The wealthy don't just give up resources because (1) changing philosophical fashions; (2) moral concerns.
pierson and leimgruber, intellectual roots
(32): though it's been identified with the historical project of SD, its origins "more usually" lie in liberal/conservative thought [!]
(34): [BUT] acknowledging that motivated by an attempt to answer the 'social question'. [well, who was posing the social question, for god's sake? is the idea that it was posed purely passively, because there was increasing misery, etc.? of course not!]
(37-38): idealism--the forward role of the ideas of the 'new' or 'social' liberalism. [let us clarify the claim--at its strongest, its explanatory! nutty]
(39): the New Deal bringing through earlier ideas and concepts [but come on, this makes it difficult to (a) explain the ND; (b) understand how transformative of a break it was w/ past policy, no?]
[1] There's a real need to clarify exactly what we're doing, here. A genealogy of the welfare state, ok. But none of this can suffice as an explanation of its origins, which is what Pierson and Co. lapse into, routinely.
asa briggs, on the welfare state
(222): what once seemed fixed (the fact of welfare), obviously is not
(223): not one 'movement', but remedies for specific problems [I'm sure this is true--but let's not obscure the important point, which is that these are all part of a single effort to attenuate the effects of the free operation of mkts]
(225): 'it was increasingly regarded as an obligation of government to ward of distress...' [OK, but why? Need to think systematically about this. State actors can change their minds--though surely in response to things happening around them, not arbitrariliy--but they also have certain imperatives to which they have to hew. So what determines policy? At the very least, not their preferences alone...]
(227): 'consensus' years of 1945 to 1950, in the UK [why?!?]
(228): definition of Welfare State: (1) minimum income; (2) meeting social contingencies; (3) range of services to all citizens
(232): Fabians kept the 'masses' in the background, only later discovered the trade unions.
(241): Oastler and the 'feudal Welfare State'
(249): Bismarck worried about SDem
(251): complexity of lineage of 19th century welfare state [but at least part of the reason that this is less relevant is because these were not nearly as significant, in terms of impact/scope, as 20th century welfare States]
(253): implicitly, the explanation is a moral one--State actors couldn't avoid the moral pressure of reformers [this just can't explain very much]
(256-257): US is different. [but no attempt to explain this!?]
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