paul pierson, new politics of the welfare state

(348): retrenchment process does not follow same process as reform

(350): welfare state generates constituencies


(351): little evidence of cutbacks (covering '75 to '90)

(355): radical reform difficult where power is well-distributed, and there are lots of veto-points (Germany, USA); but even where there are less, it is difficult

1. danger of pluralist faith--Pierson is not alive enough to the fact that, even where populations stick to welfare state, if powerful interests want its abolition, one can expect to see it [this is aside from the question of whether we've seen it or not]

neil gilbert, transformation of the welfare state

(32): four factors

1. structural changes
2. globalization of economy
3. changing ideas
4. changing socio-political processes

(46): in the enabling State, a move towards Durkheimian vision of social cohesion (not the State/public leading it, but private actors in civil society)

(51): sees convergence, when you look at total social transfers, but include everything from tax breaks to private contributions.data is from 1999.

1. no theory, here--just description. and if there is a causal argument about which of the factors come first, it seems confused.

2. implications of 'convergence' are, partly, that welfare is as American as apple pie, but also, that the Scandinavian model is less generous and certainly less different than one might think


walter korpi, the power resources model

(78): parity amongst labour and capital is not possible, as capital is superior on all of the dimensions laid out

(82):political democracy can be conceptualized as the effective use of increasing power resources (a la Vanhanen)

esping-anderson, three worlds of welfare capitalism

(161): focus on spending is misplaced (we need to focus on decommodification, in the spirit of Marshall)

(163): self-reinforcing, in the sense that de-commodification (which is when a person can maintain a livelihood w/o selling labour-power) often increases the ability of labour to organize (tighter labour markets, etc.)

(164): needs-testing, targeted benefits serve to curtail the de-commodifying effect

(166): universalism was only possible in a historically peculiar class structure (where vast majority of people aer 'little people); but once you get the 'new middle-classes,' dualism is inevitable [hmm]

(167): and somewhat unlike Pierson, the emergence of dualism is likely to make m-class less supportive of a universalistic transfer system

(170): need to move away from simple causality, to a constellation of effects that interact (class movilization, class-political coalitions, regime structures)

(171): historically, before WWII, the attitude of farmers were critical--rural class politics determined political dominance. afterwards, the rising white-collar strata becomes the linchpin for political majorities


(172): it's the political leanings of these new middle-calsses that determines what the w. state will look like -- either they'll be integrated into a universal system, part of a dualist system, or part of a system that's more generous but segregated


1. obviously, total independence from the market is a sham--this would be the end of wage-labour

yergin and stanislaw, the commanding heights

(14, 124): "underlying all this has been a fundamental shift in ideas"

(15): "importance of leaders and leadership"

(20): Atlee was a social worker

(21, 26-27): insofar as they have a concept of crisis, it's "war"/devastation [the politics of that crisis, w/ the Left in ascendancy, etc., is all obscured.]

 (29): "nationalization as a capitalist weapon" [there is a great deal of truth to this--nationalization can be a great boon for capitalists]

(34): the 'chicken feed' argument!

(51): FDR and the New Deal [no mention of Labor/Left role, strife, uncertainty, etc.]

(64): more regulation under Nixon [and Dem Congress, of course] than under any president since New Deal [is it coincidental that this post-dated second significant wave of struggle? yet no mention of this.]

(74): 'Permit Raj,' but of course

(81, 91): no acknowledgment of the successes of ISI [this framing permits 'idealism'--because then it really is the failing of ideas, and the superiority of alternative ideas, that explains historical change. interests/power be damned! must look at centrality of profits and class power, rather than the question of whether one or the other policy is 'better' for society]

(87, 91): corruption, also, is un-explained

(93): Keith Joseph as catalyst

(96): Edward Heath was UK's Richard Nixon--an unfortunate Keynesian

(107): in 1974, Thatcher and Joseph break with Heath and the Tory mainstream

(108): the first three years were a 'non-event'--only after Falklands

(113): confrontation with NUM and Scarrgill, in 1984

(115): State companies were inefficient, found it difficult to compete--in this, of course, there's always an element of truth. [on the other hand, we're confronted with the track record of neoliberalism]

(123): in total, only 46 privatizations

(124, 140, 145): again, "beliefs" as driving change [there are always all sorts of ideas around. the question is why certain ideas get selected for]

(139): getting literature on E. Asian miracle backwards--consensus is different

(142): LSE in the 1930s became redoubt of liberalism

Harvey, Neoliberalism

(19): centrally--it's a political project, not a utopian project

(31-33): difficulties w/ class--resolved by pointing to finance

Williams, Keynes

(74): Keynes actually didn't write much about social policy/welfare

(76): engaged welfare State through obsession w/ unemployment

kohli, the indian media business

(19): Indian TV mkt, unlike US, yet to move to pay-based--still ad-subsidised (this means heightened influence of advertisers)

(28-29): circulation-advertising split, for newspapers, was 60:40; but in English more adverse.

(29): ownership of a media house is sometimes more effective than lobbying [hmm]

(33): in 1980, 80% of ad spending went to print

(35): TOI is only national newspaper--circulation of 2 million

(38): English newspapers charge more for ads, because advertisers are interested in their base

(38, 46): key--one factor setting India apart is its 'overdependence on advertising'. "newspapers at mercy of advertisers--circulation only brings in 20% in English-language"

(43): allegedly, though, not significant media concentration--no real pan-India publishers

(44, 56): allowing foreign stakes in media, starting 2002

(83): imp--in TV, too, Indian operators earn 80% from advertising, and only 20% from subscription--sign of market 'immaturity' [confusion over figures, see p. 86)

(204): 40 million internet users

goodin and mitchell, foundations of the welfare state 

(x): geographical mobility undermined earlier forms of poor relief, which were localized/parish-based

(xii): breadwinner's welfare state vs. univeralized benefits

(xiii): regime types--'liberal', 'social democratic,' 'corporatist'

(xiv): nowadays, a return to 1601 and localism -- importantly, 'in an era of declining public budgets'

(xv): imp--here, the shift to neoliberalism/decline is seen as a response to changing economic circumstances. [is this not mediated by politics!? come on]

(xvi): other reasons for its decline [but, again, all these sidestep the question of shifts in the balance of forces. it's not an objective fact that SS is unpayable, for example, etc.]

1. changing nature of work
2. women's increasing participation in the labour force

marshall, citizenship and social class

(149): three sorts of rights--civil (property rights, negative rights), political, and social (welfarish)

(150): civil rights, of course, were entirely functional for a market economy (from Status to Contract)

(151, 154): good--civil rights run up against social rights. the welfare state has to fight the effects of free operation of mkts [acknowledged in the others, but clearest here]

[1] In the sense of the last argument, the Welfare State is one thing and NOT many. Reforms that attenuate the ravages of the market. It may be true that this takes different forms at different times and in different places, but the fact that, at heart, its a question of redistributing resources ought to alert us to the importance of a structural theory of its implementation. The wealthy don't just give up resources because (1) changing philosophical fashions; (2) moral concerns.

pierson and leimgruber, intellectual roots

(32): though it's been identified with the historical project of SD, its origins "more usually" lie in liberal/conservative thought [!]

(34): [BUT] acknowledging that motivated by an attempt to answer the 'social question'. [well, who was posing the social question, for god's sake? is the idea that it was posed purely passively, because there was increasing misery, etc.? of course not!]

(37-38): idealism--the forward role of the ideas of the 'new' or 'social' liberalism. [let us clarify the claim--at its strongest, its explanatory! nutty]

(39): the New Deal bringing through earlier ideas and concepts [but come on, this makes it difficult to (a) explain the ND; (b) understand how transformative of a break it was w/ past policy, no?]

[1] There's a real need to clarify exactly what we're doing, here. A genealogy of the welfare state, ok. But none of this can suffice as an explanation of its origins, which is what Pierson and Co. lapse into, routinely.

asa briggs, on the welfare state

(222): what once seemed fixed (the fact of welfare), obviously is not

(223): not one 'movement', but remedies for specific problems [I'm sure this is true--but let's not obscure the important point, which is that these are all part of a single effort to attenuate the effects of the free operation of mkts]

(225): 'it was increasingly regarded as an obligation of government to ward of distress...' [OK, but why? Need to think systematically about this. State actors can change their minds--though surely in response to things happening around them, not arbitrariliy--but they also have certain imperatives to which they have to hew. So what determines policy? At the very least, not their preferences alone...]

(227): 'consensus' years of 1945 to 1950, in the UK [why?!?]

(228): definition of Welfare State: (1) minimum income; (2) meeting social contingencies; (3) range of services to all citizens

(232): Fabians kept the 'masses' in the background, only later discovered the trade unions.

(241): Oastler and the 'feudal Welfare State'

(249): Bismarck worried about SDem

(251): complexity of lineage of 19th century welfare state [but at least part of the reason that this is less relevant is because these were not nearly as significant, in terms of impact/scope, as 20th century welfare States]

(253): implicitly, the explanation is a moral one--State actors couldn't avoid the moral pressure of reformers [this just can't explain very much]

(256-257): US is different. [but no attempt to explain this!?]

ruth berins collier, paths toward democracy (1999)

(20): key point: literature is 'overstylized' -- neither w-class-led nor elite-led images capture the democratization process, in its first or second phases. there are several corners to the cube.

(28-32): difficulties in classifying democratization (UK, Chile, etc.)

(34): M-Sec Democratizatoin -- led by m-class groups, in the main

(54): Electoral Support Mobilization -- attempt to garner support of an existing movement