democracy and development in india, atul kohli (2009)

(5, 111): Congress built its political network on back of landowning upper castes, for the most part

(6): 'low levels of mobilization' characterizing India's polity [hmm]

(7): old Congress was destroyed in Indira Gandhi's populist interlude

(11): India's leaders now more concerned with economic growth [terribly bizarre, and anti-structural understanding of State managers' priorities]

(15): variation in State-level performance, means that political factors (CPI-M, i.e.) are important

(108): classic Kohli--India's problem was that State was not cohesive enough to push State-led development

(110): Congress virtue was to establish links between elites and masses

(115): B. Moore described Nehru as the 'gentle betrayer of the masses'

(116): agricultural growth in Nehru period was extensive, not intensive

(117): implication that business was 'too regulated' in 'license raj' period

(120): India vs. Brazil--Brazil did better, relatively, b/c it's regime was less 'open'; less worried about redistribution/nationalism

(121): Indira's popularity was not institutionalized, unlike her father; opposed by entrenched Congress elite

(126): Indira's populism: 'throw money at the classes she sought to mobilize'

(126): resulting industrial deceleration in Indira period was effect of disincentives, for corporations, to invest

(132): policy shift in india is not 'economic liberalization,' but rather a 'pro-business drift

(133): Indira Gandhi's second term was more pro-business; see Industrial Policy Resolution in 1982

(134): this policy shift did lead to improved rates of economic growth

(135): debt was managed by decreasing public sector investments, which has deleterious welfare effects, of course

(138-139): India vs. Korea/Brazil, classic Kohli

(141): economic growth in India started accelerating prior to liberalization in 1991

(144, 147): pro-business strategy is not necessarily a pro-market strategy; from 'socialist India' to 'India incorporated'

(153): no structural theory of the State--Indira is following her own whims, etc., though responding to constituencies there's no real sense, here, of the power business wields

(155): Indian business wanted an 'activist' State, but one which was activist in defense of their ends

(157): IMF package was relevant, but not very important in determining reform trajectory--India had already begun

(159): Singh and Ahluwalia were important players in the policy shift, of course

(163): narrowing of the ruling alliance made space for the BJP

(164): growth rate of manufacturing was not all that affected by reforms

(165): composition of investment greatly changed after 1980--much bigger share was made up by private investors

(167): collapse of USSR and rise of WTO changed terrain on which bureaucrats made their decision, re: reforms

(168): CII came to represent 'modern' industries, who were interested in exports. there was a split, with CII more open to 'opening,' and FICCI and ASSOCHAM more circumspect

(170): Bombay Club opposition--'lowering tarrifs will destroy India's competitiveness'

(172): growth in TFP lower in post-reform period, industrial growth did not improve over 1980s

(173): reform policies helped big business more than small business; and big business was comfortable with the slow pace of external opening

(174): concentration in private industry--market capitalization of top 10 companies to GDP ratio going way up, in post-reform period

(189): push behind liberalization came from 'technocratically inclined leaders'

(195): after 1980 Gandhi shifted to Hindu chauvinism and pro-business approach, to try and compensate for the deficiences of her base in the earlier period

(200): Rajiv broke hard with Nehru and Gandhi rhetoric--but he intended the changes to go farther than they actually ended up going

(202): the '85-86 budge  was very pro-elite

(207): but, w/ popular opposition, some of this had to be tempered. the Kohli argument--democracy made things difficult

(209): business groups were very supportive of Rajiv

(211): but, again, Kohli seeing business' power as one of 'veto, rather than agenda setting'