stanley kochanek, business and politics in India (1974)

(x): relative to other groups, business associations are 'relatively well-developed'

(x): unlike other groups, have developed as interest group autonomous from political parties

(xi): not quite the 'modern functional representation', though--b/c of importance of 'primordial identities'

(198): alleging 'low prestige of private sector' in the public eye, which makes it difficult to exert influence

(208): traditionally business associations have taken defensive stands; as grievance bodies. but slowly becoming more pro-active.

(211): "major Indian business houses already own almost all the important metropolitan newspapers..."

(214): most consistent political dilemma, for business, has related to strategy it should pursue, re: Congress--from "qualified support" to "partial alienation"

(216): Marwari (Birla) attitude to Congress very different from Tata (Bombay attitude). former conciliatory, latter behind efforts to go elsewhere (Swatantra party)

(216): 1947 to 1953 was a period of uncertainty; accomodation from 1954 to 1963

(220): but 1963 to 1967 brought reversal

(220): Nehru had been well-regarded amongst Marwaris, but never liked by those who weren't pro-Congress.

(220): though, "as one industrialist put it, '...Nehru never did anything to really affect business interests.'"

(220): again, 'old Bombay industrial elite' that was most strongly provoked

(222): business sought to intervene, against Congress, in 1967 elections--designed to humble Congress and make it more amenable to business pressure

(224): Left perceived business influence in '67 election very unfavourably

(225): a section of the Marwari houses did support Indira Gandhi, though; but opposition was well-financed, as well

(225): after interlude, there was another phase of accomodation, mirroring that under Nehru (post 1971, Kochanek is dating it)

(226): an old generation was uninterested in politics; a new generation, though, is taking active interest

(229): Business played an increasing role in '67 and '71 elections

(232): estimated that business provides about 90 % of election funds [but no citation]

(233): from 1962 to 1968, companies contributed 26 million Rs--Congress recieved Rs 20 million

(234-235): issue of 'company contributions' [i.e., direct donations] has been politically explosive for a while (since '67 elections), but estimated at no more than 20% of total money

(236): by and large, donations coming from business have been individual, not collective

(237): most funding goes to Congress mainly because there is no viable opposition [this has changed, obviously]

(240): during Nehru era, business activity in parliament was limited (no functional representation for business, no businessmen really contesting)

(256): noting the existence of some lobbying, but 'primitive by American standards'

(257, see also Chp XII): and Parliamentary lobbying is much less important than lobbying ministers and/or the bureaucracy

(258): most effective way is direct personal contact, rather than written communication

(258): and mainly concerned with short-term problems rather than long-term policy [part of Kochanek's general theme that business has been short-sighted, though increasingly less so as India develops--a lovely story]

(263): effectiveness of lobbying has been on the increase since the early 1960s (citing death of Nehru, growth of self-confidence in business community, and growing importance of Parliament)

(265, 267): imp--vast bulk of business energy and resources are concentrated on prime minister, cabinet, and the higher echelons of the bureaucracy. Parliament is less important, for the reason that it has less clout.

(266): Nehru refrained from extensive nationalizations, he heavily protected industry, and he laid the foundation for expansion of private sector [no indication, though, that this would affect Kochanek's very traditional judgement of the nature of the 'license raj']

(292): some hint at a 'revolving door', between business and politics. record of businesses hiring retired bureaucrats.

(297): Gandhi lived at Birla house during New Dehli summers, but of course. Scene of his assassination.

(302): again, the problem in Gov't-Business relations [for Kochanek] is that the 'political culture' is hostile to business. too much socialism in the air.

(321): extent of business influence is 'exaggerated by its enemies, understated by its friends'

(322): citing Birla to suggest that business has a 'limited influence', but can have an effect where well-organized and its resources are correctly utilized

(332): business has been most effective in gaining access to exective and bureaucracy, insofar as (a) they're powerful; and (b) out of the public eye

(333): as party politics splintered in '63 to '71 period, it gave business some leverage--but when Congress hegemony returned in 1971, this was lost

(337): under the forces of 'internal and systemic change,' business is becoming more sophisticated, moving toward 'new lobbying' and things like this

---

[1] Kochanek is working, more-or-less, with the classic picture of the 'license raj', where much of the initiative regarding long-term policy questions comes from bureaucrats and politicians, and business responds defensively. This ignores, of course, the structural power they wield (the 'investment strike' chronicled by Vivek).

[2] The book is pluralist, through-and-through, which makes it difficult to assess exactly what is being argued. Sometimes it's admitted that the resources wielded by business matter (or must matter) tremendously, and that they have greatest influence where it counts the most (in the executive arm and bureaucracy)--90% of all election funds are supplied by business, for example. But otherwise the picture is of an aggrieved business class, held hostage to politicians who have to toe a populist line in order to appease restless masses. This is misplaced, for obvious reasons.

[3] There is, though, throughout the book, a sense that business is getting better at precisely the things it needs to do to wield influence. There is a prediction, running through the book, that fits well with what seems to have happened in India. He attributes this to systemic/internal change, but it's unclear whether this is meant to be a natural consequence (in his argument) of industrialization, or whether he agrees that it must have something to do with shifting balance of class forces.

An op-ed that tracks the history of legislation, re: corporate donations. And then ends with some information, unsourced, re: donations. The refrain in this and other pieces is, funnily-enough, that corporations in the US have less influence over political results because direct donations are prohibited there (i.e., donors make them as individuals, not as companies), but not in India. There are also several pieces calling for the donations to be made transparent, which suggests to me that information on donations is just not widely available.

It is beyond doubt that contribution by companies is given not because of any ideological reason but really as a device to be in the good books of the ruling party. Thus between 1966 to 1969, 75 companies paid down Rs 1.87 crore out of which Rs. 144 lakhs were given to the ruling party; the ruling Congress party in 1967 alone received Rs 87 lakhs. The perception and reality have not changed—thus we find that in 2003-04, the BJP got Rs 90 crores as against the Congress’ Rs 65 crores. The peak of the BJP was Rs 155 crores in 2004-05 and it went down to Rs 137 crores in 2007-08. The rise in the share of the Congress party during this period was phenomenal, starting from 2002-03 at Rs 53 crores, to Rs 265 crores in 2007-08. More significant, the corporate-political nexus is illustrated by corporate donation to the BSP of Mayawati rising in 2002-03 from Rs 10.9 crores to Rs 55.6 crores in 2007-08. Does one need more proof of the invidious entry of the corporate sector in our body politic and of the dangerous consequences?

- - -

Here, allegedly, is some information on party donations and assets, showing the BJP has more funding than all other parties combined. But the source is sketchy--some student, Afroze Alam, put in a 'right-to-information' request.

http://www.travelindia-guide.com/elections-indian-lok-sabha/political-funding.php

- - -

This website tracks assets and spending of candidates. As summarized by Sainath, in the 2009 elections the impact of money was of course considerable. The downside is that there's no indication, that I can find, on who constitutes the main sources of funding.

"...There were 3,437 candidates in the polls with assets of less than Rs.1 million, says the report. Of these, just 15 (0.44 per cent) made it past the post. But your chances soar with your assets. Of the 1,785 candidates in the Rs.1 million-Rs.5 million group, 116 (6 per cent) won. This win-ratio goes up to 19 per cent of candidates for the Rs.5 million-Rs.50 million segment. And of 322 candidates in the Rs.50 million-plus or platinum tier, 106 (33 per cent) romped home. The higher you climb the ladder of lucre, the better your chances. That is obvious. But what is striking is how bleak things are for non-millionaires. Even a modest improvement in your wealth helps. Say, you move from the below Rs.1 million group to the Rs.1-5 million group - your chances immediately improve at a higher rate than your wealth. (Of course, that works only if you are already close to the Rs.1 million mark.) So it's not just that wealth has some impact on election outcomes - it influences them heavily and disproportionately as you go up the scale..."

- - -  

democracy and development in india, atul kohli (2009)

(5, 111): Congress built its political network on back of landowning upper castes, for the most part

(6): 'low levels of mobilization' characterizing India's polity [hmm]

(7): old Congress was destroyed in Indira Gandhi's populist interlude

(11): India's leaders now more concerned with economic growth [terribly bizarre, and anti-structural understanding of State managers' priorities]

(15): variation in State-level performance, means that political factors (CPI-M, i.e.) are important

(108): classic Kohli--India's problem was that State was not cohesive enough to push State-led development

(110): Congress virtue was to establish links between elites and masses

(115): B. Moore described Nehru as the 'gentle betrayer of the masses'

(116): agricultural growth in Nehru period was extensive, not intensive

(117): implication that business was 'too regulated' in 'license raj' period

(120): India vs. Brazil--Brazil did better, relatively, b/c it's regime was less 'open'; less worried about redistribution/nationalism

(121): Indira's popularity was not institutionalized, unlike her father; opposed by entrenched Congress elite

(126): Indira's populism: 'throw money at the classes she sought to mobilize'

(126): resulting industrial deceleration in Indira period was effect of disincentives, for corporations, to invest

(132): policy shift in india is not 'economic liberalization,' but rather a 'pro-business drift

(133): Indira Gandhi's second term was more pro-business; see Industrial Policy Resolution in 1982

(134): this policy shift did lead to improved rates of economic growth

(135): debt was managed by decreasing public sector investments, which has deleterious welfare effects, of course

(138-139): India vs. Korea/Brazil, classic Kohli

(141): economic growth in India started accelerating prior to liberalization in 1991

(144, 147): pro-business strategy is not necessarily a pro-market strategy; from 'socialist India' to 'India incorporated'

(153): no structural theory of the State--Indira is following her own whims, etc., though responding to constituencies there's no real sense, here, of the power business wields

(155): Indian business wanted an 'activist' State, but one which was activist in defense of their ends

(157): IMF package was relevant, but not very important in determining reform trajectory--India had already begun

(159): Singh and Ahluwalia were important players in the policy shift, of course

(163): narrowing of the ruling alliance made space for the BJP

(164): growth rate of manufacturing was not all that affected by reforms

(165): composition of investment greatly changed after 1980--much bigger share was made up by private investors

(167): collapse of USSR and rise of WTO changed terrain on which bureaucrats made their decision, re: reforms

(168): CII came to represent 'modern' industries, who were interested in exports. there was a split, with CII more open to 'opening,' and FICCI and ASSOCHAM more circumspect

(170): Bombay Club opposition--'lowering tarrifs will destroy India's competitiveness'

(172): growth in TFP lower in post-reform period, industrial growth did not improve over 1980s

(173): reform policies helped big business more than small business; and big business was comfortable with the slow pace of external opening

(174): concentration in private industry--market capitalization of top 10 companies to GDP ratio going way up, in post-reform period

(189): push behind liberalization came from 'technocratically inclined leaders'

(195): after 1980 Gandhi shifted to Hindu chauvinism and pro-business approach, to try and compensate for the deficiences of her base in the earlier period

(200): Rajiv broke hard with Nehru and Gandhi rhetoric--but he intended the changes to go farther than they actually ended up going

(202): the '85-86 budge  was very pro-elite

(207): but, w/ popular opposition, some of this had to be tempered. the Kohli argument--democracy made things difficult

(209): business groups were very supportive of Rajiv

(211): but, again, Kohli seeing business' power as one of 'veto, rather than agenda setting'

liberalization and business lobbying in india, stanley kochanek (1996)

(157): ability of business associations to influence the regulatory regime was severely limited due to relative autonomy of the State [in other words, more-or-less the opposite of the explanation given by Vivek for problems of  'license raj']

(158): business not particularly involved in the process of liberalization ('invluence very limited')--not their lobbying that explains it, but external and internal crises.

(160): Indira Gandhi's rise to power in 1969 was a 'shift to the Left', ruining long-standing relationship between Congress establishment and elite business families

(168): Bombay Club, in 1993, emerged as industrialists opposed to reform process--unwilling to be opened up to international competition

(169): interesting--FICCI strongly endorsed Bombay Club's critique of reforms, CII's approach was more subtle (even though many of its members were in Bombay Club)

(169): imp--again, reforms were the work of a "small technocratic elite"

(170): no constituency behind Rao reforms

(171): like Kohli, reforms are understood not as dramatic, but halting and responsive to resistance of powerful sectors

the transformation of interest politics in india, stanley kochanek (1995-1996)

(530-531): FICCI ('older, more traditional, indigenous), Assocham (both indigenous and foreign), CII (new regions and sunrise industries)

(532-538): FICCI historically 'economic arm' of Congress, though not without issues internally; regional strains (Calcutta vs. Bombay) led, eventually, to split in 80s, and subsequent revitalization of Assocham

(540): Assocham became mirror image of FICCI, though they had diffferent regional bases (Western for former, North and East for latter)

(541): useful table of top business houses, affiliation, and capitalization

(542): FICCI was quantitatively superior, but Assocham had qualitatively better/more endowed membership

(543-545): CII emerged in context of political/economic instability ('89-'91)--representing younger managers, new manufacturing sectors, and the South. more modern forms of lobbying, etc.

(547): imp--in the post-reforms period, CII became proactive [claim, running through Kochanek, is that reforms were engineered by bureaucracy, and business houses were almost uniformly reactive throughout]