luders, the civil rights movement and the logic of social change

(3): disruption costs

(3): concession costs

(5): 2x2 table, accomodators, vacillators, conformers, resisters

(10, 200): not just 'public opinion' leading to policy outcomes---need measure of attentiveness, as well as opposition (see below)

(11): third parties matter as well (cost assessment for them, as well, is relevant)

(15): imp--fixation on tactics, without taking costs/targets/third-parties into account, is misleading. though obviously tactics are relevant to the argument.

(21): three groups were 'resisters' in the context of the civil rights movement--plantation int, elected officials in 'black belt', and vulnerable white workers (p. 39-41--end of ND/populist alliances, shift alleigance to segregationists)

(25): for other whites, no 'real' costs [place to clarify place of non-material motivations--'Southern way of life']

(44): KKK members from l-clases

(52): very rapid pace of mechanization made landed elite less and less worried--declining concession costs

(57): interesting FN re: reformism--only for reformist movements, are subtle distinctions necessary

(58, 192): sum of relevant sectoral differences--those businesses that were relatively immobile, locally dependent, had brand name, needed continuous investment, were most vulnerable. manufacturing/uncompetitive/high-demand/don't need new investment[?] [all this might be worth refining, a bit. but the idea is spot-on]

(64): not business in general, that came around

(66): problem with use of petition signers [no sense of numbers in relation to proportion in economy, at large]

(72, see FN on 83): imp--there can be exceptions to the idea of rationally driven involvement, of course. but you don't theorize on the margins.

(108-112): case study summaries

(111): imp--political explanation of intransigence of 'Bull' Connor, rather than personality driven

(115, 192, 202): three factors, when considering what public officials have to way: 'public preferences,' attentiveness, and magnitude of countermobilization. all this requires you to think about nature of the demands, of course [but unless we're good at foregrounding what we mean by countermobilization, you risk pluralism, here; notable that in the conclusion this third factor becomes 'electoral significance' (business can drive gov't out of power, w/o electoral clout). depending on what you demand, you could get certain sectors quite livid--and they don't need to be 'well-organized', just 'well-funded. i think he would agree, but it could be clearer in the book]

(136): collective action problem, for businesses

(138): sum, school desegregation more difficult than voter registration, b/c of threat of electoral punishment (except in black belt, where both were very hard)

(144): sum, change in attitude of legislators and President were result of shifting disruption/concession costs, over time. there was barely any organized nonsouthern opposition, of course. the S. Democrats were the principal roadblock.

(147): good- not a veto points question; a 'political configuration' problem

(150): FDR shameful, not acting on lynching, excldusion of S. blacks from ND

(150): but, slowly, rise of voting block of blacks through out-migration changed everything

(156): Eisenhower intervenes in L. Rock, but didn't intervene in Texas before, remember. has to do with timing, electoral considerations

(161-163): JFK very little prestige, inconsistent supporter of civil rights in senate. picked LBJ, which stunned progressives. made call to release King in Georgia. but fundamentally vacillating, at this point (in the earl y1960s). one-third of his electoral college votes were from Southern States--concession costs were prohibitive.

(165): F. Rides, and inaction of JFK/RFK

(167): R. Kennedy surrendered principle for expedience, in F Rides

(168): JFK appointing reactionaries to bench

(170, 199): Birmingham April/May 1963as catalyst

(174, 185): key Republican legislators played a pivotal role; S. Democrats were losers

(179): business opposition non-existent

(182, 199): Selma March 1965 as catalyst

(186): we overlook political processes [but what's driving shifts in the pol process, as you yourself have shown, is the movement! he means something legitimate, of course, but the framing is all off]