(6): rethinking two "conceptual gifts"
- historicism (first in Europe, then elsewhere)
- the very idea of the political
- nationalist elite's rejection of the 'waiting-room' version
- entry of the peasant
(12) (mis)characterization of the claims of uneven development as depending on 'historicism'
(14): Guha's two logics of South Asian political modernity [but come on--elsewhere? YOU are historicizing/particularizing a relationship that is actually universal, between ideas and material causes. these are the terms in which the question must be addressed]
- secular
- 'gods and spirits'
- that humans exist in a frame of a single and secular historical time (enveloping other forms of time)
- that humans are ontologically singular
(18): analytical vs. hermeneutic -- Marx vs. Heidegger
(22-23): historicism as the issue [not, as we would argue, a certain way of historicizing, but historicizing itself--insane!]
(27): Europe as the master narrative
(30): for capital or bourgeois, read Europe [but this is precisely what's at issue -- his misreading of the categories of capital/bourgeois]
(31-32): Subaltern Studies was concerned with the failure of its own bourgeosie, etc. [he's pushing back, but in a very different way than we would]
(34): a head-nod to Gandhi
(40): antihistorical constructions of the past were very powerful forms of collective memory [great. everyone does this. doesn't this tell you something about the inanity of your project?]
(42-43): statement--provincializing Europe as a politics and project of alliance between the dominant metropolitan histories and the subaltern peripheral pasts; neither a nativist nor a nationalist task [finding space in the in-between, when there really isn't any to be found]
(47): Marx's two aspects:
- the abstract human
- the idea of history
(49): Wall Street Journal article as aesthetic representation of the thesis of 'uneven development! [again, totally misunderstanding the concept/thrust of 'uneven' development]
(50): statement of the argument, re: abstract labor, History 1, History 2 -- abstract labor gave Marx a way of explaining away difference, through the logic of History 1. But History 2 persists.
(52): imp--getting to the 'abstract human' via the concept of abstract labor [it is not at all clear, to me, that this is what the category of abstract labor achieves (or is meant to achieve), in Marx. after all, the universalist premises of Marx predate the generalization of exchange. in this sense, Chakrabarty is understating the universalist pretensions of Marxism]
(58): for Marx, abstract labor as both description and critique (through the appropriation of life, etc.)
(63): History 1 (Capital positing itself -- here some reflections on how logic of Capital can only be grasped by someone within its throes. useful, but not entirely germane to the question of Marxism's (or social science's) universalizing scope.
(64): History 2 (heterogeneity -- through the history of money? nothing, Chakrabarty's arguing, to guarantee the subordination of History 2)
(66-67): key--History 2 as that which is left over [very deceptive extended metaphor, though -- he leaves the 'excess' unspecified. how can you coherently conceptualize the heterogeneity? if you want to argue that it is meaningful, don't you have to have some account of it, beyond the simple fact of its heterogeneity? there will always be 'stuff' left over--why should we care? once you get these ppl to answer why we ought to care, of course, you see they have to bring themselves back to the terrain of the universal]
(68): productive/unproductive [here Chakrabarty wants to give this the semblance of theoretical profundity -- it is an economic distinction, for crying out loud!]
(74): against singular 'time' -- 'time' as not always 'independent' of human systems of representation
(76): the 'gods' signify differences, problems for translation [outrageous -- can be subsumed, though, under these earlier objections]
(83): imp--why is the god of the tin miners equal to the god of the Bihari peasants? [because that's the whole fucking point of social science. it's one thing to suggest that the generalization is poorly done. it's another thing to simply reassert their irreducible specificity, the result of which is simply to mystify everything. i hope it's clear why this is analytically and especially politically devastating]
(86, 90): imp--here, he's trying to rescue his own position from the mess of cultural relativism [but offering a purely instrumental defense? interesting place to attack. in general, the framing of his own defense is very slippery--sometimes more than instrumental, sometimes expressed as a recognition that one can't forfeit the terrain of the universal without becoming completely meaningless]
(93-94): subaltern histories as 'split histories' -- not just as bringing more ppl into the modern (as in history from below)
(98-99): agrees that rationality is needed in history [but this depends, of course, on what you think that means]
(101): history writing assumes plural ways of being
(102-103): imp--Guha making consciousness the subject of rebellion [here is another good place to tease out why the whole business is, for social science, so destructive? and for politics]
(103-105): question of subaltern agency
(105): position on religion, here -- as 'subaltern pasts' that can't be glibly assimilated into Marxist history [he's a bit slippery, here -- would recognize their contingency, etc. but stupid, nonetheless, insofar as he's disavowing the only sane position]
(108): imp, further evidence of slipperiness--positioning himself against a synthesis -- we have to stay with both Guha and the Santal leader, there is no third voice [what does this mean for your causal claims, etc.? oh wait -- you're not in the business of making any, I forgot]
(237-238): reason as elitist when unreason is forced to stand for backwardness [whither truth, then? we can take some of this to its logical conclusion -- 'gods and spirits' as not necessarily 'backward' beliefs. what about hierarchy of castes? what about inferiority of women? etc., etc.]
(243): taking the stone saddle-quern as an example of an 'anachronism' that is exiled into the past rather than regarded as as 'now' as the rest of the scene [but all you need is a better narrative with equally universalist pretensions -- this is the 'uneven development' question, again]
(245): from the 18th Brumaire, suggesting Marx was alive to the 'nightmares' on the present generation [yes, but Marx would argue that the successful generation would be the one that could rid itself of this]
(247): historicist vs. decisionist [don't care to understand this]
(249) insistence on plural realities [again, does this matter when we are making specific causal claims? how, where, when? and how does it not collapses in on itself, by the weight of assuming infinite difference and infinite incommensurability of cases? if difference bothers you simply because it is difference unspecified -- well, then, everything is different! you shouldn't be able to make any claims at all]
- - - - - - - - - - - -
[1] the crux of his failings around the concept of historicism is that he misunderstands his attack on a bad brand of historicizing to be a rejection of the very project of historicizing itself. so the narrative 'first Europe, then non-Europe' is of course a stupid argument. but it is stupid not because the non-Europe isn't something that can be assimilated into the categories we would use to understand. it is because the non-Europe represents, in the terms of those universal categories, something different.
[2] if you forfeit this claim about a higher level of abstraction to which both the non-Europe and the Europe can be assimilated, I fail to understand how any alternative project can escape incoherence. in other words, Chakrabarty asserts the irreducible particularity of the non-Europe (his History 2), because there is something left over when he applies the categories of History 1. that 'excess' can't be theorized--perhaps at all, but certainly through the categories of History 1.
certainly, though, this 'excess' can't be regarded as exclusive to the non-Europe? it should be obvious that there is always something left over, whenever one attempts to apply categories/causal arguments to explain a phenomenon. rather than taking the 'excess' on its own terms--as a sign of the necessary incompleteness of our categories--we should be asking whether or not the 'excess' is relevant for the sorts of claims we are making. we have to be convinced that the 'excess' is important/meaningful.
so, to the extent that you, Chakrabarty, want to prove to me that it is, you will have to return to the categories of my argument (to 'History 1' -- to the terrain of the universal): you will have to explain to me that my failure to account for this 'excess' imperils my causal argument (so the classic example, of course, would be uneven development -- the first Europe, then non-Europe argument obviously leaves out facts that are entirely relevant to the absurd causal claims it is making. but when this objection is raised, it has to be raised in general terms -- that non-Europe occupies a different place/time in global capitalism, subject to distinct pressures/competitive strains, etc.)
[3] he misreads uneven development, of course, as taking 'backwardness' as 'past'. emphatically untrue. its political thrust comes from the opposite--that 'backwardness' is part of the 'now.' (see p. 49)
[4] Gods and spirits. here, you see him 'particularizing' a question that I think is emphatically universal. why do people invoke 'gods/spirits'/supernatural (phenomena that are clearly irrational) to understand the world? how does it motivate rebellion?
for the general discussion, this is very instructive. his position is radically unstable. either (A) you assume the commensurability of these examples--which opens up interesting questions about the relationship between ideas and structure, between myth-making and rebellion, etc. (incidentally, if --as he argues -- religion/ideas are 'central' to rebellion (a parallel reality), we risk sidelining all the interesting questions? certainly, ideas can't just assert themselves on reality? can i wish a rebellion into being, because i believe a god has summoned me to rebellion? it should be clear that there there are real limits on the extent to which you can consider this a parallel reality)
or (B) you assume the incommensurability of these examples. but surely the assumption is totally destabilizing? how do you still have commensurability within the non-Europe? between countries? between provinces? between people? either (a) Chakrabarty would have to say that you do have commensurability across the non-Europe -- in which case he is clearly reifying Europe/non-Europe divide; or (b) he would have to say that you don't have commensurability across the non-Europe -- in which case he can't avoid the postmodern mush.
[5] a jump from 'abstract labor' to 'abstract human'. but it is not the case in Marx that it is the category of 'abstract labor' that enables generalization (whether it makes it possible for subjects to generalize is a separate question). generalization is possible because of the nature of social formations, as combinations of relations of production/forces of production, etc. people everywhere entering into definite relations of production to procure their means of subsistence.
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