the political economy of military rule in pakistan, akbar zaidi (2008)

(3): military begins active role in economy under zia (citing siddiqa)

(5): key--1988-1999 as severley limited politically by ISI/military, and economically by debt and sanctions (runs up to 9/11, basically) [great place for form of state/form of regime distinction]

(7): military gov't penchant for devolution

(8): debt written off after 9/11, of course

(11): under Musharraf, April 2002 referendum, November 2002 elections

(11): Musharraf's amendments -- a NSC through which officers oversee the gov't [what came of this?]; 17th amendment, through which presidents could dissolve parliament

(13): MMA as bogey

(15): real weakness of this paper--doesn't operationalize the middle-classes, and gives no reason (except their 'wealth' and 'clout' in the abstract) to suggest why their support was important to the regime. does he mean capitalists?

(19-20): key argument is that accomodative nature of the political parties explains military rule. the mechanisms here are not sensible. but we might want to re-frame this claim as a 'dependent development' one, where, a la RSS, the effects of structural underdevelopment have hampered the political process severely. no 'democratic' actor. in other words, the lack of political resistance (or the fact, as he notes on p. 20, of a 'divided' resistance) is best understood not as a lack of intent, but as a lack of capacity.