michael goldfield, "worker insurgency, radical organization, and new deal labor legislation" (1989)

(1258): thesis--'labor militance' and 'radical organization' did have a major influence on the passing of the 1935 NLRA. this opens up questions for (1) the study of US politics and (2) the study of the modern State.

(1258): noting that, prior to the 1930s, unions were de facto illegal.

(1259): skocpol's explanation for the NLRA, in four parts

1. state as potentially autonomous
2. new deal period as a time in which the state was quite autonomous from social influence
3. against six contending explanations: not (1) multi-interest reform coalition; (2) roosevelt; (3) liberal corporate elites; (4) capital-intensive industries; (5) working-class disruption, a la Piven/Cloward; (6) working-class strength, i.e., in order to control workers.
4. key is understanding the 'autonomous' milieu in which robert wagner operated; particularly autonomous at this time, in fact, due to widespread state incapacity.
   

(1262): key--goldfield wants to distinguish between four kinds of influence that capitalists can have over the State.

1. providing impetus for a bill to pass
2. dominating the content of a bill
3. the policy-outcome of a bill is what was wanted
4. the ability to block legislation, to force compromises, and otherwise control the decision-making agenda.
   

(1262-1263): key argument is that skocpol says that the state is autonomous because no one has a strong form of influence3--but goldfield's argument is that this misses influence1, influence2, and weak forms of influence3

(1263): similarly, capitalist opposition is not simply influence4, but can be a 'whole family of activities'

(1264-1265): four understandings of labor influence

1. becoming a rival 'power elite'. this has "virtually never happened," and is not the argument. many who attempt to attack the notion that the w-class had something to do with the new deal, though, attack this straw man.
2. the Sweden model (negotiations with elites on behalf of w-class). but this is not applicable to workers' insurgency, he's noting
3. piven/cloward disruption model--too much emphasis on spontaneity, misunderstands the degree to which protest was organized.
   

concessions granted by the government in order to stem working class militance and organized radicalism. insurgency can change capital's preferences [this is what he wants to argue.]

(1265-1268): there are three arguments against labor influence. goldfield does a very good job, here, of showing them to be untenable.

1. legislation preceded upsurge--well, NLRB actually settled very few cases until 1937, coming at the very end of the '34-'38 upsurge. the dam was broken without the help of the NLRB.
   
2. labor was too weak
3. causality, in fact, goes the other way--in fact, NLRA could actually be called responsible for inhibiting the further growth if we follow Skocpol's logic, re: the '38 downturn. but she's wrong, and this would be mistaken.

(1268-1268): the counter-model, in five parts

1. labor legislation was a result of interaction between labor movement, radical organizations (CP), liberal reformers, government officials.
   
2. the impetus for the passage was a direct result of the broad labor upsurge, conflicts within labor movement, and growing influence of radicalism
3. the ties of reformers to the AFL leaders are central--they actually had narrow room for maneuver, contra skocpol
4. the legislation itself was not so radical, nor was it so unambiguously pro-labor
5. the key is understanding two aspects of labor's development: (1) the unemployed movement, farmer-labor party, etc. -- added breadth and broad-based support to labor upsurge; (2) tremendous conflict within the labor movement, with a conservative AFL and more
   

(1270-1276): the model depends on three linkages

1. connection between labor upsurge and social movements (unemployed and CP, farmers' movements, etc.)
   
2. political conflict within the labor movement, with power shifting left (strikes as 'grim reaper' for the AFL)
   
3. these phenomena had an impact on the reform process (it truly alarmed elites--reform was a more compelling option than repression, becase they actually thought revolution was on the cards. this is what the AFL was telling them, too. reformers were terrified.)

(1278): acknowledging that conjunctural factors are important, too. doesn't mean to discount those. [maybe a way to bring in the ferguson]