lecture 4, "A Nation? Peasants, Language, and French Identity"
john merriman

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two things today: (1) talk about question of when people in France began thinking of themselves as French, which is a big historical debate (2) specifically, look at the role of the school system in that process.

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question to be resolved: when did the majority of the population start to think of themselves in national terms, rather than in other terms? (in 1789, half the population spoke French; in 1871, about a quarter of the population spoke French(!))

it's a leap of faith to think, of course, that the language you speak entirely informs your identity (Alsace as an example, who thought of themselves as French despite speaking German).

In the view of Eugene Weber (who prof disagrees with), until about 1880, you had an "unawareness" of French identity (in 1864, someone went in to a particular department and students in a school had no idea what France was). A view of "savage" France, where people had to be civilized by the State's institutions into accepting the French canon (the worst of modernization theory, says prof).

Three big agencies of change, according to Weber, transforming peasants into Frenchmen: (1) railroads; (2) military conscription; (3) schools, alongside the increase in literacy in France (such that by 1900, the majority of people in France could read or write).

This basic interpretation became quite compelling (by 1914, you had people going offf to do singing Le Marseilleise)

Language and military is, of course, very interesting question. In Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had roughly 12 national groups, to go anywhere in the army (or to become a teacher, for example), you had to know German.

prof does not agree with this view--hopes to nuance it, and to look also at the role of schools in this argument.

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the whole question of timing is essential: when did French national identity permeate the different departments? (language and nationality, of course, is fascinating: at the time of the unification of Italy, in mid-1800s, the percentage of the population that spoke Italian was 5%!)

was Weber completely wrong, then? no, but you need more nuance, in sum. different histories in different departments. it is silly, prof is arguing, to look for one national identity--everyone has shared identities, different things being emphasized in different contexts.

revolution of 1848, which begins as an urban revolution, and turns into a rural lefty revolution in much of the South of the country. ends in 1851, when Napoleon the Third takes power in a coup d'etat. That gives rise to the largest national insurrection in French history (?), to defend the Republic (and the vast majority of those were peasants, and many of them did not speak French! though they were fighting for a French republic).

in that sense, this movement meant that the people didn't wait till the 1880s. so history was more complicated than the modernization picture, prof is arguing.

and indeed, even on that level--the expansion of roads in the 18th century was very important, as was the economic expansion of 1820s and 1830s (which brought people into towns, which begin to make them aware of Le France).

so yes, railroads were important--but they were not the be-all, end-all of the identity-formation process.

and fast-forward to 1914, did the people from Bretton going to fight for France "feel" French? that, also, prof is arguing, involves a leap of faith (and, conversely, not speaking French did not necessarily sign anti-French "backwardness").

in sum, prof is arguing against the "simplistic" view of the modernizers. "it just is terribly complicated."

(what about since WWII--when did patois disappear? in the 1960s, it was still spoken in many households in parts of France, etc., etc.)

(and universities? they are now more active in teaching these languages--which is a welcome change, of course, from de gaulle's determination to crush the regions)

so: be a little cautious in assuming that (1) the agencies of modernization are what created this French identity, and that (2) this has been uniform, and all subordinate identities have vanished.

not disputing the overall notion, i don't think, but complicating the analysis and chronology of it.

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what about schools?

certainly, weber is correct, schools do make a big difference.

until 1833, three things can be said about the teaching of anything: (1) girls were much less likely to go to school than boys; (2) many schoolteachers were mobile, they were people who would go from town to town, teaching for a month or two; (3) that the catholic church, primarily, dominated formal and informal education. the priest was often, especially in the 18th century, was the only person who could read in a given village (so nuns and the priests dominate education, especially in the highly religous regions).

in 1833, the Guizot law was passed. Guizot was Protestant, and he wanted to wrest education away from the Catholic church. the law mandated that every village have a school--but this matters, because each school teacher has a stamp of official authority. (and the schoolteacher becomes the person who notifies births, deaths, marriages, etc.--he represents the prestige of the state, and is so a challenge, in his very existence, to the Virgin Mary on the wall).

some control is handed back to the Church, later, with a different law under Louis Philippe.

so, you have these competing authorities scrambling to teach your kids: the State, and the Church.

furthermore, many parents declined to send their kids to school, because there were no obvious benefits to schooling. (prof citing statistics on truancy, correlated to harvests). but the state soon made schooling compulsory, as it did elsewhere--saying to parents "you have no choice."

the view is, then, that these primary school teachers (hardly anyone goes to high school until the second half of the 19th century) are the people who are going to teach children french. (patois not allowed!--at least according to the rules, of course).

but, of course, there's a "performance" effect to this: it's clear, prof is saying, regional identity is still very important in schools, as well. it's absurd to think that people weren't teaching in local dialects, just as it's absurd to think that people who didn't know french had some sense of being french. (prof saying that in the south of france this billingualism is certainly more pronounced than in the north).

don't forget, furthermore, that these perceptions of "backwardness" are written by military men or Parisians on trips to these regions (much like the critique of colonial travelogues, etc.).

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what about now?

if these areas in the south (which are tourist-invested) are going to remain more than simply sites for tourists from the north, then schools will have to maintain their traditional role in representing the identity of these communities.

in 1851, 2/3 of the departments in france were larger than they were in 1939--due to the collapsing birth rate and, as local industries collapse and the destruction of common resources, there's a huge withdrawal to urban areas (by 1900, the french population is stagnant, though of course supplemented by massive flows of immigration).

by 1979, says prof, 10,000 one-room schoolhouses close down--local educational system, in other words, is being eroded--regional and village identity giving way (schools being grouped with schools from other villages).

prof arguing, our school has to survive! if regional identity is going to persist, it will have to come through the school.

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in sum: let us realize the complexity of regional and national identities, against the modernizers. and emphasize that schools continue to play an important role, and can save regional identity, in a sense.