david garland, the culture of control (2001)

(viii, x): story centers on late modernity, and the collective, politically-shaped experience produces the penal turn

(75): again, argument is that changes produced by 'late modernity' plus 'politics of post-welfarism'

(77-78): summary of concept late modernity

(84): changes in social ecology

(85): extraordinary boost in TV ownership in 1950s

(88): weakening of moral regulation, moral absolutes [hmm--not only goes unexplained, but also dubious affinities to the neo-con explanation for rising crime. evidence?]

(90): summary of late modernity impact on crime rates: (1) increased opportunities (consumer boom, etc.); (2) reduction in situational controls, suburban liiving and tower blocks, etc.; (3) arrival of large cohort of teenage males; (4) relaxation of norms governing conduct [hmm, again]

(93): welfare state as self-undermining [slightly mistaken assessment of relationship of fiscal to economic crisis]

(97): not just economic crisis, but also the social crisis, that led to W. State rollback [hmm]

(99): success of neo-con framing of crisis as result of 'poor people's conduct'

(101): property crimes peak in 1982, homicides and violent crimes peak in late 80s

(106): high crime rates were a fact of 1960s to late 1990s

(108): President's Crime Comission Report of 1967 responded to rising crime rates by demanding expansion of War on Poverty

(122): policies like neighbourhood watch popular not because they were successful, but because they assuaged public

(136): types of criminals that were highlighted in this period were not selected for the proportion of harm for which they were responsible, but for their usefulness as a 'suitable enemy' for conservative politics

(136): Wilson and Herrnstein attributed rising crime rates to dependency culture of underclass

(139): aside from the political project, there were a series of extra-political conditions that made the political project intelligible/sensible

(146): peak of penal reaction was mid- to late-1990s, which lagged behind the peaks of criminal victimization in both US and UK

(152): argument about professional middle class being bulwark of welfarist-penal consensus; but failed to oppose punitive turn, because of their new experience with rising crime rates, etc. [bizarre--extremely amorphous constituency]