radical protest and social structure, michael schwartz

Chapter 6: Growth and Merger

(91): Alliance absorbing two different streams

1. large organizations of small yeomen/tenants, whose goal was to use local actions to reverse tenantization
   
2. small groups of large farmers/planters

(93): imp--expansion within country limits was natural; but further growth was 'unwieldy', required a statewide organizing apparatus (this becomes an important part of the story for the organization's failure -- this is probably the best explanation for why the org. starts to disintegrate. it needs larger-level organization to be effective, but this larger-level organization becomes the source of weakness, in turn)

(94): Clebourne --> Waco. at Waco, Macune's logic: exchange strategy + political strategy

(95): key at Waco was the institution of a program that offered the promise of successful reform (i.e. exchanges + political action)

(97, 100, see 102): infiltration of more prosperous farmers, landlords in mid 1880s [again, here there isn't much that explains, concretely, why they would accept the more prosperous elements, when their arguments about farmer misery are so pathetic. why accept elite leadership, if rational? why not retreat altogether?]

(98): again--as soon as Alliance programs required support above local level, real problems arose.

(100): planter class stronger in South Carolina and Mississippi, and there it had less need for the Alliance. it was where they need the support of less prosperous elements that they entered the Alliance.

(101): race--the Wheel accepted black members. quite advanced for the times -- "undertook to create unity"

(103): imp--graph of organization's evolution [here he speaks of the 'possibility of leadership domination', but in the narrative it seems more like the 'inevitability'. the counterfactual (revival of mass activity) is belied by his own presentation of the group's logic]

(102): imp--two factors explain the influx of elite elements into Alliance leadership

1. very rapid growth
2. state organizations became important centers of power and prominence (and previous point about limitations of local activism explains why they needed State organizations)
   

(103-104): here, a push and pull argument [this seems entirely inconsistent with what's argued later]

1. difficult to settle on practicable economic programs--made member less enthusiastic
2. elite leadership energetically built Populist party

(104): important graph of two leadership strategies [failure in both cases]

Chapter 7: Structure and Structural Tension within the Alliance

(105): structure of alliance a response to

1. structure of tenancy system
2. programs of the organization

(108): the Alliance was meant to exclude all 'enemies of the working farmer'; but some places it was stretched to allow merchant-landlords (NC)

(110): imp--activism took place at the level of the county, leadership at the level of the State

(113): strong in cottonized areas

(114-115): white and yeomen beginnings, but in 1887-1888 spread to Black Belt, after Clebourne

(118): roughly 1/3 non-elite in leadership (emergent possibilities in this split, which will get activated only when the differing interests get activated) [but isn't their activation inevitable?

(118): newspaper was a force for moderation

(124): key--outside aid hurt the organization, because it didn't have to undertake fundraising among the membership. this 'freed' the leadership from boosting/testing membership commitment

(125): key, in sum: Alliance responded to the tenancy system, but also contained the contradictions of the system from which it sprung. different groups were absorbed into the group, which has a result contained conflicting interests. the contradictions of the system resurfaced within Alliance. pressures for expansion led to promotion of elite individuals, and led to a centralized structure which made this possible. in short, "the class make-up of the leadership became more elite as the organization became more dependent upon leadership."

Chapter 8: Defining the Farmer's Alliance

(129): two features of protest organizations:

1. a basis in conflict
2. derivative of a parent structure

(130): institutional (the State, landlords) vs. noninstitutional power (tenants) (attempted shift from latter to former is the history of this movement, in Schwartz)

(132): begins as attempt to use farmer's non0institutional, structural power, for which 'mass organization' and 'organizational discipline' is indispensable

(133): seven point summary
Chapter 9: The Parameters of Organizational Behaviour

(135): rational doesn't mean correct; rational individuals can often be wrong. ('at least as rational as those who study them')

(136): 'social psychology' explanations

(139): vs. Smelser, who thinks that all action outside of moral and legal restrictions is 'irrational'; but this would require a whole group of people acting irrationally in unison, and would imply that people continually pursue strategies that damage their interests

(140-141): vs. Obserchal, and 'arationality' (certain things are beyond rationality); but clearly people don't act on these always, and people are not affected equally

(142): rationality is also not 'superrationality'. social systems obscure sources of problems, etc.

(143): important--for rational people, many different options are open -- many different solutions can be reationally defended in any given context (this is why informational exchange is very important, can lead to convergence of opinion)

(148-149): important-- complexity to structure that is reflected in complexity of reactions of rational individuals to the structure. it's not (just) excessive misery that gives rise to protest organizations.

(151-152): important-- this problem is compounded by the phenomenon of "structured ignorance" -- social systems obscure problems, many different interpretations (and corresponding programs) seem plausible. these typically have a 'pro-elite' character ('ideology'), because of differential access to antidotes.

Chapter 10 and 11: Determinants of Organized Protest

(155): seven factors

1. the class makeup of the organization (155-159): class refers to the role that members play in the social structrue; class interest does not mean that all will have the same opinion; this also means that orgs will suffer from internal contradictions
   
2. the internal structure of the organization (159-162): vs. Michels, saying you need to look at 'outside' interests/structure, which he doesn't do--this is what will determine patterns of oligarchization; depends on whether group uses leadership organizing or membership organizing
   
3. the nature of active and potential opposition (162-164): success of org will depend on the structural position of opposition -- rigidity of contending forces, their capacity to escalate, and the organizability of the opposition
   
4. the nature of active and potential support (164-169): will depend on demographic variables (its size, its physical arrangement), its experience and understanding, its organizational discipline (vs. Olson--you can discipline people to combat the 'free-rider' problem. but not much of an objection), the nature of its potential support
   
5. structural position of the organization's membership in the structure to be challenged (171-177): talking about the basis of power of its base--the question of structural power (given by the routine operation of the system), and leverage (organized use of this specific power--this is why protest organizations are critical). additional claims here, most important of which is that 'effective protest will rely on 'noninstitutional power' (not institutional power) [always?]
   
6. the prevailing analysis (177-188): the development of a realistic, accurate analysis of the situation is critical (again, here vs. Smelser et. al.); this is tested by how well the tactics/strategy that follow from this address grievances (mistaken perspectives do not usually survive; receive feedback). this is made more complicated by the fact that leadership is usually the agent of hypothesis testing/promulgation of new ideas, which Schwatz calls 'structured inefficiency'. this also determines who the organization manages to attract.
   
7. previous actions and outcomes (189-192): organization's subject to demoralization of their members if they don't successfully address grievances, evolve to face challenges; they need to maintain the loyalty and discipline of their membership. leadership will prefer to use 'past membership discipline'.

Chapter 12: The Life of Protest Organizations

(193): four conditions for success

1. changes must be beneficial to membership
2. group must use its latent structural power
3. group must activate enough people to give its activism a mass character
4. group must develop organizational discipline

(197): imp--the question of origins is actually a 'process' question (why do small groups grow/not grow)

Later Chapters

(202): different groups have different orientation toward marketing programs

(203): crop lien system gave unique power to boycott

(210): escalation of wholesalers defeats supply scheme

(213): imp--escalation defeats most local initiatives

(218-219): Alliance Exchange (at State level)--had two successful years (as a response to the failure of more local schemes) and then was escalated against, successfully.

(220): Waco as crossroads, after local failures--which is when AE was forged

(223): counterinstitutions require a different kind of activism (routinized) than pressure tactics (which require nonroutine acts). [this is an advantage for leaders, but not really for the group as a whole--seems to contain the seeds of membership disaffection, in that they are relatively passive]

(229): in short--the ultimate counterinstitution was defeated by the ultimate escalation

(231): a failure of analysis, in explaining rise/fall of AE[?]

(233): would have needed to create a 'countereconomy'

(240): boycott vs. exchange (boycott requried more 'effort'

(244): key--oligarchy of the alliance defeats the 'jute boycott'

(262): NC leadership learning from difficulties the AE had in Texas -- creation of 'structured ignorance', among members

(266): local groups getting sidelined as leadership -- who were needed for economic coordination -- confront failure of Exchanges, move towards politics

(269): shift into politics as the "utlimate expression" of its complex structural logic [degree of contingency here--much more than Michels, for sure]

(270, 276): key, counterfactual-- it was an attempted escalation, but through institutionalization [the alternative, for Schwartz, would have been a revival of local action--but it's not clear that this would have saved them?]

(274): State structure/leadership favored activities that didn't require active membership activity--just the threat of their existence (lobbying, etc.)

(277-278): summary of oligarchization

1. local boycotts meet escalations, state structure needed
2. resources available for state structure
3. elite elements enter state leadership
4. leadership-membership conflict
5. state leadership grows stronger
6. 'solution' of reviving membership off cards for leadership -- they have different class perspective
7. favore entry into politics
8. leadership pursues its own interest

(282-284): crushing of populism integral to Jim Crow, 1890 as key year

(285-286): using Moore--planters' pact with weaker industrialists, that black tenants would be kept on farms by being prohibited from industrial employment. so planters weren't defeated, and authoritarianism was a result