georges lefebvre, the coming of the french revolution

(vii-ix): translator defense of revolution's necessity

(xiv-xv): imp--different interests of the classes arrayed in the revolution [though here a recognition that there are facts "awkward to a purely materialist theory of class conflict," there's no attempt to rethink the basic categories of 'bourgeoisie' in the way that Comninel demands]

(xvi): the bourgeoisie had to offer something to everbyody--so they seized on the philosophy of natural rights (the philosophy of the 18th century)

(1-2): key--a new class growing within the aritsocratic order -- it was a revolution to restore the harmony between fact and law [as Marx argued--it is in this sense that Lefebvre's is the classic account]

(3): people were not the original force, but events moved steadily in the direction of the popular revolution

(7): clergy owned a tenth of the land

(8): but wasn't much of a class--"the aristocracy meant the nobility"

(9-10): nobility owned about half of the land, from which they collected dues [here he's acknowledging, again, the fact that the bourgeoisie could also own land and collect dues]

(12): nobility of the sword (wedded most to tradition) vs. nobility of the robe (of recent bourgeois extraction, wealthy because offices had high mkt value)

(16): imp--18th century was not just the time of the bourgeois revolution, but it was also the "last offensive of the aristocracy"

(20): Montesqieu's "Spirit of Laws" as the handbook of the aristocracy--arguing for 'bodies' in opposition to the monarchy; a 'liberty' of the aristocracy

(22): debt servicing in 1788 amounted to 50% of government expenditures (couldn't repudiate it because of the Parliaments and the Paris bourgeoisie--who would have forsaken further assistance)

(23): key--"under the Old Regime, the richer a man was, the less he paid. Technically the crisis was easy to meet: all that was necessary was to make everybody pay."

(25): "the character of the King and Queen must be included." [!?]

(27): aristocracy wanted to use the deficit to assert themselves, viz-a-viz the King

(29-30): battle on--around 1787-1788, between the King and the Aristocracy

(33): calling for the Estates-General, but in a way that favors the aristocracy ("a common front against royal power")

(34-37): key--at this stage, the aristocracy was imagining a France without the power of the absolutist monarchy. their model would have been England post-1688 [this is the c-factual Lefebvre raises--"had the aristocracy had their way"]; they had no intention of surrendering their privileges.

(41): key--[in direct contrast to Comninel's conception of them as exploiters,] Lefebvre suggesting that it was only because the bourgeoisie was intermixed with the rest of the population that they could assume leadership of the revolution.

(42-44): levels of the bourgeois class: (1) finance (pg. 42 -- tax farmers, rentiers); (2) merchants (pg. 43--industry, which was subordinate, is grouped here); (3) liberal professions; (4) skilled workers/crafstmen/sans-culottes, who were hostile to capitalism

(46): in short--extreme diversity of positions reflected in the diversity of life; most bourgeoisie were not very well off, and were intimately connected to common people [well, then, in what sense a coherent class, at all? upper bourgeois simply seems to mean non-nobles living off taxes/rent, and lower bourgeois simply seems to mean not proletarian--but what connects the two?]

(47): its imprudence in attacking the aristocracy was driven by a desire to eliminate legal, hereditary privilege

(48-50): int--doing them an injustice by suggesting they were motivated by their own interests alone. have to account for their 'historic mission', their idealism. [hmm]

(52): pivot point--in September 1788, the Parliament of Paris (aristocracy) rules that the Estates-General should be convened as in 1614--the bourgeoisie rebels, and redirects its ire on the aristocracy.

(53-54): the Committee of Thirty

(55): moderation of the 'patriot party', which had no objections to the idea of 'three orders' -- just wanted the 'doubling of the Third' (same number of reps as the nobility)

(58): December 12, 1788 -- a manifesto of the aristocracy, worried about the suppression of feudal rights, etc. [again--useful to think how we might re-interpret this, in light of the Comninel]

(61): November 1788-February 1789 -- the bourgeoisie was becoming 'more radical', in face of intransigence the 'doubling'. moving to question of voting by order or by head, and possibly even getting rid of the privileged orders

(65): Lawyers dominated the election process for the 3rd Estate

(68): representatives of the Third Estate identified the cause of their class with the cause of their nation.

(69-70): Sieyes was both the godfather and a gravedigger (before a pamphleteer and leading light; after the Fall of the Bastille, the popular revolution terrified him)

(72-75): imp--clear that all three orders were unanimously against absolute royal power--however, there were widely different positions on the question of privileges and civic equality, of course [a potential counterfactual, here -- suggesting that an official plan of reforms, akin to the Charter of 1814, could have saved the monarchy. 'but the court remained inert.]

(82-83): May 4, 1789 the Estates-General convenes; June 17, Third Estate takes the name of 'National Assembly'. King/Necker find themselves on the back foot.

(84-85): On June 20 they take the Tennis Court Oath (some reservations)

(87-89): imp--a of June 23rd shows the King willing to become a Constitutional Monarch, which itself shows that everything has moved forward. Decree is moot, because as July approaches the National Constituent Assembly is declared.

(92):imp--things are finely poised, the Assembly expects force to be used to expel them. BUT the force of the people intervened, and the Old Regime "went down beyond recall"

(97): imp--the Army was staffed by people who were suffering on account of high prices, mingling with townspeople, etc. [speaks to some truths about revolutions, I should think]

(98-99): the strength of insurrectionary movements lay with the 'lesser bourgeoisie' (handicraft workers, shopkeepers)

(99): very interesting--it was precisely because of the lack of coherence/organization of the working-class, Lefebvre is suggesting, that the bourgeosie was willing to move so far with the revolution. otherwise you might have had an 1848, is the implication. [this speaks to larger concerns about the 'bourgeois revolution' -- clearly there is some sense in which Comninel's invitation to think through the structure of exploitation has purchase, implicitly, in Lefebvre's account]

(102-105): economic distress (high price of bread, etc.) as an immediate cause of the insurrection

(108): almost one-half of the population (10 million out of 23 million), it's estimated, were in need of relief

(109): the economic crisis was read as an 'aristocratic conspiracy' by the Third Estate, however incorrectly

(114): attack on the Bastille was initially demand for 'arms'

(116): the 'tricolor' was a synthesis (red and blue for Paris, white for the King)

(118): int--a kind of bourgeois 'dual power'; the co-existence of the formal assembly (the common council) with district assemblies (direct democracy)

(120-122): the 'Terror', here, is made sense of through the fears of the 'aristocratic conspiracy'

(125): July 1789, a differential deepening of the Revolution--in some places the local revolution was complete; in some places democratic development was less pronounced; and yet in others the power of the Old Regime remained intact

(126): "France surged spontaneously in a federation of local units."

(127): National Guard was half-hearted in repressing disorder (the National Assembly tried to get people to pay old taxes, etc.-- but it "preached in the desert")

(133): key--Peasantry didn't enter the scene before July 14, despite being 3/4 of the population. Nonetheless, without their adherence the Revolution could hardly have succeeded. They suddenly revolted, and their uprising is one of the most distinctive features.

(132): France vs. England--unlike England, many French peasants were landowners, yet to be reduced to the ranks of the landless en masse (even though there were propertyless peasants, in quite sizeable numbers [confusing]).

(134): the Old Regime was afflicted by a serious 'agrarian crisis', owing to backwardness of cultivation (need for more land, which wasn't available).

(135): property rights remained unquestioned--principle was penalizing enemies of 'the country', not those w/ property [hmm]

(136): key--the peasantry was critical of the bourgeoisie (here he means 'commercial wealth'), but was most aroused to a state of fury by the privileges of the aristocracy [this, obviously, directly refutes Comninel's contention that the two were twin exploiters--unless we are going to make a 'misperception' qulification, which seems fruitless]

(140): key--the 18th century had seen increasing burden on the peasantry, as well as the steady encroachment on the common rights of the peasantry

(142): bourgeois discomfort over peasant agitation over manorial rights (since that was a form of property)

(143): imp--the convocation of th E-G had an enormous impact on the peasantry--one cannot exaggerate the echoes, argues Lefebvre ('the King meant to give them satisfaction')

(144): the idea of an 'aristocratic conspiracy' against a 'good King' [construction of a usable history/present]

(146): the economic crisis had revolutionary consequences, in two ways

1. enflamed the peasants, turning them against the tithe owners and lords
   
2. it generalized a sense of insecurity which was blamed on the aristocracy

(148): the bourgeoisie wasn't spared [hints at the notion of twin exploitation, but not developed]

(157): the aristocrats had hoped to postpone the Declaration--the equality of rights threatened their privileges

(159): events were confirming the principles--"the people were not waiting upon deliberations of the Assembly to realize their desires"

(161): key--strongest hint that bourgeoisie and nobility had common interests [this is the closest we get to a recognition of Comninel's argument that the 'bourgeoisie's' source of wealth was in manors/fiefs, etc.]

(168): imp--only the National Assembly was able to achieve the national unity for the monarchy had long pined.