(2): Mughal empire (peak in 1600s--1526-1707, heuristically) described as 'war-state'--vitality depended on its military power. emperor at apex, below the military aristocracy (here whole description of mansabdari system--crux is that system depended on constant expansion of resources, which itself required constant territorial expansion)
(4): economic crisis of the 1700s--resources were stagnating, and there was polarization in the masabdari system. there was also a continuous price rise since the late 1600s.
(7): also major peasant rebellions were a major cause--oppression at the hands of Mughal ruling class. often led by disaffected local zamindars.
(12): review of controversy (some argue prosperity was cause of the crisis, not depression)--not really settled, here, simply saying that 18th century wasn't a dark age, as corrective
(20): Marathas--only potential successor to Mughals, but couldn't because of its own limitations (power was shared among chiefs--pg. 24)
(25): Mughal-Maratha continuity--Mughal tradition central to social and political life of Maratha state system
(28): what comes out in these pages, above all else, is the absurdity of communal renderings of Indian history
(35): in sum--major characteristic of 18th century India was weaking of centralized Mughal empire, and dispersal of political power. a "transformation of the polity", rather than collapse.
(38): discussion of early E. India company, and question of whether it was driven by aspirations to imperial expansion
(39-42): why British expansion? military superiority of E. India company only decisive after mid-1700s--at first some aggression by Sir Josiah Child had proved disastrous. this period, generally, marked the beginning of territorial expansion--as expansion and financial strength came to be connected. in sum, both pressures from metropole and periphery [i.e., not much of an explanation]
(43): R. Clive arrives, after a crisis/conflict with Siraj-ud-daula became Nawab in Bengal--Clive decides on coup d'etat, using some disaffection in his own court
(44): Battle of Plassey, 1757--"Plassey plunder", acquisition of jagirs, etc. (no longer would Company be funded by import of bullion--now buillion could be exported, and Plassey also opened gates to private fortunes)
(45): Battle of Buxar, 1764, followed by Treaty of Allahbad, 1765--Company gets revenue collecting rights to Bengal, Bihar, Orissa
(52-54): Battles with Marathas in Mysore--Company takes over in 1799
(56): Awadh annexed in 1856
(58): British concerned about Punjab due to rise of Khalsa army, experiments with democratic republicanism--continuous political instability made it unreliabable as a buffer state. Anglo-Sikh war began in 1845. Annexed by 1849.
(60): by 1857, Company had annexed 63 percent of the subcontinent, equivalent to 78% of its population. Remaining territories were commanded by the Princes.
(61): at this stage, too, Company decided to raise its own army
(62): ends chapter with, again, a non-explanation
(66): two phases of British empire: (1) America and the West Indies, till 1783 (Peace of Paris); (2) swinging East
(69-70): two trends emerging in Indian administration of EI Company--though there are serious similarities (buttressing landed elites in both, an authoratative paternalism, etc.)
- Cornwallis system, based on the Permanent Settlement
- Ryotwari Settlement (Munro), with intention of preserving India's village communities
(75-76): relations between British State and EI Company--'delegated sovereignty'. Right from the beginning the State participated in Empire (Company paid the Crown, annually)
(77): a critique of the Company, too, from the anti-monopoly school inspired by Smith (Regulating Act of 1773 formally recognized parliamentary right to control Indian affairs)\
(78): Pitts India Act of 1784 -- more direct government control, in short
(79): Charter Act of 1813 -- 'undoubted sovereignty of the Crown'
(80) Act of 1833 -- possessions of Company held in trust for the Crown, Gov Gen. of Bengal became Gov Gen of India, etc.
(81): in short--The Government of India Act 1858 was thus more a continuation of the above process, than abrupt change (creation of viceroy, answerable to Sec. of State--continuity of civil service, etc.)
(82): Bengal Famine of 1769-1770, wiped out 1/3 of the population (land revenue experiments, etc.)
(83-85): Cornwallis' Permanent Settlement of 1793 was seen as a resolution, wherein revenue would be fixed (influence of Physiocratic thinking). Fixed zamindars in place, as it made them center of revenue collection--with the addendum of the creation of private property in land (giving them land ownership, but with the possibility of losing the land if they didn't collect revenue). The losers were the peasants, whose customary rights were now ignored (reduced to tenants). Burden of high revenue assessment shifted to them.
(85-86): Discussion of jotedar thesis
(87-88): details of Ryotwari Settlement (begun in 1793, continued by Munro in 1801), which made villages unit of revenue collection, rather than zamindars. This vested individual proprietary rights in the peasants, rather than in the zamindars (the State, though, was the supreme landlord, according to David Ludden). Also very high revenue demands.
(89): Ryotwari Settlement in Madras put the cultivators in 'great distress'
(89): It also strengthened the political clout of the old village apparatus.
(92): Discussion of how much this represented continuity, how much it represented dramatic change.
(92-95): Mahalwari Settlement (Punjab, C. India)
(95): in sum--by mid-19th century, three systems of land revenue administration (P Settlement made with zamindars, Ryotwari with proprietors and Mahalwari with the village community. Common to all was over-assessment, given that the primary aim of the Company was to maximize revenue collection.
(100-101): discussion of place of indigenous justice system (point that Hindu personal laws, for example, were interpreted in a way that benefited the conservative and feudal elements in society)
(102): zamindars formally divested of police powers in 1793, but remained integral to coercion and oppression
(103): new model for policing was implemented by Napier in Sind, in 1843 -- a separate police department, on the model of Ireland (whole territory under supervision of IG--rank and file would be Indian, officers would be European)
(104): emergence of a "Police Raj", between 1857 and 1947
(105): E. India Company Army-- 214,000 sepoys in 1856 (army claimed largest share of Company's expenditure in India)
(106): stereotypes--wheat-eating Indians more suitable than rice-eating groups (Awadh, Bihar)
(106): Company also came to possess a high caste army, which was prone to revolt when their social privileges were cut from the 1820s (from 1815 had started to recruit Gurkhas, and other social groups--levelling reforms in the 1830s created discontent). All this was backdrop for the mutiny.
(108): After the mutiny, of course, certain groups were picked (Pathans, Jat of Punjab, Rajputs of N. India, Gurkhas of Nepal). In 1914, 3/4 of the infantry were from Punjab, Nepal, or NWFP
(108): Army numbered 250,000, devouring 40% of central revenue, all to keep the peace at home. "A garrison state."
(109): Kitchener vs. Curzon over Army independence from Viceroy (Curzon resigned after not fully winning the disagreement)
(109): Army was kept illiterate, insulated in garrisons, and safe from political influence (even still, one British soldier to every two or three sepoys)
(110): Training of Indian officers only began in 1931, and very tentatively.
(110): the Civil Service--'considerable autonomy', even though they were only meant to be implementers. Fifty or sixty extended families contributed bulk of recruits, in mid 19th century
(111): the DCO
(112-113): The gradual Indianization of the Civil Service--but until Lord Ripon opened this up to the middle classes, this was reserved for the privileged. Measures were very controversial. Not until Gov of India Act 1919 that simultaneous examination was introduced.
(114): Why 'indirect rule' through the Princes? For reasons of resources, financial and manpower, though went through its ups and downs
(115): 1857 was important in this regard because it was seen that territories under indirect rule were less affected than those under direct rule.
(118): absurdity of gun-salutes for Princes
(120): all this said, internal autonomy of princes was restricted considerably by Residents and Political Agents
(122-123): in short--After 1857, classic colonial relationship emerged--market for manufactured goods (cotton, iron, steel, railways, machinery--85% of cotton piecegoods produced in Lancashire and 17% of British iron and steel at time of WWI), source of raw materials. Until WWI, no import duty--contrary trend in the rest of the world. Lancashire lobby continued to press hard, even afterwards. India was also field for capital investments (Gov of India had to guarantee profits to railway investors). Export surplus balanced Britain's trade deficit. Britain could also use Indian army to maintain its empire. Military expenditure accounted for some 1/3 of the Indian budget.
(123): drain estimated at 17 million pounds per annum in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (less than 2% of export value ,but was 'potential surplus)
(124): in short--British failed to foster growth, with few exceptions.
(124-125): limited investment in irrigation--only a quarter of the total cropped area was under public irrigation system in 1947. Aggregate yields were largely static in colonial India; between 1920 and 1947, lagged well behind pop growth. Near-famine conditions were not rare.
(125-126): peasants forced into cash crops by high revenue demand and need for cash, for debt servicing--adverse impact on agrarian pop (Deccan, for example, very well integrated into cotton markets after Civil War boom; and it was here that famine would strike soon after). At the same time, should note that 80% of cropped area was growing food crops when British left.
(127): Railways served the empire--guaranteed profits, serving Army and commercial interests. Very few multiplier effects.
(128-129): Effects of all this evident in 'deindustrialization', though here there is discussion of its scope
(130): Differential access to capital, exacerbated by racial exclusivism (sixty agency houses controlled 75% of total industrial capital, and half of employment on eve of WWI--repatriation was obviously a problem)
(131): Tea, coal, and jute was dominated by British capital, in large part
(132): real indigenous success came after WWI, in cotton in Western India
(133): Iron and steel production also begun by Tata Iron and Steel, producing 66 percent of steel consumed in India by late 1930s
(134): important--concluding here by arguing that there was a diminution of Empire's interest in maintaining India--persistent financial crises, need to impose import tarrifs, declining British investment as pressures built up. This was critical in explaining transition.
(143): need to make ordinary Indians into good workers and good consumers (elementary education for the masses, higher education for the fringe)
(144): "an educated class of 55,000" out of a population of 195 million ( a little more than 2 million had attended elementary schools), in 1881-1882
(147): female infanticide among high-caste landowners (pattern of reforms from aove)
(147): discussion of sati -- very much an exception, practiced in select areas; revived on a wider scale under the colonial period. Raja Rammohun Roy's role not negligible, at all
(159): overview of agrarian structure--five groups, with about 65 to 70 percent of the population being non-owners of land (all sections of the peasantry, he's arguing, were alienated by British land policy by late eighteenth and early nineteenth century)
(161): important role of religion in rebellion--Sanyasi and Fakir rebellion (useful to make point against alleged 'intrinsic' conservatism of Islam)
(162): similarly, the Tariqah-i-Muhammadiya in Bengal--Titu Mir (started collecting taxes, etc.)
(162): similarly, the Faraizi movement in E. Bengal (some confusion in the way this is presented--but roots in the rural poor, uniting against landlords, planters, British). Dudu Mian succeeding Haji Sharitullah--"Land belonged to God, he declared, collecting rent or levying taxes on it was therefore against divine law."
(163-164): similarly, the Moplahs of Malabar in the 1840s and 1850s.
(165): similarly, tribal rebellion of Santhal hool in 1855-1856--some fifteen to twenty thousand killed before it was suppressed(!)
(144): "an educated class of 55,000" out of a population of 195 million ( a little more than 2 million had attended elementary schools), in 1881-1882
(147): female infanticide among high-caste landowners (pattern of reforms from aove)
(147): discussion of sati -- very much an exception, practiced in select areas; revived on a wider scale under the colonial period. Raja Rammohun Roy's role not negligible, at all
(159): overview of agrarian structure--five groups, with about 65 to 70 percent of the population being non-owners of land (all sections of the peasantry, he's arguing, were alienated by British land policy by late eighteenth and early nineteenth century)
(161): important role of religion in rebellion--Sanyasi and Fakir rebellion (useful to make point against alleged 'intrinsic' conservatism of Islam)
(162): similarly, the Tariqah-i-Muhammadiya in Bengal--Titu Mir (started collecting taxes, etc.)
(162): similarly, the Faraizi movement in E. Bengal (some confusion in the way this is presented--but roots in the rural poor, uniting against landlords, planters, British). Dudu Mian succeeding Haji Sharitullah--"Land belonged to God, he declared, collecting rent or levying taxes on it was therefore against divine law."
(163-164): similarly, the Moplahs of Malabar in the 1840s and 1850s.
(165): similarly, tribal rebellion of Santhal hool in 1855-1856--some fifteen to twenty thousand killed before it was suppressed(!)
(166-167): Ranajit Guha said colonialism had led to "revitalization of landlordism." Landlords' power to oppress greatly expanded by British law. Rightly urging a political understanding of the rebellions that followed, as a result.
(168): Religion providing legitimacy to the 'revolutionary messianism' of these movements.
(170): Revolt of 1857 was not a mere mutiny, but an uprising by the rural society of N. India--can only be understood in the context of the social and economic changes being wrought on it during the first century of Company rule. (peasant-sepoy links were very important--see pg. 172)
(171): about half of the sepoys of the E. India company were involved.
(172-173): in the N. of India (Bengal and Punjab remained peaceful, as did S. India), feudals and peasants united in rebellion--both had grievances against the British (feudals had lost land; peasants had been given high revenue demands).
(175): Hindu-Muslim unity was maintained, all along
(178): discussion of some historians verdict that this was an "elite" movement? don't downplay role of masses, in short
(180): became an impetus to racial segregation--many Indians were "beyond reform". A conservative brand of liberalism was to be unleashed.
(219): dismissal of the safety valve account, re: origins of Indian nationalism
(223): Bonnerji, president of first Congress--"thoroughly loyal and consistent well-wishers of the British Government" (cautious reformers)
(228): Naoroji -- no greater calamity than for England to leave
(231): Ec. Nationalist critique
(232): failure of the liberal strategy--trying to prepare a 'logical case', melted in the face of political reality
(233): early nationalists were by and large pro-zamindar, pro-commercial class (except when of forigin origin--labour reforms in Assam were okay, on tea plantations, but not in Bombay, etc.)
(239): re-interpreting Hindu law, re: child marriages
(246): construction of an authentic past, mediated by Orientalists
(248): the turn away from moderation, after the failure of that politics became evident by end of the 19th century. extremism developed under leadership of Lal-Bal-Pal (Punjab, Maharashtra, Bengal, respectively
(249): and Curzon (1899-1905) magnified nationalist angst further--self-confident, despotic imperialism
(251): Surat split in 1907 reflected divide between moderates and extremists in nationalist movement
(253): reasons behind partition of Bengal--fear that it would help stave off of opposition to Empire
(259): after Surat split, Congress was lorded over by moderates--until Gandhi enters, in 1920
(261): Moreley-Minto reforms, 1909--marked end of dominance of Bengal, capital transferred to Delhi
(263): evolution of Muslim political identity occurred on the terrain of the colonial--argument
(264): ashraf vs. ajlaf -- trenchant divides within the Bengali Mulsim community
(265): numbers documented Muslim oppression, nonetheless, in the late 1800s in Bengal
(266): nonetheless, the ashraf cast politics in their image--their interests were presented as the interests of all the Muslims, which was far from the case, of course
(269): interesting--Islam, though, functioning as a link between the elite and the masses
(272): Sir Sayyid's leadership in Muslim community in UP -- pro-imperialist, championed specific class interests, etc.
(275): reactionary character of the ML constitution--control of 'men of property and influence' (argument that this contained some of the radical impetus behind its formation)
(280): useful list of reforms--1861, 1886, 1897, 1892, 1882, 1883, 1909, 1919
(281): Morley-Minto 1909--(1) repression; (2) rallying the moderates; (3) divide and rule through separate electorates
(283): Montagu-Chelmsford 1919 (i.e., Govt of India Act 1919)
(287): 12 to 13 million people had lost their lives due to famine and epidemic of 1918-1919
(293): Gandhi moderation--Gandhi's early satyagraha (distrust of the 'mobocracy' was evident in these campaigns)--would not take the campaigns beyond their limited goal in Champaran; in Kheda withdrew the campaign; in Ahmedabad, unsatisfying resolution
(295): again--not only was he using it as a 'tap', he was 'tapping' into already existing histories of mobilization
(296): Rowlatt Satyagraha (against Rowlatt Act, 1919--which was passed to counterbalance the reforms). Failed political campaign. And its failure, it's being argued, made him realize the necessity of Congress.
(298): ML around this time was becoming a tad respectable--Lucknow Pact in 1916 offered a joint platform. This it the time of the Khilafat movement.
(300): launching Non-Cooperation (January 1921--February 1922)--opposed by Pal, CR Das, Jinnah
(302-303): Gandhi moderation--Gandhi reacts to violence in Bombay when Prince of Wales visits--postpones campaign. Chooses ryotwari area. Masses in the Non-cooperation movement often crossed the line of non-violence--and this is why Gandhi hesitated to begin full-fledged no-revenue campaign.
(306): Gandhi moderation--asking for harmonious capital-labor relationship
(308): Gandhi moderation--critiques UP peasants for violence
(310): Gandhi moderation--condemning mass exuberance as "Mobocracy"
(312): two factors setting ground for CD
(315): Bardoli Satyagraha--launched in Gujarat by Patel with Gandhi's blesings. This brought Gandhi back into spotlight.
(317): Gandhi moderation--Gandhi announced an eleven-point ultimatum for Lord Irwin, 1930--a motely of bourgeois demands, peasant themes, issues of general interest.
(318): this is the context for the Salt Tax agitation in 1930--picked his issue well. CD would be 1930-1931, in first phase.
(318): signs of more radicalism in this movement, though
(320): Gandhi moderation--Gandhi had reservations about involving w-class. Also fear of peasant radicalism in 1930-1931.
(320): and then The Compromise of 1931--question of why, whose pressure, etc. (capitalists were beginning to be unnerved by the mass movement--see also pg. 365). Nevertheless this failed, and Gandhi returned empty-handed in September-December 1931. Only option was to renew battle.
(322): Launched again CD 1932-1934--thousands would be arreted, and this would 'fail'. Though moral victory, and would be converted into election victory in 1937.
(324-325): Gov't of India Act, 1935 -- opposed by both Congress and the ML; 10% of population enfranchised, separate electorates; federal structure to protect imperial power at the center, concern Congress with the provinces; nominees of princes would be 30 to 40% of central legislature (good details here)
(328): Congress maintained policy of non-interference in affairs of princely states, till 1938 (see pg. 330)
(335): Hindu Right as a reaction to Khilafat
(337): Jinnah's preference for constitutional politics drove him away from Congress--abhorred Gandhian politics
(339): the absurdity of thinking of Muslims as a political 'bloc' in the 20s and 30s
(340): key juncture, 1934-1939--Jinnah returns to India in 1934, to really take the reins of ML--still willing to work with Congress, but the elction results means that he's no use to them. Instead they launch a 'mass contact' campaign' (like Nehru's own Muslim Mass Contact campaign, which fails b/c of Hindu right). By 1939 ML membership is at three million.
(358): Significant indigenous capitalist development--62% of larger industrial units were Indian capital--smaller factories even more so. Modest growth occured in spite of British policy--they had begun to organize themselves to pressure British policy (discussion, here, of their relation to the imperial project--loyalist or not, how afraid of Labor viz-a-viz State, etc.)
(361): key--that Indian businessmen realized that Gandhi was the only one that could prevent Congress from becoming anti-capitalist.
(363): currency debate--drew Congress and the Indian businessmen closer on a common platform, especially as Congress reverted to constitutionalism in the 20s
(364): Gandhi moderation--All India Trade Union Congress counterweight to communist influence in the late 20's; only kind of opposition that the nationalists could have stomached, from the capitalists
(365): business was not willing to support the second round of CD -- several warring factions, many wanted to get back, to 'constitutionalism'. very happy when it was suspended in April 1934.
(367): key, 1934-1937--major interest of capitalists was to keep Congress within bounds of constitutional politics. Decision to participate in 1937 elections brought capitalists closer to Congress. In spring of 1938, after rise in industrial unrest in 1937-1938--see pg. 379, Congress provincial gov'ts took a definite step towards Capital-most infamous was the Bombay Trade Disputes Act, November 1938.
(369): working-class was 2.1 million in 1911 -- rural poor pushed out of villages, absorbed by industry as it grew in the late 1800s and early 1900s
(370): argument that working-class, though, remained fragmented when it arrived in urban areas--didn't develop working-class consciousness ('dual self')
(372): scarily bad arguments by Chakrabarty--trade unions as alien to the 'cultural space'
(375): unmistakable State repression in favor of capital
(376): important, Congress ambivalent towards the working-class--most articulate where European capital was involved, but moderating influence where Indian capitalists were affected
(377): Gandhi moderation--using the labor strike for political purposes was a serious mistake (rhetoric of family bonds, for Labor-Capital)
(377): despite this apathy, working-class was overwhelmingly involved in the nationalist movement
(378): Gandhi moderation--Gandhi disapproved of autonomous labour militancy--don't seek to destroy capital or capitalists. Congress socialists, because committed to the umbrella of Congress, were ineffectual at integrated the working-class into nationalist movement in any substantive way.
(379-380): important--Communists consistently opposed to the State--Gov't offensive against them in banning strikes, in 1929, wasn't met with oppposition from Congress (and Meerut conspiracy case). BUT Comintern Third Period caused them to disassociate from Congress, which was a mistake in Indian context; did better after UF strategy adopted in 1935, until People's War line adopted in 1942, during QI
(390): Gandhi and a limited role for women, which they didn't obey
(395): Aruna Asaf Ali turns down Gandhi's advice to surrender, during Quit India movement
(168): Religion providing legitimacy to the 'revolutionary messianism' of these movements.
(170): Revolt of 1857 was not a mere mutiny, but an uprising by the rural society of N. India--can only be understood in the context of the social and economic changes being wrought on it during the first century of Company rule. (peasant-sepoy links were very important--see pg. 172)
(171): about half of the sepoys of the E. India company were involved.
(172-173): in the N. of India (Bengal and Punjab remained peaceful, as did S. India), feudals and peasants united in rebellion--both had grievances against the British (feudals had lost land; peasants had been given high revenue demands).
(175): Hindu-Muslim unity was maintained, all along
(178): discussion of some historians verdict that this was an "elite" movement? don't downplay role of masses, in short
(180): became an impetus to racial segregation--many Indians were "beyond reform". A conservative brand of liberalism was to be unleashed.
(219): dismissal of the safety valve account, re: origins of Indian nationalism
(223): Bonnerji, president of first Congress--"thoroughly loyal and consistent well-wishers of the British Government" (cautious reformers)
(228): Naoroji -- no greater calamity than for England to leave
(231): Ec. Nationalist critique
(232): failure of the liberal strategy--trying to prepare a 'logical case', melted in the face of political reality
(233): early nationalists were by and large pro-zamindar, pro-commercial class (except when of forigin origin--labour reforms in Assam were okay, on tea plantations, but not in Bombay, etc.)
(239): re-interpreting Hindu law, re: child marriages
(246): construction of an authentic past, mediated by Orientalists
(248): the turn away from moderation, after the failure of that politics became evident by end of the 19th century. extremism developed under leadership of Lal-Bal-Pal (Punjab, Maharashtra, Bengal, respectively
(249): and Curzon (1899-1905) magnified nationalist angst further--self-confident, despotic imperialism
(251): Surat split in 1907 reflected divide between moderates and extremists in nationalist movement
(253): reasons behind partition of Bengal--fear that it would help stave off of opposition to Empire
(259): after Surat split, Congress was lorded over by moderates--until Gandhi enters, in 1920
(261): Moreley-Minto reforms, 1909--marked end of dominance of Bengal, capital transferred to Delhi
(263): evolution of Muslim political identity occurred on the terrain of the colonial--argument
(264): ashraf vs. ajlaf -- trenchant divides within the Bengali Mulsim community
(265): numbers documented Muslim oppression, nonetheless, in the late 1800s in Bengal
(266): nonetheless, the ashraf cast politics in their image--their interests were presented as the interests of all the Muslims, which was far from the case, of course
(269): interesting--Islam, though, functioning as a link between the elite and the masses
(272): Sir Sayyid's leadership in Muslim community in UP -- pro-imperialist, championed specific class interests, etc.
(275): reactionary character of the ML constitution--control of 'men of property and influence' (argument that this contained some of the radical impetus behind its formation)
(280): useful list of reforms--1861, 1886, 1897, 1892, 1882, 1883, 1909, 1919
(281): Morley-Minto 1909--(1) repression; (2) rallying the moderates; (3) divide and rule through separate electorates
(283): Montagu-Chelmsford 1919 (i.e., Govt of India Act 1919)
(287): 12 to 13 million people had lost their lives due to famine and epidemic of 1918-1919
(293): Gandhi moderation--Gandhi's early satyagraha (distrust of the 'mobocracy' was evident in these campaigns)--would not take the campaigns beyond their limited goal in Champaran; in Kheda withdrew the campaign; in Ahmedabad, unsatisfying resolution
(295): again--not only was he using it as a 'tap', he was 'tapping' into already existing histories of mobilization
(296): Rowlatt Satyagraha (against Rowlatt Act, 1919--which was passed to counterbalance the reforms). Failed political campaign. And its failure, it's being argued, made him realize the necessity of Congress.
(298): ML around this time was becoming a tad respectable--Lucknow Pact in 1916 offered a joint platform. This it the time of the Khilafat movement.
(300): launching Non-Cooperation (January 1921--February 1922)--opposed by Pal, CR Das, Jinnah
(302-303): Gandhi moderation--Gandhi reacts to violence in Bombay when Prince of Wales visits--postpones campaign. Chooses ryotwari area. Masses in the Non-cooperation movement often crossed the line of non-violence--and this is why Gandhi hesitated to begin full-fledged no-revenue campaign.
(306): Gandhi moderation--asking for harmonious capital-labor relationship
(308): Gandhi moderation--critiques UP peasants for violence
(310): Gandhi moderation--condemning mass exuberance as "Mobocracy"
(312): two factors setting ground for CD
- crisis in the 1920s, as cash crops collapsed (rich peasants and small holders aggrieved)
- emergence of an indigenous capitalist class after WWI (and its consequence self-organization)
(315): Bardoli Satyagraha--launched in Gujarat by Patel with Gandhi's blesings. This brought Gandhi back into spotlight.
(317): Gandhi moderation--Gandhi announced an eleven-point ultimatum for Lord Irwin, 1930--a motely of bourgeois demands, peasant themes, issues of general interest.
(318): this is the context for the Salt Tax agitation in 1930--picked his issue well. CD would be 1930-1931, in first phase.
(318): signs of more radicalism in this movement, though
(320): Gandhi moderation--Gandhi had reservations about involving w-class. Also fear of peasant radicalism in 1930-1931.
(320): and then The Compromise of 1931--question of why, whose pressure, etc. (capitalists were beginning to be unnerved by the mass movement--see also pg. 365). Nevertheless this failed, and Gandhi returned empty-handed in September-December 1931. Only option was to renew battle.
(322): Launched again CD 1932-1934--thousands would be arreted, and this would 'fail'. Though moral victory, and would be converted into election victory in 1937.
(324-325): Gov't of India Act, 1935 -- opposed by both Congress and the ML; 10% of population enfranchised, separate electorates; federal structure to protect imperial power at the center, concern Congress with the provinces; nominees of princes would be 30 to 40% of central legislature (good details here)
(328): Congress maintained policy of non-interference in affairs of princely states, till 1938 (see pg. 330)
(335): Hindu Right as a reaction to Khilafat
(337): Jinnah's preference for constitutional politics drove him away from Congress--abhorred Gandhian politics
(339): the absurdity of thinking of Muslims as a political 'bloc' in the 20s and 30s
(340): key juncture, 1934-1939--Jinnah returns to India in 1934, to really take the reins of ML--still willing to work with Congress, but the elction results means that he's no use to them. Instead they launch a 'mass contact' campaign' (like Nehru's own Muslim Mass Contact campaign, which fails b/c of Hindu right). By 1939 ML membership is at three million.
(358): Significant indigenous capitalist development--62% of larger industrial units were Indian capital--smaller factories even more so. Modest growth occured in spite of British policy--they had begun to organize themselves to pressure British policy (discussion, here, of their relation to the imperial project--loyalist or not, how afraid of Labor viz-a-viz State, etc.)
(361): key--that Indian businessmen realized that Gandhi was the only one that could prevent Congress from becoming anti-capitalist.
(363): currency debate--drew Congress and the Indian businessmen closer on a common platform, especially as Congress reverted to constitutionalism in the 20s
(364): Gandhi moderation--All India Trade Union Congress counterweight to communist influence in the late 20's; only kind of opposition that the nationalists could have stomached, from the capitalists
(365): business was not willing to support the second round of CD -- several warring factions, many wanted to get back, to 'constitutionalism'. very happy when it was suspended in April 1934.
(367): key, 1934-1937--major interest of capitalists was to keep Congress within bounds of constitutional politics. Decision to participate in 1937 elections brought capitalists closer to Congress. In spring of 1938, after rise in industrial unrest in 1937-1938--see pg. 379, Congress provincial gov'ts took a definite step towards Capital-most infamous was the Bombay Trade Disputes Act, November 1938.
(369): working-class was 2.1 million in 1911 -- rural poor pushed out of villages, absorbed by industry as it grew in the late 1800s and early 1900s
(370): argument that working-class, though, remained fragmented when it arrived in urban areas--didn't develop working-class consciousness ('dual self')
(372): scarily bad arguments by Chakrabarty--trade unions as alien to the 'cultural space'
(375): unmistakable State repression in favor of capital
(376): important, Congress ambivalent towards the working-class--most articulate where European capital was involved, but moderating influence where Indian capitalists were affected
(377): Gandhi moderation--using the labor strike for political purposes was a serious mistake (rhetoric of family bonds, for Labor-Capital)
(377): despite this apathy, working-class was overwhelmingly involved in the nationalist movement
(378): Gandhi moderation--Gandhi disapproved of autonomous labour militancy--don't seek to destroy capital or capitalists. Congress socialists, because committed to the umbrella of Congress, were ineffectual at integrated the working-class into nationalist movement in any substantive way.
(379-380): important--Communists consistently opposed to the State--Gov't offensive against them in banning strikes, in 1929, wasn't met with oppposition from Congress (and Meerut conspiracy case). BUT Comintern Third Period caused them to disassociate from Congress, which was a mistake in Indian context; did better after UF strategy adopted in 1935, until People's War line adopted in 1942, during QI
(390): Gandhi and a limited role for women, which they didn't obey
(395): Aruna Asaf Ali turns down Gandhi's advice to surrender, during Quit India movement
No comments:
Post a Comment