huber and stephens, development and crisis of the welfare state (2001)

(xi): welfare states, especially Nordic ones, as "remarkably resilient"

chapter one: introduction

(1-3): the argument, in nine claims

1. (1): partisan politics is 'single most important factor that shaped the development of welfare states'. this was strongly related to social structural features (strength of organized labor and religious cleavages). [this is a theoretical contribution, insofar as it stresses the importance of left political power, and not just movement power with infrequent left government--Australia and NZ from 1950-1972 are examples of the latter--see pg. 10, pg. 114, pg. 195. this (and their emphasis on gender) is what principally distinguishes them from the 'political class struggle' school--see pg. 20]. their reflections on CD welfare states vs. SD welfare states fit here, too, since the more universalistic character of the latter has its origins in the fact that it was 'more left', in this sense--see pg. 144, 312-313, where the distinctions are summarized (Netherlands is a CD case where there is constant pressure from SD).
   
2. (1): the welfare states required, also, the economy to be embedded in high-productivity, export production regimes (had to maintain high investment and high levels of employment). a 'mutually enabling fit'--see pg. 23. against others (Esping-Anderson), their argument is that the essence of the welfare State is not decommodification, but actually high qualification for the labor market--see pg. 184, pg 334. emphasis is that an individual's separation from the labor market be temporary and involuntary. they try and integrate as large a proportion of the population as possible.
   
3. (1): the importance of the partisan character of government (see pg. 305) declines as you move to the post-crisis years, as States have less latitude (leftists less to expand, rightists less to cut). at the same time, they do not go to zero (Nordic states after crisis of early 90's).
   
4. (2): immediate cause of retrenchment was a large increase in unemployment (more people dependent on transfers, less people contributing). the exception to this is the US and especially the UK--see pg. 219.
   
5. (2): against the orthodox globalization literature, found little support for claim that cutbacks were caused by sharp trade competition. at the same time, it was true that financial deregulation mattered for policy choices--it is more difficult to keep interests low because of threat of exit, see pg. 12). on top of this, globalization did matter to an even greater extent, in Australia and NZ, which hadn't constructed their welfare states on the basis of exposure to the international economy in the same way as the other States.
   
6. (2): the structure of decision-making mattered, insofar as constitutions with many 'veto points' both inhibited and slowed the pace of policy change [US and Switzerland vs. UK and Denmark and NZ]. NZ and UK had system-changing retrenchment, something that we can only make sense of if we pay attention to this--see pg. 307, pg. 309
   
7. (2): a strong interactive effect of women's labor force participation and social democratic government--i.e., linkages seen in Nordic countries between "social democratic government, increases in participation, women's political mobilization, and social service expansion'. "where women have been more mobilized and allied with political parties that support gender equality..." --see pg. 28, pg. 196.
   
8. (2, see also 28-29, 323): found a medium level of path-dependency (not strong, because then you can't make sense of the UK or of New Zealand), owing to four mechanisms. these are four ways in which the claim about the 'long-term effects of partisan government' is operationalized--see pg. 28-29: first, structural constraints (balance of power in society; policy options are limited by the constellation of power in a country in a given period (US labor, Swedish business)); second, ideological hegemony (center of gravity of public opinion, distribution of actors preferences, which can be shaped, also, by historic struggle); third, policy ratchet effects (rapid growth of support for welfare state provisions after their introduction, generating a new political center of gravity); fourth, regime legacies (empowerment of certain social actors who then shape further development; future possibilities for development of the welfare state are determined by what happened previously--each actor begins with the current state as given) [all this is a theoretical contribution, related to the very first point. however it does seem as if some of them are a bit confused; they blur with each other, but no matter.]
9. (13, 337): a theoretical contribution, but perhaps helpful to think of as a ninth claim--part of 'power constellation theory', of course. they are finding space between the pluralist and Marxist theories of the State--welfare state policy can respond to labor and work against the interests of capital (rather than being 'functional' for capitalist dominance, as Poluantzas put it), without requiring us to be as silly as the pluralists, of course. another way of putting it, as they do in the conclusion: "in the absence of working-class organization, the Marxist theory was correct: Public policy was formed according to the interests of capital". However, if counterhegemony is mobilized through working-class organization and electoral politics, this can change--see pg. 337-338
   

(3): the theoretical frame, power constellations approach

1. class power balance
2. structure of state and of state-society relations
3. complex of relations amongst systems of states, on an international level

(8-9): two methodological contributions

1. bringing quantitative and qualitative analysis together
2. you can miss larger constraints when you analyze simply short-term events (so, for example, you will see little employer opposition in Nordic countries--but this misses how much these employer preferences have been shaped by a longer history)

(11): 'siding' with the political-institutional school, who agree that this wasn't built by bureaucrats...

(12): ok--high-skill high-wage position int he international economy [this clearly isn't open to anyone--how do we run with this?]

(12): welfare state benefits as 'compensation' for wage restraint in export industries

chapter two: theoretical framework and methodological approach

(14): there have been three main theoretical approaches

1. logic of industrialism--these are byproducts of economic development and its consequences
2. state-centric--focused on the policy-making role of bureaucrats, who are relatively autonomous from social forces (very different kind of relative autonomy, of course)
3. political class struggle/power resources--distribution of power between left and right identified as primary determinant of difference in impact of welfare state (see claim one, as summarized above)
   

(17-18): on class--as elaborated, a fundamentally Weberian theory of class (borrowing Elster--no exploitation). yet when it comes to operationalizing this, they have a more or less Marxist list. acknowledging, also, the critical importance of organization (this is part of a claim highlighting the importance of the point of production--so in that sense, it is possible to think of this as more-or-less Marxist. unpack).

(20): critical contribution--what distinguishes us from the other power resources theory is our focus on political parties. focus on the long-term partisan character of government.

(22): more on path-dependency, policy legacies

(22): more on State structure and 'veto points'

(23): importance of a 'mutually enabling fit' between welfare states and the production regimes in which they're embedded.

(25-26): craft vs. industrial unions -- or, more broadly, centralized vs. decentralized unions (with the former more likely to take a leftist, class-wide perspective). this has at least three effects on labor movement:

1. more successful at consciousness transformation means more electoral success
2. more electoral success means more likely to influence state policy
3. more powerful vis-a-vis capital

(26): and in sum--it is this form of organization of the union movement, its influence on the incumbency of the left, and the possibilities for capital which are highly consequential for the policy regime (we have lost some of the ordering of the argument, here, so think through this)

(31-32): again, more reflections on 'path-dependency'--placing themselves in the middle

(35): a bit on counterfactual reasoning -- the task is to try and imagine what would have happened had the long-term partisan character of government been flipped (if the LP had been in power in Australia from 1950-1972, for example)

(37): Swedish bourgeois parties did not dismantle Welfare State from 1976-1982

chapter four: welfare state and production regimes

(110): thinking of four types of welfare states

1. social democratic: (1) universalistic entitlements, (2) comprehensiveness of social policy regimes, (3) citizenship based entitlements, (4) high income replacement rates (in pensions, i.e.), (5) emphasis on high levels of publicly delivered social services; (6) gender egalitarianism; (7) policies aimed at labor force training. associated with nationally coordinated market economy with high union coverage and centralized wage bargaining, etc., etc. (details here).
   
2. Christian democratic: (1) fragmented entitlements; (2) mostly employment-based entitlements; (3) emphasis on transfers; (4) moderate to high replacement rates; (6) male breadwinner pattern; (7) passive labor market policy.
   
3. liberal welfare state: (1) partial program coverage; (2) income or needs testing entitlement; (3) moderate to low replacement rates; (4) few public delivered services; (6) passive family policy; (7) passive labor market policy.
   
4. wage earner welfare state (Aus, NZ): (1): partial coverage due to protection given by wage-setting; (2) role for income testing; (3) moderate to low replacement rates; (4) few publicly delivered services ; (6) male breadwinner; (7) passive labor market. liberal market economy with, especially initially, substantial protection to domestic producers.
   

(112): social democratic states much more equal and had lower levels of poverty than the liberal welfares states. also surprising how 'redistributive' CD welfare states, were.

chapter five: welfare states and production regimes in the golden age

(115-117): sources of SD strength

1. strong labor movements is critical, undisputed starting-point for social democratic strength (not divided by ideology or confessional--religious homogeneity, in other words).
2. a divided right helps.
3. corporatism, where you have strong union movements in export markets that need some coordination.

(119): a break with the 'poor law' tradition--a right not to be poor, rather than saving only the 'deserving poor'

(120): important--legislation more egalitarian than negotiation

(122): SAF aggressiveness was conditioned by SD strength

(123-125): three phases of development, in Sweden

1. 1945-1955
2. passage of ATP, in late 1950's
3. beginning in 1960 which is where you begin to get increased women's participation, which leads to women's mobilization, in turn (late 60s early 70s)

(127): active labor market policy (moving displaced workers to high-productivity sectors, making it impossible for low-productivity enterprises to exist)

(129-130): critical--they had to have a growing market for their products (for Sweden, this was continental Europe)

(135-137): Finland in two phases, pivoting on the 1960s (which is when it became a real Nordic welfare State, as the Left comes to power in 1966--a shift, with this, to one of the highest reinvestment ratios)

(141): a weaker left in Denmark, stronger agrarian interests

(144): key--the CD welfare states, less universalistic, less service oriented, and much less gender egalitarian

(147): 1949 elections was key counterfactual in Germany's case--could have been much more universalistic and solidaristic

(152): German welfare state was getting stronger in the 70s, but then the crisis hit

(156): Austria was closer to SD state than Germany -- mainly because of greater participation of SD in government

(162): Netherlands was more religiously divided--like in Germany, there was a missed opportunity after the war, but the Left was too weak to take advantage

(164): here, more conservative forces had the reins, but were always worried by the serious challenge posed by the Left (this is important to the larger argument)

(169): key--NZ was one of most advanced welfare state in 1950 (labor had been in power for much of the two decades previous--see pg. 174), but degenerated as the international economy took its toll (because it was based on a protected manufacturing sector)

(180): AUS vs. NZ on constitutional structure, reflected in medical outcome (less generous in the former)

(184): key--essence of the welfare state is not decommodification, but high qualification and participation in the labor market

(188): important to remember that the women's mobilizations came from those outside the core of SD welfare state's initial constituency (manufacturing workers). this is why it is particularly important to play close attention to 'interactive effects', rather than read this as a simple consequence of SD.

(189): business was not interested in wasting political capital on chucking things they could not chuck.

(190-194): various examples to illustrate how they see path dependency working out. useful.

chapter 6: welfare state retrenchment

(219): key--welfare states by and large unemployment driven (Denmark, Netherlands as early as 1975; Germany and Australia in the 1980s; Scandinavia in the 1990s). all a pragmatic response to increasing burdens on the welfare state, and declining contributions. exceptions are the US and UK, where these are ideologically-driven.

(220): there was, everywhere, declining public share of health expenditure quite early (70s). explained away by rising medical costs.

(220): partisan effects had disappeared by the 1980s (diminished already in the 1970s)

chapter 7: the politics of welfare states after the golden age

(223): key, crisis of the 1970s brought:

1. internationalization of trade
2. internationalization of production
3. deregulation of financial, capital, currency markets (which has meant, critically, that governments cannot control both the interest rate and the exchange rate--countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy produces an outflow of capital and a downward pressure on exchange rates. in a fixed regime, this will drive the interest rate higher and higher).
   
4. decline of industrial, rise of service
5. decline of Fordism, rise of skill-differentiated manufacture and flexible specialization

(224): globalization refers to the first three components above

(225-226): specific way in which unemployment impacted

1. fiscal pressures
2. and the perception that they were permanent problems

(226): not the internationalization of trade, since these were highly open economies already. these countries have been high-skill export economies. [but does this dismiss the argument that they became open to competition?]

(227): capital is not always looking for low wages (most investment flows to OECD countries)

(227-230): key--certainly, the internationalization of capital markets has had a detrimental impact on the generosity of welfare states. you could only keep low interest rates if you were willing to accept a depreciating currency, which would mean, among other things, difficulty importing capital goods, raw materials, etc. [question is how this fits, exactly, in the argument--proximate cause, via unemployment? this seems right, see pg 230]

(230): key, impact on fiscal policy is complicated. it is quite clear that they are saying the latter dynamic prevails in the 1980s and 1990s.

1. on one hand, should be easier--since the threat of crowding out is less [this seems weak]
   
2. on the other hand, fiscal expansion will have to be counteracted by monetary austerity, or else your currency will depreciate (owing to inflation). if you have fixed exchange rates, this will require you to drive up interest rates, counteracting fiscal stimulus. if you have floating exchange rates, your exchange rate will fall, increasing domestic inflation, which threatens to become a vicious cycle.

(230): important--there is a kernel of truth, then, in globalization being linked to retrenchment (lower investment owing to deregulation). but it is a second-order cause, and there are other things that have caused unemployment. [this is more important than they are letting it be, i think--here they are talking about the 'crisis' (fall in investment, capital stock formation, etc.), some of these:

1. speaking of rising participation rates, but this is limited in its scope.
2. 'demographic burden'--but not clear, they say, because it is more a question of labor force participation
3. having grown to limits--but these are political, they are saying

(300): 'modest cuts' vs. (302):widespread cuts (of considerable magnitude, some)

(305): still some partisan impact in the 1990s in Nordic countries

(307, 309): UK and NZ have deep cuts -- this shows that 'political structure' matters.

chapter 8: conclusion

(312-323): repeated summary of the argument

(324): five problems with the American model of neoliberal job growth:

1. if you account for incarceration, there's nothing special going on
2. not clear that the American experience is 'replicable', if you think of what happened to UK/NZ, who tried it
3. costs in terms of poverty and inequality are quite high
4. increase in inequality is likely to lead to a deterioration in skills
5. the idea that wages have to be low in service is dubious because service sector is heterogeneous

(325): an essential step has to be increased levels of domestic investment

1. invest social insurance systems domestically [not already happening?]
2. return to budge surpluses to bring down interest rates
3. change financing of social security schemes to ease burden on employers
4. creation of part-time jobs (two part-time better than one full-time and one employed), as in Netherlands
5. investment in training

(328): all this is radically different than in UK/US

(334): again, unlike Esping-Anderson, commodification is the heart of the Welfare State, not decommodification.

(340): you have to pay attention to the structure of States (state-centered theory), but not without forgetting power relations

(341, 345): interesting, and worth discussing--in their final restatements, it comes close to a Marxist theory--Nordic states as a compromise between capital and labor, where capital has considerable hegemonic power and states are still structurally dependent on capital. but, they will want to insist, power constellations, only, can make sense of the great distinctions to be made between Sweden and the US (certainly, it does seem like P's functionalism is off-limits; simply not true that the welfare state, also, has not redistributed income, like some old Marxists once thought)

(344): Aus/NZ radically egalitarian in their origins?! Sweden very hierarchical, Norway not. Saying all this to make an important claim about how an inherited political culture cannot explain anything.