alexander rabinowitch, the bolsheviks in power (2007)

prologue

(1-13): summary of the Revolution: causes and events, useful

(2): implication that the moderate socialists were interested in the survival of the Provisional Government because they believed it "was essential for Russia's military security and survival." No real mention of doctrinal commitment -- and maybe it wasn't that important, thinking back to the first book? anyway...

(2): this is useful--"Top Bolshevik leaders were divided into three groups. On the left were Lenin and Leon Trotsky, among others, for whom the establishment of revolutionary soviet power in Russia was less an end in itself than the trigger for immediate worldwide socialist revolution. In the center was a group of often quite-independent thinking leaders whose views on the development of the Russian revolution tended to flucturat... And on the right was a highly influential group of more moderate national party leaders led by Lev Kamenev and including Grigorii Zinoviev, Vladimir Miliutin, Aleksei Rykov, and Viktor Nogin (all members of the Bolshevik Central Committee), and Anatoli Lunacharskii... In Lenin's absence, this group's outlook, more than any other, shaped the Bolsheviks' public political platform."

(12-13): key--Rabinowitch's reading of the events, and his preliminary account of how the Bolsheviks arrive at authoritarianism. Hinges on the two struggles: one between the Bolsheviks and the liberal-moderate socialists; the second within the Bolsheviks (proponents of an all-socialist government, and the Left and Leninists). There is a sneaking implication that had the former succeeded, we might be elsewhere; but Rabinowitch's own book shows this to be highly unlikely. Would the moderate socialists really have pushed to take power, at any point in October or before? More likely we would have had tactical blunder, after tactical blunder--and the continuation of a thoroughly bankrupt and discredited PG. Maybe, even, a putsch would have eventually succeeded, absent the intransigence of the Left. Having said all this: clearly, there is something, still, in reading the future into these first few months, whether we decide, later, that it's illegitimate. Rabinowitch wants to emphasize the intransigence of the Mensheviks and the SRs over the new gov't, in particular. And thus, on this reading, the question of who was to blame is alive, even if its scope/importance is still limited.

PART ONE: THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

Chapter 1, Forming a Government

(17): executive summary--"Bolshevik moderates... did not end their efforts, or those of other left socialist groups, to form a multiparty, homogeneous socialist government at the Soviet Congress and in its immediate aftermath. During these days, they sought to restore the moevement toward creation of a broad socialist coalition that had been destroyed by the violent overthrow of the Provisional Government engineered by Lenin just before the opening of the Congress of Soviets. When that failed, they strived mightily to ensure that the exclusively Bolshevik cabinet ultimately approved by the congress, the Council of People's Commissars, would be strictly accountable to the multiparty Central Executive Committee."

(18): "...Left SRs declined cabinet posts pending construction of a broadly inclusive socialist coalition...", October 26

(19): key--Lenin outlines a land program to the letter that proposed by the Left SRs; and NOT the Bolshevik program ('As a democratic government we cannot ignore the feelings of the masses even if we don't agree with them.').

(19): Kamenev names a new cabinet -- but this is to be provisional pending the Constituent Assembly.

(20): key--Avilov's "remarkably prophetic argument", arguing against the ability of an all-Bolshevik slate to govern (arguing instead for a Provisional Executive Committee which would form a broad, all-socialist gov't). The resolution did not pass, even though about half of the Bolshevik cabinet supported it, according to Rabinowitch. Trotsky takes the podium to defend the All-Bolshevik character of the new gov't--will not stand with traitors, more-or-less is his argument. [about 150 out of 600 vote for Avilov's proposal; the rest are for Lenin)

(21): wow--The All-Russian Union of Railway Workers takes an anti-Bolshevik stand, threatening to "take control of the entire Russian railway network." But then the officer/mass question is open here, as well, as evidenced by two rank-and-file workers disagreeing...

(21): A new CEC is elected, which includes some 62 Bolsheviks and 29 Left SRs, among other groups. The other groups will be permitted to enter, as well. "The potential entry into the CEC of representatives of peasant soviets was especially significant in terms of broadening the government, because most soviets were still dominated by SRs."

(22): key (note that this is linked to the worldwide revolution)--Rabinowitch arguing that most delegates anticipated a return to the pre-October demands for an all-socialist, multiparty coalition gov't. "Lenin and Trotsky, however, did not share this view. They were now concerned most of all with retaining freedom of action for themselves, so as to maximize the galvanizing effect of violent social upheaval in Russia on revolutionary workers abroad."

(23): October 26/27, shut down of opposition newspapers, which could be charged with 'incitement'. Bolshevik gov't locked in fight with Petrograd City Duma's All-Russian Committee for Salvation of the Homeland and the Revolution.

(23): October 28, large part of the bureaucracy on strike

(24): October 29, armed fighting claims 200 lives in Petrograd--more than those lost in the February or October revolutions. But suppressed.

(25): October 28, a week of streetfighting begins in Moscow, also claims hundreds of lives

(26): October 29, Bolshevik Central Committee (no Lenin, Trotsky) agree to participate in negotiations towards a ceasefire, and in efforts to broaden the government.

(27): key--though the moderates in the Bolshevik party were amenable to compromise, Rabinowitch is making the case that this encouraged the Mensheviks and SRs to take an even harder line--it "encouraged moderate socialists to bleieve that the Bolsheviks were on the brink of defeat..." [evidence is Menshevik Central Committee resolution on October 28, which prohibited negotiation; very hard stance demanding exclusion of Bolsheviks from gov't at the Vikzhel talks, to which the moderate Bolsheviks responded meekly]

(29): the view of the 'Left-moderates', embodied by Martov: "...only the formation of a government uniting the entire democracy, not just the soviets, but excluding representatives of privileged society, offered the hope of heading off a terrible civil war, the destruction of the democracy, and the imposition of a rightist dictatorship..."

(29): "...at the first two Vikzhel pleneary meetings and in the meeting of the 'Special Commission' on 30 October, the Mensheviks and SRs stymied all efforts at compromise by insiting that Bolsheviks be eliminated from the government altogether."

(31): nonetheless, approaching a compromise (excluding Lenin and Trotsky from gov't)

(33-34): key--confrontation between Lenin, Trotsky and the moderates, over the question of compromise. Rabinowitch is suggesting that "Lenin was on safe ground in arguing... that the revolutionary masses would view compromises undermining Soviet power and the gains of October as a betrayal of Bolshevik promises [the task, instead, was to take the gov't toward "All Power to the Soviets"]. On the other hand, the counter-argument seems perfectly tenable, too--"Lunacharski insisted that a homogeneous socialist government rather than an exclusively Bolshevik or even Soviet government was a necessity. In response to Lenin's categorical rejection of compromise, he argued that if the Bolsheviks did not obtain the cooperation of the existing state apparatus they 'would not be able to manage anything.' He acknowledged that the party had the option of 'restorting to terror'..." Nogin from Moscow is making this point, too--the importance of "splitting the opposition" [the danger, here, seems to be--obviously--the seductive nature of the counterfactual. against this, it is critical to reassert that these alternatives were proposing to take the Bolsheviks further away from Soviet power; at the very least, this is how the positions were argued, at the time]

(35): "...Trotsky, as much as Lenin if not more, was then obsessed with instigating immediate decisive socialist revolutions in the more advanced countries of Europe by means of a big revolutionary bang in Russia. Judging by his statements, it is no exaggeration to suggest that most of his thinking about Russian politics was shaped by this overarching concern..."

(36): November 1 meeting of Bolshevik Central Committee rejects Lenin's proposal to pull out of talks--but resolved to pursue the talks with more of an ultimatum in mind, on the basis of certain minimum demands

(37): Volodarskii (26 years old): "He was also skeptical about the likelihood of early socialist revolutions in Europe. 'We must understand that having taken power we will be forced to lower wages, to increase unemployment, to institute terror,' he had warned. 'We do not have the right to reject these methods, but there is no need to rush into them.' [!]

(38-39): November 2 Central Committee meeting rejects agreement with the moderate socialists (details of how this was passed, intervention of Petrograd Committee are here)

(39-40): important--Nonetheless, at a CEC meeting, Kamenev softens this: retains minimum demands of the earlier ultimatum (primacy of the CEC, recognition of the decrees of the Congress of Soviets, rejection of creation of a new parliamentary body), but also allows for broadening of the CEC. "The primary purpose of the proposal Kamenev presented was to continue the negotiations. For the Left SRs, these were forward steps. [Lenin's proposal, in contrast, had aimed to halt them]"

(40): November 3, the Vikzhel talks reconvene--but the agreement of the earlier meetings is now abandoned, as more radical demands are put forth by the Bolsheviks (recognition of the Congress, responsibility of gov't to the CEC)

(41): important--Lenin furious at the Bolshevik moderates for wanting to continue negotiations. "He now asked each individual member of the Central Committee not openly allied with Kamenev to sign a formal statement pledging to bring the dispute with the moderates before top party committees regionally and nationally..." [Trotsky, Sverdlov, Stalin, Uritskii, Dzerzhinskii, Sokolnikov, Bubnov, Adolf Ioffe, and Matvei Muranov signed--not clear that all of them were unsympathetic to compromise, though they agreed on party discipline]. Kamenev, Rykov, Zinoviev, Nogin, and Vladimir Miliutin resigned from Central Committee, hoping to touch off shock waves.

(42): Rabinowitch commentary, key: "By leaving the Central Committee and not responding positively to the idea of convening an emergency national party meeting, moderate Bolsheviks left one of the revolution's most important arenas of battle and helped 'ensure the victory of Lenin's whole line,' no less than did the Mensheviks and SRs in quitting the Second Congress of Soviets."

(42): important--"Unfortunately for the Mensheviks and SRs, the Bolsheviks' initialy revolutionary decrees, and their apparent toughness in dealing with the internal and external counterrevolution, had rejuvenated the revolutionary spirit of Petrograd's lower classes, a fact reflected in the expansion of support for Lenin's position at the local level."

(44): all this wrangling aside, key--"In Bolshevik Central Committee resolutions on the government question during this period, regardless of whether they were proposed by the moderates or Leninists, the CEC's primacy over the Sovnarkom was consistently reaffirmed... In practice [however], limitations on the independent power of the Sovnarkom, and the prerogatives and sensibilities of the CEC, were ignored by the Sovnarkom from the start... Similar arbitrariness characterized the behavior of the MRC, [which had become] the main command post for security in Petrograd and for expansion of Soviet rule nationally"

(45): important, precisely because it opens up into the larger questions of the revolution--Rabinowitch noting that if this temporary arbitrariness could have been justified in the last week of October, by the beginning of November, with immediate threats overcome, the persistence rule by arbitrary decree was clearly problematic.

(46): CEC meeting on November 4th: delicate tussle over Muraviev's endorsement of lynch justice, highlighting the issues [eventually rescinded by CEC a few days later]. and over Lenin's press curbs--which were repealed, at least formally.

(47): Over these struggles, Left SRs withdraw from everything but the CEC.

(47): key, for Rabinowitch's argument: "Nogin made an emotional plea for a compromise on the government issue, following it up with an announcement that was as prohpetic as it was startling. As he put it, the only alternative was a 'purely Bolshevik government maintained by political terror...'" [Rykov, Miliutin, Ivan Teodorovich, and Nogin all resign from the Sovnarkom -- all four were people's Commissars]

(47): another powerful indictment of the hardline, delivered by Lozovskii

(48): "...Nogin's announcement of resignations from the government had the effect of an exploding bomb..."

(48): key, a confidence vote on the Sovnarkom introduced--"With historical perspective, one can see that this was a critical moment in the earliest evolution of the Soviet system. The primary source of the Bolsheviks' popular authority lay in the identification of the party with the Soviets and the defense of the Soviets as the embodiment of the revolution. An open break between the Sovnarkom and the CEC at this point... might have significantly undermined the authority of the former... A roll-call vote ended up 29 to 23, with 3 abstentions. Riazanov and other leading moderate Bolsheviks... do not appear to have voted. This circumstance, coupled with the 'yes' votes of four people's commissars--Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, and Nikolai Krylenko--was decisive." [wow]

(49-50): Lenin has Kamenev replaced with Sverdlov as head of the CEC.

(50): merger with the Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies further stregnthened Lenin's position (it had been centrist/right, but now dominated by Left SRs). Official creation of a joint CEC (including also soldiers and sailors and trade unionists) took place on November 15. [it is not satisfactorily explained, here, why the Left SRs, upset with so much else, would consent.]

(51): "...by the end of November, the Bolsheviks had a majority in the combined CEC"

(51): there was a moment here (before the inclusion of soldiers, sailors, and trade unionists in the combined CEC) where the Left SRs could have exercised authority and taken power, but did not.

(51-52): Maria Spiridonova, a Left SR leader: "'However alien their [Bolshevik] crude behavior is to us, we are maintaining close contact because the masses...follow them.' "

(52): question, again, of relationship of Sovnarkom to the CEC -- a decree is passed demanding closer collaboration. BUT, key: "It was not quite that. As time would show, the understanding depended on good faith on the part of the Bolsheviks and left extensive discretionary power in the hands of the Sovnarkom. Nonetheless, for some time, people's commissars dutifully made reports on their work to the CEC. Also, many major decrees, though by no means all, were transmitted to the CEC for confirmation after adoption by the Sovnarkom.

(53): key, and a place, here, to ask many questions--Rabinowitch is seeing the seeds of the future Russian state emerge in these dynamics; these first few days (in a sense, the effect of his earlier volume is almost slightly nullified). Regardless, the argument is that Lenin's success in these battles with, first, the moderate socialists, and especially second, the Bolshevik moderates and the Left SRs precluded the creation of a multiparty, coalition socialist gov't, and laid the foundations for continued all-Bolshevik rule. I suppose when we ask when democracy (or revolution) in Russia lost, we have to ask about the plausibility and importance of the multiparty coalition -- because other democratic, alternative arrangements did exist (what about all power to the soviets, for example, however impractical). In other words, given the bankruptcy of the socialist factions, there is no reason to make a rosy estimation of the lost opportunity wrt Menshevik/SR elements. Certainly, the pragmatic counterargument (that the Russian Revolution could have avoided a debilitating Civil War, if these early steps had been navigated more carefully) is very tempting; but it is not clear that it stands the test, empirically. Nonetheless, here is a place where counterfactuals truly flourish.

Chapter 2, Rebels into Rulers

(54): executive summary--"The collapse of efforts to broaden the Sovnarkom or even make it accountable to the multiparty CEC... meant that in the wake of the October revoltuion the Bolsheviks bore exclusive responsibility for maintaining order and provicing municipal services, and food and fuel, to Petrograd and the surrounding region... Lenin and Trotsky were not particularly concerned with the practical implications of their acts... The consequence of their stance, however, was that Bolsheviks in the city part organization, the Petrograd Soviet, and Petrograd district soviets were forced to transform themselves from rebels into rulers and to reshape or construct new local government and administrative bodies. These burdens led inexorably to the fundamental transofmraiton of the Petrograd Bolshevik party organization's composition, structure, method of operation, and relationship to its constituencies."

(55): Soviets did not assume gov't functions till late November--"Only then, more than a month after the Bolsheviks assumed formal power, did the executive organis of the Petrograd Soviet begin to play a meaningful role in governing revolutionary Russia's capital city. By virtue of being chair of the newly elected Executive Committee and Presidium, Zinoviev, who had restored himself to Lenin's good graces by abandoning the moderates, became head of the Petrograd Soviet. HE was to hold that post till the end of 1925."

(55): November 16, Petrograd City Duma officially dissolved (though elections were held November 27-28 to elect a new one, and retain expertise of the civil service; all-Bolshevik return, of course)

(56): important--as the Bolsheviks saw it at this time, Soviets were not institutions of administration--"Having devoted their lives to fomenting revolution, at the outset they perceived soviets less as organs of popular self-government than as political institutions whose task of consolidating the revolution was by no means over and which would at most define public policy, not implement it..." [the question was why they didn't simply take over the work of district dumas, which were controlled by Kadets and moderate socialists] "Not until late November and December..., in the face of strikes by civil servants partly directed by district dumas, did district soviets begin dissolving them." [often begun by the local Bolshevik party committee--evidence that the overall organization of the Party was still quite decentralized, he is arguing]

(57): "...District party committee and district soviet resolutions dissolving district dumas provided for their reelection. Prepartions for these elections were often initiated, but none were actually held..."

(57): "...work stoppages by veteran civil servants petered out in early January, not because they were smashed or replaced by freshly trained representatives of the revolutionary masses, as Trotsky advocated, but because ultimately most of them were dependent on wages for survival..."

(58-59): threat of bourgeois counterrevolution on the Don (Alekseev, Kaledin, Denikin and Kornilov regrouping) -- but a threat that was overstated by Lenin, Rabinowitch is arguing, as much of their rank-and-file was not motivated to fight.

(59): key to understanding the disintegration of the democratic life of the party, Rabinowitch is suggesting--'party work has ground to a halt' owing to the other demands on its best organizers; "The record shows that during the first year of Soviet power in Petrograd massive outflows of the most effective party workers, leading to organizational dysfunction, were the rule in all districts." ['we need to take steps to avoid being overwhelmed by 'October Bolsheviks' -- by inexperienced recruits]

(61): MRC disbanded on December 5 (it had been the effective governing authority in Petrograd (not the Soviets and not really the City Duma), up to this point--"from directing military operations and policing into such areas as the procurement, delivery, and distribution of food, fuel, and other basic necessities; transport and travel; labor relations and wages; public health; prison administration; and the allocation of housing.")

(62): to gauge popular opinion on Bolshevik rule, we can look to the Constituent Assembly elections between 12-14 November (and this opens into the question of the provinces, of course)

(64-65): the class question within the women's movement -- interesting pages

(67): discussion of the SR platform, which Rabinowitch is arguing was not very radical, save for the revolutionary agrarian program (permanent expropriation without compensation)

(68): Left SR platform was much more radical, even if it "upheld the sanctity of the Constitutent Assembly as revolutionary Russia's supreme political authority." Called, more or less, for the decrees passed at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets (including accountability of gov't to the Soviets), but also for the undoing of the political damage wrought by the premature seizure of power [of course, it's worth adding that they would have hardly have been in a position to demand this, had the premature seizure of power not taken place]

(68-69): in sum--"With preponderant strength among peasants in the countryside, nationally the SRs received the largest number of votes... In Petrograd... the results of elections to the Constituent Assembly were a strong endorsement of revolutionary Bolshevik policies and Soviet power by lower classes in the Petrograd region... [and among the Baltic Fleet and soldiers on the Northern Front]". Nonetheless, thus begins the tussle over the Constituent Assembly as alternate source of political authority in post-revolutionary Russia.

(71): important--"During these days, the Leninist Bolshevik leadership pursued the general directions developed when the outcome of the elections to the Constituent Assembly became known, namely, organizing recall elections, doing everything possible to undermine the Constituent Assembly at a popular level, and asserting control over arrangements for the assembly."

(73): important--All this being said, both Bolsheviks and Left SRs were in agreement that the Constitutent Assembly's power should be subordinated to the authority of the Soviet. Both parties were pursuing, at this time, a policy of balancing competing imperatives: broadening the revolution, and sustaining Soviet power.

(74-75): November 27/28, a 10,000-100,000 pro-Constituent Assembly march of well-dressed citizens.

(76): Pitirim Sorokin, future founder of Sociology Department at Harvard, main speaker at an SR rally!

(76-77): all this protest/occupation moves the Bolsheviks to outlaw the Kadets, which brings matter to a head for the moderate socialists (and even the Left SRs), as it seems to indicate an unwillingness to let the Constituent Assembly convene.

(78): Trotsky and Terror: 'There is nothing immoral in the proletariat finishing off a class that is collapsing... You [the Left SRs] wax indignant at the naked terror which we are applying against our class enemies. But let me assure you that in one month's time at the most, it will assume more frightful forms, modeled after the terror of the great French revolutionaries. Not the fortress but the guillotine awaits our enemies..."

(78): CEC adopts a suitably Bolshevik resolution on the Constituent Assembly and the Kadets.

(79): executive summary of the chapter, once more. He sees in this chapter the seeds, no doubt, of the "organization's increasing isolation from its social base." The question, for us, is obviously whether this was at all avoidable (were there strategic errors made, in other words?). Insofar as this has to do with the transition from rebels to rulers, it is more-or-less unavoidable--the weakening of Party work is something can be explained from the context, of course. But one senses that Rabinowitch wants to make, against Lenin and Trotsky, a stronger critique.

Chapter 3, The Defeat of the Moderates

(80): Left SRs accept posts in the Sovnarkom, despite their reservations, December 9 1917 (see 84, also)

(82-83): Rabinowitch is offering an alternative explanation for the rise of the VCheka, that has squarely to do with the "Left SR" problem--"It now appears likely that the MRC decided to disband not because it considered its role finished but because its radical Bolshevik leadership was frustrated with the Sovnarkom. It is also clear that the decisive factor dictating the Sovnarkom's approval of the MRC's self-liquidation and the creation of the VCheka was its perceived need for a temporary agency, free from meddling by the Left SRs, to deal decisively with the threatened nationwide strike of civil servants and, even more fundamental, to contend with the danger posed by supporters of the Constituent Assembly to the survival of Soviet power.. For Soviet leaders, it became clear that the presence of Left SRs [and specifically Shteinberg taking the Commissariat for Justice] made combating counterrevolution impossible..."

(87): interesting counterfactuals--considered without context, really, it seems impossible to deny the legitimacy of Shteinberg's position.

(88): Nonetheless, four Left SRs enter the VCheka in early January 1918, after much wrangling.

(89): the question of the moderate Bolsheviks (organized into the Constituent Assembly
'fraction'), yet again--based on the "principle that the Constituent Assembly should be the ultimate arbiter of Russia's political destiny."

(90): key--Lenin's Theses on the Constituent Assembly (December 12) -- Soviets as a higher form of democracy--"any form of government the Constituent Assembly might create would be an intolerable step backward from the republic of soviets..." ; broadest use of recall, therefore, and unequivocal recognition of Soviet power was imperative. Nonetheless, the Party moderates were sidelined, quite slyly but explicitly. Details here.

(93): a surprisingly Left-inspired SR program, probably to attract the support of the soviets

(94): Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets, January 1918

(97): weaknesses of the VCheka--in many workers'/soldiers' minds, much like the Okhrana

(98): assasination attempt on Lenin, January 1918--attributed to the Right SRs

(103): executive summary, leading up to tensions with the Consituent Assembly--"...the Central Committee's stance on the primacy of Soviet power over the Constituent Assembly, coupled with the reluctance of the SRs to try to provide for the Constituent Assembly's security, along with the indifference of the bulk of Russian population to its fate, all but assured its quick demise."

Chapter 4, The Fate of the Constituent Assembly

(106-107): Major clash, January 5 1918, at rally for defense of Constituent Assembly--'brutal' killings by amateur security forces deployed by the Soviet authorities, without corresponding provocation.

(111): at this point, though, still divergent positions within the party on the fate of the assembly; nonetheless, plan was to push a program so radical that the Assembly would be forced to disband.

(112): opens with a fight!

(115): key-- "[Chernov, SR] challenged the Bolsheviks to request an immediate nationwide plebiscite on attitudes toward the Constituent Assembly if they had doubts about its right to express the will of the people... Implicit in what he said was the asummption that... the era of Soviet rule was over and that of new institutions to be created by the Constituent Assembly was about to begin.."

(116): Bukharin responds, emphasizing importance of Soviets

(117): Tsereteli, from the Mensheviks, on the offensive -- 'At the present time you are fighting neither Kerensky nor Tseretel but the expressed will of the entire population.' [!] Calling for the subordination of the soviets, explicitly, to the Constituent Assembly.

(119): Sorokin presentation (on behalf but against express will of Left SRs; as peasant leader, really) also backing away, marginally, from calling for the dissolution of the assembly. Influence of moderates, and desire to distinguish themselves, argues Rabinowitch. Raises the specter of the agrarian question.

(121): "All that can be gleaned from available sources is that Lenin arrived armed for bear and, in the name of the Central Committee, demanded an immediate Bolshevik walkout and dissolution of the Constituent Assembly after the first session."

(122): Bolsheviks withdraw; Left SRs walk out at 4AM, after Assembly doesn't vote on recognition of Soviet power!

(126): A few dissenters in the CEC against dissolution of the Constituent Assembly (Riazanov and Lozovskii)

(127) executive summary--"Most important, however, Sviatitskii was probably on target when he pointed to the Russian people's fundamental indifference to the fate of the Constituent Assembly, allowing Lenin to command that they all simply go home..."

PART TWO: WAR OR PEACE ?

Chapter 5, Fighting Lenin

(131): central importance of Bolshevik demand of immediate peace--both to rank-and-file, and to Bolshevik moderates who were otherwise opposed to Lenin's radical line.

(131): Brest-Litovsk talks begun on 20 November, 1917; negotiations on 9 December, 1917

(132): but 'universal proletarian peace', or stuck with unilateral negotiations with the Central Powers?

(135): disagreements at negotiations over commitment to self-determination of all subject peoples, proposed by Ioffe as condition in his opening proposal

(136): Lenin-sponsored survey shows massive weaknesses and disaffection in Russia's capacity to resist, in event of break-down of talks

(139): even still--"In fact, with virtually no exceptions, everyone, either explicitly or implicitly, rejected compromise with the Central Powers" [this is the Petrograd Soviet]

(141): Lenin's views on peace, key--"my reading of the available evidence leads me to conclude that Lenin came to power convinced of the need for immediate peace if revolutionary Russia was to survive but that this concern did not trouble him much becasue of his absolute confidence in the immediacy of decisive socialist revolutions abroad... However, he began to have doubts... Following his sojourn in Finalnd [December 24-27], he made one of his characteristic 180-degree turns, concluding that htere was no alternative to accepting whatever peace terms the Germans offered. The stage was set for one of the most profound intraparty crisis of Lenin's years..."

(142): Left Communist opposition, advocacy of "revolutionary war"--particularly heated owing to proximity of upheaval in Germany, belief that German soldiers would not fight Russian troops.

(143): and Trotsky's middle position--"simply to declare the war was over, that the army was being demobilized, and that it was going thome to build a socialist Russia."

(143): On 8 January, at ad hoc conference on this issue, the Left Communists won handily (32 for them, 16 for Trotsky, 15 for Lenin).

(144): 11 January, this was brought up at Central Committee meeting--Trotsky's position wins 9 to 7 (Lenin's was considered so weak, not even voted on!)

(149): here, and elsewhere, it is Bukharin's and the Left Communist position that subordinates everything to the objective of international revolution.

(151-152): Trotsky presents his position at Brest; General Max Hoffman calls off the truce. But the Russian delegation, at this point, is still confident that the Great War is over; that the Germans won't carry out an offensive.

(153-154): executive summary

Chapter 6, "The Socialist Fatherland Is in Danger"

(158): "For [Trotsky], the aim of immediate, open, and comprehensive demobilization was to demonstrate to the entire world Soviet Russia's unequivocal determination to end its participation in the war and to put the burdent of protecting the Russian revolution, if that became necessary, squarely on Europe's revolutionary masses..."

(158): "Trotsky's final statement at Brest had flowed naturally from the conundrum [that it was necessary to demand more than simply a return to status quo--in line with peace without annexations, the right of self-determination, etc.]

(160): On February 13 (new calendar), Germans had in fact taken a decision, against Trotsky's expectation, to launch a limited offensive, to 'put the Bolsheviks in their place' (on February 18)

(161): the debate re: a separate peace is re-opened with haste

(162-165): key, for two reasons--Lenin continually demanding immediate capitluation; but in battle with Bukharin, who "suggested that Lenin and those who favored peace at virtually any price were succumbing to panic..." But eventually Lenin (and Trotsky) triumphant, within the party and at the Soviet. Further controversy, though, because this decision was fundamentally made by the Sovnarkom, without consultation with CEC (and by a one-vote margin).

(166): Rank-and-file (as expressed by district soviets) in Petrograd opposed, by and large, to surrender? Most were Left Communists (see 167)

(167): key, different point--at this time, the Petrograd party organization was re-shaped, which "appears in retrospect to have been a major step in the destruction of the relative internal democracy..."

(167): serious dissent within the Central Committee (Bukharin, Uritskii, Lomov, Bubnov)

(168): in sum, despite peace proposal from Lenin/Trotsky, increasing militancy in both the Bolshevik and Left SR camps, including at lower, district levels, it seems. [though not, at all, among soldiers]

(171-172): CEC meeting chaired by "tactically astute" Sverdlov, who recognized possibility that peace issue could bring down the gov't (Left SRs were with the Left Communists) -- prepared instead, essentially, for the imminent defense of Petrograd.

(173): important, new German peace conditions arrive--"Could [Lenin] have been revealed that they were not harsher? ... ON the other hand, the intervening days had revealed the depth and scope of aversion to bowing before German imperialism on the party of many if not most of Lenin's closest comrades-in-arms. Surely there are few better examples of Lenin's legendary tenacity and strength of will than his fierce determination to overcome his opponents at this critical juncture..."

(174): Lenin's threat to resign hangs over the meeting to consider the terms. Vote is 7 to 4, with 4 abstentions, in favor of accepting the terms.

(178): And, after much intense discussion, a tense vote at the CEC meeting in favor of acceptance. 112 to 86, with 22 abstentions.

(178-180): executive summary

Chapter 7, An Obscene Peace

(181-182): With capture of Pskov, an apparent German advance to Petrograd, despite acceptance [though they had actually planned to stop short]. Thus talk of evacuating the capital to Moscow.

(183): key -- "The relationship between the Petrograd proletariat and the Bolsheviks, in February and March 1918, had already cooled compared to what it had been when Kerensky advanced on the capital in late October 1917, and this hampered recruitment efforts. This change was partly a result of popular disenchantment with the economic consequences of the October revolution, above all food shortages and spiraling unemployment. Other factors impeding the recruitment of workers for defense at the end of February and in March 1918 included general demoralization; the large number of party members... already transferred from their jobs to serve with Red Guard detachments supporting consolidation of the revolution around the country...; the startling suddenness of the resumption of German military operation; and the utterly confused military and political situation."

(187): tracking the degeneration--in this atmosphere, VCheka given right to summarily execute 'counterrevolutionaries' and common criminals [Left SRs opposed, importantly]

(188-189): order to shoot people putting up posters saying 'Russia Has Been Sold to the Germans'[!]. District soviets opposed, importantly.

(191-192): worker activists committed to defense of revolution; rank-and-file, much less so.

(192-193): key--and gradually (early to mid-March), a shift in the wishes of district Soviets and trade unions, too, who had been initially opposed to peace: "...a major grassroots shift in favor of ratificationh and against the Left Communists..."

(196-198): important, Seventh All-Russian Bolshevik Party Congress, March 1918 (focus on ratifying the Brest treaty, for Party-wide legitimacy) [Lenin here criticizes the Left Communists, AND Trotsky] "[Bukharin] reminded Lenin that, to the contrary, the Left Communists had consistently held to the principle that the Russian revolution would either be saved by revolutions abroad or would be crusehd by the capitalist powers... To Bukharin, the fundamental difference between the two sides was that the Left Communists believed in the imminence of an international workers' revolution." Debate lasts 12 hours; final vote is 30 in favor, 12 against, 4 abstentions. Riazanov resigns. AND Trotsky resigns, taking umbrage at implication that he is to blame [when majority of Party had backed his line]; but takes it back, for reasons that are unclear/undocumented.

(200-202): the move to Moscow, early March

(203): Kronstadt Soviet still radical beyond belief--"'Did we overthrow Russian tsarism and the bourgeoisie to bow before German stranglers without a fight?'" Represented, also, by increasing gains made by Left SRs in the soviet, at expense of Bolsheviks, in early months of 1918.

(203): Fourth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, March 1918 [814 of the 1172 delegates were Bolsheviks; 238 Left SRs; 114 unaffiliated]

(204-205): important--despite "...overwhelming support for ratification among Bolshevik delegates...", Congress hears arguments against ratification, by Left SRs--focusing on ongoing resistance in areas occupied by Germany, prospect of partisan warfare, and the danger of betraying international revolution. Left SRs (and Left Communists) threaten to leave Sovnarkom if peace is ratified, in order to fight German imperialism on the ground--which they do upon the ending of the Congress.

(208-209): executive summary

PART THREE, SOVIET POWER ON THE BRINK

Chapter 8, A Turbulent Spring

(213): amid crises, "Bolshevik leaders staying in Petrograd were also faced with the emerging opposition of Petrograd workers... In the late spring and early summer of 1918, these problems worsened and new ones emerged [i.e., outbreak of civil war]"

(214): creation of Petrograd Labor Commune (SK PTK), after gov't retreat to Moscow

(216): key--"...This was still a fluid time in the relationship between soviet and party agencies in Petrograd. Local party bodies, striped of many of their most experienced members, were now beginning to consider broader political and economic issues. However, they still shied away from direct involvement in government..." [relationship between 'party work' and 'soviet work'; two different attitudes prevailed within the Party]

(220): chaotic, tense relations between Petrograd, ravaged by crises at this time, and Moscow

(221): SK PTK pursuing line of moderation on counterrevolution and crime (not shooting)

(223): terrible food supply situation in Petrograd

(224): 46% of Petrograd's labor force was unemployed, by April 1918; breakdown of industry

(223-225): key--the EAD had been formed (opposition movement of moderate socialists and unaffiliated factory workers), "stimulated by the widespread view that trade unions, factory committees, and soviets, perhaps especially district soviets, were no longer representative, democratcially run working-class institutions; instead, they had been transformed into arbitrary, bureaucratic, government agencies. There was ample reason for this concern..." [and key seems to be the food supply problem; exacerbated as it was by the separate negotiations with the Ukraine, pursued by the Germans at Brest]

(225): key, tracking the disintegration of distric soviets and local party committees--"As in the case of Bolshevik district committees, links between local soviets and factory workers, critical for leftist success in 1917, were broken. Who had time for meetings and agitation among constituents with the Germans at the gates?"

(228): optimists vs. pessimists in the EAD, around the question of worker support vs. Bolsheviks. "Turning point in their strategic orientation" is mid-May, when all issues come to a head.

(231-232): "The growing disenchantment of Petrograd workers with economic conditions and the evolving structure and operation of Soviet political institutions... naturally worried Bolshevik authorities in Petrograd..." [This is when Zinoviev declares that Soviets had become 'Houses of Lords,' and proposes nonparty worker conferences as remedy--as an institution to legitimize the district soviet's work...]

(234): First City District Workers Conference, May-June 1918

Chapter 9, Continuing Crises

(237): Danger of military advance of Germans, allied with Finland whites--jeopardizing the Baltic Fleet [leading to the 'Ice March' of the Baltic Fleet]

(242): "The determination of Lenin and Trotsky to avoid a renewal of war with Germany in May 1918 was not only a consequence of their enduring assumptions about the hopelessness of sucessfully defending Petrograd..."

(243): dark act by Trotsky, according to Rabinowitch--the execution of Shcastny (commander of Baltic fleet), on trumped-up charges of trying to overthrow the Petrograd Commune, 21/22 June 1918 [and this enraged the Baltic Fleet, with whom he was quite popular]

(244-245): antigovernment revolts, also, at Obhukov--"one of Russia's largest producers of [military goods]", and thus hit hard by demobilization in December 1917.

(246): assasination of Volodarskii, June 20 1918.

(248): June 1918, membership numbers at 13,472 (36,000 in February; 60,000 in October 1917).

(248-249): key--new elections to the Petrograd Soviet, announced on 13 June--goal to purge moderate socialists, to counteract the right of the EAD to represent workers, etc. [Rabinowitch looking at the electoral rules, and saying this was fixed to assist the Bolsheviks in various ways]

(251): and election results in June 1918: "the governing parties receieved a 3 to 1 majority among workers." [badly amongst women]. "One is still left, however, with the nagging question of how many Bolshevik deputies from factories were elected instead of the oppostion because of press restrictions, voter intimidation, vote fraud..." [in sum, a highly suspect victory]

(254): repression of the EAD, and the thwarting of the general strike they had called for July 2. not pretty.

(256-257): a cholera outbreak compounding all issues, in July-September 1918 [4,305 deaths]

(258-259): executive summary

Chapter 10, The Northern Commune and the Bolshevik-Left SR Alliance

(261): purpose of this chapter is to discuss run-up, foundation of soviets in the Northern Oblast, whose "primary historical interest lies in the revealing arguments that broke out... over Left SR participation in the new government and over the government's structure..."

(262): Zinoviev vs. Fishman at the First Northern Oblast Congress (over Brest, primarily)

(263): critical--Left SR challenge: "the main social base of revolutionary government [b/c of decomposition of the proletariat] would have to be Russia's still enormous, healthy, and politically able class of laboring peasants...a diktat of party officials was being substituted for class-based democracy exercised through freely elected, representative soviets" [right on]. Goes on to present a proposal to involve the masses, once again, in gov't, in his words.

(265): responsive in their counterproposals--but "in practice, it quickly fell by the wayside; as in the central government, the Central Executive Committee of the Northern Oblast was subordinate to the SK SO..."

(265-266): key--"The debate... graphically illustrated the ties that bound the Bolsheviks and Left SRs, as well as the profound differences... For the Petrograd Bolsheviks, starved for cadres, the Left SRs were a source of energetic, competent personel... [To Left SRs], the Bolsheviks were still the heroic architects of 'October.' They still had a healthy core--the Left Communists--with whom Left SRs felt an especially strong kinship" [these are good pages to look at in more depth, for Bolshevik-Left SR question; though his treatment of this is marred by a slight utopianism, one suspects, insofar as it seems obvious that the Party in opposition is always more capable of demanding democratic reforms, what have you, than the one in power. But this defense, too, can go too far--that is where one must tread carefully.]

(267): key conjuncture--Lenin's 'Immediate Tasks of Soviet Power', on April 29, 1918 ["unquestioning implementation of government directives, obedience to commissars, utilization of 'bourgeois specialists', re-imposition of one-man managerial authority..., and other 'capitalist' measures such as restoration of wage incentives..."]. This deeply, deeply troubled the Left SRs.

(268): key--Another significant source of Left SR anger at Bolsheviks was Lenin's "use of armed force to solve the ever more urgent problem of urban hunger."

(268): March 1918 ration for workers in Petrograd was 1,082 calories! June 1918 was 714! And it was typically worse than this, Rabinowitch notes.

(269): key conjuncture, beginnings of Town-Country--Thus, Sovnarkom (approved by CEC) decree of 13 May 1918 declares all peasants with "grain surpluses" "enemies of the people." [objections raised by Left SRs]. "Lenin's policy of squeezing the peasntry to feed starving workers, and the resulting creation of a virtual state of war between town and country, was implemented on a large scale in the late spring and summer."

(274): Left SR role in moderating (or, at least postponing) 'Red Terror'

(278-281): more useful examples of significant co-operation and importance of Left SR collaboration with Bolsheviks in the gov't, up until the summer of 1918 at the very least.

(281-282): executive summary: "For Soviet power in the region, the period between mid March and July 1918 was a time of continuing crises. That it survived without resort to terror was due in no small part to effective collaboration between Petrograd Bolsheviks and Left SRs, and their mutual restraint in dealing with each other. However, the collaboration was not to last. The breakdown of the Bolshevik-Left SR bond in Petrograd and in the Northern Commune was soon to be triggered by events and directives from Moscow..."

Chapter 11, The Suicide of the Left SRs

(283): tracking decline in relationship, begun in March with ratification of Brest treaty (and continued through food procurement decision, spetsy in management of workplace and army, and authoritarian domestic policies, etc., etc.)

(283): Rabinowitch noting "sharply increasing support for the Left SRs, especially among peasants in the provinces..."

(283): "Thus, as spring turned to summer, Left SR and Bolshevik national leaders were on a collision course that would have serious implications for Bolshevik-Left SR collaboration in Petrograd..."

(284): key--an "especially adverse impact" on the CEC Peasant Section, which was a Left SR Bastion headed by 'legendary' Spiridonova--and had been key in extending Bolshevik power into the countryside from January to April 1918

(285): after mid-March, though, the Peasant Section had sent agitators to organize resistance to the Germans, in contravention of national leadership's decision, of course. Charges of 'separatism', therefore, were somewhat justified.

(287): Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, 28 June 1918 [demanded by Left SRs in face of growing tensions, Rabinowitch suggests]

(287): by this time, though, internal dissent within the Bolshevik Party had died down; little prospect of a Left Communist-Left SR alliance.

(287-288): key-- Mensheviks and SRs were expelled June 14, probably to tip the numbers more favorably in the Bolsheviks' favor--final delegates numbered 678 for the Bolsheviks, and 269 for the Left SRs. Rabinowitch arguing that "there is, in fact, substantial circumstantial evidence that the huge Bolshevik majority in the congress was fabricated, and that the number of legitimately elected Left SR delegates was roughly equal to that of the Bolsheviks..."

(288-289): deeply unsavory picture of the Bolsheviks emerging in these pages.

(290): nonetheless--and this is the "suicide"--Left SR Central Committee authorized, in July 1918, the assasination the German Ambassador, Count Mirbach, in a hope to re-open the war.

(292-293): "...still convinced that all-out war with Germany would be an unmitigated disaster for the revolutionary cause, Lenin quickly recovered and focused on showing the Germans that the Bolsheviks were quite capable of easily handling the Left SRs. The catch was that it was by no means clear that the organized military forces immediately available to him were a match for those at the disposal of the Left SRs..."

(294): key--Rabinowith arguing, quite fairly, that it was not an uprising against 'Soviet power', as Lenin accused it of being, as much as it was "consistent with the objective of reshaping the policies of the Leninist Sovnarkom..."

(294): "more than four hundred Left SRs, mostly rank-and-file members, were caught and an uncertain number were summarily shot..." [!] [Others were detained and arrested--Spiridonova, for example, held in prison until November 1918]. All Left SRs expelled from responsible positions in gov't (though not membership, it seems); Peasant Section was gutted.

(295): absolutely key, tracking the degeneration--Soviet constitution passed at the Fifth Congress (July 1918). "...The constitution perpetuated the fiction that the elective All-Russian Congress of Soviets was the highest organ of state authority, and that between its convocations, except in dire emergencies, the Sovnarkom was subordinate to the CECE, which was the supreme legislative, administrative, and controlling organ of government; in practice, however, the opposite prevailed. Between the Fifth Congress in July 1918 and the Sixth Congress the following November, the CEC assembled only eight times (as a rule, the Sovnarkom met daily), and, with the Mensheviks, SRs, and Left SRs effectively excluded, its meetings were largely ceremonial..."

(295-296): The first constitution legislated dominance of City over Town, with differential rates of representation (1 deputy for 25,000 electors in city soviets; 1 deputy for 125,000 electors in provincial soviets)

(297): Bolshevik authorities in Petrograd heard about the assasination before Petrograd Left SRs!

(302): interesting--by the time of the Fifth Congress, the Left SRs have a majority in the Kronstadt Soviet--"adopted a resolution [there] expressing aversion to centralized dictatorial government as a violation of the principle 'All Power to the Soviets' and a throwback to bourgeois systems of government." Kronstandt Soviet dissolved, and their newspaper (in operation since March 1917) shut down, on July 9, 1918.

(302-305): nonetheless, Petrograd Left SRs defiant, since obvoiusly the Bolshevik story of an 'attack on Soviet power' they knew to be untrue--most stood by their Central Committee's decision to assasinate Count Mirbach.

(306): key--none of this marks the complete exist of Left SRs from gov't, partly because of the severe shortage of cadres; but it does mark the end of them as a collective force in revolutionary politics, it seems. "The end of the Bolshevik-Left SR alliance marked the decisive turn to one-party government in Soviet Russia. Around the same time, government centralization in Petrograd was advanced by the abrogation of the taxing powers of district soviets..."

(307-309): executive summary

(309): "Despite their skyrocketing stregnth in the countryisde before Mirbach's assassination, the Left SRs never recovered from the battering they received at the hands of the Bolsheviks following their impetuous act." [ah, the counterfactuals!]

PART FOUR: CELEBRATION AMID TERROR

Chapter 12, The Road to 'Red Terror'

(313): key--"The summer of 1918 saw a hardening of policies toward real and potential counterrevolution in Petrograd... These threats grew with astounding speed... The drift to Red Terror in Petrograd and other Russian cities during the late summer of 1918 grew out of the insecurity caused by these ominous developments. Factors often cited for causing the Terror, such as pressure from Lenin, the assassinations of Volodarskii and Uritskii, and the unsuccessful attempt to kill Lenin, played a less significant role..."

(318): mid summer 1918, "...Uritskii still resisted the extremist tide at a time when the Cheka in Moscow was already arbitrarily shooting class enemies and when, for practical purposes, unofficial Red Terror was in full sway there and in other Russian cities..."

(319): By late spring, Western allies (especially Britain and France) had started to support various anti-Bolshevik movements "friendly to the cause of pursuing the war against Germany to victory, at first primarily with large infusions of money." [real intervention beginst August 2]

(320): conscription into Red Army begins at the end of June, 1918 [further compromises Party work]

(323): Lockhart "conceded that the Allied intervention was an indirect cause of the Red Terror. There is a kernel of truth in that, at least insofar as Petrograd is concerned..."

(324): By August, Uritskii was "losing ground to advocates of 'Red Terror' in the SK SO..." [19 August seems to mark the start date, as regards the PCheka; first mass shooting was on the 21 of August--quite chilling, but they all are, aren't they?]

(326): Uritskii assasination, on August 30, 1918

(329): attempted assasination of Lenin on same day, at speech to factory workers.

Chapter 13, The Red Terror in Petrograd

(330): "The fundamental aim of the Red Terror in Petrograd, in the fall of 1918, was to ensure political stability at a time when the city was being stripped of its security forces..."

(333): About 800 were shot in Petrograd in the fall of 1918, in total; and 500 by the Kronstadt Cheka [but probably more, Rabinowitch is noting, since this doesn't include 'lynch justice']

(340): some alarm, at local levels (Trade Union Council), at the "indiscriminate character of the Red Terror" (September 1918). [errors were made, Bolsheviks shot]

(342): Zinoviev on the Red Terror, at the Seventh City Conference

(342): Riazanov objections to blood-stained red banners

(343-344): key--all this, of course, exacerbated the dire straits the Bolsheviks found themselves in--by September 1918, membership stood at around 6,000 (according to Fitzpatrick, remember, a year earlier it had been 60,000).
And 40% of the members had joined after October! "Clearly, then, mobilization of experienced Bolsheviks for positions in the Red Army and food procurement detachments... had drastically altered the proportion of party veterans to newcomers to the detriment of the party organization." [additionally, only 10% were women; a tiny, tiny fraction were educated]

(349): key--in late 1918, 'failed rebellion' of Left SR-led Second Baltic Fleet Detachment [owing, in large part, to 'conscription'--additionally, "many of the mobilized sailors came from rural villages where Left SR influence still predominated"], in a pattern of events that "foreshadowed the Kronstadt revolt of March 1921." Horrific conditions--more than half did not have shoes! Demanding a return to the gov't of the soviets, nullification of Brest, etc.

(355): important--Eleven of the leaders of the rebellion were shot. Goodness. Crew of another battleship "boldly protested what it termed the 'brutal massacre of genuine proletarians who, because of genuine, truly terrible hunger, participated in nothing more than a hunger riot which was later dubbed an anti-Soviet insurrection.'"

(355): executive summary

Chapter 14, Celebrating 'The Greatest Event in the History of the World'

(357): In the fall of 1918, euphoria over the C. European upheavals.

(371): Moscow-Petrograd rivalry, in part over the autonomy of the Northern Commune as an institution of gov't.

(371): Sixth All-Russian Congress called for 6 November, 1918--primarily to discuss changed international situation, after WWI

(376-377): Zinoviev predicting a Socialist Europe within a few years.

(378-382): large turnout to the anniversary celebrations. "By all accounts, it was a mass festival unlike any Petrograd had ever witnessed."

(380-381): Zinoviev keynote speaker; never mind his position, a year ago!

(382): 100,000 workers marching (only 6,000 members or so, remember)!

(386): In a celebration in a surrounding village: "the crowd gatehred around a 'bonfire of the revolution' to witness the burning of efficies of tormentors and servatns of the old regime... To the author of this acount, an unforgettable sight was the gray-bearded men who had learned about the torment of serfs imposed by landowners fom their fathers and grandfathers dancing in childlike merriment around the bonfire..."

(387-388): executive summary--increasing power of Central Bureau (and governmental agencies, more generally) over district Soviets

Chapter 15, Price of Survival

(389-401): executive summary of entire argument

(390): "In retrpospect, their [the Bolshevik moderates] thinking about the longer-term dangers of an exclusively Bolshevik assumption of power in backward Russia appears very wise..."

(390): key--"Neither revolutionary ideology nor an established pattern of dictatorial behavior are of much help to explain fundametnal changes in the character and political role of the Bolshevik party..., although the impact of both cannot be entirely discounted. The fact is that the Petrograd Bolsheviks had to transform themselves from rebels into rulers without benefit of an advance plan... Most significant in shaping the earliest evolution of party and soviet bodies, their relationship to each other, and the Soviet political system generally, were the realiteis the Bolsheviks faced in their often seemingly hopeless struggle for survival."

(391-393): absolutely key, in sum--"Three factors explain the relatively weak leadership role of the Petrograd Bolshevik party organizatoin during the first months of Soviet rule. Initially, the most important of these was the lack of any special concern.. with the institutionalization of an authoritative and exlusive directing role for party organs in government. Most historians of Soviet Russia have assumed [this]... However, the large body of relevant sources... leaves no room for doubt that for some time the need for a highly structured, all-powerful, centralized party dictatorship was by no means apparent to most Petrograd Bolsheviks... A second factor that helps explain the weak leaderhip... was that, between January and April 1918, it was a participant in... the bitter intraparty conflict over ratificatoin of the Brest treaty... The debilitating effects of the controversy on the party... were not eased until late March... at the emergency Fifth Conference... when the Left Communists were defeated... A final factor contributing to the ineffectiveness of the Petrograd Bolshevik organizatoin at this juncture was the colossal attrition of its most reliable and qualified personnel... The close, interactive linkages between the Petrograd party organization and factory workers, soldiers, and sailors that had been key to the development of popular political programs... were shattered."

(396): key--"The Left SRs provided Soviet power with a critically important link to the countryside. Had the Bolshevik-Left SR alliance survived, it seems likely that the Russian civil war would have been significantly less torturous..."

(397): changing relationship between the Petrograd Soviet and district soviets is dated to fall of 1918, when the latter start to surrender their independence and start to fall in line with directives from above.

(398): "The burden of existing evidence indicates that these events can best be understood as the culmination of a gradual process during which the moderating influence of such key individuals as Uritskii, Krestinksii, and Proshian was replaced by pressure for systematic Red Terror, in part 'from below.'"

(401): ends with dismissiveness towards the German Revolution, in the sense that it is never implied--in his account--that it could have gone past the moderate phase. in fact, as he argues, it was self-consciously repudiating Bolshevik extremism (the important questions, though, and counterfactuals, are left unaddressed.)

---

(1) surely the most important question to ask is the role of the international justification--is it ever anything but utopian? and what then could have been done [/ought to have been done], best, absent this hope? although remember, the deployment of this justification changes across issues, over time, and with its purveyors (it is the Left Communists' justification for revolutionary war in February 1918, for example; and always, also, the Left SRs justification for much of policy pursued in the first half of 1918)

(2) the Left SR position on dissent and terror often seems decidedly more principled than the Bolsheviks--and doesn't, unlike the Mensheviks/SRs, seem to sacrifice the revolution. surely questions are raised here, then? alternatives, though?

(3) as he comes closer and closer to tracking the degeneration, it's quite clear that the Bolsheviks are less and less to be absolved (particularly in the way in which the composition of the Fourth and Fifth Congress of Soviets was tinkered with). But condemnation has to be historical, and comradely--where, again, are the strategic errors that could have been realistically avoided? On the part of the Bolsheviks, since the Left SR blunder is obvious.

(4) question of the peasantry--would it be possible to argue that the gutting of the Peasant Section, with the demise of the Left SRs, sowed the seeds for much of what would come to pass in the Civil War and after? Or is that simply utopian, and too easy?