ideology and utopia, karl mannheim (1929)

(336):two distinct and separable meanings of the term 'ideology'

1. the particular-- when "we are sceptical of the ideas and representations advanced by our opponent"
2. the total-"the ideology of an age or of a concrete historico-social group..."

(337): some distinctions between the two

• particular calls into question specific assertions; total calls into question Weltanschauung
• particular implies, still, a shared thought-system (psychological); total denotes an opposite system of beliefs (noological, or theoretical)
• particular is pscyhological and individual, total more structural and functional (and social)

(338): critical--"...conditioned by the same social situation, they are subject to the same illusions. if we confine our observations to the mental processes which take place in the individual..., we shall never grasp in its totality the structure of the intellectual world belonging to a social group in a given historical situation. although this mental world as a whole could never come into existence without the experiences and productive responses of the different individuals, its inner structure is not to be found in a mere integration of these individual experiences. thd individual members of the working class, for instance, do not experience all the elements of an outlook which could be called the proletarian Weltanschaung..."

(338): "the aim of the analysis on this level is the recontstruction of the systematic theoretical basis underlying the single judgments of the individual."

(339): the problem of false consciousness--"compelled by the dialectical processes of thought, it is necessary to concentrate our attention with greater intensity upon the task of determining which of all the ideas current are really valid in a given situation..." [even as we have conceded, entirely, the premise that all ideas are socially and historically determined. the justification, he seems to be saying, will recall pragmatism]

(339): interesting--"an ethical attitude is invalid if it is oriented with reference to norms, with which action in a given historical setting, even with the best of intentions, cannot comply. it is invalid then when the unethical action of the individual can no longer be conceived as due to his own personal transgression, but must be attributed rather to the compulsion of an erroneously founded set of moral axioms... a theory then is wrong if in a given practical situation it uses concepts and categories which, if taken seriously, would prevent man from adjusting himself at that historical stage..." [notion of 'adjustment' seems particularly important, here--examples given include lending without interest]

(340): a further form of 'ideological distortion', he's arguing, come when one employs "ideology as a form of knowledge[which] is no longer adequate for comprehending the actual world..."

(340): important--but distinction between this kind of incongruity, and the incogruity of utopian ideology -- which is "oriented towards objects which do not exist in the actual situation... [and which] when they pass over into conduct, tend to shatter... the order of things prevailing at that time"

(341): utopias, of course, can get integrated into the establishment ideology, once purged of revolutionary implications [heaven]

(341-342): 'existence' as a 'concretely-operating order', for the sociologist

(342): very true--the importance of contradictory character of prevailing 'order of things' and attendant ideology--"every 'actually operating' order of life is at the same time enmehsed by conceptions which are to be designated as 'transcendent' or 'unreal'. part of this, he's arguing, is the fact that "living consistently... in a society which is not organized on the same principle is impossible."

(343): this is the key distinction between 'ideologies' and 'utopia'--the latter is committed to transformative political practice. and something revolutionary is invariably deemed utopian by the powers-that-be (always meant, then, "in the relative sense").

(344): "by calling everything utopian that goes beyond the present existing order, one sets at rest the anxiety that might arise from the relative utopias that are realizable in another order."

(344): "only in utopia and revolution is there true life, the institutional order is always only the evil residue which remains from ebbing utopias and revolutions. hence, the road of history leads from one topia over a utopia to the next topia..."

(345): key, though, that this not be abstractly formulated--"it is our intention not to establish purely abstractly...some sort of arbitrary relationship between existence and utopia, but rather if possible to do justice to the concrete fullness of the historical and social transformations of utopia in a given period."

(345): sounds quite orthodox--"the existing order gives birth to utopias which in turn break the bounds of the existing order, leaving it free to develop in the direction of the next order of existence." [only this denotes a never-ending process--'utopias are often only premature truths']

(346): well-put: "it is always the dominant group which is in full accord with the existing order that determines what is to be regarded as utopian, while the ascendant group which is in conflict with things as they are is the one that determines what is regarded as ideological." [caveat that same group/project can contain both utopian and ideological elements--bourgoisie and freedom]

(346): for historical study, realization is the criteria that determines what was ideology and what was utopia.