(51): the question, put neatly: “in what sense are there in general 'objectively valid truths' in those disciplines concerned with social and cultural phenomena?
(51-52): our science began as a 'technical science' – even though slowly have we come to appreciate this, he's arguing, we have not made the critical distinction between normative and existential knowledge (we were hampered, in this, by a kind of evolutionary determinism—what exists, in effect, could be no other way; the normative question isn't appropriate, in that sense)
(52): “it can never be the task of an empirical science to provide binding norms and ideals from which directives for immediate practical activity can be derived.” NEITHER is it the case, though, that empirical science must forsake norms/ideals. “The problem is rather: what is the meaning and purpose of the scientific criticism of ideals and value-judgments?”
(52-53): proposing, here, an analysis in terms of ends-means, technical criticism. “Science can make him realize that all action and naturally... inaction imply in their consequences the espousal of certain values... The act of choice is his own responsibility.”
(54): science can aid the decision-maker in a quest for logical consistency of principles, too. But again: “As to whether the person expressing these value-judgments should adhere to these ultimate standards is his personal affair; it involves will and conscience, not empirical knowledge.”
(55): “only on the assumption of belief in the validity of values is the attempt to espouse value-judgments meaningful. However, to judge the validity of such values is a matter of faith.”
(56): in other words, a rejoinder to the technocrats and social engineers: “The distinctive character of a problem of social policy is indeed the fact that it cannot be resolved merely on the basis of purely technical considerations which assume already settled ends. Normative standards of value can and must be the objects of dispute in a discussion of a problem of social policy because the problem lies in the domain of general cultural values.”
(56): ah yes, dear max: “And the conflict occurs not merely... between 'class interests' but between general views on life and the universe as well.” [though he goes on to suggest that, yes, class interests play their part]
(57): critical, summary passage: “The fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must know that we cannot learn the meaning of the world from the results of its analysis... it must rather be in a position to create this meaning itself. It must recognize that general views of life and the universe can never be the products of increasing empirical knowledge, and that the highest ideals, which move us forcefully, are always formed only in the struggle with other ideals which are just as sacred to others as ours are to us.”
(58): this is critical, and perhaps gives us the first opportunity to push back: “This proposition remains correct, despite, as we shall see, the fact that those highest 'values' underlying the practical interest are and always will be decisively significant in determining the focus of attention of analytical activity in the sphere of the cultural sciences.” [in my translation-cum-extension—the necessary partiality of any position re: the empirical facts-on-the-ground is due to this necessary feature of scientific life; the spectre of the practical lurks, always, affecting the nature of what is understood as “factual,” what is deemed worthy of attention, etc. in this sense, weber's account is obviously informed by an excessive optimism, even as he's, rightly, attacking the technocrats. But is his defense, perhaps, meant as an “aspiration”?]
(59-60): at any time, he's arguing, that “value-judgements” enter the pages of this journal, they must be made explicit; any attack on another's world-view must proceed from the conscious self-presentation of one's own world-view (“it must be a struggle against another's ideas from the standpoint of one's own”).
(60): again, the same question as foregrounded above—here, Weber is striving to distinguish the scientific person from the evaluating/acting one.
(61): again, we get the impression that he understands the critique that we would level, back. And yet he's defending this optimistic vision of the purely scientific man. See, for example: “Hence, the very recognition of the existence of a scientific problem coincides, personally, with the possession of specifically oriented motives and values.”
(62): the journal as 'partial' to the interests of the working class
(63): moving, then, to the problem at the heart of the earlier formulation—how can we speak of “objectivity,” as such?
(64): interesting, a very specific definition of what social science is concerned with: “By a social science problem, we mean a task for a discipline the object of which is to throw light on the ramifications of that fundametnal social-economic phenomenon: the scarcity of means.” [I would only add what is really meant here, is the [relative] scarcity of means]
(64-65): what, exactly, are we to make of this prominence of the “economic” within the essay?
(65-66): important, a Weberian materialism, which will require some unpacking as the essay proceeds, with particular attention paid to this distinction between the “economically conditioned” and the “economically relevant”: “Specifically economic motives... operate wherever the satisfaction of even the most immaterial need or desire is bound up with the application of scarce material means. Their forces has everywhere on that account conditioned and transformed not only the mode in which cultural wants or preferences are satisfied, but their content as well, even in their most subjective aspects. The indirect influence of social relations... extends... into all spheres of culture without exception... They are 'economically conditioned.'... On the other hand, all the activities and situations constituting an historically given cultrue affect the formation of the material wants... They thereby affect the course of 'economic development' and are accordingly 'economically relevant.'”
(66): an immediate distinction, which seems critical, pegged to the question of causality, between “historical knowledge” and those things that are preliminary contributions to “historical knowledge” – the former seems to consist of inquiry into the origins of “economic cultural phenomenon”; the latter into tracing these phenomena across cultural contexts.
(67): “We are only drawing the conclusions of this policy when we state that the scientific investigation of the general cultural significance of the social-economic structure of the human community and its historical forms of organizaiton is the central aim of our journal.” [how shall we interpret “cultural,” here? Does it simply mean “ideological”? Not that? Something more, something less?]
(67-68): he is perfectly aware of the alleged “one-sidedness” of the 'economic' approach to cultural life that is being espoused, here. However: the defense is that this one-sidedness is intentional, and necessary; in a nutshell, he seems to be arguing that doing away with this one-sidedness exposes us to an investigation whose breadth forecloses scientific investigation. In that sense, this is not a “general social science”--and that is precisely what makes it possible [but we have the question of 'causality,' again; it is not clear to me that limitation-as-defense can spare you from the thorny theoretical problems that are at the heart of the question of how to understand culture, regardless of the scope of your investigation; although, differently understood (more accurately, inverted), this is kind of the accommodation that a Marxist materialism must perform, too]
(68): critical, rejection/appropriation of Marx: “Liberated as we are from the antiquated notion that all cultural phenomena can be deduced as a product... of the constellation of 'material' interests, we believe nevertheless that the analysis of social... phenomena with special reference to their economic conditioning and ramifications was a scientific principle of creative fruitfulness... The so-called 'materialistic conception of history'... as a a formula for the causal explanation of historical reality is to be rejected most emphatically. The advancement of the economic interpretation of history is one of the most important aims of our journal..”
(68-70): only “laymen” and “dilettantes” are partial to the materialism outlined in the Communist Manifesto! He sees people searching for “economic” explanations—the abuse of 'in the last instance.' Nevertheless: precisely this, in his mind, explains the fact that social scientists have begun to underestimate its scientific power.
(70-71): after more commentary on this alleged search, in the Marxist tradition, for an “economic” explanation of everything, he writes: “The explanation of everything by economic causes alone is never exhaustive in any sense whatsoever in any sphere of cultural phenomena, not even in the 'economic' sphere itself.” [again, it is interesting to try and respond with the framework of limiting the object of analysis—that some things, indeed, have internal, non-material explanations, but that at a higher level of generality (and scientific meaningfulness), when we expand the bounds of what we want to explain, this is simply not the case. superficially, remember, he seems to be agreeing to a similar kind of materialism via limiting. yet it should be obvious that ours is worlds apart, precisely because it asserts the primacy of an ordered materialism. To me it is unclear that his, in this admission of “one-sidedness,” is anything more than an epistemological mish-mash.]
(72): and thus, all explanations are “one-sided,” in some, very primary, fundamental way: “There is no absolutely 'objective' scientific analysis of culture—or put perhaps more narrowly but certainly not essentially differently for our purposes—of 'social phenomena' independent of special and 'one-sided' viewpoints according to which—expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously—they are selected, analyzed, and organized for expository purposes.”
(73): applying a law to explain concrete reality requires you to decide what, exactly, will constitute the explanandum: “those elements in each event which are left unaccounted for by the selection of their elements subsumable under the 'law' are considered as scientifically unintegrated residues which will be taken care of in the further perfection of the system of 'laws.'”
(73): following from this, he notes the quest for “astronomical knowledge” – “the attitude which declares the ideal which all the sciences... towards which they should strive... is a system of propositions from which reality can be 'deduced.'”
(73-75): important--his critique recalls Hume: “the reality to which the laws apply always remains equally individual, equally undeducible from laws.” and later, on pg 75, arguing against the notion that reality can be broken up into building blocks ('factors') that can then be used to explain things causally, he makes the same kind of point: “The real reason is that the analysis of reality is concerned with the configuration into which those (hypothetical!) 'factors' are arranged to form a cultural phenomenon which is historically significant to us. Furthermore, if we wish to 'explain' this individal configuration 'causally' we must invoke other equally individual configurations on the basis of which we will explain it with the aid of those (hypothetical!) 'laws.'”
(76): important--acknowledging, again, the necessary partiality of our object of study, in the cultural sciences (how, again, are we to relate this to the social sciences? As subset? As distinct? Surely the same principle applies, to everything): “The significance of a configuration of cultural phenomena and the basis of this significance cannot however be derived and rendered intelligible by a system of analytical laws... since the significance of cultural events presupposes a value-orientation towards these events. The concept of culture is a value concept. Empirical reality becomes 'culture' to us because and insofar as we relate it to value ideas. It includes... only those segments of reality which have become significant to us because of this value-relevance... Perception of its meaningfulness to us is the presupposition of its becoming an object of investigation.”
(78): the object of our study is defined by its individuality, in this sense: “We seek knowledge of an historical phenomenon, meaning by historical: significant in its individuality.”
(78): important--arguing that we have to perform this selection of what is significance (i.e., it is not simply a perennial obstacle to 'pure' knowledge; it is a necessary, epistemological tool): “And the decisive element in this is that only through the presupposition that a finite part alone of the infinite variety of phenomena is significant, does the knowledge of an individual phenomenon become logically meaningful. Even with the widest imaginable knowledge of 'laws,' we are helpless in the face of the question: how is the causal explanation of an individual fact possible—since a description of even the smallest slice of reality can never be exhaustive?... A chaos of 'existential judgements'... would be the only result of a serious attempt to analyze reality 'without presuppositions.'... Only certain sides of the infinitely complex concrete phenomenon, namely those to which we attribute a general cultural significance—are therefore worthwhile knowing.” ”
(79): again, we can only capture things as they exist concretely and individually (“imputation”): “It is in brief a question of imputation. Wherever the causal explanation of a 'cultural phenomenon... the knowledge of causal laws is not the end of the investigation but only a means. It facilitates and renders possible the causal imputation to their concrete causes of those components of a phenomenon the individuality of which is culturally significant.”
(79): you do need, of course, what he calls 'nomological' knowledge; in other words, the 'general' and the 'universal' have their place: “whether a single individual component... is... to be assigned causal responsibility for an effect... can in doubtful cases be determined only by estimating the effects which we generally expect from it...”
(80): “in the cultural sciences, the knowledge of the universal or general is never valuable in itself.”
(80): summary passage, outlining why knowledge of cultural phenomena cannot be 'objective': “Firstly, because the knowledge of social laws is not knowledge of social reality but is rather one of the various aids used by out minds for attaining this end; secondly, because knowledge of cultural events is inconceivable except on a basis of the significance which the concrete constellations of reality have for us in certain individual concrete situations.”
(81): “All knowledge of cultural reality... is knowledge from particular points of view.”
(83): a refutation of a refutation of the materialist understanding of laws as 'superstructrue' (which doesn't, of course, mean that it is a defense of the materialist position).
(84): important—truth is pegged to the 'pursuit': “It obviously does not follow from this that research... can only have results which are 'subjective' in the sense that they are valid for one person and not for others. Only the degree to which they interest different persons varies... IN the method of investigation, the guiding 'point of view' is of great importance for the construction of the conceptual scheme which will be used in the investigation. In the mode of their use, however, the investigator is obviously bound by the norms of our thought just as much here as elsewhere. For scientific truth is precisely what is valid for all who seek the truth.”
(84-85): the assertion of a universal, general will come up with problems because 'everything is in flow'
(85): turning, now, to the question of methodology – what is the status/use of the objects we employ?
(85): against the enlightenment weltanschung, which had its roots in the optimism/technical character of the natural sciences (the non-problematic move from concrete to abstract)
(86): with the theory of evolution, this reached its peak: “it appeared as if there was in general no conceivable meaning of scientific work other than the discovery of the laws of events.”
(87-88): dealing, here, with a more sophisticated theorist, who agrees on the non-identity of laws with reality, but still believes in the pursuit of abstract laws which can model reality. He's arguing that they're caught in a bind, it seems: “In spite of the fundamental methodological distinction between historical knowledge and the knowledge of 'laws' which the creator of the theory drew as the first and only one, he now claims empirical validity, in the sense of the deducibility of reality from 'laws,' for the propositions of abstract theory... This claim fails to observe that in order to be able to reach this result even in the simplest case, the totality of existing historical reality including every one of its causal relationships must be assumed as 'given' and presupposed as known.”
(90): important--introducing the “ideal-type,” by way of the free-market model: “The ideal typical concept will help to develop our skill in imputation in research: it is no 'hypothesis' but it offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses. It is not a description of reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression to such a description. It is thus the 'idea' of the historically given modern society, based on an exchange economy, which is developed for us by quite the same logical principles as are used in constructing the idea of the medieval 'city economy' as a 'genetic' concept... It is a utopia. Historical research faces the task of determining in each individual case, the extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from reality...” [note my emphasis, which suggest that the ideal-type itself must be recognized as a product of a particular history]
(92): ideal-type, con't: “The construction of abstract ideal-types recommends itself not as an end but as a means. Every conscientious examination of the conceptual elements of historical exposition shows however that the historian as soon as he attempts to go beyond the bare establishement of concrete relationships and to determine the cultural significance of even the simplest individual event in order to 'characterize' it, must use concepts which are precisely and unambiguously definable only in the form of ideal types.”
(93): and more still: “it is even less fitted to serve as a schema under which a real situation or action is to be subsumed as one instance. It has the significance of a purely ideal limiting concept with which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed for the explication of certain of its significant components.”
(94): I suppose this means that it is only in application that the ideal-typical becomes filled out? “...the concepts thereupon become ideal-typical in the sense that they appear in full conceptual integrity either not at all or only in individual instances.”
(94): he is obviously, as he says here, not saying that these things are real, or that they are a 'procrustean bed' into which history can be cast, or that they are real forces which explain the passage of history.
(98): the ideal-typical might become evaluative—as in, it contains what the author thinks christianity 'ought' to contain. This is obviously departing from what Weber wants the theorist to do. “The sphere of empirical science has been left behind and we are constructed with a profession of faith, not an ideal-typical construct.”
(99): are you proceeding, then, from what men themselves think? “In other words, here too the practical idea which should be valid or is believed to be valid and the heuristically intended, theoretically ideal type approach each other very closely and constantly tend to merge with each other.”
(100-101): these passages are important, though I have not fully understood the argument that leads to this assertion (though I understand the assertion): “The goal of ideal-typical concept-construction is always to make clearly explicit not the class or average character but rather the unique individual character of cultural phenomena.”
(101-102): here are the passages where he acknowledges the fixity of the ideal-type as hitherto constructed, and thus proposed an ideal-type of 'developmental' dimensions; in other words, you apply the ideal-type to a historical progression: “This procedure gives rise to no methodological doubts so long as we clearly keep in mind that ideal-typical developmental constructs and history are to be sharply distinguished from each other...”
(102): “The danger of this procedure... lies in the fact that historical knowledge here appears as a servant of theory instead of the opposite role.”
(103): important—assimilating Marx: “we will only point out here that naturally all specifically Marxian 'laws' and developmental constructs—insofar as they are theoretically sound—are ideal types. The eminent, indeed unique, heuristic significance of these ideal types when they are used for the assessment of reality is known to everyone... Similarly, their perniciousness, as soon as they are thought of as empirically valid or as real 'effective forces,' 'tendencies,' etc., is likewise known to those who have used them.”
(104): the idea that we will transcend the era of ideal types one day is wrong, even as it is right to point out the inevitable obsolescence of current ideal-types, weber thinks: “At the very heart of their task lies not only the transiency of all ideal types but also at the same time the inevitability of new ones.”
(106): important—he is writing explicitly against this position, remember—the position that makes ends of theoretical concepts, rather than recognizing it as means: “the latter still hold in many ways, expressly or tacitly, to the opinion that it is the end and the goal of every science to order its data into a system of concepts, the content of which is to be acquired and slowly perfected through the observation of empirical regularities, the construction of hypotheses, and their verification, until finally a 'completed' and hence deductive science emerges.”
(108-110): an illustration of the 'buzzing, confused complexity' through agriculture
(110): summary passage: “The objective validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon the ordering of the given reality according to categories which are subjective in a specific sense, namely, in that they present the presuppositions of our knowledge and are based on the presupposition of the value of those truths which empirical knowledge alone is able to give us.”
(111): summary passage: “The 'objectivity' of the social sciences depends rather on the fact that the empirical data are always related to those evaluative ideas which alone make them worth knowing and the significance of the empirical data is derived from these evaluative ideas. But these data can never become the foundation for the empirically impossible proof of the validity of the evaluative ideas.”
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