collected snippets of immediate importance...


Thursday, November 27, 2008

Estimates of TTP strength run to over twenty thousand tribesmen, and Mehsud is said to command at least five thousand fighters. He is likely responsible for a rash of suicide bombings throughout Pakistan over the past year. A small contingent of his forces also made headlines when they managed to take hostage over 250 Pakistani soldiers in August 2007. By all appearances, the Pakistani Taliban now represents the greatest threat to security within Pakistan. Significant militant groups other than the TTP include the TNSM in Bajaur Agency, Swat District, and neighboring areas of the NWFP, founded by the pro-Taliban Sufi Mohammad and more recently commanded by his son-in-law, the popular and charismatic “Radio Mullah” Fazlullah. In South Waziristan, a tribal militia under the command of Maulvi Nazir apparently received Pakistani government support in factional fighting against Uzbek militants over the past year. And in Khyber Agency, another radio Mullah, Mangal Bagh Afridi, leads Lashkar-e-Islam (LI), a militant group that has resisted association with the TTP, is active all the way to the outskirts of
Peshawar, and desires Taliban-style government.

(...) Consequently, security and development efforts on the Afghan side of the border take on special urgency. Interdicting the narcotics trade is especially relevant. Without a more effective counternarcotics campaign in Afghanistan, one that stresses shutting down major trafficking rings, militants in Pakistan will continue to enjoy easy access to cash, and, by extension, to foot soldiers, vehicles, and weapons.
(...) In the short run, a temporary work program may also be a useful means to ompete with the Taliban for the many mercenary foot soldiers who only fight for the paycheck. That said, any cash-for-work program that does not lead to stable, sustainable incomes might quickly prove counterproductive by frustrating the mbitions of the men (and their families) it is intended to serve.
(...) The peculiar colonial-era mechanisms for governance in the FATA—its federal administration through the governor and political agents by application of the FCR—must yield to a more representative and transparent political process.

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