Civil-Military Relations in 'Islamic Democracies', Lenze 2011

(198-199): useful for Turkey timeline

(208): distinguishing characteristic of Turkey is army's possession of broad popular support

(229: Though, still, occasionally take pains to avoid the 'poor, conservative, peasant electorate'

(241): Kemalist shift to the Left in the 1960s

(252): 1980 coup in context of an economic crisis

(258): After 1980 coup military imposes restrictive constitution before handing back power

(261): Military continuity into civilian era (i.e., re-democratization with persistent powers)

267): 1989, Turkey gets its first civilian president

(272): International incentives to be democracy (EU, etc.)

(283): AKP successfully passed legislation that increased civilian control over the military

(285, 298): Here, an (1) individual-based explanation of why the military didn't intervent after the AKP intruded on its privilege; plus (2) fact that the economy was doing well

Christian Democracy and the AKP: Parallels and Contrasts, Hale 2007

(294): CD has its origins in the immediate post-WWII environment (as fascism was discredited but communism ascendant)

(295): Vatican came to democracy only in 1944

(297): These were 'catch-all' parties that followed the general drift towards neoliberalism; always strongly pro-Europe

(302): AKP inherited an economic mess, initially turned to IMF

(304): CHP/Military involved in public devates [This has to be distinguished from praetorianism]

(305): Political Parties Law a serious intervention--prohibits unions from affiliating with political parties..

(306): AKP less middle-class than the CD parties

The evolution of civil-military relations in post-war Turkey, Karabelias (2006)

(131): 1876, Turkey's first constitution and Parliament

(132): DP punished for pursuing policies that hurt military, 1950-1960

(133): Between 1960-1965, and 1971-1973, military in power--able to resolve pol/organizational problems [Did this better than Pak military? Why?]

(133): 1980 Coup happened after economic crisis and 'mobilization'

(133): 12 September 1980 to 6 December 1983, military rule

(134): important--military sponsored a constitutional intervention to safeguard its powers (Constitution of 1982), and institutionalized themselves in power, shaping the terrain of political competition, banning parties, etc. [How is this different from praetorian democracy?]

(139): in the early-mid 1990s, a series of crises meant that the Military still wielded substantial control

(140): military as an institution was (1) very large and important; (2) very cohesive [True of Pakistan as well, though. This can't explain much of anything]

(140): Details re: military's independent economic power [Again, here important to see what exactly the contrast with Pakistan consists in]

(141): Civilians have relatively less legitimacy [Means miltary can open the democratic process w/o as much fear?]

A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish Generals.., Aydinli (2009)

(585): The popular coup? "Society" supports its Army [Overstated, of coruse--but certainly greater legitimacy has something to do with its ability to relinquish power more quickly than in Pakistan. Something like, 'better institutionalized']

(587): Two groups in military: Bukukenit (conservative bloc), and Ozkok (progressive bloc)

(593): 'soft power' now, 'hard power' before [same idea as 'support from society']

religion and culture in turkey, andrew mango (2004)

(999): education in Turkey coresponds to lower level of mosque attendance; opposite of Europe

globaliation and capital mobility in the automobile industry, aschoff (2010)

(1): perception of competition over wages is at the root of declining union power (i.e., that unions' subscription to the globalization narrative explains their failed strategies) [interesting but surely marginal]

(6): not 'race to the bottom' [this is better framed as 'filling out' the other pressures that capital faces]

1. large market
2. skilled workforce
3. proximity to assemblers/suppliers
4. state policies
5. pressures from finance

(9): US has been the site fo much new investment

(11-12): Serious pressures to move to low-wage sites [The point of the argument, then, can only be that this isn't the only thing going on. Not that it's entirely unimportant, which is sometimes how the claim is presented]

(16): New jobs have been created by new assembly/component firms, thanks to foreign capital moving to the US (and this is equal to the job loss)

(19): why capital moves? 1. location theory; 2. political conditions; 3. laobur

(29): Aschoff wants to introduce four dynamics: 1. intercapitalist competition; 2. capital-labour competition; 3. gepolitics; 4. financialization

(44): for Delphi, "a tacitcal decision' was made to move abroad--it wasn't mandated by economic exigencies, but was a strategic decision

Chapter 2

(49): 1. There have been more oepneings than closings in the US, based on Aschoff's sample

(53): 2. Investment is also happening in 'traditional' regions

(59): 3. US assemblers opened almost as many as Asia suppliers have; US suppliers have opened far more

(63): 4. There's been a 'stretching' of production, rather than a replacement of North by South

(65): Low-value added production has moved to Mexico; high value-added has stayed within US

(68): in sum, we have seen 'restructuring,' rather than simple job loss

(71): in the 1990-2005 period there was expansion (but without addition of labour)

(74): important--new investment in traditional regions has remained unorganized [strongly suggesting that it's union bankruptcy rather than the bogey of the 'US South' that's prohibited expansion]

Chapter 3

(84-85): suggestion of ways in which apartheid was dysfunctional for Capital

Chapter 4

(131-132): Delphi's trajectory is not a 'production costs' one, but (1) rise of finacne + (2) inter-capitalist competition story [Again, these are all pressures, yes--but it's still true that lowering costs would still be a way of alleviating pressures. It's distinct from the globalization story, but it is not a total refutation of that story's central mechanism, for good reason.]

(142): Volcker shock hit manufacturing hard (tight credit, high dollar)

(143): Ec recovery by 1982, but interest rates were still high

(145): 'State policies "matter" [But of course they do. It seems an odd 'central mechanism' for an analysis of why capital moves, though]

(146): Now, three processes matter: (1) export restrcitions; (2) financialization; (3) GM-UAW relations

(153): 'quick-fix' solutions to deep problems were pursued

(155): key--restructuring in response to pressures int he 1980s undermined post-war compact between Capital and Labour (through (1) geographical mobility; (2) technical changes; (3) firing [In this sense, the post-war compact was unwound as much by the normal operation of capitalism, as it was by 'bureeaucracy'. The key question, which Aschoff doesn't really ask, is what could labour have done realistically. Counter-factually, had a different strategy been pursued, how might this have looked?]

(157): a 'cooperative' stance didn't work [so, again, what would have? Militancy?]

(159): There's a 'lazy' argument here that the Reagan counterrevolution made it difficutl to resist [At best this ignores the effects of bureaucratization; at worst, this ignores capitalism!]

(177, 183): Accessions, concessions, etc. [Good place to ask the counterfactual question]

(187): Firms closed above and beyond what was necessary--used this opportunity to restructure/streamline so as to better position themselves to be competitive

(203): Labour costs are a small % of value [for a diss that wants to evaluate the importance of labour costs in determining capital mobility, surely this has to be brought up earlier!?]