(12): instrumental obscurantism--SAK enjoning muslims not to join Congress by saying can't be 'friends' with non-Muslims
(16): British cobble together 51 'representative' Muslims, 1909 -- 41 were landowners!
(16): 1910, tensions in ML with arriving 'lawyer party'
(17): Congress failure to attract Muslims b/c
- ML convincing 'Muslims'
- Congress use of Hindu symbolism in Maharashtra (Tilak and Gokhale)
(18): Swadeshi was borrowed from Chinese boycott of American goods
(21): Jinnah joins ML in 1913, as 'lawyer/liberal' wing of ML becoming more powerful
(21): this is context of Lucknow Pact in 1916 (high-water mark of unity)
(22): Jinnah suggestion that only 'matriculates' should be allowed into Congress
(24): Jinnah disdainful at agitation/discord during Khlilafat campaign ('inviting chaos')
(24): all manner of anti-British fatwas passed
(26): Simon Comission was all-white; Nehru report was the Congress' response (rejected separate electorates)
(27): Jinnah put forward 14 points , in 1928, as objection (separate electorates, strong representation at centre). Rejected at by All-Parties Conf.
(28): RTConf and CDisobdience, 1930-32
(29): Gov't of India Act 1935
(32): Congress' contradictions, imp--in UP in favour of land reforms, but in Bengal opposed to them; in Punjab and Sind opposed legislation against moneylenders
(34): in '36'-'37, Jinnah wanted to push for negotiations with Congress; but Congress was in strong position, and regarded ML as unimportant
(35): this attitude exemplified in Congress dismissiveness to ML in UP, 1947 elections (demanded that ML merge with Congress). Azad focused on this as leading to Pakistan
(36): Nehru on Muslims--'I come into greater touch with Muslim massess.."
(36): Congress launching Muslim mass contact movement, a challenge to ML
(36): suggestion that this induces Sir Sikander, Fazlul Hug, Saadullah to push their members to join ML
(40-41): ambiguity over Lahore resolution, 1940
(42): Jinnah alliance with titled genry in Punjab, NWFP and Sindh, who loved the British.
(42): imp, this added to the several reasons that collaborationist stance during WWII was essential to ML success
(43): Jinnah-Gandhi negotiations in 1944--denouncing proposed Pakistan as 'moth-eaten', but forced to accept just that in 1947...
(44): Jinnah wrecked Simla conference, 1945, with uncompromising attitude
(45): 1946 elections, ML did much better (but ML ministries only in Bengal and Sind)
(45): Cripps in 1946, failed to bridge differences between Congress and ML
(48): Jinnah launched murderous DAD August 1946 in response to Cabinet Mission Plan failure to give ML sole right to nominate Muslim members to interim government
(52): critical--when up against it, in 1945-1946, ML's path to the masses was through ulama, pirs. divine displeasure against candidates who didn't vote for ML.
(53): lefties in the ML, in this period (GM Syed expelled, of course, because of outspoken criticisms)
(54): in this period (37-47), ML went through a steady centralization
(54-55): character of ML Council--landlord dominated, second biggest party was lawyers
(57-58): important, ML by itself was very weak in Bengal and Punjab, b/c of weight of non-Muslims. had to make alliances with provincial parties. ML also very weak in Frontier and Sindh.
(59): 'popularity' of ML in this time period, moreover, was very short-lived ('pakistan and Islam,' not 'issue-based')
(59): the organizational structure of the ML was very, very weak. Jinnah-heavy, full of pliable men.
