India-backed NA coming up as late as Sep 2009
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/226531

"While far from perfect, you will find Zardari is pro-American, anti-extremist and eager to be seen as working with the USG."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/213170

"While the party had no grassroots supporters, its candidates in both 2002 and 2005 performed well due to their personal influence in their local areas."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/135859

"As he has before, Zardari stressed that the Global War on Terror (GWOT) was "Pakistan's war."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/156183

"The decision was no surprise; Zardari advised Ambassador weeks ago that he felt he had to move to rein in Nawaz (Ref ). However, in a phone call, Zardari--just back from his latest trip to China--told Charge February 25 that he had "nothing to do with the decision" and had been surprised by Shahbaz's disqualification. He noted that the Court had ruled against the government, which had been representing the Sharifs. He said he had ordered PPP Punjab Governor Taseer to temporarily take over the Punjab government until new elections for a Chief Minister could be held. He expected the PPP would have a candidate and thought the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) party would also be interested in running a candidate."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/193807

" There may be as many as 5000 such terrorist detainees currently in the custody of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps from operations in Malakand, Bajaur, and Mohmand. As operations in these areas and other parts of the FATA proceed, this number will increase."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/224469

"The Pakistani Army has for just the second time approved deployment of U.S. special operation elements to support Pakistani military operations. The first deployment, with SOC(FWD)-PAK elements embedded with the Frontier Corps in XXXXXXXXXXXX, occurred in September (reftel). Previously, the Pakistani military leadership adamantly opposed letting us embed our special operations personnel with their military forces."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/229065

"During Ambassador's fourth meeting in a week with Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Kayani on March 10, he again hinted that he might, however reluctantly, have to persuade President Zardari to resign if the situation sharply deteriorates. He mentioned Asfundyar Wali Khan as a possible replacement. This would not be a formal coup but would leave in place the PPP government led by PM Gilani, thus avoiding elections that likely would bring Nawaz Sharif to power. We do not believe Army action is imminent. We do believe Kayani was laying down a clear marker so that, if he has to act, he can say he warned the U.S. in advance and gave us ample opportunities to pressure both sides to back down. Kayani is trying to leverage what he considers predominate U.S. influence over Zardari, instead of seeking a direct confrontation that could provoke an unhelpful civil-military clash... He told Nawaz that he would win the next election and should just be patient; by pressing now, he threatened a political vacuum that would be filled by the Army. This time, warned Asfundyar, Nawaz might not be sent into a comfortable exile. Nawaz refused to budge."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/196412

"General Petraeus raised the likelihood of an alternative shipment route for NATO through central Asia, stressed the continued need for the route through Khyber, and expressed appreciation for increased cooperation on the border with ISAF forces."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/188670

"Zardari is our best ally in Pakistan right now, and U.S. interests are best served by preventing another cycle of military rule... We now are providing approximately $2 billion annually to Pakistan, including: $1.2 billion in Coalition Support Fund reimbursements; $150 million to improve socio-economic conditions in FATA; $300 million in ESF aid for the rest of Pakistan; over $10 million for internally displaced persons fleeing combat in Bajaur, Mohmand and Swat; $300 million (not yet received); and an imminent $15 million in aid to the NWFP police.8. (C) If approved and financed, the Kerry-Lugar legislation will enable us to triple non-military aid to $1.5 billion per year. We will plan in FY 2010 to spend over $100 million to augment civilian police and $873 million to build counter-insurgency capability."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/193196

"Baitullah Mehsud and the military are the predominant
actors in South Waziristan. However, as the government plays
out a strategy of divide and rule, the alliances, feuding, and
maneuverings of other militants as well as tribal and political
figures bears watching in assessing the direction that
operations in South Waziristan will take. End comment."
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/07/09PESHAWAR147.html

"Yes, ISI for the most part, is cooperative with U.S.
Consulate requests for information and support. They are an
important U.S. ally in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).
However, there is a divided loyalty within ISI ranks which may
cause inaction, or assistance to Taliban and anti U.S. groups."
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/07/09PESHAWAR147.html

ISI, (Note: Pakistan’s military intelligence. End note), during the in camera session of the parliament recently, had briefed lawmakers and senior GOP officials concerning the virtues of some taliban elements versus the “real militants.”
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/01/09PESHAWAR2.html

It is too early to predict how effective
this new alliance will be in launching cross-border attacks
on U.S./NATO forces, but its formation will provide the group
with unfettered access to Afghanistan across North and South
Waziristan. It is another indication that the GOP's tribal
divide and conquer strategy against militants is not working,
at least not to our advantage. Pakistan's security forces,
however, may see limited downsides to an arrangement that
focuses militant attacks outside of Pakistan.
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/03/09ISLAMABAD478.html

"This is just the second time that GHQ has approved deployment of U.S. special operations elements to support Pakistani military operations. In September 2009, four SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel who were embedded with the Frontier Corps (FC) at XXXXXXXXXXXX in the FATA, provided ISR for an FC operation (reftel). This support was highly successful, enabling the FC to execute a precise and effective artillery strike on an enemy location... U.S. special operation elements have been in Pakistan for more than a year, but were largely limited to a training role. The Pakistani Army leadership previously adamantly opposed letting us embed U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) with their military forces to support their operations. The recent approval by GHQ -- almost certainly with the personal consent of Chief of Army Staff General Kayani -- for SOC(FWD)-PAK deployments to XXXXXXXXXXXX appears to represent a sea change in Pakistani thinking. Patient relationship-building with the military is the key factor that has brought us to this point. The Pakistanis are increasingly confident that we do not have ulterior motives in assisting their operations. In addition, the direct recipients of SOC(FWD)-PAK training appear to have recognized the potential benefits of bringing U.S. SOF personnel into the field with them for operational advice and other support. In addition, the success of the initial deployment to XXXXXXXXXXXX likely helped catalyze the follow-up requests for new and repeat support."
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/10/09ISLAMABAD2449.html

DGISI Pasha said Kayani was receiving criticism on the bill from the Corps Commanders. Ambassador emphasized the bill’s long-term commitment to Pakistan and made three points: provisions of the bill could be waived; the bill only requires certifications and “assessments;” and the bill does not apply to the large amounts in the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund or Coalition Support Fund but only, so far, to non-appropriated Foreign Military Financing. Pasha and Kayani repeated that the Army had taken huge steps this year in its bilateral cooperation with the US and in its campaign in Swat and Bajaur and was getting little public (or private) credit from the US for these historic steps. Kayani said he was considering a statement on the bill, but he was struggling with what to say. He realized that Senator Kerry and Vice President Biden, the original sponsor of the bill, were among Pakistan,s best friends. He predicted the parliamentary debate would be tough, but in the final analysis the government controlled the agenda.
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/10/09ISLAMABAD2427.html

the moderate muslim brotherhood, FA 2007

(108): MB as 'moderates' with whom the US can work

(110): for moderates in MB, democracy as compatible with 'slow Islamization'

(111): whereas for jihadists (Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi), democracy is 'polytheism'

(111): road to power is not revolutionary ('Fabian strategy')

(112): 'salafi?' but there is the Jamal al-Din al-Afghani kind (political participation), and the Saudi kind

(113): Qutb's ambiguous legacy

(115): reformist vs. conservative divide, re: question of political party

(115): no effective international organization -- ('no Comintern'). differences re: Iraq invasion, war in Lebanon, etc.

(118): no Islamists arrested in the French riots in 2005

(119): softness of the brotherhood in France (UOIF)