heper and evin, state democracy and the military: turkey in the 1980s


(83): effect of political system was to re-found party system on a modern footing


(138): Menderes was an expression of non-urban elite discomfort of secularist-statis turn; military was unfriendly to landed elite who were culturally more conservative


(164-165): [from William Hale article] young officers marginalized in later coup, precisely because of 'coup within a coup' fears

the political economy of turkish democracy, caglar keyder (1979)

(4) key argument is the absence of a hereditary aristocracy; it was politically expropriated by the bureaucratic elite (beginning of its dissolution in the late 19th century, with the Tanzimat reforms)

(5) weak landlord class

(7) w/ independence in 1923, there was the birth of a new bourgeoisie

(7) key--those who had benefited from the explusion of the Greeks and the Armenians (who were merchants and rich peasants, respectively) were the social basis of Turkish nationalism

(9-10) the independence movement was categorically not a social revolution, no fundamental change in the economic structure

(9) Kemalism was a partial break from original ideology of CUP period


(12) Kemal's reforms in the 1920s sought to imitate the superstructure of Western modernity, and he was forced to defend these against the peasantry. Probably made easier by healthy state of economy

(13-14) from the 1930s to WWII, v. close to fascism in its essentials, though (!) it lacked a popular base. 'only repression kept the regime intact'

(15) almost half of trade in 1936 conducted w/ Germany

(15-18) in mid-1930s, conscious prioritization of industry; landowners and m-peasantry suffering, which would become basis of DP. rooted in landlords, m-peasantry, and some disaffected bourgeoisie

(19) most vilalges had v. few landlords, mostly poor-mid peasants

(20) key claim--relative 'success' of democracy was based on (1) absence of aristocracy; (2) millions of middle peasants

(23) in 30s/40s/50s, Turkey marked by scarcity of foreign capital

(25) May 1960 coup in context of (1) student movement; (2) support of urban intelligentsia; (3) DP authoritarianism

(26) in 1961, RPP got same number of votes as in 1957 (residual sympathy for the DP, after assasination)

(28): key--Turkey's unique democracy was b/c of (1) large small-holding peasantry; (2) absence of foreign capital, and, w/ 1960s, (3) stalemate between fractions of the bourgeoisie (i.e., agrarian capitalists vs. commercial bourgeoisie)

(30): March 1971 to Oct 1973 coup, followed massive workers' demo in June 1970

(31): motivated, at least partly, by a clash between big capital and small capital--over control of Chambers of Commerce, etc.

(31): by 1970s, easy phase of ISI coming to an end

(32) 'petty bourgeois radicalism' had a hand to play in this. idea that radical schemes could be passed through the military.

(34) key--Army driven out of political life b/c (1) continuing strength of military reformist tradition, which respects constitution. recrutiment from lower-class milieu, rather than landowning aristocracy; (2) credibility of political parties

(36-40): RPP becoming more radical, winning some w-class support. but not quite a SD party



(

R. Walker, "Putting Capital In Its Place" (1999)

(264) ability to pay high wages = 1. productivity + 2. w-class capacity + 3. politics of labour (social contract, etc.) + 4. profit on investment + 5. condition of place

(264) we are very far from living in a low-cost world--still serious c-tendencies

(266) there are place-specific assets

(267) obv--not all industry has moved to Haiti, yet

(268) agglomeration economies

(269) cheap labour competition is an issue, but a minor one

(269-270) what matters are unit costs: wages x productivity (Germany at 80% of Us, Japan at 50% of US in 1980s)

(272) It's the success of the NIC's that has raised the spectre of 'cheap labour'

(273-274) immigration is a small proportion of the labour force; except in exceptional cases, difficult to see how they could bring down wages (think, also, that immigration to US was highest during first boom, and was cut off only in the 20s)

(277) low-road capitalisms have done well, on occasion, but never matched records of their high road rivals

(278) investment drives productivity growth (w/o determining it entirely, of course)

(279) Japan went to SE Asia (partly) in reaction to US attempts to protect domestic manufacturing in 1985

(280) servioces grew most because the rate of profit there has held up the best

(280) overcapacity in the world economy as fundamental cause of slowdown

 (281) for Europe and Japan post-WWII, not high nor low road, but 'divided highway' (i.e., some of their competitive advantage did come from low wage costs)
 

Walker, "A Requiem for Corporate Geography" (1989)

(44) Myrdal's influence on location theory through concept of 'cumulative causation'

(46) in contrast to classic theory, the calculus of large firms is basically indistinguishable from small firms [part of the attempt to recenter discussions on the economy/capitalism, away from firm parameters]

(47) organizational characteristics also don't change parameters of firm calculus (again, beyond corporate geography)

(50) corporate goegraphers promote 'industrial organization' over processes of industrialization [reminder that you can't escape capitalism]

(53) neoclassicals smuugle everythin in through the back door--everything important that affects/defines production is exogenous to their model, in effect

(53) 'efficacy' vs. 'cost efficiency'

(57) wide variety of organizational forms can work

(60) against 'uneven development', no notion of fixed hierarchy of places

(62-63) 'affection for petty bourgeois palliatives (i.e., small business, etc.)--need, in short, for a more "capacious socialist agenda"

 

walker, "geography of production" (2000)

(14) including everything manufacture-like not classified as such, estimates are 40-50% of total labour force

(119) skyscrapers as 20th century's 'dark satanic mills'

(119) workplace integration presents various advantages, but doesn't mean you need River Rouge -- 'importance of factory as a business strategy' diminishing..

(120) "no single best solution" [the problem, here, is that this becomes just a nice way of saying you have nothing to say]

(123) industrial location is not about pre-given costs, but about creating systems of innovation, etc.

(126) technological development has its own logic, dependent on the industry/sector (i.e., mechanization in agriculture is different from mechanization in healthcare)

justice as equality, christopher ake (1975)

(71) justice is to be understood as complete equality in benefits and burdens (it can, of course, be traded for other social virtues)

(76-77) Barry's critiqeu of Rawls: difference principle is not about justice, exclusively, but actually incorporates considerations of welfare [the whole 'better off' bit]

(80) crux of the argument is that justice comes apart from other considerations; and that it absorbs common distributive maxims

(81) friend who finds book? reward only the one who found it, or the one who looked without finidng it? only the former, but this is because it's competition within the rules of a contest

(86) intentions matter to the extent that they reflect burdens borne [the danger, in all this, is that Ake's argument simply narrows what we use 'justice' to describe, w/o actually assisting in any solution to the problem of how to arrange institutions to fit intuitions]

(88) effort and need are not opposed criteria, on this conception--both are burdens that people bear

parasites, pimps, and capitalists: a naturalistic conception of exploitation, tommie shelby (2002)

(382) defending a nonmoral notion of exploitation

(389) 'outcome' model of parasitism--paraiste benefits, host is harmed vs. process model of parasitism--parasite scrounges on host's foraging efforts (i.e., distribution of benefits vs. how exploiters obtain benefits)

(393) 'basic structure of exploitation' (BSE): (a) if Y forced to make sacrifice which benefits X; (b) X obtains this advantage by virtue of some power over Y

(394-395) defining 'harm'/'sacrifice'  -- it can't be the case that it's only exploitation of the exploited gets no benefit, because there are examples of exploitative relationships in which the exploited gets some benefit (i.e., a wage, a gig, etc.) [seems to me you'll have to introduce some kind of counterfactual notion]

(397-398) the cause of compulsion need not be another agent--compulsion by circumstance can lead to 'opportunistic' compulsion [vs. Nozick]

(403) does Shaq exploit his opponents?

(403) domination and exploitation can come apart, at times

(404) for the MArxist concept, exploitative relationships need to be self-reproducing. in other words, add (c) to BSE's (a) and (b). (c) being that the relationship persists and is essential to reproduction

(408) sum of SER in Marxist terms [Shelby cashing this out w/o the LTV]

(412) surplus appropriation can be non-exploitative provided tht benefits don't accrue b/c of a group's power over productive resources

(413) conditions of SER (forced to do surplus labour) can be product of compulsion by circumstance, for sure

(413) opportunistic exploiters (capitalists who benefit from workers' double-freedom) vs. coercive exploiters (added dimensions of the pimp-prostitute relationship, etc.)

(416) three kinds of Marxist approaches to the problem of exploitaiton: (a) distributive, that exploitation unjustly distributes some important good; (b) principled, that exploitation violates some important principle; (c) nonmoral, which Shelby is arguing we should take seriously [the claim, again, is not that this undermines the moral critique of Marxists, just that the fact of exploitation can be established independent of its evaluation]